L’Afrique subsaharienne francophone vit des phases de transition entre des «formes politiques» de parti unique ou de démocratie limitée vers des «formes politiques» de pluripartisme ou de démocratie. Il ressort de l’observation de ces transitions que les régimes politiques, entendus ici comme formes de séparation des pouvoirs, utilisés lors de ces transitions adoptent les mêmes caractéristiques. La fonction du régime de transition, qui est de permettre la libéralisation des institutions politiques de l’État, est facilitée par l’adoption d’une forme parlementaire de régime. Cependant, une analyse plus approfondie révèle que si tous ces régimes adoptent les caractéristiques «externes» du régime parlementaire, «la forme politique» n’est pas la même. Dans un cas, elle traduit une forte concentration du pouvoir dans le corps du Chef de l’État, quand dans l’autre, elle est se répartit entre les organes du régime. Aussi, il n’y a pas, de régime de transition, mais plutôt un «modèle constitutionnel» de la période qui reprend partout les mêmes éléments, sans en tirer les mêmes conséquences. / Sub-Saharan Africa has been known for going through transitional phases from one-party state dictatorship or limited democracy to a multi-party system or a real democracy. Observing these transitions highlights the fact that the same type of regimes is used during the process. At first, it can be said that transitions are made by a parliamentary system. Adopting this specific form of regime enhances the aim of the transitional regime, which lies into liberalizing the political institutions of the country. Nevertheless, a more profound study reveals that if all those regimes may have the external criteria of a parliamentary system, it's not the same regime per se. In one case, most of the power remains in the hand of the head of State while in the other, it's a shared power. Thus, there is no transitional regime but what can be described as a "constitutional model" of the transition that uses the same organs but with a different distribution of power between them.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Diogo L Machado de Melo.pdf: 1012467 bytes, checksum: a8948ef69a5fbe62e30c5e237138153b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-18 / This work aims to show the divergences between the criteria used by jurists to interpret the fault within the scope of extracontractual liability, and to suggest an adequate model, coherent with the civil-constitutional principles involving the study of private law, especially the application of damage law. In order to do so, departing from the evidence and proof of fault permanence as an element that characterizes fault liability and its coherence with the current stage of civil law studies, criteria and models now used by jurists to interpret it will be presented. After listing problems involving currents currently followed especially the subjective theory and the insufficiency of the objective theory under the light of premises currently fixed, civil-constitutional model to orient the interpretation of this important element will be presented as well as how it behaves within the empirical dynamics by using ethical standards, principles like the dignity of the individual (CF, art. 1st, III), social solidarity (CF, art. 3rd, I) and objective good faith, which exert a direct influence over inter-private relationships / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar as divergências entre os critérios utilizados pela doutrina para interpretação da culpa no âmbito da responsabilidade extracontratual e, dentro desse contexto, sugerir um modelo adequado aos princípios civil-constitucionais que envolvem o estudo do direito privado, especialmente a aplicação do direito de danos. Para tanto, partindo-se da constatação e comprovação da permanência da culpa como elemento caracterizador da responsabilidade subjetiva e sua coerência com o atual estágio dos estudos do direito civil, serão apresentados os critérios e modelos até então utilizados pela doutrina para sua interpretação. Elencados os problemas envolvendo as correntes até então utilizadas especialmente a teoria subjetiva e a insuficiência da teoria objetiva à luz das premissas até então fixadas, será apresentado um modelo civil-constitucional orientador da interpretação desse importante elemento e como ele se comporta na dinâmica empírica , valendo-se de padrões éticos, de princípios como a dignidade da pessoa humana (CF, art. 1º, III), a solidariedade social (CF, art. 3º, I) e a boa-fé objetiva, que exercem influência direta nas relações interprivadas

Le modèle réformiste de la Constitution de l’Angleterre a intellectuellement dominé la France du XIXe siècle. Synthèse des aspirations françaises visant la stabilité politique, cette représentation mêle un historicisme de l’accomplissement libéral du gouvernement représentatif et une adhésion à la légitimation coutumière de l’innovation. Elle procède d’un jeu de projections contradictoires sur la Constitution anglaise. D’une part, les libéraux romantiques identifient dans ses institutions, les conditions propres à préserver l’individu des abus du pouvoir et à permettre le développement de la démocratie. D’autre part, les traditionalistes perçoivent dans la continuité historique de l’Angleterre, les bienfaits structurants de la hiérarchie sociale et de la liberté aristocratique. Plus particulièrement, les Doctrinaires décèlent, dans la morphologie civilisationnelle de l’Angleterre, une société déployant la liberté dans l’ordre. C’est dans le parlementarisme, produit historique de l’évolution institutionnelle anglaise, que la doctrine politique finit par identifier le régime politique susceptible de clore les tensions révolutionnaires françaises. Pensé comme une matrice libératrice des énergies individuelles et conservatrice de l’ordre politique et social, il dépossède le chef de l’Etat