Domestic Violence is a pervasive social evil which must be combated with every means possible. To this end, the legislator enacted the Domestic Violence Act, 116 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the DVA) to provide for a fast and accessible process by which the victims of domestic abuse can obtain an interdict to protect themselves against further acts of violence. Section 7(1)(c) of the DVA allows for a court, when considering an application made for a protection order in terms of the Act, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering the shared residence of the Applicant and Respondent. Section 7(1)(d) allows for a court, when considering an application as mentioned, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering any specific part of the shared residence. It is argued that the orders provided for in sections 7(1)(c) and (d) amounts, de facto, to an order that evicts the Respondent from the shared residence. Evictions are a traumatic procedure for the person(s) concerned, and endangers a large variety of human rights. It should therefore be approached with extreme caution to ensure that no person’s fundamental rights are infringed. Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) determines that no person(s) may be evicted from their home without a valid order of court, which order should be granted only after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Specific pieces of legislation have been enacted to regulate the eviction process, prescribing specific procedures and setting requirements for a legal eviction. When an order is given in terms of section 7(1)(c) of the DVA, these procedures are not followed and the requirements are not met, resulting in illegal evictions. These orders may further infringe upon certain fundamental rights of the Respondent, such as the constitutional property rights set out in section 25, and the right of access to the courts. The concerned sections of the DVA can be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. However, it is argued that the DVA is in practice frequently misused by applicants, to such an extent that it becomes a tool of abuse, defying the whole purpose of the Act and extreme caution should be used by presiding officers when considering applications for orders in terms of sections 7(1)(c) and (d) of the DVA. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Domestic Violence is a pervasive social evil which must be combated with every means possible. To this end, the legislator enacted the Domestic Violence Act, 116 of 1998 (hereafter referred to as the DVA) to provide for a fast and accessible process by which the victims of domestic abuse can obtain an interdict to protect themselves against further acts of violence. Section 7(1)(c) of the DVA allows for a court, when considering an application made for a protection order in terms of the Act, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering the shared residence of the Applicant and Respondent. Section 7(1)(d) allows for a court, when considering an application as mentioned, to make an order prohibiting the Respondent from entering any specific part of the shared residence. It is argued that the orders provided for in sections 7(1)(c) and (d) amounts, de facto, to an order that evicts the Respondent from the shared residence. Evictions are a traumatic procedure for the person(s) concerned, and endangers a large variety of human rights. It should therefore be approached with extreme caution to ensure that no person’s fundamental rights are infringed. Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) determines that no person(s) may be evicted from their home without a valid order of court, which order should be granted only after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Specific pieces of legislation have been enacted to regulate the eviction process, prescribing specific procedures and setting requirements for a legal eviction. When an order is given in terms of section 7(1)(c) of the DVA, these procedures are not followed and the requirements are not met, resulting in illegal evictions. These orders may further infringe upon certain fundamental rights of the Respondent, such as the constitutional property rights set out in section 25, and the right of access to the courts. The concerned sections of the DVA can be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. However, it is argued that the DVA is in practice frequently misused by applicants, to such an extent that it becomes a tool of abuse, defying the whole purpose of the Act and extreme caution should be used by presiding officers when considering applications for orders in terms of sections 7(1)(c) and (d) of the DVA. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Thesis (LLD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The question that this dissertation addresses is which immaterial property interests may be recognised and protected under the constitutional property clause and if so, under which circumstances. The question originated in the First Certification case 1 where the court held that the constitutional property clause is wide enough to include property interests that require protection according to international norms. The traditional immaterial property interests or intellectual property rights (patents, copyright, designs and trademarks) are protected as property in private law on a sui generis basis. Since it is generally accepted that the property concept in constitutional law includes at least property rights protected in private law, it is relatively unproblematic to include intellectual property rights under the constitutional property clause. In Laugh It Off v SAB International,2 the Constitutional Court explicitly balanced the right to a trademark with the right to freedom of expression, which is accepted as authority that at least trademarks may be recognised and protected as constitutional property. The other intellectual property rights may most likely be recognised and protected by analogy. Foreign law as well as international law also indicates that intellectual property should be recognised and protected