This thesis traces the history of Conscientious Objection and draft evasion from the introduction of the Universal Male Conscription system in 1949 to the end of the authoritarian dictatorship period in 1993. I especially focus on the persecution and stigmatization of religious Conscientious Objector groups such as the South Korean Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Seventh-day Adventists. The negative labeling of these Conscientious Objectors as social deviants is part of an initiative led by the South Korean state to solidify Universal Male Conscription as a social norm. This process was supported by the implementation of a national surveillance system as well as the intensification of a nation-wide crackdown on draft evasion, which was viewed indifferently from Conscientious Objection. Thus, this project reveals the ostracization of Conscientious Objection as well as the normalization of Universal Male Conscription as an interconnected issue that came to be perpetuated throughout South Korean History.

This thesis traces the history of Conscientious Objection and draft evasion from the introduction of the Universal Male Conscription system in 1949 to the end of the authoritarian dictatorship period in 1993. I especially focus on the persecution and stigmatization of religious Conscientious Objector groups such as the South Korean Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Seventh-day Adventists. The negative labeling of these Conscientious Objectors as social deviants is part of an initiative led by the South Korean state to solidify Universal Male Conscription as a social norm. This process was supported by the implementation of a national surveillance system as well as the intensification of a nation-wide crackdown on draft evasion, which was viewed indifferently from Conscientious Objection. Thus, this project reveals the ostracization of Conscientious Objection as well as the normalization of Universal Male Conscription as an interconnected issue that came to be perpetuated throughout South Korean History.

The right to freedom of conscience is protected by international conventions and declarations of human rights that have been ratified by Sweden. Nationally, the issue of health professionals’ right to freedom of conscience in the abortion care is not resolved by public inquiry. This has led to that Sweden has been notified to the European Committee of Social Rights on the grounds that the country is considered to be violating the Council of  Europe Resolution 1763 and that the proper question to be determined by regulations of the interests that are balanced, based on their legal value in relation to each other. Freedoms, rights and obligations conflict with each other. In Norway the health professionals are legally entitled to abstain from performing and assisting abortion, which the employer is obliged to consider in organizing its activities. In light of the countries different regulations but similar legal traditions, the study includes an empirical comparison of health care employees experiences of conscience in the context of the abortion care. How the Swedish law relates to the legal ruling and normative rules of conscience and whether a right to conscientious objection can be derived from case law, is examined in the study. The legal investigation shows that Sweden does not recognize and guarantee freedom of conscience in the abortion care. The fact that career choices are based on voluntariness speaks in the essay against a right to conscientious objection. This is proved by the ECHR and the European Commission's general view that the manifestations attributable to belief or religion can not be considered a subject to discrimination, if the situation includes possible obstacles to religious practice can be traced to volunteerism. The essays empirical comparison is displaying what the complexity of freedom of conscience means in abortion activities organized by different legal systems. The informantsworking inSwedenfear thataconscience clauseshalllimit women’s rightto abortionandthat health professionalsshould not havean equivalentapproach tothe patients.Furthermore they fearedproblemsrelated toorganization andwork environment.The informantsworking in Norwayhave experiencedproblemsthrough conflictsbetween health professionalsrelated toreservationright. / Rätten till samvetsfrihet skyddas av internationella konventioner och deklarationer om mänskliga rättigheter som Sverige har ratificerat. Nationellt har frågan om vårdpersonals rätt till samvetsfrihet inom abortvård dock inte bemötts genom offentlig utredning. Detta har föranlett att Sverige anmälts till Europeiska kommittén för sociala rättigheter på grund av att landet betraktas bryta mot Europarådets resolution 1763 samt att rättsfrågan får bedömas utifrån reglering av de intressen som avvägs, utifrån bestämmelsernas rättsliga värde i förhållande till varandra. Friheter, rättigheter och skyldigheter står emot varandra. I Norge ges vårdpersonal lagenlig rätt att reservera sig från att utföra och assistera abortingrepp, vilket arbetsgivaren är skyldig att beakta vid organisering av verksamheten. Mot bakgrund av ländernas skilda reglering men liknande rättstraditioner görs en empirisk komparation av arbetstagares upplevelser av samvetsfrihet inom ramen för abortvård. Vidare bemöts hur svensk rätt förhåller sig till rättsligt styrande och normerande bestämmelser av samvetsfrihet och huruvida en rätt till samvetsvägran kan härledas ur rättspraxis. Av rättsutredningen framgår att Sverige inte erkänner och garanterar samvetsfrihet inom abortvård. Att yrkesval bygger på frivillighet bemöts i uppsatsen emotsäga en rätt till samvetsvägran. Detta styrkes av Europadomstolens och Europeiska kommissionens generella åsikt om att manifestation hänförlig till övertygelse eller religion inte kan anses vara föremål för diskriminering om situationen som inkluderar möjliga hinder för religionsutövning kan härledas till frivillighet. Uppsatsens empiriska komparation visar på den komplexitet som samvetsfrihet innebär inom abortverksamheter styrda av skilda rättsordningar. Informanterna som arbetar i Sverige befarar att en samvetsklausul ska inskränka kvinnors rätt till abort och att vårdpersonalen inte ska ha ett likvärdigt förhållningssätt till patienterna. Vidare befaras problematik hänförlig till organisering och arbetsmiljö. Informanterna som arbetar i Norge har upplevt problematik genom konflikter mellan vårdpersonal hänförlig till reservationsrätten.

