The thesis examines the speeches and debates in the Australasian Federation Conference of 1890, and the Australasian Federal Conventions of 1891 and 1897-8 for the purpose of establishing what the framers of the Commonwealth Constitution understood to be the meaning and purpose of the individual sections of the Constitution upon which they were called upon either to support or oppose. The particular matters involved in the examination are the manner and form in which the principles of responsible government were incorporated into the constitution, and the relationship of these principles to the powers of the Senate; the crisis in the 1891 Convention in relation to the powers of the Senate over money bills; the significance of the difference in composition of the Convention of 1891 compared with that of 1897-8; the significance of the classification of the Constitution as an indissoluble federation under the Crown; the principles of responsible government and the provisions of s.57 in the context of the deadlock over Supply in 1975; the meaning and purpose of s.41 preserving the rights of voters qualified to vote in State elections for the lower Houses, and the misconceptions in relation thereto the position of aborigines under the Constitution; the meaning and purpose of the special laws power in the light of the 1967 Constitutional referendum, and its interpretation bU the High Court in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case; the relationship of the intentions of the framers of the Constitution to the interpretation bu the High Court of the Financial Clauses of the Constitution, and the provisions of s.92; and the meaning and purpose of the external affairs power, and the corporations power as understood bu the framers of the Constitution.

L’instauration d’un contrôle de constitutionnalité au sein du système juridique a d’importantes conséquences sur la façon d’appréhender la constitution. En effet, si l’on estime traditionnellement que les juges qui en sont chargés ne font qu’appliquer des normes constitutionnelles préexistantes, l’étude théorique de la production normative au sein du système juridique permet d’envisager le pouvoir créateur des juridictions à travers leur aptitude à attribuer une signification juridique aux énoncés qu’elles interprètent. On peut alors considérer qu’en exerçant un contrôle de constitutionnalité, les juges sont bien en mesure de produire les normes constitutionnelles qu’ils sont réputées « découvrir » dans le texte de la constitution et appliquer aux cas qui leur sont soumis. L’analyse du discours juridique amène à conclure que l’usage de ce pouvoir créateur par les juges constitutionnels a des effets sur la représentation de la constitution. La mise en avant fréquente de normes formulées de façon très générale, notamment les fameux principes, traduit une tendance à avoir de la constitution une conception axiologique, qui s’illustre notamment à travers le rapprochement esquissé entre les jurisprudences constitutionnelle et européenne. / The establishment of judicial review within the legal system has important consequences on the way the constitution is comprehended. Indeed, even though it is generally acknowledged that the judges, who are assigned to such a task, only enforce pre-existing constitutional norms, theoretical studies about norm production within the legal system allows to consider their normative power as regards to their ability to assign legal meaning to text they interpret. We can therefore consider that when they carry out judicial review, the judges are able to produce constitutional norms which they are supposedly « discovering » in the wording of the Constitution and apply it to the cases submitted to them. The analysis of the legal discourse brings us to conclude that the use of such a normative power by constitutional judges impacts on the representation of the Constitution. Frequently putting forward norms expressed in a very general manner, in particular the much talked about principles, reflects a trend towards an axiological conception of the constitution, which especially illustrates itself through a closer connection outlined between constitutional and European case law.