de son pouvoir personnel, dans la mesure où il le rend irresponsable. En outre, il consacre le règne de l’opinion publique par la prédominance de la chambre élective et par la reconnaissance de la responsabilité politique des ministres. Enfin, il encadre l’action politique par les usages historiques hérités de la monarchie représentative. Fondé sur un projet politique, le parlementarisme français donne corps à une philosophie prudentielle du droit constitutionnel. Celle-ci conçoit la constitution comme un cadre institutionnel au sein duquel l’agir politique doit pouvoir adapter la société à son stade de développement historique. Le laconisme des Lois constitutionnelles de la Troisième République témoigne de l’enracinement de ce réformisme constitutionnel. Plus qu’un compromis politique de circonstances, il cristallise en effet une politique constitutionnelle libérale et conservatrice. Ce travail entend montrer qu’elle résulte de la modélisation française de la Constitution anglaise au XIXe siècle. / The reformist model of the English Constitution was intellectually predominant in nineteenth century France. As a synthesis of French yearnings for political stability, this representation historicises the liberal achievement of representative government and endorses the legitimacy of innovation through custom. It results from contradictory visualisations of the English Constitution. On the one hand, romantic liberals identify in its institutions the necessary elements to protect individuals from abuses of power and to allow the development of democracy. On the other hand, traditionalists perceive in England’s historical continuity the structuring benefits of social hierarchy and aristocratic freedom. More particularly, French Doctrinaires see through the morphology of the English civilization a society that secures freedom within order. French thinkers recognise in parliamentarism, as a product of England’s institutional evolution, the political regime capable of putting an end to French revolutionary tensions. As a mould that both liberates the energies of individuals and protects the political and social order, it renders the Head of State irresponsible and thus strips him of personal powers. Furthermore, it establishes the reign of public opinion through the superiority of the elected chamber and the recognition of government responsibility. Finally, it disciplines political action through the historical practices inherited from representative monarchy. Based on a political project, parliamentary government in France gives substance to a prudential philosophy of constitutional law. This philosophy views the constitution as an institutional framework within which political action must be able to adapt society to its historical phase of development. The laconism of the constitutional laws of the Third Republic reflects this constitutional reformism. Rather than a circumstantial political compromise, it crystallizes a liberal and conservative constitutional policy. The present study aims to show that it is the result of how the English Constitution has been modeled in France during the nineteenth century.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renato Castro Teixeira Martins.pdf: 1083653 bytes, checksum: e06707211cba98c41bcc338a7c81cda7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-22 / The studies on the abuse of the procedures in the law process, found in the doctrine, are about punishment of the part and the indemnification of the injured part, especially in face of the malicious abuse of legal process hypotheses. The current paper aims to show that the technique of the so-called impertinence must be used as a manner to restrain the abuse of the law in the process, avoiding as much as possible injury to the parts and to Justice Administration, emphasizing its restraining role. The first part of the paper concerns the phenomena of the civil process constitutionalization, analyzing the constitutional guarantees that are directly connected to the theme of this study. On the second part, the theories of law abuse are analyzed, as well as their incidence on the material and procedural spheres concerning the law exercises of sueing and defending, including appeals and procedural incidents. The third part is dedicated to the study of many hypotheses of the so-called impertinence that are present in the Brazilian civil process system, analyzing the instructions of the doctrine and the understanding of the jurisprudence. Finally, we defend the use of the technique of the so-called impertinence in cases that are not explicitly seen in the system / Os estudos sobre o abuso do direito no plano processual, encontrados na doutrina, abordam o tema destacando a punição da parte e o ressarcimento do prejudicado, especialmente diante das hipóteses de litigância de má-fé. A presente dissertação tem o objetivo de mostrar que a técnica da manifesta improcedência deve ser utilizada como forma de coibir o abuso do direito no processo, evitando, tanto quanto possível, a ocorrência de danos às partes, ressaltando a sua característica inibitória. A primeira parte do trabalho aborda o fenômeno da constitucionalização do processo civil, analisando as garantias constitucionais que estão diretamente ligadas ao tema deste estudo. Na segunda parte, são examinadas as teorias sobre o abuso do direito, bem como a sua incidência nos planos material e processual, no que diz respeito ao exercício dos direitos de demandar e de defesa, inclusive por meio de recursos e incidentes processuais. A terceira parte é dedicada ao estudo das diversas hipóteses de manifesta improcedência que estão previstas no ordenamento processual civil brasileiro, analisando-se os ensinamentos da doutrina e os entendimentos jurisprudenciais. Ao final, defendemos a utilização da técnica da manifesta improcedência em casos que não estão previstos expressamente no sistema