Cette thèse porte sur le rôle du compromis politique dans des conflits liés à la pluralité religieuse. Comment prendre une décision collective lorsque le désaccord touche aux convictions religieuses de certains groupes ? Le compromis est défini comme une procédure de prise de décision collective reposant sur des concessions réciproques. Nous en proposons une analyse conceptuelle ainsi qu’une défense de type procédural que nous illustrons par des cas précis de disputes mobilisant des acteurs religieux, en particulier les controverses françaises sur l’objection de conscience au service militaire et sur l’avortement. L’intérêt de réfléchir au compromis en relation avec la pluralité religieuse est l’antithèse supposée entre religion et compromis. Tandis que la politique est souvent décrite comme « l’art du compromis », le religieux est perçu comme le domaine de l’absolu et de l’intransigeance. Notre argument n’a pas pour objectif de confirmer cette assertion ou de l’infirmer : il ne s’agit pas de démontrer que les personnes religieuses sont plus ou moins conciliantes que leurs homologues séculiers. Nous soulignons, en revanche, la valeur procédurale du compromis notamment lors de disputes opposant des acteurs à religieux à une loi de l’État libéral et séculier. Si la politique est bien « l’art du compromis », elle ne se réduit pas au seul marchandage des intérêts. De même, si la religion touche au sacré et au non-négociable, la coexistence et la coopération dans une société plurielle ne se font pas sans concessions. / This dissertation deals with the role of political compromise in conflicts stemming from religious diversity. How can a collective decision be made when disagreement affects the religious convictions of some groups? Compromise is defined as a decision-making procedure based on reciprocal concessions. I propose a conceptual analysis and a procedural defense of compromise which I illustrate with cases of disputes that have mobilized religious actors, especially the French controversies on conscientious objection to military service and on abortion. Reflecting on compromise in relation to religious diversity is interesting because of the putative antithesis between religion and compromise. While politics is often described as the “art of compromise,” religion is perceived as the realm of the absolute and the intransigent. My argument is not intended to confirm or to invalidate this assertion. I do not demonstrate that religious people are more or less conciliatory than their secular counterparts. I emphasize, however, the procedural value of compromise particularly in disputes opposing religious actors and the law of the liberal and secular state. If politics is “the art of compromise,” it can not be reduced to a mere bargaining of interests. Similarly, if religion touches the sacred and the non-negotiable, coexistence and cooperation in a plural society are not achieved without concessions.

yes / In recent years, there has been increasing concern about unethical conduct within corporate business, not least because of the scandalous behaviour of former chief executives at top blue chip companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and Volkswagen. These scandals have not only threatened the privileged position of senior corporate employees but also the solvency of the companies they manage and lead. The high profile cases of corporate crime and corruption that occurred in the early 2000s together with the 2008 Wall Street bailouts (Sorokin 2010) and the growth in criminal prosecutions since (Garrett 2014) have raised the profile of business ethics to an unprecedented level. Greater public sensitivity towards and awareness about the unlawful and immoral conduct of firms in the United States and elsewhere, has created demand for organizations to become more accountable and socially responsible and prompted greater regulatory scrutiny. It has also served to highlight the embryonic (Ciulla 2005) and delimited (Freidland 2012) state of research and scholarship on business ethics, where the focus has tended to remain on leadership (Kellerman 2012). A neglected, though important, line of ethical enquiry concerns followership (Kellerman, 2008). Corporate wrongdoing would be less formidable and extensive if it was not aided and abetted. Two key questions arise. First, what prompts followers to support rather than oppose bad leaders? Second, what can be done to stem or at least curtail their allegiance to bad leaders?

