The decisions of the federal government such as new legislation, bills and reforms can have serious implications for the financial markets, especially in terms of corporate profitability and shareholder value. As the overseers of federal agencies, U.S. Senators are arguably the most important participants in these decision making processes, in addition to being the most informed investors in the market. As such, Senators may be able to capitalize on their superior networks and information through stock trading. The portfolios traded on such insider information should generate abnormal returns against the market index. This study conducts an analysis of the abnormal returns on common stock purchases reported by U.S. Senators between 1995 and 2012. This paper recreates congressional buy portfolio using a consistent methodology throughout the entire sample period considered by earlier studies. While the sample size is reduced, the methodology used in this analysis relies on actual transactions dates to maximize accuracy. An analysis of the abnormal returns of the common stock investments of U.S. Senators during the period 1995 – 2012 shows that Senators are generally poor investors: purchases made by senators underperform the market index by approximately 3% a year.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Presidents Carter and Reagan each established a new United States policy to govern sales or transfers of conventional arms to foreign nations. President Carter called for stricter controls and an overall reduction in arms transfers to foreign nations. President Reagan believed that arms transfers to friends and allies strengthened the United States position in the world. This thesis analyzes the success of both arms transfer policies in the Persian Gulf by comparing the dollar amount and type of equipment actually transferred against the formal Congressional Notifications (Arms Export Control Act section 36b). Further, it examines proposed arms sales and transfer with respect to strategic access of the Persian Gulf. Finally, it examines employment and financial impacts of the Foreign Military Sales program on the United States economy. / http://archive.org/details/economicpolicyim00gilb / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

A STUDY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON SYSTEM IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE R.O.C. Abstract With the implementation of the Defense Act and the Organization Law of the Ministry of National Defense in 2002, all defense-related matters became formally regulated by law. The relationship between the military and other civilian agencies in the government are therefore of vital importance to national security and defense development. Especially the relationship with Congress, it could influence not only the approval of defense budgets and legislative proposals regarding armed forces, but also the development of military organizations. Based on the author¡¦s previous experience serving as an MND congressional liaison officer, there are some issues need to be worked out, and they become the research motives of this study: Due to confrontations between the Administration and Congress, defense related matters are constantly questioned by lawmakers and encounter considerable difficulties, the author wanted to identify whether the source of this problem is the legal system itself, the personnel involved, or the effectiveness of current congressional liaison system. Since the operation of current military congressional liaison teams depend only on personal experiences and lack professional expertise from related fields such as political science, media propaganda, public relations, administrative management, policy marketing, etc., liaison officers are forced to explore the delicate interactions between the Administration and Legislation all by themselves. Furthermore, liaison personnel from different levels fail to integrate effectively and can not cooperate functionally with the Office of Military Spokesmen. With the above shortcomings, current military liaison teams can only be regarded as congressional contacts, the author would like to provide helpful recommendations through this practical research. Since the MND was among the first few government agencies that established corresponding congressional liaison teams, there are a lot of references available. This research took a qualitative approach, related studies, then interviews with legislators, MND officials, congressional staff, media reporters, and officers serving as (or used to be) military congressional liaisons were conducted and analyzed to investigate the function and effectiveness of current MND congressional liaison system. The first objective of this research is to clearly define the role and functions of the MND congressional liaison system and to enhance its effectiveness in the interactions between the military and Congress. The second objective is to help MND congressional liaison personnel establish enough professional expertise and knowledge to facilitate appropriate approvals of defense budgets and legislative proposals while maintaining a politically neutral stand under the omnipresent political pressures from opposing parties. The third objective of this research is to provide findings and recommendations for the establishment of MND congressional liaison system by examining current liaison procedures from different aspects such as military relations, public policies, issue management, policy marketing, propaganda, and public relations, as well as by investigating the effectiveness of the operations of current liaison system from in-depth interviews with professionals. The Congress plays as a role of Constitutional politics due to the process of making defence policies. Congressional liaison system is main organization of MND for communicating, assisting law makers to conduct the responsibilities of supervising the Constitution. Also, it is the bridge and interface for obtaining ¡§support defence policies ¡¨ from public, political parties and excellent politicians. This article provides recommendations of academics and policies, and as a reference of creating congressional liaison system, focus on organizations, law and regulations, personnel and operations.