The nature of governorship just before, during, and just after the American Revolution is a subject that has been noticeably neglected in the historiography of the Revolution. While biographies of individual governors have been written, there remains a need for a clear ideological and constitutional debate about the actual executive functions, the nature of the appointment system in place, and the constitutional role of governors across the colonial and state periods. This dissertation examines the evolution of governorship in Virginia from 1758 to 1781. It attempts to identify, define and compare two different systems of governorship in Virginia. It examines the nature of executive authority and constitutional role of the different governors in this period. It seeks, first, to identify and define a gubernatorial system in colonial Virginia. By analysing a governor’s methods of appointment, the governor’s constitutional status, his relationship with the legislature and the people at large, this dissertation will identify a ‘British’ system of governorship. Second, the dissertation will attempt to identify a separate republican system of governorship in Virginia that was established in 1776. It will analyse the Virginia Constitution and explain the gubernatorial position in this political framework. It will also examine the first five years of Virginia’s independence from Britain and focus on the nature of gubernatorial authority in practice. By identifying two distinct models of governorship, this dissertation will be able to compare them in order to ascertain to what extent Virginians relied upon or abandoned British constitutional thinking and practice. The dissertation maintains that Virginians relied heavily upon British constitutional thinking when establishing their system of governorship in 1776. While Virginians rejected wholeheartedly a system based on monarchical influence and patronage, they were inspired by radical Country Whig thinkers who had dictated that an uncontrolled executive branch posed the greatest threat to the political system. Virginians in 1776 established a system of governorship that was inherently weak and that was controlled and dominated by the legislative branch. This dissertation, however, maintains that the system of state governorship established by the Virginian Convention in 1776 was not wholly dissimilar to the practical powers and influence at the disposal of royal governors. Both systems were inherently weak: the royal and state governors could not exert any meaningful control over the legislative branch, were not able to exert much influence over the people at large and were not granted many significant practical powers. This dissertation will also demonstrate that executive power, and the perceptions of the dangers that executive power posed, had developed markedly from 1776 to 1781. Not only will it prove that Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry enjoyed more powers than was prescribed to the governorship in 1776, but it will also show that, by 1781, a strong executive branch was required to save the state of Virginia from potential collapse.

Les bouleversements en Europe à la fin des années 1980 n’ont pas épargné l’Afrique subsaharienne. Si au niveau mondial ces bouleversements ont conduit à la dislocation du bloc de l’Est et à la remise en cause des équilibres géostratégiques, en Afrique noire, ils ont permis la chute des régimes autoritaires et dictatoriaux. L’Afrique noire francophone qui fait l’objet de cette étude n’est pas restée en marge de cette évolution. C’est au niveau constitutionnel, plus précisément, dans le domaine de la protection des droits de l’homme que l’on constate le changement le plus significatif. Celui-ci est marqué par l’adoption de nouvelles constitutions à tendance libérale, la création des juridictions constitutionnelles autonomes et spécialisées, la reconnaissance des communautés ethnoculturelles qui constituent le substrat humain de l’État. Cette thèse qui porte sur « la protection constitutionnelle des droits de l’homme dans les États d’Afrique noire francophone » depuis 1990 veut justement montrer que la garantie des droits et libertés dans cette zone géographique vise le respect de la dignité humaine, que cette garantie relève en partie du droit positif à travers notamment la Constitution, la loi et les instruments juridiques auxquels les États africains souscrivent, ce qui semble conférer au système africain de protection des droits de l’homme une dimension universelle. Mais il s’agit aussi de convaincre dans cette étude que la norme juridique n’est pas le seul élément qui participe à la protection des droits de l’homme dans les États d’Afrique noire francophone : les us, les coutumes, la pratique, les usages et les traditions en vigueur dans la société participent aussi, à certains égards, à la protection des droits de l’homme. Pour cette raison, l’universalité des droits de l’homme qui apparaît dans le nouveau constitutionnalisme africain doit être relativisée à cause de la prégnance du droit traditionnel, et, surtout, de l’influence des facteurs anthropologiques (culture, religion, tradition…) dans la société. Le constituant africain semble de plus en plus tenir compte de cette influence. Depuis 1990, il intègre les règles traditionnelles dans la Constitution, ce qui confère au droit constitutionnel africain toute son originalité et un caractère dualiste. Ce dualisme se traduit particulièrement par la conciliation entre le droit moderne et le droit traditionnel. / Upheavals in Europe at the end of 1980s did not save (spare) sub-Saharan Africa. If at the world level these upheavals led (drove) to the dislocation of the east block and to the questioning of the geostrategic balances, in Black Africa, they allowed the fall of the authoritarian and dictatorial diets (regimes). French-speaking Black