as constitutional property. However, there are other, unconventional immaterial property interests that are not protected as property in private law. Some are protected in private law, but not as property; others originate in public law; and yet others are not protected yet at all. In terms of the Constitution, South African courts may consider foreign law, but must consider international law. This dissertation determines when these interests may be protected as constitutional property by reference to foreign cases from German, American, Australian and Irish law; regional international law, namely European Union cases; and international law. The conclusion is that unconventional immaterial property interests may generally be protected if they are vested and acquired in terms of normal law, have patrimonial value and serve the general purpose of constitutional property protection. Property theories are also useful to determine when immaterial property interests deserve constitutional protection, although other theories may be more useful for some of the unconventional interests. The German scaling approach and the balancing of competing interests is a useful approach for South African courts to help determine the appropriate level of protection for specific immaterial property interests without excluding some at the outset. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die vraag waarmee hierdie verhandeling handel is of belange in immateriële goedere erken en beskerm kan word in terme van die grondwetlike eiendomsklousule en indien wel, onder watter omstandighede. Die vraag het sy ontstaan in die First Certification saak,3 waar die Grondwetlike Hof beslis het dat die eiendomsklousule se omvang wyd genoeg is om belange in eiendom in te sluit wat volgens internasionale norme beskerming verg. Sekere regte in immateriële goedere word op ’n sui generis basis in die privaatreg beskerm, naamlik die regte in tradisionele immaterieelgoederereg kategorieë of intellektuele eiendom (patente, kopiereg, ontwerpe en handelsmerke). Dit is 'n algemene beginsel van grondwetlike eiendomsreg dat die konsep van eiendom minstens belange insluit wat as eiendom in die privaatreg beskerm word. In Laugh It Off v SAB International4 het die Grondwetlike Hof 'n handelsmerkreg opgeweeg teen die reg op vryheid van uitdrukking en hierdeur implisiet erken dat minstens handelsmerke en dalk ook ander intellektuele eindemsregte deur die eiendomsklousule erken en beskerm kan word. Buitelandse reg sowel as internasionale reg dui aan dat intellektuele eiendom grondwetlike beskerming behoort te ontvang. Buiten hierdie belange is daar ook immaterieelgoederereg belange wat nie onder eiendomsreg beskerm word in die privaatreg nie. Sommige van hierdie belange word wel in die privaatreg beskerm, maar dan onder ander areas van die reg as eiendom; ander het hul oorsprong in die publiekreg; en die res word tans glad nie beskerm nie. Die Grondwet bepaal dat howe buitelandse reg in ag kan neem en dat hulle internasionale reg moet oorweeg. Die verhandeling se vraag word beantwoord met verwysing na sake uit die Duitse, Amerikaanse, Australiese en Ierse grondwetlike reg; streeks-internasionale reg van die Europese Unie; en internasionale reg. Die onkonvensionele immaterieelgoederereg belange kan oor die algemeen beskerm word as eiendom indien daar 'n gevestigde reg is, die reg in terme van gewone reg verkry is en die belang die algemene oogmerke van die grondwetlike klousule bevorder. Die teorieë oor die beskerming van eiendom is van nut om te bepaal watter belange beskerm kan word, alhoewel sekere onkonvensionele belange beter geregverdig kan word deur ander tipes teorieë. Die Duitse metode om belange op te weeg kan van besonderse nut wees vir Suid Afrikaanse howe om te bepaal watter vlak van beskerming spesifieke belange in immaterieelgoedere behoort te geniet.

The introduction of the first democratic Constitution and the land reform programme in South ' Africa provided the impetus for the development of a new perception of property. In terms of the traditional private law perception property rights are reduced to abstract, scientific concepts which form part of a hierarchical system of rationally and logically related concepts and definitions, the relationships between which remain largely unaffected by social and political realities. In this view the constitutional property clause is interpreted as a guarantee of existing individual property rights against unwarranted state interference. Proponents of the traditional private law view argue that this perception of property need not be replaced by a new constitutional perception of property, because the traditional private law perception is legitimated by the fact that it developed in an uninterrupted, linear line from Roman law. It is regarded as flexible enough to adapt to new and different social and political circumstances. However, the truth is that the development of property rights was disrupted by a number of discontinuities or fundamental breaks in different periods of its development. It is argued in this thesis that the introduction of the new constitutional order in South Africa can be regarded as another of these discontinuities, and that the strict adherence to the private law perception of property may be abandoned in favour of a new debate on property where the social and political function of property is emphasised more strongly. Land reform promotes the public interest in that it ensures the equitable use, distribution and exploitation of property. In most cases the implementation of land reform necessitates the limitation of property rights. A conservative judiciary's adherence to the traditional private law perception of property may lead to a constitutional conflict between the judiciary (that aims to afford existing property rights strong constitutional protection) and the legislature (that aims to promote the public interest by implementing land reform). Such a constitutional conflict can be avoided if the South African courts adopt an approach in terms of which the social and political role and function of property in society is recognised. / Private Law / LL.D.

