Owing to the insufficient varieties of the financial products or the offer of identical financial services or merchandise by banks, Taiwan¡¦s financial environment has resulted in over-banking predicaments. In addition, the financial company managing directors are bewilderedly on the concept of economies of scale so as to consider that the more physical banking chains they construct, the more business deals will be done. Owing to the said reasons, the banks have involved in large scale and intense competition such as applying low margin strategy over the years. In the early days, the banks have established branches, ATM, as well as telephone speech banking to better service their customers. Nowadays, electronic banking, the newest banking service, is undoubtedly included by each bank to provide even better and quick service to answer to customers¡¦ instant demands. By providing 24 hours a day, all yearlong prompt services and convenient access, the electronic banking have considerably increased the banking transactions, largely reduced the operating cost, brought more earnings and created preferable competitive advantage so that it is unquestionably considered as the 21st century¡¦s revolutionary financial service innovation. In theory, owing to its traits of no boundary to territory and time, the electronic banking could ideally contribute to more revenues than that of the physical banking chains. The phenomenon, moreover, stands for that the original electronic banking has reformed from its affiliated role to the banks to the fact that it could successfully compete with the physical banking chains. In retrospect to the early stage of the electronic banking, bank companies have purposely established the electronic banking in attempt to lower the operating cost such as bank account checking service that has obviously consumed a great deal of the manpower and in the hope of transferring those activities from the bank counters or telephone speech banking to electronic or virtual banking. By doing that, the customers could personally check through their accounts from the electronic banking system banks provide. Along with the rapid growth and use of the internet, more and more banks have realized that the electronic banking could contribute more and more innovative banking services and good margin. Through the study, we have found that the major obstacles to the development of the electronic banking are resulted from that the users have very little trust on the internet transaction mechanism. In addition to that, 1) alternatives such as physical banking chains and ATM are easy to access 2) users¡¦ not being able to access to the electronic banking unless certain application is submitted to banks beforehand 3) the interference on banking by government¡¦s regulation 4) banks¡¦ failure to lessen users¡¦ concern of the internet transaction safety through advertisement or propaganda have all dragged the development of domestic electronic banking. By interviewing professionals, here we conclude the following suggestions to solve the issue that very few people using the electronic banking. 1) It is suggested that IC card and card reader to be applied for the verification of users¡¦ identity instead of solely inserting users¡¦ name and password on the internet as a way to lessen users¡¦ perceived risk. 2) It is suggested that the electronic banks should include the tax paying platform. Considering that the low cost electronic bank will substantially surpass the physical banking chains owing to its effortless access, electronic banking executives should come up with revolutionary solutions to enhance the efficiency as well as added value of electronic banking.

In this research, the case company is by originally shipyard which make small fish boat, with fast development of the deep-sea fishery in Taiwan, the technology and producing can also the fast promotion. After the 21st century along with global sea environmental protection consciousness, the fishery policy adjustment causes 50% sales reduction. The case company inevitably is facing the traditional market reducing, pondered the future will manage direction and goal. This research in faces in the process in view of the document company which the market transforms, how creates the competitive advantage, this will study the conclusion summary as follows to show. 1. Is insufficient to when itself brand well-knowingness to sell in the market, using the seller develops the full quantity production line will causes the production and the technical personnel grow stably. 2. The domestic market is small, the marking strategy is important for the international market; the company should positively carry out and adjust the company resources. 3. Carries out the company to organize to reform, establishes the perfect organization system, expands and service promoting in order to help the company. 4. At present positively develops the full quantity production line and the dealer, long-term establishment brand and stable growth.

Även om forskning i miljöområdet och forskning i psykologi har kommit långt saknas det forskningsansatser som förenar de två. Ambitionen med uppsatsen är att förena miljöområdet och psykologi genom att undersöka vilka faktorer som är bidragande orsak till miljöengagemang. Deltagarna var 91 studenter som svarade på en enkät där miljöengagemang studerades. Resultatet visade att det fanns ett signifikant samband mellan att tycka människor i världen var viktiga och ha ett miljöengagemang. Det fanns även ett positivt samband mellan om närstående var miljömedvetna och om deltagaren var det samt ett positivt samband mellan miljömedvetenhet i teorin och praktiken.

Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.

Examining the neural correlates associated with the moment a stimulus enters or exits conscious awareness is one way to potentially identify the neural mechanisms that give rise to consciousness. In the present study, we examined neural activity using electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings while participants observed a bilateral shape-from-motion (SFM) display. While the display is in motion, the observer perceives an object that is immediately segregated from a noisy background. After the motion stops, the observer’s experience of the object remains momentarily in awareness, before it eventually fades out of consciousness back into the noisy background. Consistent with subjective reports of perceptual experience, we observed a prominent sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN), but only in conditions associated with sustained awareness. Importantly, the amplitude of the SPCN was correlated with individual differences in visual awareness, suggesting that this activity plays a significant role in the maintenance of objects in consciousness.

Examining the neural correlates associated with the moment a stimulus enters or exits conscious awareness is one way to potentially identify the neural mechanisms that give rise to consciousness. In the present study, we examined neural activity using electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings while participants observed a bilateral shape-from-motion (SFM) display. While the display is in motion, the observer perceives an object that is immediately segregated from a noisy background. After the motion stops, the observer’s experience of the object remains momentarily in awareness, before it eventually fades out of consciousness back into the noisy background. Consistent with subjective reports of perceptual experience, we observed a prominent sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN), but only in conditions associated with sustained awareness. Importantly, the amplitude of the SPCN was correlated with individual differences in visual awareness, suggesting that this activity plays a significant role in the maintenance of objects in consciousness.

Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.

Many interpreters read Nietzsche as an epiphenomenalist. This means that, contrary to everyday “felt” experience, consciousness has no causal influence on our actions. In the first half of this paper I show that an epiphenomenalist interpretation proposed by Brian Leiter is unsupported by Nietzsche’s texts. Further, contemporary research does not conclusively support epiphenomenalism, as Leiter claims. In the second half of the paper I present the novel, causally efficacious view of consciousness that is supported by Nietzsche’s texts. This view of consciousness does not present consciousness as a self-caused faculty that is in some way separate from the rest of our mind and body, but rather views consciousness as a non-essential property of certain mental states. I trace the development of this idea through two key passages and show that, in the danger it presents as well as in the promise, consciousness is clearly causally efficacious.

Brian Leiter is one of the few Nietzsche interpreters who argue that Nietzsche rejects all forms of free will. Leiter argues that Nietzsche is an incompatibilist and rejects libertarian free will. He further argues that since Nietzsche is an epiphenomenalist about conscious willing, his philosophy of action cannot support any conception of free will. Leiter also offers deflationary readings of those passages where Nietzsche seemingly ascribes free will to historical figures or types. In this paper I argue against all of these conclusions. In the first section I show that, on the most charitable interpretation, Nietzsche is not an epiphenomenalist. In the second section I trace Nietzsche’s alleged incompatibilism through three of his works and offer reasons to be skeptical of the claim that Nietzsche was a committed incompatibilist. Finally, I argue that Nietzsche is not being sarcastic or unacceptably revisionary when he makes positive ascriptions of free will.

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