Africa which is the object of this study did not stay outside this evolution. It is at the constitutional level, more exactly, in the field of the protection of the human rights that we notice the most significant change. This one is marked by the adoption of new constitutions with liberal trend (tendency), the creation of the autonomous and specialized constitutional jurisdictions, the gratitude (recognition) of the ethnocultural communities which establish (constitute) the human substratum of the State.This thesis which carries (wears) “the constitutional protection of human rights in the States of French-speaking Black Africa” since 1990 exactly wants to show that the guarantee of the rights and the liberties in this geographical zone aims at the respect for the human dignity, that this guarantee is partially (is partially a matter) of the substantive law through in particular the Constitution, the law and the legal instruments to which the African States subscribe, what seems to confer on the African system of protection of human rights a universal dimensions.But it is also a question of convincing in this study that the legal rule is not the only element which participates in the protection of human rights in the States of French-speaking Black Africa : customs (US), customs, practice, uses (practices) and current traditions in the society participate so, in some respects, in the protection of human rights. For that reason, the universality of the human rights which appears in the new African constitutionalism must be put in perspective because of the prégnance of the traditional right (law), and, especially, the influence of the anthropological factors (culture, religion, tradition…) in the society.The African constituent seems more and more to take into account this influence. Since 1990, he integrates (joins) the traditional rules into the Constitution, what confers on the African constitutional law all its originality and a dualistic character. This dualism is particularly translated by the conciliation between the modern right (law) and the traditional right (law).

Rarement, la durée des mandats politiques n’est considérée autrement que comme une donnée subalterne dans l’analyse des régimes politiques alors que, dans la vie politique courante, elle constitue une donnée essentielle de la pratique politicienne.Cependant, la durée des mandats politiques est une donnée qui découle de la mise en œuvre de concepts aussi essentiels à la définition du vivre-ensemble politique que la Démocratie, la Citoyenneté, la République, la Souveraineté et la Représentation. Partant du constat que la notion est rarement questionnée en terme de droit constitutionnel, il s’agit d’analyser les dispositions institutionnelles de pays aux traditions juridiques différentes pour étudier la place que tient la notion de durée des mandats politiques et quels rôles cette notion joue dans l’équilibre institutionnel de chaque État.Dans cette analyse, il convient de prendre en compte la durée théorique du mandat mais également les possibilités d’un renouvellement ou d’une prorogation ou, au contraire, les différentes éventualités de sa réduction.Parce qu’elle constitue une donnée importante de la délégation que le Peuple Souverain concède à la Représentation, la notion de durée des mandats politiques devrait s’inscrire au cœur de la Constitution de chaque État. On constate cependant que tel n’est pas toujours le cas dans la mesure où, parfois, des mandats politiques essentiels voient leur durée être réglée par la loi. Par ailleurs, les mandats politiques locaux, dont l’importance ne fait que croître dans l’esprit du citoyen, ne sont abordés que dans le cadre législatif. À rebours de ce premier constat, on observe également que le thème de la durée des mandats politiques fait l’objet de dispositions dans les traités internationaux universels ou régionaux.Dans un deuxième temps, l’analyse des dispositions constitutionnelles de plus de 70 pays montre que la durée des mandats politiques est, dans un premier temps, établie par rapport aux caractéristiques que l’on souhaite donner au régime politique et que cette durée agit, en retour, sur l’évolution du régime politique considéré, les mandats et leur durée interagissant entre eux au sein d’un même régime.Enfin, si on peut constater que la durée la plus communément admise se situe entre quatre et cinq ans, il faut souligner que, historiquement au moins, la durée la plus généralement pratiquée a varié en fonction de l’équilibre admis entre respect de la Souveraineté du Peuple et latitude concédée à la Représentation, chaque expérience soulignant la difficulté d’établir un compromis intellectuellement satisfaisant entre droit du citoyen et liberté des gouvernants. / Rarely, the duration of the political mandates is considered otherwise than as a subordinate in the analysis of political regimes while in everyday political life, it constitutes an essential fact of political practice.However, the duration of the political mandates is a data resulting from the implementation of concepts such essential to the definition of political living together as Democracy, Citizenship, Republic, Sovereignty and Representation. Starting from the premise that the concept is rarely questioned in terms of constitutional law, the analysis of the institutional provisions of countries with different legal traditions allows us to study the place that takes the concept of duration of political mandates and what role this concept plays in the institutional balance of each state.In this analysis, we have to take into account the theoretical duration of the mandate but also the possibility of a renewal or extend or, on the contrary, the various contingencies of its reduction.Because it constitutes an important factor of the delegation that the Sovereign People grants to the Representation, the notion of duration