Thesis (LLD )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”), an original method of acquisition of ownership, is regulated by two prescription acts. Prescription is mostly regarded as an unproblematic area of South African property law, since its requirements are reasonably clear and legally certain. However, the unproblematic nature of this legal rule was recently brought into question by the English Pye case. This case concerned an owner in England who lost valuable land through adverse possession. After the domestic courts confirmed that the owner had lost ownership through adverse possession, the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg found that this legal institution constituted an uncompensated expropriation, which is in conflict with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. This judgment may have repercussions for the constitutionality of prescription in South African law, despite the fact that the Grand Chamber – on appeal – found that adverse possession actually constitutes a mere (constitutional) deprivation of property. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate whether prescription is in line with section 25 of the Constitution. To answer this question, the dissertation investigates the historical roots of prescription in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, together with its modern requirements in South African law. The focus then shifts to how prescription operates in certain foreign systems, namely England, the Netherlands, France and Germany. This comparative perspective illustrates that the requirements for prescription are stricter in jurisdictions with a positive registration system. Furthermore, the civil law countries require possessors to possess property with the more strenuous animus domini, as opposed to English law that merely requires possession animo possidendi. The justifications for prescription are subsequently analysed in terms of the Lockean labour theory, Radin’s personality theory and law and economics theory. These theories indicate that sufficient moral and economic reasons exist for retaining prescription in countries with a negative registration system. These conclusions are finally used to determine whether prescription is in line with the property clause. The FNB methodology indicates that prescription constitutes a non-arbitrary deprivation of property. If one adheres to the FNB methodology it is equally unlikely that prescription could amount to an uncompensated expropriation or even to constructive expropriation. I conclude that prescription is in line with the South African property clause, which is analogous to the decision of the Grand Chamber in Pye. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verkrygende verjaring (“verjaring”), ‘n oorspronklike wyse van verkryging van eiendomsreg, word gereguleer deur twee verjaringswette. Verjaring word grotendeels beskou as ‘n onproblematiese aspek van die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg, aangesien die vereistes daarvan taamlik duidelik en regseker is. Nietemin is die onproblematiese aard van hierdie regsinstelling onlangs deur die Engelse Pye-saak in twyfel getrek. Hierdie saak handel oor ‘n eienaar wat waardevolle grond in Engeland deur adverse possession verloor het. Nadat die plaaslike howe die verlies van eiendomsreg deur adverse possession bevestig het, het die Vierde Kamer van die Europese Hof van Menseregte in Straatsburg bevind dat hierdie regsreël neerkom op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening, wat inbreuk maak op Artikel 1 van die Eerste Protokol tot die Europese Verdrag van die Reg van die Mens 1950. Hierdie uitspraak kan implikasies inhou vir die grondwetlikheid van verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ten spyte van die Groot Kamer se bevinding – op appèl – dat adverse possession eintlik neerkom op ‘n grondwetlik geldige ontneming van eiendom. Derhalwe was dit nodig om te bepaal of verjaring bestaanbaar is met artikel 25 van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. Vir hierdie doel word die geskiedkundige wortels van verjaring in die Romeinse en Romeins- Hollandse reg, tesame met die moderne vereistes daarvan in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ondersoek. Daar word ook gekyk na hoe hierdie regsreël in buitelandse regstelsels, naamlik Engeland, Nederland, Frankryk en Duitsland, funksioneer. Hierdie regsvergelykende studie toon dat verjaring strenger vereistes het in regstelsels met ‘n positiewe registrasiestelsel. Verder vereis die sivielregtelike lande dat ‘n besitter die grond animo domini moet besit, wat strenger is as die Engelsregtelike animus possidendi-vereiste. Die regverdigingsgronde van verjaring word vervolgens geëvalueer ingevolge die Lockeaanse arbeidsteorie, Radin se persoonlikheidsteorie en law and economics-teorie. Hierdie teorieë illustreer dat daar genoegsame morele en ekonomiese regverdigings vir die bestaan van verjaring is in lande met ‘n negatiewe regstrasiestelsel. Hierdie bevindings word ten slotte gebruik om te bepaal of verjaring bestaanbaar is met die eiendomsklousule. Die FNB-metodologie toon dat verjaring neerkom op ‘n geldige, nie-arbitrêre ontneming volgens artikel 25(1). Indien ‘n mens die FNB-metodologie volg is dit eweneens onwaarskynlik dat verjaring op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening – of selfs op konstruktiewe onteiening – neerkom. Gevolglik strook verjaring wel met die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsklousule, welke uitkoms soortgelyk is aan dié van die Groot Kamer in die Pye-saak.