Little is known about why elected officials choose to get involved in presidential nomination struggles. Recent research argues that elected officials have a collective incentive to nominate an electorally viable and ideologically unifying candidate. Yet, elected officials must balance these collective incentives with their own personal considerations (e.g., reelection motives, policy interests, ambition, ideology) that may either foster or inhibit their ability to act on their collective desire to nominate viable, ideologically unifying candidates. Further, this research then determines the extent to which elected officials are rewarded-or punished- for getting involved during the presidential nomination process. In particular, interparty differences between the Republican and Democratic coalitions predict that Republicans, but not Democrats, will be rewarded for attempting to lead intraparty nomination struggles. Finally, this research links the aggregate-level findings that endorsements from elected officials are important determinants of nomination outcomes to the individual level by arguing that elected officials' endorsements mobilize their constituents to get involved in politics. In particular, as the mobilization process targets those who are already likely to participate in the first place, endorsements during presidential primaries leads to differential participation in politics. In sum, this research provides individual level foundations for the causes and consequences of congressional endorsements in presidential nomination contests.

The relationship between the representative and the reapportioned district is the central feature of the present study as it attempts to assess selected facets of the 13th Congressional District in transition.

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / This paper examines four televised Congressional hearings: Kefauver, Army McCarthy, Watergate and Iran-Contra. These hearings were studied in order to determine the effects that television coverage of hearings have on: the public, the hearings and the political process. Each hearing was examined in its historical context. Specific sessions of the hearings were looked at in terms of their televised impact. Finally, an analysis of the effects of the coverage was made. The public was emotionally aroused by the television coverage of the hearings. Despite many critics opinions, there was no evidence from any of the hearings that significant shifts in public opinion came about as a result of watching the hearings on television. Emotions were aroused because television is an emotional medium. Given the environment in which the hearings were presented, it was not surprising that the emotional reaction of the public did not translate into shifting of opinions because the public did not view the "show" as real. The presence of the cameras affected the functioning of the hearings. The focus of the hearings shifts from determining legislative alternatives to informing (influencing) the public. Finally, the coverage affected the political process. Legislators taking part in the hearings gained national exposure and often moved on to higher elective offices. In the most negative view the hearings were perceived as no different than any other drama show. In a positive light, television coverage increased the exposure of a greater percentage of the public to the democratic process in action. / 2031-01-01

No description available.