of political mandates should be at the heart of the Constitution of each State. We note, however, that such is not always the case where, sometimes, essential political mandates see their duration be set by the simple law. In addition, local political mandates, whose importance is growing in the minds of the citizens, are addressed in the legislative framework. Countdown of this first observation, there is also the theme of the duration of the political mandates in universal or regional international treaties.In a second phase, the analysis of the Constitutions in more than 70 countries shows that the duration of the political mandates is, initially, established with the characteristics that we want to give to the plan policy and that duration is, in turn, on the evolution of the political scheme, the mandates and their time interacting each other within same plan.Finally, if it can be seen that the most commonly accepted duration lies between four and five years, it should be note that, historically at least, the most generally practiced duration has varied according to balance admitted between respect for sovereignty of the people and latitude granted to representation, each experience highlighting the difficulty of establishing an intellectually satisfactory compromise between the citizen’s right and freedom of the rulers.

In this dissertation I argue that the notion of environmental justice is recognised by section 24 of the Constitution, forms part of our law, and could play a role in South African socio-economic rights litigation as a transformative tool. I assert that because environmental justice recognises the intrinsic links between the distribution of basic resources and the environments in which poor people continue to find themselves in post 1994 South Africa, it has the ability to enhance and strengthen the enforcement of socio-economic rights. Environmental justice can do so by, among other things, focussing the court‟s mind on questions of justice and equity in the context of previous unjust environmental decision-making. In chapter 1, I explore the origins of environmental justice as a conceptual framework and as a movement that first emerged in the United States, and was subsequently embraced in the early post-apartheid era in response to immense environmental injustices experienced by South Africa‟s poor black majority as a result of apartheid. I discuss how many of these injustices not only „linger on‟ in post 1994 South Africa, but have also arguably become more entrenched, representing a failure on the part of the hopeful environmental justice movement of the early post-apartheid era. I highlight some of the reasons for this failure, which include the fragmented nature of the environmental justice movement, changes in government policy in relation to environmental issues, and the inadequate implementation of environmental laws intended to ensure public participation. In spite of these set backs, I argue in chapter 2 that there remains room for environmental justice to play a role in transformative constitutionalism. I then demonstrate that, despite environmental justice having been incorporated into our law, it has failed to capture the imagination of lawyers engaged in socio-economic rights litigation. Sustainable development and human rights discourses have thus far been the dominant voices in socio-economic rights litigation, at the expense of environmental justice, and its transformative potential. In chapter 3, I analyse Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg, which concerned the right to free basic water under section 27 of the Constitution. In my analysis of Mazibuko, I align myself with those who criticise the court‟s approach as anti-transformative. I do so by demonstrating that the court ii „technicised‟, „personalised‟, „proceduralised‟ and so, „depoliticised‟ the applicants‟ challenge to the government‟s policy. In this way, the court endorsed the „commodification‟ of water, and a „neo-liberal paradigm‟ towards access to basic water. I point to how linking environmental justice to the right to access to basic water could have encouraged the court to adopt a more redistributive and transformative approach. Finally, in chapter 4, I conclude by considering the future role of environmental justice in socio-economic rights litigation to enhance the ability of the environmental right to challenge poverty and effect transformation in the lives of poor people in South Africa. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / Public Law / Unrestricted

Author and philosopher Ayn Rand has gathered a cult like following thanks to her bestselling novels We the Living, Anthem, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. Through Rand's fictional writings she illustrates the principles of her philosophy objectivism. Objectivism employs five principles; objective reality, reason, self -interest, capitalism and individualism as the truths that govern the philosophy. Objectivists believe that their self-reliant philosophy holds the key to all life's answers. This thesis examines the following question: what would the founder of objectivism Ayn Rand think about the U.S. Constitution? Sadly Ayn Rand passed away in 1982 and never expressed her full opinion on how she felt about the U.S. Constitution. However, using the five principles of the objectivist ideology, public interviews done with Ayn Rand during her life time, and the opinions expressed by Rand in her four fictional novels this thesis will deconstruct the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights and then reconstruct them so that they concur with the objectivist philosophy. The purpose of this thesis is to inform readers of the objectivist philosophy and to highlight the differences and similarities between Ayn Rand's beliefs and the Founding Fathers through the Constitution.

