Sun Qi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [83-85]). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter SECTION ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter SECTION TWO --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.6 / BENEFIT OF DIVERSIFICATION --- p.6 / COST OF DIVERSIFICATION --- p.9 / EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE --- p.12 / Chapter SECTION THREE --- CLINIC STUDY OF THE BANKRUPTCY OF GITIC --- p.15 / Chapter I. --- BACKGROUND OF GITIC --- p.16 / Chapter II. --- FACTORS BEHIND THE FAILURE --- p.19 / Chapter III. --- NEGATIVE INFLUENCE --- p.34 / Chapter IV. --- OVERVIEW OF THE RED CHIPS --- p.40 / Chapter SECTION FOUR --- GENERAL ANALYSIS ONE: CORPORATE COST OF CAPITAL AND THE RETURN ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT --- p.52 / Chapter I. --- SAMPLE DESCRIPTION --- p.54 / Chapter II. --- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION --- p.55 / Chapter III. --- INVESTIGATION OVER THE RESULTS --- p.61 / CAPITAL STRUCTURES --- p.61 / CASHFLOWS AND FINANCING DECISIONS --- p.64 / INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN ON VALUE AND COST --- p.68 / Chapter SECTION FIVE --- GENERAL ANALYSIS TWO: DIVERSIFICATION AND CORPORATE STOCK RETURN --- p.72 / Chapter I. --- MEASURE OF FOCUS --- p.72 / Chapter II. --- REGRESSION DESCRIPTION --- p.73 / Chapter III. --- REGRESSION REPORT --- p.74 / Chapter SECTION SIX --- CONCLUSION --- p.78 / TABLES / Chapter 1. --- NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATE STRUCURES / Chapter 2. --- "AGGREGATE ANNUAL CASH INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS AS PERCENTS OF AGGEGATE BEGINNING OF YEAR BOOK CAPITAL,1992-1998" / Chapter 3. --- "AGGREGATE INVESTMENT AND FORMS OF FINANCING AS PERCENTS OF AGGREGATE BEGINNING OF YEAR BOOK CAPITAL,1992-1998" / Chapter 4. --- "BASIC DATA OF THE ENTERING FIRMS YEAR BY YEAR,1992-1997" / Chapter 5. --- "RATES OF RETURN ON VALUE AND COST (IN PERCENT) FOR NON-FINANCIAL RED CHIPS,1992-1998" / Chapter 6. --- CORPORATE FOCUS AND STOCK RETURNS / APPENDIX / Chapter 1. --- RED CHIPS BY THE END OF1998 / Chapter 2. --- THE COLLAPS OF GITIC (SUMMARY) / Chapter 3. --- SOME SYDICATED LOANS OF RED CHIPS MATURING IN1999 / Chapter 4. --- GROWTH RATE OF ASSETS (GRA) AND RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) / Chapter 5. --- RETURN ON ASSETS FOR NON-FINANCIAL RED CHIPS (PERCENT) / Chapter 6. --- RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY FOR NON-FINANCIAL RED CHIPS (PERCENT) / Chapter 7. --- DEBT TO EQUITY RATIOS OF RED CHIPS (PERCENTAGE) / Chapter 8. --- CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION REPORT / Chapter 9. --- CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION OUTPUTS (CONTROLLING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES)

Ma Yue. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-36). / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

by Wong Kar Shun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-164). / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.i / PREFACE --- p.ii / Chapter chapter i --- introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Questions and Objectives --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Background of Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The Importance of Corporate Disclosures --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- The Nature of Corporate Disclosures in Hong Kong --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- A Brief Review of Previous Empirical Voluntary Disclosure Studies --- p.9 / Chapter 1.2.3.1 --- Agency-Theory Based Studies --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosures --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Model and Hypotheses --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4 --- Research Approach and Design --- p.23 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Annual Reports --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Variables Measurement --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.1 --- The Measurement of Dependent Variables --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.2 --- The Measurement of Independent Variables --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- Data Analysis --- p.30 / Chapter 1.5 --- Justifications of the Study --- p.30 / Chapter 1.6 --- Significance and Potential Contributions of the Study --- p.32 / Chapter 1.7 --- Organization of the Thesis --- p.35 / Chapter chapter ii --- literature review on corporate disclosure / Chapter 2.1 --- Scope of Review --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Overview --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Agency theory of Disclosure --- p.39 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Signaling Theory --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Contingency Theory --- p.45 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- Capital Need Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- Proprietary Cost Theory --- p.47 / Chapter 2.2.7 --- Other Theories or Justifications for Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.48 / Chapter 2.2.8 --- Conclusion of Disclosure Theories --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Disclosure --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Corporate Disclosure Surveys --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1.1 --- The Usefulness and Information Value of Annual Reports as Perceived by