The main scholarly goal of this thesis is to identify the different types of relationship indigenous traditional laws and traditional governance structures have with the laws and institutions of the modern state in Africa. The aim is to distil lessons, insights, and observations which have comparative relevance for the study of (non-Western) constitutions and constitutionalism. The case-studies from Botswana, South Africa, and Ethiopia are part of this search for potentially generalisable patterns which hold across both time and place. The investigation is thus, both a) a comparison across three case-studies and b) a historic comparison across time. That is, each case-study contains a comparison of the different legal and political mechanisms managing the relationship between the traditional and the modern during the different constitutional phases spanning precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. For each case-study investigation starts with the international and regional levels of analysis and then moves down to the national and local levels. After examining nation-wide constitutional and political factors, the focus is directed on the traditional laws and governance structures in three select locations: i) the Bakgatla Batswana of Botswana; ii) the Transkei amaXhosa of the Eastern Cape; and iii) the Guji/Borana Oromo of Ethiopia. The three case-studies epitomise three different paths to empowering indigenous African constitutionalism. In Botswana we see early recognition, domestication, and continuity; in South historical distortion, manipulation, followed by democratic rebirth; and in Ethiopia we see how an idealised version of indigenous Oromo constitutionalism is in resurgence after its near extinction in recent history. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Public Law / LLD / Unrestricted

Standard explanations of judicial behaviour (i.e. legal, rational-choice, attitudinal, and institutional models) are overly static and exogenous, interested in instances of sudden change in judicial behaviour, as triggered by appointments, legal reforms, or shifts in the political context. While these models are useful in understanding the external incentives affecting judicial behaviour, they are unsuitable for explaining sustained judicial empowerment beyond temporary strategic calculations. In response, recent 'ideational' approaches, especially studying constitutional courts, highlight the importance of judges' ideas about their role - not their ideologies or policy preferences - in instilling a mission, rather than an incentive-oriented view of the judicial function. Yet, despite their more dynamic approaches, those methods have overlooked how ideational change in the 'outside' world translates into change 'inside' this type of courts. Due to those limitations, this study proposes a complementary explanation of judicial empowerment: a theory of informal mandates and endogenous empowerment. Viewed through this lens, change and variation in judicial empowerment within and across cases are explained by the construction, expansion, and endurance - or absence and collapse - of collective internal understandings of the court's role and mission. Such understandings are developed as legal doctrines and articulated under broader informal mandates by 'mission leaders'. Gradually, these informal mandates can expand and gather majority support from strategic partnerships formed between 'mission leaders' and 'supporting leaders' - usually justices with high seniority. The more these informal mandates expand and endure inside the court, the less exogenous factors and strategic incentives over-determine its behaviour in the long-run. Judicial empowerment, thus, is better understood as a process that develops and expands gradually, endogenously, and informally, with a mission-oriented purpose. The theory is applied in the constitutional tribunals of Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay from 1990 to 2016. These countries have similar rule-of-law conditions, but their constitutional tribunals differ considerably in the strength and endurance of their informal mandates and, as a result, have attained different levels of judicial empowerment.

Universal suffrage is a guiding principle of democracy. However, it has a long history of being selectively denied. While many of these exclusions have dissipated in twentieth century rights revolutions’, the right to vote is still widely withheld for prisoners. This paper looks at criminal disenfranchisement, its origins, development, and contemporary manifestations. Part I will discuss the history of criminal disenfranchisement to trace its development from a tool of social exclusion to a collateral consequence of criminal conviction. Part II will look at the judicial treatment of contemporary disenfranchisement laws through a selection of representative case studies. Part III will consider how the representative cases form a trend towards criminal enfranchisement, and the implications of this trend for future constitutional challenges in jurisdictions where such laws persist. This paper argues that this trend, while tangible, is tentative and its force may be strengthened through a transnational judicial dialogue.

Universal suffrage is a guiding principle of democracy. However, it has a long history of being selectively denied. While many of these exclusions have dissipated in twentieth century rights revolutions’, the right to vote is still widely withheld for prisoners. This paper looks at criminal disenfranchisement, its origins, development, and contemporary manifestations. Part I will discuss the history of criminal disenfranchisement to trace its development from a tool of social exclusion to a collateral consequence of criminal conviction. Part II will look at the judicial treatment of contemporary disenfranchisement laws through a selection of representative case studies. Part III will consider how the representative cases form a trend towards criminal enfranchisement, and the implications of this trend for future constitutional challenges in jurisdictions where such laws persist. This paper argues that this trend, while tangible, is tentative and its force may be strengthened through a transnational judicial dialogue.

