This dissertation presents an extension of the warlord competition models found in Skaperdas (2002) and Konrad and Skaperdas (2012). I consider two non-parasitic warlords located on a line. Each warlord allocates resources for the extraction of natural resources, the production of goods and services, and conflict with the opposing warlord. Within the symmetric rates of seizure model, I use three different forms of the contest success function, a primary tool in the conflict theory literature, in my analysis. I show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet wins a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy. Under certain conditions, the placement of the point of conflict at the midpoint between the two warlords maximizes the total resources toward war and minimizes total production. Under the asymmetric rates of seizure model, I find that the warlord closer to the point of conflict invests more in warfare and less in production; that is, results that counter what is found in the symmetric model. / Economics

Syftet med denna studie är att genom intervjuer med företrädare för svenska elitidrottsklubbar, inom fotboll och ishockey, beskriva vilka ekonomiska åtgärder som vidtagits på grund av intäktsbortfallen till följd av Covid19-pandemin, samt vilka konsekvenser det har haft för klubbarnas finansiering och deras syn på risker med finansieringen. Pandemin har medfört ekonomiska påfrestningar med stora intäktsbortfall, vilket har satt klubbarnas finansiella verksamhet på prov. En verksamhet som redan präglas av idrottens ekonomiskt destruktiva konkurrens. Studien utfördes genom kvalitativ metod med en abduktiv ansats. Empiriinsamling skedde via fem semistrukturerade intervjuer med representanter från svenska elitfotbolls- och elithockeyklubbar, samt kringliggande organ som har direkt samröre med klubbarna. Intäktsbortfallen har framkallat ekonomiska åtgärder hos klubbarna i form av kostnadsbesparingar och alternativa intäkter, samt en mer kontinuerlig budgetering utifrån olika scenarion, baserade på eventuella restriktioners omfattning. Klubbarna anser att de har klarat sig bra rent ekonomiskt under pandemin. Detta härleds dock främst till stöd och bidrag från intressentgrupper som bidragit till deras ekonomiska motståndskraft. Trots att elitidrottsklubbarnas finansieringssätt visar sig vara riskfyllt, framför studien att klubbarna inte tar detta i beaktning då de kan förlita sig på stöd från intressentgrupperna vid tider av finansiella svårigheter. / The purpose of this study is to describe, through interviews with representatives of Swedish elite sports clubs in football and ice hockey, what financial measures have been taken due to loss of income as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, and what consequences it has had for the clubs financing and their view of the risks with their financing. The pandemic has brought economic constraints on the sports clubs, due to large losses of income, which has put their financial activities to the test. Activities that are already characterised by the economically destructive competition of sport. The study used a qualitative method with an abductive approach. The empirical data was collected by conducting five semi structured interviews with representatives from the sports clubs themselves, and also from surrounding organisations with direct association with the clubs. The loss of income has resulted in measures such as cost reduction, finding alternative income sources and a more continuous budgetary planning, based on scenarios of possible restrictions. The clubs consider themselves to have endured the economic constraints, brought by the pandemic, fairly well. However, the main contributing factor to the clubs economic resilience is support from interest groups. Even though the way elite sports clubs are financed is considered to be risky, the findings of this study show that the clubs do not take this into consideration because they can rely on economic support from these interest groups in times of financial distress.

Cette thèse étudie le rôle et l’impact des groupes de pression dans le processus d'adoption d'uneréglementation environnementale. En effet, les controverses scientifiques de ces dernières années(OGM, Médiator, gaz de schiste) nous interrogent sur leurs effets, notamment lorsque la réalisation oul'ampleur d'un dommage environnemental et / ou sanitaire sont incertaines. En particulier, lors d'unedemande d'Autorisation de Mise sur le Marché d'un produit potentiellement dangereux, noussupposons que deux groupes de pression s'affrontent, représentant, respectivement, les intérêts d'uneindustrie et ceux des victimes d'un dommage : le premier milite pour son autorisation et le second pourson interdiction. Dans ce contexte, l'information détenue par le régulateur bénévole est primordiale.Présumant qu’il est inconscient, ex ante, de l'ampleur du dommage, nous nous interrogeons sur lapertinence d'écouter les groupes de pression afin de prendre une décision socialement efficace dans lecas où le groupe industriel fait face à un système de responsabilité, ex post. Pourtant, l'application dece système est imparfaite, suite à l'insolvabilité de l'industriel ou par le fait qu'il ne soit pas poursuiviou reconnu coupable. Lorsque le régulateur prend sa décision après l'affrontement des groupes depression, la mise en place d'un contest séquentiel, avec l'outsider qui joue en premier, est socialementpréférable. Par ailleurs, les conditions sous lesquelles le régulateur doit accorder son attention auxgroupes de pression plutôt que prendre sa décision sur la base d'une analyse coûts-bénéfices, utilisantses croyances a priori sur le dommage, sont caractérisées / This thesis examines the role and the impact of pressure groups in environmental regulation process.Indeed, in recent years, scientific controversies (GMO, Médiator, shale gas) have lead us to wondermore about their effects, especially when the achievement or the extent of environmental damage and /or health are uncertain. In particular, in the context of a market approval process of a potentialdangerous product, we assume that two pressure groups are fighting, representing respectively theinterests of industry and those of victims of damage: the first campaigns for its authorization and thesecond for its prohibition. In this context, information available to the voluntary regulator is important.Assuming that he is unaware of the magnitude of the damage ex ante, we question the relevance ofpaying attention to lobbyists to take a socially efficient decision, in a case where the industrial groupfaces a responsibility system, ex post. However, the application of this system is imperfect, because ofthe insolvency of the industry or by the fact either that the industrial group responsibility is notrecognized, or that the victims group does not request compensation for damages. When the regulatortakes his decision based on a contest, the introduction of a sequential contest in which the outsidermoves first is socially preferable. Moreover, the conditions under which the regulator has to payattention to the pressure groups rather than taking his decision based on a cost-benefit analysis, usinghis prior beliefs on damage, are characterized.