External Users --- p.51 / Chapter 2.3.1.2 --- External Users' Information Requirements --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.1.3 --- Corporate Preparers' Attitudes to Disclosure / Comparison of the Perceptions between Preparers and Users --- p.55 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- The Independent Variables Used in Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1 --- "Agency Theory, Signaling Theory and Political Cost Related Variables" --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.1 --- Firm Size --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.2 --- Listing Status --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.3 --- Raising Capital --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.4 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.63 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.5 --- Leverage --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.6 --- Size of Auditor --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.7 --- Industry Type --- p.65 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.8 --- Ownership Structure --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.9 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.2 --- Proprietary Cost Variables --- p.67 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.3 --- Contingency Variables --- p.68 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- The Dependent Variables Used in Disclosure Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.1 --- Disclosure Index Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.2 --- Specific Disclosure Choice Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.79 / Chapter chapter iii --- literature review on corporate governance / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Definition and Scope of Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Theoretical Context of Corporate Governance --- p.83 / Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- Agency Theory of Corporate Governance --- p.84 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Evolution and Functions of Various Corporate Governance Structures --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.1 --- The Board of Directors --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.2 --- Independent Non-Executive Directors --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3 --- Board Committees --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.1 --- Audit Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.2 --- Remuneration Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.3 --- Non-executive Chairman --- p.91 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Corporate Governance Movement in Various Parts of the World --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in U.K --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.2 --- Corporate Governance in the USA --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Continental Europe --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.4 --- Corporate Governance in the Far East --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in China --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.2 --- Other Asian Countries --- p.96 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Governance --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Corporate Governance Surveys --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.1 --- Price Waterhouse Survey in 1995 --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.2 --- HKSA's surveys in 1995 and 1997 --- p.102 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance --- p.104 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.105 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Ownership structure --- p.106 / Chapter 3.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.106 / Chapter chapter iv --- hypotheses development / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.108 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Research Model I: The Relationship between Corporate Governance / Specific Firm Attributes and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosures --- p.109 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Corporate Governance Structures Variables --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.1 --- The Ratio of Independent Non-executive Directors to Total Directors on Board (INDs) --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.2 --- The Existence of Audit Committee --- p.113 / Chapter 4.2.1.3 --- The Existence of Dominant Personality --- p.114 / Chapter 4.2.1.4 --- The Percentage of Family Members on Board --- p.115 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Corporate Ownership Structures --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.1 --- Family's Share Ownership --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.2 --- Concentration of Share Ownership / The Existence of a Non-director Dominant Shareholder (s) --- p.117 / Chapter 4.2.2.3 --- Directors' Personal Share Ownership --- p.119 / Chapter 4.2.2.4 --- Independent Non-executive Directors' Personal Share / Chapter 4.2.2.5 --- Ownership --- p.120 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Controlling Variables --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.1 --- Firm Size --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.2 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.122 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Financial Leverage --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.4 --- Profitability --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Industry Type --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2.3.6 --- Excluded Variables --- p.125 / Chapter 4.3 --- Research Model II (The Relationship between Disclosure Strategy adopted by firms and Corporate Governance/Specific Firm Attributes) --- p.126 / Chapter 4.