In this thesis, I attempt to justify the use of foreign precedent in Supreme Court constitutional cases and respond to various criticisms that have been brought forth. There are many critics of this process, as it is typically thought that Supreme Court Justices ought to look to their own domestic constitution and history of precedent when deciding cases. One of the critiques that I highlight is that the process is undemocratic and I respond to this by showcasing a distinction between procedural and constitutional conceptions of democracy. As well, I attempt to justify the process by showing how the utilization of foreign precedent can actually help judges uphold important values that we cherish in a constitutional democracy. I also attempt to do this for those who do not endorse the constitutional conception of democracy, by distinguishing between a community’s moral opinions and true moral commitments. I also examine two landmark cases Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v. Texas, in order to establish the reasons that judges utilize foreign precedent; namely, as a source of further legal information and not due to any binding requirement. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

In many countries, citizens have the power to propose new laws oramendments to their constitutions by popular initiatives. Provided that they have a special legitimacy, they are often regulated by different procedures to the legislation enacted by the legislature and may be used by their proponents to avoid the restrictions that the “ordinary” legislation is subject to. Recently, this has led that several popular initiatives which have come into conflict with the rights of minorities, fundamental rights of other affected groups, and other constitutional guarantees have been submitted. From the perspective of a comparative analysis, this article explores whether the laws in Switzerland and California set the procedural and substantive restrictions to this mechanism of direct democracy and to what extent. In this context, the author questionswhether the scope and enjoyment of fundamental rights may be subject to popular initiatives. Finally, several recommendations are made to improve the legal limits of popular initiatives and their control mechanisms to ensure that the scope and enjoyment of fundamental rights are not subject to the contentof popular initiatives. / En muchos países, los ciudadanos tienen la facultad de proponer nuevas leyes o modificaciones a la Constitución mediante iniciativas populares. Dado que las mismas gozan de una legitimación especial muchas veces se regulan por procedimientos diferentes a la legislación promulgada por la legislatura y pueden ser usados por sus proponentes para esquivar las restricciones a las que la legislación «ordinaria» está sujeta. Eso ha llevado a que, recientemente, se han presentado varias iniciativas populares que han entrado en conflicto con los derechos de las minorías, derechos fundamentales de otros grupos afectados, y otras garantías constitucionales. Desde una perspectiva de análisis comparativo, este artículo explora si las legislaciones en Suiza y California establecen restricciones procedimentales y sustantivas a este mecanismo de democracia directa y en qué medida. En este contexto, cuestiona si el alcance y el disfrute de los derechos fundamentales pueden estar sujetos a iniciativas populares. Finalmente, este artículo hace ciertas recomendaciones destinadas a mejorar los límites legales de las iniciativas populares y de sus mecanismos de control para garantizar que el alcance y el disfrute de los derechos fundamentales no estén sujetos al contenido de iniciativas populares.

La présente recherche se propose d'analyser et de comparer les articulations juridiques et politiques réalisées entre le système du gouvernement responsable et la fonction de chef de l'état dans deux républiques européennes très peu étudiées en France, la Grèce et l’Irlande. Il s'agit de tenter d'apporter une contribution à la théorie générale et à la pratique des régimes politiques de l’Europe contemporaine, en plaçant l'attention sur une problématique constitutionnelle majeure dans les républiques parlementaires mais relativement négligée. Malgré la primauté incontestable du gouvernement majoritaire, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il laisse subsister, dans les régimes républicains, des virtualités dualistes longtemps en sommeil, mais que des évolutions récentes paraissent vouloir réveiller ou au moins remettre en question dans certains pays. En d'autres termes, la fonction présidentielle, qui semblait condamnée à une inéluctable neutralisation dans les systèmes dominés par le premier ministre, tend à (re)trouver une vocation sinon gouvernementale, du moins centrale. Par-delà leurs différences structurelles, culturelles et politiques initiales, les constitutions grecque de 1975 (révisée de façon significative en 1986) et irlandaise de 1937 offrent deux exemples permettant de tester l'hypothèse retenue. / The present thesis proposes an analysis on comparative basis of the legal and political articulations that take place between the system of the responsible government and the presidential function in these two parliamentary democracies, not thoroughly studied in France. The aim of this research is a contribution to the general theory and practice of the political systems in modern Europe, stressing out aspects of an important constitutional topic for parliamentary republics which is still relatively neglected. Although the supremacy of the majoritarian government is not put into question, it can be still claimed that within the republican political systems, certain dualist implications, that remained for long inactive, tend to be reactivated again in some countries by recent events. In other words, the presidential function that seemed to be condemned to an inescapable neutralisation within the systems dominated by the political figure of the Prime minister tends to find once again a reason of being, if not governmental, at least central. Beyond their initial structural, cultural and political differences, the Greek Constitution of 1975 (revised significantly in 1986) and the Irish Constitution of 1937 offer two fruitful examples of the constitutional dynamics that could test the above-mentioned assumption.