Gouvernance, état d’exception et construction étatique à Madagascar : ces trois notions sont indissociables d’une approche de la composante juridique du concept d’état d’exception. Cette démarche implique, d’une part, l’examen de la construction tourmentée de l’ordre juridique postcolonial et celui, d’autre part, du processus de constitutionnalisation des pouvoirs de crise. Par ailleurs, il conviendra de se pencher sur les applications de l’état d’exception qui, de 1972 à 2002, ont suscité une nouvelle dynamique de conceptualisation et, mutatis mutandis, la perpétuation d’une tradition juridique de l’exception. Cette approche éclairera les dérives liées à la pratique et à l’expérimentation des pouvoirs de crise. Elle en explorera les propriétés. Elle n’en exclura pas, loin s’en faut, les marqueurs comparables avec d’autres cas d’étude et les interférences incontournables avec le droit international. Dans un deuxième temps, cette contribution s’efforcera d’interroger la composante politique de l’état d’exception. En effet, cette dimension prédominante détermine une meilleure compréhension de l’application du dispositif sur le terrain malgache, tout en permettant d’expliciter la construction et les pratiques politiques de l’état d’exception, là où le droit reste muet, discret, inapplicable, obscur ou équivoque. Notre démonstration s’appuiera ici sur une notion-clef de la pensée schmittienne : le « décisionnisme politique ». Par ailleurs, les théories du philosophe italien Giorgio Agamben, relatives à l’état d’exception comme « paradigme normal de gouvernement » et sur le concept-même de « dispositif », viendront enrichir l’analyse de l’usage et de la maîtrise des pouvoirs de crise. Dans un troisième temps, il conviendra de circonscrire et de questionner la thèse de l’«exceptionnel ordinaire», fréquemment soutenue par de nombreuses théories et de confronter sa pertinence au cas malgache, afin d’en apprécier la validité. Le montage politique d’«état d’exception permanent » et la banalisation des crises occasionnent, à l’aune du contexte malgache, l’émergence de la notion inédite d’« état d’exception débridé », sans toutefois éclipser celle, tout autant inédite, d’« exception particulière », comme tend à le démontrer la crise politique de 2009. Cette analyse ne manquera pas de recourir aux apports de l’anthropologie : en effet, dimensions culturelles, spécificités malgaches et imaginaire collectif contribueront à mieux circonscrire les modes d’acculturation de la société malgache aux concepts « importés ». Enfin, sans clôturer la réflexion, cette contribution s’efforcera de mieux saisir la dialectique de « l’État malgache en déliquescence ». Sera explorée l’émergence de nouveaux paradigmes de gestion de crise plus concertée, plus consensuelle, plus inclusive, plus rationnalisée, plus internationalisée, moins autoritaire, moins contestable, moins « débridée ». Tout aussi éloigné des jugements de valeur hâtifs que des reconstructions à dominante « culturaliste » qui privilégient une forme de fatalisme sur la trajectoire et le sort de la Grande Île, notre contribution visera d’abord à expliciter des réalités socio-politiques complexes, et à considérer les nombreux défis qui subsistent dans le processus encore inachevé de construction de l’État de droit à Madagascar / No study of governance, of the degenerative State of Madagascar, and its state of emergency can be properly undertaken without consideration of the legal component of a state of exception. This task calls for a close examination of the tumultuous construction of post-colonial judiciaries and the constitutionalising of emergency powers in time of crisis. Moreover, it would be appropriate to pay particular attention to the terms of imposition of states of exception which, from 1972 to 2002, provided new impetus to the conception and perpetuity of such apparatus. This approach would bring to light the abuses and excesses related to the exercise and experimentation of emergency powers, and provides hallmarks or milestones that may be observed or corroborated in adjacent studies, thereby introducing essential references for international law. In a second step, this work cannot hide the political component of a state of exception. Actually, this dimension allows for a better understanding of the context in the case of Madagascar, because it highlights the political construction and practice of the mechanism in areas where conventional law has been silent or discrete, obscure or ambiguous, and therefore difficult to enforce. This demonstration draws on the primary notion of the Schmittien doctrine, that of “political decisionism”. It is acknowledged that the theories developed by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, about states of exception