During the First World War, ideas of duty and sacrifice were a dominant characteristic of public discourse in New Zealand. Specifically, concern centred on a perceived inequality of sacrifice, which saw brave soldiers die on the front lines, whilst other men remained on the home front, apparently avoiding duty. This thesis charts the prevailing and powerful ideas that circulated during wartime New Zealand around these two stereotypes; on the one hand there was the soldier, the ideal of service and duty; on the other, the conscientious objector, a target for the derogatory label of 'shirker'. While there are a few select critical works which examine the experiences of New Zealand World War One conscientious objectors, such We Will Not Cease (1939) and Armageddon or Calvary (1919), there is a near complete absence of studies which examine the home front and ask how conscientious objectors were perceived and consequently judged as they were. It is the contention of this thesis that ideas around the soldier and the 'shirker' were interrelated stereotypes and that both images emerged from the process of mass mobilisation; a highly organised war effort which was largely dependent for its success upon the cooperation of wider civilian society. In sum, the thesis examines and analyses the ideas within mainstream New Zealand society as they appeared in public sources (notably newspapers, cartoons and government publications), and in doing so, tracks how social mores and views towards duty, sacrifice and service were played out at a time of national and international crisis.

The main objective of this thesis is to examine conscientious objection to military service as a case of resistance to modern power in relation with the possibilities of &ldquo / self&rdquo / . In this context, Max Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / ego&rdquo / and Michel Foucault&rsquo / s conceptualisations of modern power and modern subject are critically analyzed. In accordance with the relation between conscientious objection and the possibilities of self, Foucault&rsquo / s theories of &ldquo / power over life&rdquo / and &ldquo / ethics of care of self&rdquo / are discussed by examining disciplinary power and bio-power in relation with militarized society characterized by universal male conscription. On the other hand, Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / the union of egoists&rdquo / and his conceptualization of &ldquo / Ownness&rdquo / is employed in order to investigate the possibilities of constituting an autonomous self. This study reveals that the act of conscientious objection overlaps objector&rsquo / s endeavour of creating an autonomous self. It is argued that following Stirnerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of &ldquo / self&rdquo / , the objector, by refusing external power over his/her will in militarized society, indeed, engages in a struggle to constitute his/her own definition of self and his/her way of life.

Conscription of white males to the South African Defence Force between 1969 and 1994 was one of the measures used by the South African government to uphold apartheid and white supremacy. While it appeared that the majority of white males and their families supported the National Party propagated ideologies of the country at the time and felt it was their duty to render military service, there were some for whom this duty provided a conflict of conscience. Giving expression to this conflict and finding constructive ways of dealing with it was almost impossible within the highly restrictive, repressive political, legal and social climate of that time. Limited options seemed available to the young men who had objections to serving in the military, namely exile, evasion or deferment: personal choices that drove people into physical and emotional isolation, and which did not engage the state in the resolution of this conflict. Some young men, however, chose to confront the state and object openly. This began a protracted series of negotiations with ruling authorities, debates within state structures, legislative changes and prosecutions that attempted to prevent and quash the presence of objectors. In the face of this oppression, family and friends formed themselves into solidarity groups around individual objectors to support them in handling the consequences of their objection and in making their stance known and heeded by the government. And so began a movement for change, which over the years learned the skills of nonviolent direct action and constructively challenged the state on issues of conscription and the militarisation of society. This initiative, known as the Conscientious Objector Support Group, although small in scale, ranks as one of the anti-apartheid movements that contributed to South Africa’s peaceful transition to democracy. As such it has invaluable lessons to share with movements for change throughout the world that are presently grappling with situations of human rights’ violations. / Thesis (M.Com.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008.