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.126 / Chapter chapter v --- research methodology and design / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Research Approach --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.130 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The Empirical Testing of Hypotheses --- p.130 / Chapter 5.3 --- Survey Design and Data Collection --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- The Development of the Survey Instrument --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Pilot Study --- p.132 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Questionnaire Contents --- p.133 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- Sample of Main Survey --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.5 --- Questionnaire Distribution and Response Rate --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.6 --- Testing for Non-Response Bias --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.7 --- Characteristics of Sample Preparer Firms --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.8 --- Respondent Titles --- p.141 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Measurement of the Research Models --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- The Measurement of Variables in the First Research Model --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variable --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variables --- p.144 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- The Measurement of Variables in the Second Research Model --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variables --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variable --- p.146 / Chapter 5.5 --- Data Analysis Tools --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Survey Data --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Multivariate Analysis --- p.148 / Chapter 5.6 --- Summary --- p.156 / Chapter chapter vi --- field survey findings / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.151 / Chapter 6.2 --- "Analysts Users' Perceived Importance, Attributes and Usage Behaviour of Annual Reports" --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Major Sources of Corporate Communication --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Attributes of Annual Reports (vs Other Source of Information) --- p.154 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Preparers' Perceived Importance of Different Types of Annual Report Users --- p.155 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Number and Time Spent on Reading Annual Reports by Users --- p.157 / Chapter 6.2.5 --- Extent of Usage of Various Types of Information in the Annual Reports by Users --- p.158 / Chapter 6.3 --- Disclosure Process and Strategy --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- The Extent that Users' Information Needs are Considered as a Top Priority in the Disclosure Process --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Disclosure Strategy/Process of Firms --- p.161 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- External Factors Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.164 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Internal Participants Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.166 / Chapter 6.3.5 --- Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on Corporate Disclosures Strategy --- p.167 / Chapter 6.4 --- Costs/Benefits and Importance of Different Voluntary Disclosure Items Perceived by Preparers and Users --- p.169 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.171 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.172 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- Net Benefits and Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.173 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Perceived Importance of Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure Items by Users --- p.176 / Chapter 6.5 --- Preparers' and Users' Perceptions of Capital Market Functioning and the Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- The Short Term/Long Term Efficiency of Hong Kong Capital Market --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- The Impression of Share Values --- p.179 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- The Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Reportingin Hong Kong --- p.180 / Chapter 6.5.4 --- The Existence of Communication Gap and its Impact on Share Values --- p.182 / Chapter 6.5.5 --- Adequacy and Effectiveness of Current Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.183 / Chapter 6.5.6 --- The Need of More Disclosure Requirements and Types of Information Disclosures --- p.185 / Chapter 6.6 --- Summary --- p.188 / Chapter chapter vii --- hypothesis testing / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.190 / Chapter 7.2 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Variables in the Research Model --- p.190 / Chapter 7.3 --- Test for the First Research Model (Extent of Voluntary Disclosures as the Dependent