This study is a contribution to Chinese-Western dialogue of bioethics but perhaps the first one of its kind. From a Chinese-Western comparative ethical perspective, this work brings Chinese ethical theories, especially Confucian ethics, into a contemporary context of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS, and to see how the deeply-rooted thoughts of Confucius interact, compete, or integrate with concepts from Western ethical traditions. An underlying belief is that some ideas in Confucian ethics are important and insightful beyond their cultural and historical origins in China and other Confucianism influenced societies.Methodologically, this thesis employs two approaches, conceptual normative analysis combined with critical interpretation. The ‘interpretive’ approach I employ, as an important methodology supplementing my normative analysis, not only deals with Chinese ancient texts, but also explains specific beliefs and practices in China.With a critical eye, this thesis carefully examines a number of key topics in the ethics of AIDS in China from a cross-cultural perspective. Topics including: views on personhood and the vulnerability of People Living with HIV/AIDS; prioritising and balancing the role of ‘harm reduction’ and the role of ‘eradication of deviant behaviour’ in AIDS policy in China; rights-based opt-out approach and duty-based family-centred approach in HIV testing and Biobanking; blood donation; moral responsibility and personal responsibility for health; and the popular rhetoric of ‘innocent infection’ versus ‘guilty infection’ in AIDS. My overall aim in this work is to present a cross-cultural bioethics study through the investigation of some ethical issues in AIDS in China from a Chinese-Western comparative perspective and also attempt to suggest a humane and effective policy for HIV/AIDS which I believe is appropriate to both traditions. I believe this work has contributed to our knowledge in three related but independent areas: the control of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in China; medical ethics in China; and to both the methods and the utility of cross-cultural study of bioethics between China and the West.

The dissertation deals with the controversy between two contemporary Western philosophical interpretations of early Confucian ethics: Confucian virtue ethics and Confucian role ethics. The dissertation not only discusses the different presentations of what constitutes the core characteristics of early Confucian ethics, but also critically reconstructs and analysis the changing Western reception of early Confucian ethics. The two interpretations are compared in order to critically assess the ongoing controversy and to evaluate the prospects of the newly suggested alternative reading of early Confucian ethics as Confucian role ethics. This dissertation aims at demonstrating that Confucian role ethics interpretation places the relational concept of the human as the totality of one’s lived roles and relations at the centre of its explication of early Confucian ethics, and thus tackles both major pitfalls that weaken the now dominant Confucian virtue ethics interpretation: the incommensurability challenge and the marginalization of relational aspect in early Confucian thought. Confucian role ethics interpretation merits further research and development in order to fully reveal its implications; that is, the importance (and the limitations) of relationality as well as the familial and communal roles not only for early Confucianism, but also for contemporary Western philosophical discussions on the scope and nature of ethics and the notion of the human being. / Disertacijos tyrimo objektas – dabartinis nesutarimas tarp dviejų filosofinių ankstyvosios konfucinės etikos interpretacijų Vakaruose: konfucinės dorybių etikos ir konfucinės vaidmenų etikos. Disertacijoje tiriami skirtingi aiškinimai kas laikytina ankstyvosios konfucinės etikos svarbiausiais bruožais. Tuo pačiu, disertacijoje rekonstruojama bei kritiškai analizuojama kintanti vakarietiškoji ankstyvojo konfucianizmo recepcija. Pasirinktos interpretacijos disertacijoje lyginamos siekiant kritiškai pasverti tarp jų šalininkų tebeegzistuojančius nesutarimus bei įvertinti naujai pasiūlytos alternatyvios ankstyvojo konfucianizmo interpretacijos – konfucinės vaidmenų etikos – plėtojimo perspektyvas. Disertacijoje įrodinėjama, jog alternatyvi konfucinė vaidmenų etikos interpretacija ankstyvojo konfucianizmo etinių idėjų ašimi laikydama reliacinę žmogaus sampratą, žmogų aiškinančią kaip jo gyvenamų sąryšių ir vaidmenų visumą, sprendžia abi pagrindines nūdienoje dominuojančią konfucinę dorybių etikos interpretaciją silpninančias problemas: nebendramatiškumo iššūkį bei sąryšingumo svarbos ankstyvajame konfucianizme marginalizavimą. Todėl konfucinė vaidmenų etikos interpretacija turi būti plėtojama toliau, siekiant pilnai atskleisti ir suvokti sąryšingumo ir šeiminių bei bendruomeninių vaidmenų svarbą (bei jų ribas) ne tik ankstyvajai konfucinei etikai, bet ir šiuolaikinių Vakarų diskusijoms apie etikos sritį ar filosofinę žmogaus sampratą.