Sous l’Ancien Régime, l’armée française était, en principe, composée de troupes professionnelles recrutées sur le mode du volontariat. Son recrutement était par ailleurs complété par différentes formes d’obligations militaires comme le ban, le guet et garde ou encore la milice provinciale. Les aspects techniques de ces institutions, leurs origines, leur évolution ou encore leur ampleur, sont connues. Il n’en va pas de même des fondements et des limites de l’exercice du pouvoir de contrainte qu’elles supposent. Il existe certes des études classiques sur l’histoire de la conscription, du pro patria mori ou de l’obligation to die for the state. Mais leurs conclusions sont contradictoires, elles négligent la doctrine et la législation d’Ancien Régime, et leur perspective n’embrasse qu’une partie des conditions de légitimité d’une obligation qui impose aux sujets de risquer leur vie et de tuer. L’objet du présent travail est donc d’offrir un exposé des justifications avancées en faveur ou contre l’obligation militaire, et d’identifier les débats auxquels celle-ci a donné lieu entre le XVIe et le XVIIIe siècle. Pour éclairer et ordonner le syncrétisme des préambules de la législation royale et déceler les obstacles que permettent de surmonter les arguments, il a paru nécessaire de calquer le plan de la thèse sur l’ordre du traitement de l’obligation militaire dans les ouvrages doctrinaux. Or, ceux-ci abordent l’obligation militaire sous trois angles complémentaires, trois séries de conditions cumulatives correspondant aux trois appartenances qui définissent l’état des personnes : citoyens membres du corps politique ; chrétiens membres du corps mystique de l’Église ; hommes intégrés dans un ordre et considérés dans leur individualité. À ces trois séries de personnes correspondent alors trois séries de biens : le bien commun de l’État, le bien divin, commun lui aussi, et le bien propre des individus. Ces trois biens correspondent aux conditions classiques de la légitimité des lois qui, dans la doctrine thomiste, sont orientées vers le bien commun, doivent respecter la loi divine et être justement réparties. Ces séries de considérations permettent de structurer la thèse en trois parties. Deux enseignements peuvent être tirés du tableau des conditions de légitimité de l’obligation militaire sous l’Ancien Régime. En premier lieu, il révèle un besoin constant de légitimation d’un devoir mortel. Tout absolu qu’il était, le roi de France ne pouvait exiger ad nutum l’obligation militaire. Il lui fallait, au moins, avancer une argumentation et, au mieux, respecter certaines conditions. En second lieu, l’histoire des justifications de l’obligation militaire sous l’Ancien Régime est celle de la progression du bien commun qui permet de repousser les limites traditionnelles qui encadrent le pouvoir royal. Cette évolution n’est pas sans susciter des critiques de la doctrine qui, d’une certaine façon, cherche à protéger l’individu. / Under the Ancien Régime, the French army was, in principle, composed of professional troops recruited on a voluntary basis. In addition, recruitment included various forms of military obligation, such as the arrière-ban, the watch and guard or the territorial militia. The technical aspects of those institutions are well known, as are their origins, their evolutions, and their scope. But the underlying foundations and limitations of the enforcement powers implied by them are not. There have been classic accounts of the history of conscription, pro patria mori, or the obligation to die for the state. But their conclusions are contradictory; they overlook the doctrine and legislation of the Ancien Régime, and they embrace but a fraction of the conditions governing the legitimacy of the obligation for subjects to risk their lives and kill. The subject of this present work is to offer an account of the justifications put forward in favor or against military obligation, and to identify the debates it has generated between the 16th and the 18th century. In order to clarify and organise the syncretism of the preambles of the royal legislation and detect the challenges that allows to overcome the arguments, it was deemed necessary to model the thesis plan on the treatment order of the military obligation in doctrinal publications. They address that topic from three complementary perspectives, with three sets of cumulative conditions corresponding to three affiliations that define a person’s status: citizen, who are members of the body politic; Christians, who are members of the mystical body of the Church; men members of an order or considered in their individuality. Three series of goods correspond to those three types: the common good of the State, the divine good, common as well, and the individual good. Those three goods correspond to the classical conditions of the law’s legitimacy that, in Thomistic doctrine, are aimed at the common good, must abide by the divine law and be justly distributed. These sets of considerations help to structure the thesis in three parts. Two conclusions can be drawn from the overview of the conditions for the legitimacy of military obligation under the Ancien Régime. Firstly, it shows a constant need of legitimation of a deadly duty. As absolute as he was, the King of France could not demand ad nutum military obligation. He needed to, at least, put forward an argument and, at best, respect certain conditions. Secondly, the history of the justifications for military obligation under the Ancien Régime is that of a progress of the common good, which led to push back the traditional limitations to the royal power. This evolution is not without instigating criticism of the doctrine that, in a certain way, seeks to protect the individual.

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