This thesis probes the relevance of objections against newly establishing contemporary paradigm of human dignity, based on connection between dignity and Kantian views on human autonomy, which possess universalistic ambitions. First chapter introduces the fundamental concepts of human dignity during history. The chapter shows there have been evolved at least three different concepts: (i) dignity as an internal value; (ii) dignity as a social status; and (iii) dignity as a certain manner of social behavior. Second chapter consequently deals with courts` techniques regarding the dignity as a legal concept. The conclusions extrapolated from German, Israeli and South African judicial decision-making noticeably support objections raised in contemporary discourse against the abovementioned universalistic concept. In spite of these universalistic ambitions, human dignity represents concept enabling to construe individual human rights through values shared by vast majority in certain jurisdictions. This mindset naturally leads to the limitation of individual freedom rather to its expansion, in the name of an idea that ideal moral order objectively exists. Consequently, the authority of classical human rights is considerably weakened. In third chapter the effort to analyze and construe current judicial practice is...

La règle du précédent, clé de voûte de la Common law, impose au juge de respecter les décisions analogues précédentes, en l’absence de justification pour se départir de celles-ci. Cette règle est donc logiquement absente de la théorie du droit romano-germanique, selon laquelle, schématiquement, le juge n’est soumis qu’à la loi. Pourtant, l’étude des décisions des juridictions de tradition romaniste et, plus précisément, des cours constitutionnelles montrent que ces dernières n’hésitent pas à appliquer la règle du précédent. Il ne s’agit pas d’une volonté de se soumettre à un précédent contraignant et obligatoire, mais de juger en conformité et dans la logique des solutions antérieurement adoptées. L’autorité du précédent constitutionnel est donc, le plus souvent, psychologique et le juge constitutionnel peut renoncer à l’appliquer lorsqu’il l’estime nécessaire. Le précédent devient ainsi un instrument judiciaire universel, permettant d’assurer, indifféremment du système juridique, l’uniformité et la cohérence de la jurisprudence. / Precedent, the key-stone of Common law, obliges the Court to comply with analogous preceding decisions, in the absence of justification for abandoning them. This rule is therefore logically absent from the theory of Civil law, according to which, schematically, the Court is only bound by written law. Nevertheless, the study of court decisions in Civil law systems and, more exactly, those of constitutional courts show that they do not hesitate to apply the rules of precedent. It is not a question of a will to be held by a binding and obligatory precedent, but to judge in conformity and within the logic of previously adopted solutions. The authority of constitutional precedent is therefore, more often than not, psychological and the constitutional court can desist from applying it when it deems necessary. Precedent thus becomes a universal judicial instrument, enabling to ensure, regardless of the legal system, the uniformity and the coherence of case-law.

L’autorité de la chose interprétée des arrêts de la Cour EDH est un concept avec une double signification. Il désigne à la fois l’autorité jurisprudentielle et l’autorité interprétative de la Cour EDH. Ces deux aspects interconnectés témoignent du caractère propre de sa jurisprudence. Ainsi, la force obligatoire que revêt par hypothèse la décision rendue n’est pas isolée à l’espèce mais elle peut être étendue aux États tiers au litige dans la mesure où la Cour EDH est expressément investie du pouvoir d’énoncer des interprétations authentiques qui font corps à la Convention. Certains arrêts de la Cour EDH ont donc une force référentielle obligatoire et sont, de ce fait, opposables à l’ensemble de la communauté des États contractants. Complètement dissociée de l’obligation qui concerne l’État défendeur au titre de l’article 46 de la Convention, l’obligation de tenir compte de la jurisprudence européenne implique l’intervention proactive de l’État pour mettre en conformité son système national sans attendre la condamnation de la Cour EDH. Les juridictions nationales ont progressivement reconnu cet effet dissuasif de la jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg en contribuant au développement d’un partenariat inter-juridictionnel puisque la mise en oeuvre des arrêts de la Cour EDH est une responsabilité judiciaire partagée. / The Res interpretata effect of the ECtHRs’ judgments is a concept with double significance. It designates both the authority of the ECtHR’s case-law and its interpretative authority. These two interconnected aspects demonstrate the special nature of the Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the binding force of the Court's judgment is not restricted in the case at hand, but it can be extended to the States that were not a party to the proceedings insofar as the ECtHR has the power to enunciate the authentic interpretations of the Convention. Certain judgments of the ECtHR have, thus, an obligatory referential force and are, as a consequence, binding on the entire community of the Contracting States. Entirely separated from the obligation that concerns the defendant State under Article 46 of the Convention, the obligation to take into account the ECtHR’s case-law involves the State’s proactive intervention to bring its national system in conformity with the ECtHR’s standards. The national jurisdictions have progressively accepted the dissuasive effect of the ECtHR’s case-law by contributing to the development of an inter-jurisdictional partnership since the implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments is a shared judicial responsibility.