Disertacijos tyrimo objektas – dabartinis nesutarimas tarp dviejų filosofinių ankstyvosios konfucinės etikos interpretacijų Vakaruose: konfucinės dorybių etikos ir konfucinės vaidmenų etikos. Disertacijoje tiriami skirtingi aiškinimai kas laikytina ankstyvosios konfucinės etikos svarbiausiais bruožais. Tuo pačiu, disertacijoje rekonstruojama bei kritiškai analizuojama kintanti vakarietiškoji ankstyvojo konfucianizmo recepcija. Pasirinktos interpretacijos disertacijoje lyginamos siekiant kritiškai pasverti tarp jų šalininkų tebeegzistuojančius nesutarimus bei įvertinti naujai pasiūlytos alternatyvios ankstyvojo konfucianizmo interpretacijos – konfucinės vaidmenų etikos – plėtojimo perspektyvas. Disertacijoje įrodinėjama, jog alternatyvi konfucinė vaidmenų etikos interpretacija ankstyvojo konfucianizmo etinių idėjų ašimi laikydama reliacinę žmogaus sampratą, žmogų aiškinančią kaip jo gyvenamų sąryšių ir vaidmenų visumą, sprendžia abi pagrindines nūdienoje dominuojančią konfucinę dorybių etikos interpretaciją silpninančias problemas: nebendramatiškumo iššūkį bei sąryšingumo svarbos ankstyvajame konfucianizme marginalizavimą. Todėl konfucinė vaidmenų etikos interpretacija turi būti plėtojama toliau, siekiant pilnai atskleisti ir suvokti sąryšingumo ir šeiminių bei bendruomeninių vaidmenų svarbą (bei jų ribas) ne tik ankstyvajai konfucinei etikai, bet ir šiuolaikinių Vakarų diskusijoms apie etikos sritį ar filosofinę žmogaus sampratą. / The dissertation deals with the controversy between two contemporary Western philosophical interpretations of early Confucian ethics: Confucian virtue ethics and Confucian role ethics. The dissertation not only discusses the different presentations of what constitutes the core characteristics of early Confucian ethics, but also critically reconstructs and analysis the changing Western reception of early Confucian ethics. The two interpretations are compared in order to critically assess the ongoing controversy and to evaluate the prospects of the newly suggested alternative reading of early Confucian ethics as Confucian role ethics. This dissertation aims at demonstrating that Confucian role ethics interpretation places the relational concept of the human as the totality of one’s lived roles and relations at the centre of its explication of early Confucian ethics, and thus tackles both major pitfalls that weaken the now dominant Confucian virtue ethics interpretation: the incommensurability challenge and the marginalization of relational aspect in early Confucian thought. Confucian role ethics interpretation merits further research and development in order to fully reveal its implications; that is, the importance (and the limitations) of relationality as well as the familial and communal roles not only for early Confucianism, but also for contemporary Western philosophical discussions on the scope and nature of ethics and the notion of the human being.

張雅茵. / "2001年9月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001. / 參考文獻 (leaves 141-150) / 附中英文摘要. / "2001 nian 9 yue" / Zhang Yayin. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 141-150) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 導論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- （不）自然的中國性事 --- p.12 / Chapter (一) --- 高羅佩：「中國」人的性習慣是健康的 --- p.13 / Chapter (二) --- 何謂「健康」的性習慣？一一對高羅佩的批判… --- p.16 / Chapter (三) --- 高羅佩對中國古代性事論述的影響 --- p.26 / Chapter (四) --- 小結：看不見女性的中國性事 --- p.33 / Chapter 第二章 --- （不)柔順的儒家女性肉體 --- p.40 / Chapter (一) --- 宗法父權及儒家女性 --- p.41 / Chapter (二) --- 壓抑的女性情慾 --- p.43 / Chapter (三) --- （非)柔順的肉體 --- p.45 / Chapter (四) --- 宗法父權/父權體制對(儒家)女性情慾 及身體的監控 --- p.46 / Chapter (五) --- 小結 --- p.62 / Chapter 第三章 --- 明代(不曾）禁錮的性事文化 --- p.71 / Chapter (一) --- 從滅(人)慾到反禁欲 --- p.74 / Chapter (二) --- 儒家女性的閱讀與書寫 --- p.80 / Chapter 第四章 --- 《癡婆子傳》一一儒家女性的情慾「越軌」 --- p.93 / Chapter (一) --- 小說內容 --- p.94 / Chapter (二) --- 重新閱讀(re-reading)《癡婆子傳》 》 --- p.95 / Chapter (三) --- 宗法父權規管下的儒家女性 --- p.98 / Chapter (四) --- 道德規條下的空間 --- p.104 / Chapter (五) --- 情慾的踰越 --- p.107 / Chapter (六) --- 儒家女性的「懺悔 」 --- p.126 / Chapter (七) --- 小結 --- p.128 / 結論 --- p.135 / 參考書目 --- p.141

Even in the context of the multicultural scholarship, there is a lack of psychological research addressing the in-law relationship experiences of East Asian American daughters-in-law (DILs) residing in the U.S., specifically with regard to the emotional impacts and resiliencies that these women may experience in the face of potentially conflictual family dynamics. The primary purpose of this study was to contribute to the multicultural psychology literature by exploring the cultural, relational, affective, and coping experiences of these women, especially with regard to their unique social location and cultural contexts of Confucian and European American influences. The present study utilized a consensual qualitative research (CQR) methodology to analyze the narratives of 12 Korean and Chinese American women who identified as 1.5 and 2nd generation and as DILs within their family network in the U.S. The results shed light into the affective and relational duress that they experienced due to their in-laws’ differing cultural values and traditional expectations. In particular, the participants reported that they often used indirect coping strategies to manage these stressors. The study offers multicultural training and practice recommendations for mental health service providers to consider when working with Korean and Chinese American women and their families.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.