The role of local political leadership has featured highly in the government modernisation agenda for the past 15 years. Both the previous Labour government and the current Coalition government have emphasised that strong local councillors are at the heart of our democracy. Their focus has evolved from the traditional style of collective leadership to a more individualistic style, in the form of directly elected mayors. The aim of this research is to attempt to identify whether directly elected mayors of local authorities are better "facilitative leaders" than indirectly elected leaders. Facilitative leadership has been identified in many different accounts as a more effective style for leading our modern media-savvy and technology enabled communities and provides the basis for testing the merits of different leadership models. The research reviews the literatures on political and public leadership, governance and local government modernisation. A qualitative method is adopted using in-depth interviews with 25 respondents from four different local authorities to create four mini "case studies". The authorities chosen reflect the different leadership models under investigation, as well as other important demographic differences such as the urbanlrural mix, party political control/independent control, unitary/two tier structures, to enable a broad comparison to be made. The Mayors, Leaders, Chief Executives and other stakeholders were interviewed as they are key participants within the two leadership models. The study concludes that mayors are better facilitative leaders than indirectly elected leaders by several measures. In four of the eight elements studied, mayors were clearly identified as being more effective, and in the other four elements, the two models were shown to be equally effective. Several reasons for these differences are put forward, but the single most important one appears to be the higher visibility and profile of mayors at both election time and during their term of office. This. research contributes to the growing literature on local governance and leadership. It also signals to governments that despite the finding that mayors are better facilitative leaders, they do not appear to have generated the ultimate goal of increasing public confidence, participation and voter turnout. Other measures will be needed to increase public engagement in local government.

The nature of governorship just before, during, and just after the American Revolution is a subject that has been noticeably neglected in the historiography of the Revolution. While biographies of individual governors have been written, there remains a need for a clear ideological and constitutional debate about the actual executive functions, the nature of the appointment system in place, and the constitutional role of governors across the colonial and state periods. This dissertation examines the evolution of governorship in Virginia from 1758 to 1781. It attempts to identify, define and compare two different systems of governorship in Virginia. It examines the nature of executive authority and constitutional role of the different governors in this period. It seeks, first, to identify and define a gubernatorial system in colonial Virginia. By analysing a governor’s methods of appointment, the governor’s constitutional status, his relationship with the legislature and the people at large, this dissertation will identify a ‘British’ system of governorship. Second, the dissertation will attempt to identify a separate republican system of governorship in Virginia that was established in 1776. It will analyse the Virginia Constitution and explain the gubernatorial position in this political framework. It will also examine the first five years of Virginia’s independence from Britain and focus on the nature of gubernatorial authority in practice. By identifying two distinct models of governorship, this dissertation will be able to compare them in order to ascertain to what extent Virginians relied upon or abandoned British constitutional thinking and practice. The dissertation maintains that Virginians relied heavily upon British constitutional thinking when establishing their system of governorship in 1776. While Virginians rejected wholeheartedly a system based on monarchical influence and patronage, they were inspired by radical Country Whig thinkers who had dictated that an uncontrolled executive branch posed the greatest threat to the political system. Virginians in 1776 established a system of governorship that was inherently weak and that was controlled and dominated by the legislative branch. This dissertation, however, maintains that the system of state governorship established by the Virginian Convention in 1776 was not wholly dissimilar to the practical powers and influence at the disposal of royal governors. Both systems were inherently weak: the royal and state governors could not exert any meaningful control over the legislative branch, were not able to exert much influence over the people at large and were not granted many significant practical powers. This dissertation will also demonstrate that executive power, and the perceptions of the dangers that executive power posed, had developed markedly from 1776 to 1781. Not only will it prove that Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry enjoyed more powers than was prescribed to the governorship in 1776, but it will also show that, by 1781, a strong executive branch was required to save the state of Virginia from potential collapse.