Variable) --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Bivariate Analysis --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Multiple Regression Models and Assumption Testings --- p.198 / Chapter 7.2.3 --- Test of Violation of Multiple Regression Assumptions --- p.199 / Chapter 7.2.4.1 --- Linearity --- p.200 / Chapter 7.2.4.2 --- Normality --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.3 --- Constant Variance of Residuals --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.4 --- Non-Multicollinearity --- p.202 / Chapter 7.2.4.5 --- Log Transformation of the Model --- p.203 / Chapter 7.2.4.6 --- Multivariate Empirical Results --- p.204 / Chapter 7.2.4.7 --- Extent of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.205 / Chapter 7.4 --- Testing of the Second Research Model --- p.207 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Testing of Assumptions of the Second Research Model --- p.208 / ANOVA Results --- p.208 / Chapter 7.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.212 / Chapter CHAPTER VIII --- "SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION" / Chapter 8.1 --- Overview of the Study --- p.214 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Current State and Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.217 / Chapter 8.3 --- Discussion of the Current State of Annual Report Disclosure and the Corporate Governance --- p.220 / Chapter 8.4 --- Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Hypothesis Related to Corporate Governance --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Hypothesis Related to Other Specific Firm Attributes --- p.226 / Chapter 8.5 --- Limitations of the Study --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Limitations of the Survey Questionnaires --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Credibility of Disclosures --- p.229 / Chapter 8.6 --- Contributions of the Study --- p.230 / Chapter 8.1 --- Recommendations for Further Study --- p.231 / Chapter 8.2 --- Conclusions --- p.233 / appendix --- p.235 / Chapter 1. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Corporate Report Preparers' Version) --- p.235 / Chapter 2. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Financial Analysts' Version) --- p.244 / REFERENCE --- p.252

A quality corporate disclosure environment is vital for an efficient market. The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to study the information environment of the Chinese capital market. There are different types of participants playing equally important roles in the smooth functioning of the Chinese capital market. I attempt to study the information issue from three different perspectives using three separate essays. / Apart from raising the awareness on the importance of quality corporate disclosure in the smooth functioning of a capital market, this study provides evidence supporting the importance of a transparent information environment for analysts' earnings forecast accuracy and how opinion dispersion among financial analysts and investors at large affects subsequent stock returns. Allowing investors a thorough understanding of the Chinese capital market mitigates misconception and can help foreign funds and local investors to make investment decisions in the China capital market. / In my second essay, my focus is on financial analysts; examining the role of information disclosure and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Using all the Chinese firms included in the I/B/E/S files, I evaluate the predictive accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Apart from examining the relative forecast errors of the analyst vis-a-vis a naive forecast model as well as studying the determinants and explanatory variables of the differential analysts' forecast errors between groups of firms, regression analysis is also conducted to evaluate such determinants. / In my third essay, I recognize that investors at large react differently to information disclosed and my focus is on the dispersion of opinion among financial analysts. I examine the role of such differences in opinion in relation to the cross section of future stock returns in the Chinese capital market. Results show that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings earn lower return than otherwise similar stocks. Results also suggest that a more correct interpretation of dispersion in analysts' forecast is as a proxy for investors' opinion differences about a stock rather than as a proxy for risk. / In the first essay, my focus is on a general information user level, looking at what information is available in the capital market as disclosed by firms. My first essay analyzes the firm-specific news announcements for Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges with foreign ownership (firms issuing B shares) to gain an understand of the current information disclosure environment in the China stock market. I establish a news database which permits an examination of the distributional characteristics of the news items by categories, firm nature and timing. This essay also reports a positive relation between frequency of news disclosure and the total market capitalization, the total asset and the percentage of tradable share of a firm. / Lui Man Ching Gladie. / "August 2003." / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3409. / Supervisor: In-Mu Haw. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Wang, Zhuojun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 46-47). / Abstract also in Chinese.