Much of the political punditry in the United States discusses the notion that facing a primary election results in legislators voting in a more partisan fashion in the legislature. A common refrain of this analysis is that facing the primary election constituency (Fenno 1978) or even the threat of facing the primary election constituency causes the senator to vote with the ideological extremes of the party in following sessions of congress. The literature on congressional elections has examined this area of research as it applies to the U.S. House, but few studies fully examine the impact of primary elections on roll call voting in the Senate. This study examines Senate primary elections to see how facing a primary, specifically a competitive primary, influences how a senator votes in the legislature in the first term following the election. This study specifically asks if senators who face a competitive primary challenge and win reelection vote with their party more often in subsequent congresses than senators who do not face a competitive primary challenge. Using OLS regressions and a number of control variables shown in the literature to impact roll call voting patterns, I examine the percentage of the vote that a senator received in her primary election compared to her party unity score in the Senate after the election. While my models demonstrate that facing a competitive primary correlates with a senator having a higher party unity score than senators who do not face a competitive primary, in all of my models the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant. However, serving in the majority party and being elected in certain election years did have a statistically significant impact on a senator's partisan voting behavior. When testing an interaction effect between facing a competitive primary and serving in the majority party after the election, I also did not find a significant relationship between the interaction and a senator's change in party unity score. These findings add to our understanding of congressional elections by exploring an under-studied aspect of elections in the United States, and future research that adapts and refines the methodology of this study could further develop these results. / Master of Arts / There is a common perception that facing a primary election makes it more likely that a member of congress votes with her party more often. The idea is that the primary voters want their representatives to be more radical, and therefore push incumbents to the extremes, resulting in more polarization in the legislature. While studies on elections to the House have shown mixed results when examining this question, few studies examine if these patterns exist in elections to the Senate. This study examines Senate primary elections to see how facing a primary influences how a senator votes in the legislature. However, because of limited data, this study examines competitive primaries, based on how much of the vote the senator receives in her election, rather than ideological primaries, based on the senator being challenged from the extremes of the party. This study specifically asks how facing a competitive primary influences a senator's partisan voting patterns in subsequent congresses after their election. In order to study this, I examine the percentage of the vote that a senator received in her primary election compared to her partisan voting patterns in the Senate after the election. I did not find that senators who face a competitive primary respond by voting in a more partisan fashion in the congressional sessions following the election. However, serving in the majority party and being elected in certain election years did have a significant impact on a senator's partisan voting behavior. When testing if the impact of facing a competitive primary was conditioned by serving in the majority party, I also did not find that serving in the majority party conditions the impact of facing a competitive primary on a senator's partisan voting patterns. While these findings did not support the notion that facing a competitive primary influences a senator's partisan voting behavior, future research could alter this study to further examine this question. Such additional research is necessary in order to more fully understand Senate elections.

This study examines the relationship between public opinion about the environment and the introduction of congressional legislation on environmental issues. Using public opinion data gathered by the General Social Survey from 1977 to 2002, this work examines correlations between how the public views the environment in each and the number of bills introduced in the U.S. House and Senate addressing environmental issues. The findings indicate that there is a correlation between overall concern felt in the public and congressional action on certain aspects of environmental protection. The results also highlight the potentially disturbing finding that the race and economic class of a respondent play a role in the level of correlation between respondents' concern for the environment and congressional action on environmental issues.

Congressional reporting requirements are an integral part of congressional oversight. These oversight-reporting activities are an important element of the concept of a legislative-centered public administration (Rosenbloom, 2000) "derived from the major discussions, decisions, and actions taken by Congress with regard to federal administration." This dissertation first describes the development of congressional reporting requirements by presenting selected agency cases. Based on these cases, common themes are identified that help in understanding the requirements and the problems associated with congressional reporting. The dissertation then makes specific recommendations for enhancing reporting requirement activities (e.g., tracking, monitoring and feedback) as part of the congressional oversight process. A proposed management approach to improve the congressional oversight process to build a legislative-centered public administration is presented at the conclusion of the dissertation. The dissertation process used a research approach that included selected cases, interviews with key individuals in the reporting process and analysis of data, including databases maintained by the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate. The dissertation is composed of three parts with two chapters in each part. Part I covers background information about congressional reporting requirements, the objectives and approach used in writing the dissertation, and the key theoretical literature that underpins the discussion of congressional reporting requirements. Part II of the dissertation discusses management and growth of reporting requirements. Part III of the dissertation discusses ways to gain control of congressional reporting requirements and increase their usefulness. The dissertation concludes that there is little evidence to indicate that congressional reporting requirements are being systematically managed in a way that achieves the objective for which they are created. The most serious substantive shortcoming is the lack of an institutional process to support and encourage discussion between Congress and the agencies preparing reports to provide for feedback and to identify reporting requirements that are no longer necessary. A comprehensive and systematic management approach is needed and a proposed management approach is discussed. Comprehensive and systematic management will bring about greater collaboration between congressional committees and their agency partners in an enhanced legislative-centered public administration. / Ph. D.