Depuis la Révolution de 1789, la France a multiplié les expériences constitutionnelles et, après avoir refusé le bicamérisme, a connu depuis 1795 de nombreux régimes dotés d’une chambre haute. Les secondes assemblées républicaines, monarchistes ou impériales ont jalonné nos institutions publiques et politiques. Durant plus de deux siècles, la fonction présidentielle de la chambre haute s’est ainsi progressivement affirmée. L'éminence naturelle d'une telle charge, de même que l'autorité dont elle jouit au Palais du Luxembourg, permettent au président d'incarner la chambre haute. Cela n'empêche pas la fonction de demeurer en retrait sur le plan politique et cantonnée au périmètre caméral jusqu’en 1875. C’est alors qu’elle s’affirme, générant une influence au-delà de la haute assemblée. Son émancipation lui offre des attributions institutionnelles nouvelles. Ces missions sont efficacement remplies, attestant de la maturité de la fonction et permettant à de grands noms d’y être associés : la famille Pasquier, J. Ferry, J. Jeanneney, G. Monnerville, A. Poher… / Since the Revolution of 1789, France has multiplied the constitutional experiences. Most of political regimes have kept the bicameral system. The upper Houses, republican, monarchist or imperial, have thus marked out our institutions. For more than two centuries, the presidential function of the upper House has built its outlines.The natural eminence of such a workload, as well as the authority it enjoys in the Palais du Luxembourg, allows the President to personify the upper chamber. It doesn’t prevent the function from staying back from the political scene and confined to the cameral’perimeter until 1875. Then it asserts itself, creating an impact beyond the second chamber. Indeed, its emancipation giving new institutional attributions. These missions are successfully fulfilled, certifying the maturity of the function and allowing famous names to be related to them : the Pasquier’s family, J. Ferry, J. Jeanneney, G. Monnerville, A. Poher…

Résumé en français / Résumé en anglais

La compétence de nomination du président de la Ve République désigne l'habilitation par laquelle le chef de l'État peut attribuer un emploi, une fonction, une dignité ou un titre à une personne considérée. Partant du constat de ce que cette compétence est volontiers assimilée à un pouvoir de choisir les personnes nommées (désigner), la thèse se propose d'interroger cette évidence.La première partie s'attache à démontrer la mutation de la compétence de nomination en un pouvoir de nomination, c'est-à-dire en une faculté de désigner et/ou de nommer sans habilitation ou en vertu d'une habilitation fautive. Cette démarche permet de mettre au jour la spécificité de cette attribution présidentielle. Si le pouvoir de nomination est un pouvoir capté, ceci s'explique essentiellement par le pouvoir de nomination lui-même. Ce phénomène se répercute sur les contrôles des nominations présidentielles: l'appropriation du pouvoir de nomination par le chef de l'État explique largement leur inefficacité. La seconde partie de la thèse en fait la démonstration.L'étude des nominations présidentielles est riche d'enseignements. Elle offre un point de vue privilégié sur les institutions de la Ve République et permet de mieux comprendre les rapports de pouvoirs qui façonnent le système politique. Une telle recherche révèle combien la manière de penser les institutions n'est pas dénuée d'effets et explique la façon dont elles sont pratiquées. / As part of his competence for appointments, the president of the 5th Republic has authority to grant jobs, functions, honours or titles to any given person. This dissertation challenges the widely-held assumption that such a competence is often understood to mean the power to choose (to nominate) the persons who are appointed . The first part of the dissertation aims at demonstrating how the president's competence for appointments has evolved into the power of appointment, that is to say the capacity to choose and/or to appoint without authorization or upon mistaken authorization. Such an approach allows to highlight how specific this presidential function is. If the power of appointment is a power that the president has acquired unduly, it can be accounted for by the very essence of the power of appointment. The phenomenon then affects the checks implemented on presidential appointments : the undue acquisition of the power of appointment by the president accounts for their ineffectiveness. The survey of presidential appointments is most instructive. It provides valuable insights into the institutions of the 5th Republic and helps better understand the balance of powers within the political system. This research illustrates how the way institutions are constructed to a certain extent influences the way they are put into effect.