The introduction of the first democratic Constitution and the land reform programme in South ' Africa provided the impetus for the development of a new perception of property. In terms of the traditional private law perception property rights are reduced to abstract, scientific concepts which form part of a hierarchical system of rationally and logically related concepts and definitions, the relationships between which remain largely unaffected by social and political realities. In this view the constitutional property clause is interpreted as a guarantee of existing individual property rights against unwarranted state interference. Proponents of the traditional private law view argue that this perception of property need not be replaced by a new constitutional perception of property, because the traditional private law perception is legitimated by the fact that it developed in an uninterrupted, linear line from Roman law. It is regarded as flexible enough to adapt to new and different social and political circumstances. However, the truth is that the development of property rights was disrupted by a number of discontinuities or fundamental breaks in different periods of its development. It is argued in this thesis that the introduction of the new constitutional order in South Africa can be regarded as another of these discontinuities, and that the strict adherence to the private law perception of property may be abandoned in favour of a new debate on property where the social and political function of property is emphasised more strongly. Land reform promotes the public interest in that it ensures the equitable use, distribution and exploitation of property. In most cases the implementation of land reform necessitates the limitation of property rights. A conservative judiciary's adherence to the traditional private law perception of property may lead to a constitutional conflict between the judiciary (that aims to afford existing property rights strong constitutional protection) and the legislature (that aims to promote the public interest by implementing land reform). Such a constitutional conflict can be avoided if the South African courts adopt an approach in terms of which the social and political role and function of property in society is recognised. / Private Law / LL.D.

Thesis (LLD (Public Law))—University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / Since the advent of constitutional democracy in 1994 South African courts have been faced with new interpretive imperatives.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties. The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries. In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the dispute. With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances. Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or unlawfully occupied structures. This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South African courts. This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public interest. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ʼn absolute reg is nie en dat dit deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie. In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ʼn ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat ‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël. Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van 1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige bewoonde strukture te sloop. Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat se polisiëringsmag is. In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ʼn disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas. Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur andersins regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur middel van ʼn statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor die afgelope eeu ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls wat die uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development purposes. The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when this question comes up again in future. The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for economic development. The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes. / South African Research Chair in Property Law, sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University / Cuicci bursary fund / Faculty of Law Stellenbosch University

The main purpose of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 is to provide for fundamental reform of the law relating to water resources in South Africa. Section 3(1) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA) stipulates that the national government, as the public trustee of the nation's water resources, must ensure the protection, use, development, conservation and management of water. Water must also be controlled in a sustainable and fair manner, to the advantage of all persons and in accordance with the national government`s constitutional mandate. Subsection (2) stipulates that the Minister is ultimately responsible to ensure that water is allocated and used in a fair manner, for the benefit of the public interest, while promoting environmental values. Subsection (3) further stipulates that the national government also has to regulate the use, flow and control of all water in the Republic. These provisions of the NWA gave birth to the concept of public trusteeship in the South African law. The NWA provides for a number of different water us rights; from water use rights for domestic purposes to water use rights for the purpose of agriculture. Considering the extent of the study of all the water use rights that exist within the provisions of the NWA, this research will focus on licensed water use rights intended for agriculture. In this study it will be determined whether these licensed water use rights form part of a person's estate. Furthermore, it will also be determined whether these rights are transferable and whether a value can be attached to these rights in the estate of a person. / Thesis (LL.M. (Estate Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2010.