Study project (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The most basic principle of agency theory is that an individual will always serve his own interest best. According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory describes individuals as rational, risk averse en motivated by egotism. Agency theory also deals with the conflict that exists between different parties in an organization due to people's egoism. This self-interest can lead to goal incongruence if a person is placed in an environment where he has to serve somebody else's interest. Ownership and management vested in the same party until about 130 years ago. These roles were however separated with the development of the modem organization. The principal or owner is now represented by the shareholder and management serves as the agent. The principal thus appoints the agent to serve and manage his interest in the organization optimally. The principal's goal is the maximising of his shareholders' wealth. The agent's goal to carry out his task with the minimum effort and or to obtain maximum benefit for himself. It is thus clear that the goals of the principal and agent might often differ and this will give rise to goal Incongruence. This goal incongruence may give rise to some managerial actions which will be detrimental to optimal value of the company. The agency conflict, which is caused by man's self interest, manifests in the modem organization in a number of ways. These are referred to agency problems in this assignment. Agency problems are found both on a micro- and macroeconomical level. Agency cost is the sum of the difference between the real and optimal value of the company, the monitoring costs of the principal and the bonding costs of the agent. This cost is to the disadvantage of the principal and might even be to the disadvantage of the agent. It is thus essential that agency conflict and agency costs are reduced to a minimum. A number of measures are taken to address the agency problems and to reduce their negative effect on the organization. None of these measures will be efficient enough ifused in isolation. An optimal combination of solutions will depend on the company's specific circumstances. An empirical study was conducted to determine to what extent the agency problems manifest during the demutualisation of a big insurance business. The measures taken to address these problems were also investigated as well as the extent to which these were successful. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die basiese aanname van agentskapsteorie is dat die individu sy selfbelang altyd eerste sal stel. Volgens Eisenhardt (1989) beskryf agentskapsteorie individue as rasioneel, risikoongeneigd en gemotiveer deur selfbelang. Agentskapsteorie handel verder oor die konflik wat tussen die verskillende belanghebbende partye binne 'n organisasie as gevolg van persone se selfbelang ontstaan. Hierdie selfbelang van die mens kan lei tot doelwitinkongruensie, indien die persoon in 'n omgewing geplaas word waar daar van hom verwag word om 'n ander se belange te dien. Eienaarskap en bestuur was tot ongeveer 130 jaar gelede gevestig in dieselfde party. Met die totstandkoming van die moderne onderneming, is hierdie rolle egter geskei. Die prinsipaal of eienaar word nou verteenwoordig deur die aandeelhouer en die bestuur dien as die agent. Die prinsipaal stel dus die agent aan om na sy belang in die onderneming om te sien en dit optimaal te bestuur. Die prinsipaal se doel is die maksimering van sy aandeelhouerswelvaart. Die agent poog om sy taak met minimale inspanning te voltooi en of uitsonderlike voordeel vir homself te behaal. Dit is duidelik dat die prinsipaal en agent se doelwitte meermale sal verskil en doelwitinkongruensie ontstaan dus. Hierdie doelwitinkongruensie word vergestalt in sekere aksies wat bestuur soms neem en wat daartoe lei dat die optimale waarde van die firma nie bereik word nie. Die agentskapskonflik wat as gevolg van die partye se selfbelang ontstaan manifesteer in die moderne onderneming op 'n verskeidenheid van wyses, wat in hierdie werkstuk as agenskapsprobleme gedefinieer word. Agentskapsprobleme kom op 'n mikro- sowel as op 'n makro-ekonomiese vlak voor. Die verskil tussen die werklike en optimale waarde van die organisasie, plus die prinsipaal se moniteringskoste en die agent se gebondenheidskoste, verteenwoordig agentskapskoste. Hierdie koste strek tot die nadeel van die eienaars en meermale ook tot die nadeel van die bestuur. Dit is dus noodsaaklik dat agentskapskonflik en die gepaardgaande agentskapskoste tot 'n minimum beperk word. Daar word van 'n verskeidenheid van maatreëls gebruik gemaak ten einde die agenskapsprobleme aan te spreek en hul negatiewe impak op die onderneming te versag. Nie een van hierdie oplossings kan in isolasie gebruik gemaak word nie en afhangend van die onderneming se spesifieke omstandighede, sal daar hoogstens 'n optimale kombinasie van oplossings ontwikkel kan word. Daar is vervolgens in hierdie werkstuk 'n empiriese ondersoek uitgevoer ten einde te bepaal in hoe 'n mate die agenskapsprobleme tydens die demutualisering van 'n groot versekeringsonderneming manifesteer. Die neem van regstellende stappe om hierdie probleem aan te spreek is ondersoek, sowel as die mate waartoe hierdie maatreëls suksesvol was al dan nie.

Yu Xin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-38). / Abstracts in English and Chinese.