being the ordinary models for government and how they could serve as “mechanism”, are particularly fertile for the analysis of governance by emergency powers. In a third step, it seems appropriate to analyse the thesis of “the ordinarily exceptional” which is frequently upheld by numerous theories and to see how it may apply to case of Madagascar. The political construction of a permanent state of emergency and the trivialisation of crises lend themselves to the unprecedented notion of an “unrestrained state of emergency” in Madagascar, different from the equally original “particularly exceptional state”, where the political crisis of 2009 could serve as an example. This analytical path takes inevitably into account the cultural and other specificities of Madagascar, and the pros and cons of “imported” ideas and concepts. Finally, this paper is completed, without closing the analysis, with the demonstration of “A State of Madagascar in Decay”. The emergence of new models for crisis management is explored; these are more consensual, inclusive, rational and international. They are less authoritative, less disputable, less unrestrained and less unbridled. The trial against the state of emergency is removed, as are all fatalistic ideologies regarding the future of the Grande Île. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind the realities of evidence and the numerous challenges that remain in the yet unaccomplished process of (re)construction of a State of Law in Madagascar

The purpose of this study is to trace the judicial history of the disintegration of the traditional concept of "state action" and the consequent development of the new concept that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments apply to private action among individuals.

LLM / Department of Public Law / The defining moment of Zimbabwean constitutional reform came in 2008 after the disputed and violence riddled elections of 2008 when the three main political parties entered into a transitional Government of National Unity and were tasked with the establishment of a new constitution which was ultimately adopted in 2013 following a protracted and turbulent process which began in 2009. Some segments of the civil society however argued that the concerned political parties had ‘captured the constitutional project and narrowed it to a short-term struggle motivated by the pursuit of party political interests at the expense of the will of the people and nation’s broad long-term interests’, and thereby subverted and/or negated the aspirations of the people. It is against this background that the study therefore assesses the participation, role and significance of the rural populace in the drafting of the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution. The study traces the history of constitutional reform efforts in Zimbabwe, beginning with the colonial Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, to the protracted exercise of 2009 to 2013 which gave birth to the current Constitution. It focuses on the 2009-13 constitution making process as a case study. The study employs an interdisciplinary approach by adopting both doctrinal and empirical research approaches. The study employed the doctrinal research approach to provide for a doctrinal analysis of the relevant global, regional and domestic legislation and case law. The empirical research approach, through interviews, was used to collect qualitative data from the general members of the rural populace and key institutions such as political parties and human rights organisations from three selected rural districts, namely Bulilima, Makonde and Mutasa. The study indicated that while a significant number of the rural populace participated in the constitution making process, the legal environment which subsisted during the constitution making process did not allow for the unfettered flow of information and ideas, as a direct result of repressive legislation such as AIPPA, Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Interception of Communications Act and POSA, among others similar laws, and as well as the deeply polarised political environment owing to the nature of the relationship between the ZANU PF-led government and the opposition political parties. The study further showed that the process was heavily dominated by the political parties to the Global Political Agreement and all the political parties wanted to ensure the adoption of a constitution that best reflected their preferences and partisan views rather than the will of the masses, making the 2013 Constitution an elitist negotiated document, contrary to the provisions of Article VI of the GPA which provided for the right of Zimbabweans to make a constitution for themselves and by themselves.