The first chapter of this thesis considers a contractual principal-agent relationship in an unstable environment. The players are uncertain whether repeated interaction is possible. I examine the role that the deliberate choice of an incomplete (non-verifiable and unenforceable) contract plays in signalling stability and trust. In this model, contractors may privately observe shocks that force them to end the relationship after the current period. Complete (verifiable) contracts, which are assumed to be feasible, ensure cooperation in compliance with the contract. With incomplete contracts, the players make themselves vulnerable to exploitation by their partners. But if cooperation occurs notwithstanding, the contractors update their beliefs about each other’s willingness to interact again. When the agent observes that her partner and herself are able to continue the relationship, she undertakes a non-contractible, mutually beneficial investment. The second chapter is based on the theory by Hart and Moore (QJE, 2008) that regards contracts as reference points for feelings of entitlement. Parties’ ex post performance depends on whether they receive what they feel entitled to, which is assumed to be the best possible outcome permitted by the contract. Consequentially, there exists a trade-off between contractual flexibility (agreement on a price interval) and rigidity (agreement on a single price). Hart and Moore do not analyse the role that third party contract enforcement plays for parties’ feelings of entitlement, shading on performance and contract choice. I demonstrate that Hart and Moore’s results rely on a number of assumptions that can be challenged when incorporating litigation into the model. They assume that trade is voluntary but renegotiation is prohibited. I argue that either trade is voluntary but renegotiation is possible or courts compel parties to trade according to the contract. In the former scenario, fixed price contracts may not act as reference points and the parties feel entitled to the best possible outcomes from renegotiation. In the latter scenario, contracts may act as reference points because of the option of contract enforcement. However, potential flexibility incorporated in the contract is lost. The third chapter provides an experimental examination of the effect of contract enforcement on contractors’ reference points for feelings of entitlement. Previous experiments by Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (AER 2011) analyse and support the theory by Hart and Moore (QJE, 2008) that contracts are reference points. Both theory and experiments ignore the role of contract enforcement for contractors’ feelings of entitlement. I replicate and confirm Fehr, Hart and Zehnder’s baseline experiment. I also run an additional treatment in which buyers can offer sellers more or less favourable prices than specified in the contract, whereas sellers can request enforcement of contracts as written. I find that contract enforcement matters, without being invoked, for sellers’ punishment behaviour through feelings of entitlement. Without explicit contract enforcement, flexible contracts (agreement on a price range instead of a single price) leave sellers feel entitled to the best possible price permitted by the contract. However, buyers rarely offer such a price which leads to disappointment and punishment. With the option of contract enforcement, sellers feel entitled to the price which the court would enforce, even if it is equally unfavourable than in the no court treatment. The presence of the court provides an outside validation for which prices are reasonable and thereby limits disappointment and punishment.

Using the findings of a five-year ethnographic study, this thesis examines the contractual relationships that prevail in low-technology moderately competitive industries characteristic of the contemporary Ukrainian economy. The research reports on how contracts are enforced and how the stability of business relationships is ensured in Ukraine. The established view of many scholars that business efficiency is held back in most post-Soviet economies by frequent contractual violations and dysfunctional courts is not entirely supported by the research underpinning this thesis: in Ukraine, contract enforcement is generally effective enough to allow stability in day-to-day transactions, and the commercial courts do provide adequate backing. Although the mechanisms used to enforce contracts in Ukraine are generally similar to those found in developed countries, there are distinctive features within the overall pattern. In particular, firms rely extensively on repeated interactions and self-enforcing devices while signing short-term formal contracts and avoiding interdependency between trading partners. They do not rely on their reputation or business association memberships and they make no use of private arbitration. Instead, a few legal institutions dating back to the Soviet period proved adaptable and viable in a market economy. When transactions involve either state-owned companies or the exercise of administrative resources, contract enforcement becomes problematic. Illegal kickbacks from suppliers and the coercive use of state machinery come into play, and asking a court to enforce a contract is more costly and less effective than in other cases. However, the author shows that in the typical everyday transactions of Ukrainian private firms, the state and its administrative resources are involved in the minority of cases, and that they do not undermine the dominant pattern of orderly contractual dealings. The thesis concludes that the contractual pattern prevalent in Ukraine effectively serves straightforward traditional buyer-seller transactions but it is ill-suited to meet the requirements of globalized trade, production diversification and technological progress. Adaptations of the existing system to meet these requirements are likely to depend upon changes in the wider business environment, namely upon institutions constraining the coercive power of the state.

Today it is well known that institutions have a significant impact on growth and development. Less research has been investigating how institutions and in-stitutional quality affect trade. This thesis will specifically examine the effect contract enforcement has on bilateral trade. Secure property rights and con-tract enforcement are important for a country’s productivity and growth. The empirical analysis is based on the gravity model of trade to examine what explains the trade flows and more importantly what impact contract enforce-ment has on the bilateral trade. Instead of using one of the many existing sub-jective measurements of contract enforcement, an objective measurement called Contract-Intensive Money (CIM) is used. The results show that contract enforcement of the exporting country has a greater impact on exports than that of the importing country. As expected the institutionally dependent sector of machinery and transport equipment requires a higher level of contract enforcement than the standardized food sector. It implies that the exporting country will have a comparative advantage in export-ing complex products and import simple products. The results also indicates that the effect on exports is higher when there is development of a country’s poor contract enforcement rather than improvement in already high-quality contract enforcement in the partner country.

<p>Today it is well known that institutions have a significant impact on growth and development. Less research has been investigating how institutions and in-stitutional quality affect trade. This thesis will specifically examine the effect contract enforcement has on bilateral trade. Secure property rights and con-tract enforcement are important for a country’s productivity and growth.</p><p>The empirical analysis is based on the gravity model of trade to examine what explains the trade flows and more importantly what impact contract enforce-ment has on the bilateral trade. Instead of using one of the many existing sub-jective measurements of contract enforcement, an objective measurement called Contract-Intensive Money (CIM) is used.</p><p>The results show that contract enforcement of the exporting country has a greater impact on exports than that of the importing country. As expected the institutionally dependent sector of machinery and transport equipment requires a higher level of contract enforcement than the standardized food sector. It implies that the exporting country will have a comparative advantage in export-ing complex products and import simple products. The results also indicates that the effect on exports is higher when there is development of a country’s poor contract enforcement rather than improvement in already high-quality contract enforcement in the partner country.</p>

This dissertation consists of three essays in international economics. The first chapter investigates whether opening up to international financial flows improves aggregate productivity in the presence of limited contract enforceability. I present a model of two countries that differ in terms of the degree of contract enforcement and analyze the consequences of financial market integration among those countries. Then, I test the predictions of the model empirically. The model predicts that aggregate productivity improves after financial integration in economies with strong contract enforcement, while it deteriorates in countries with weak enforcement. The empirical analysis confirms that the effect of capital account liberalization on productivity is different in economies with different degrees of contract enforcement. The second chapter addresses whether foreign firms harm the environment in a host country where environmental standards are not as strict as in the source country. The question as to whether strict environmental regulations in developed economies cause the relocation of pollution-intensive production into developing countries has captured the attention of economists. Instead, we ask whether multinational firms, frequently the target of environmentalists, are in fact harmful for a host country's environment. Using plant-level data from Chile, we find that foreign firms are cleaner than domestic plants. We then propose a model that delivers these features of the data. Using the model we get policy implications regarding environmental regulations and multinational production. The last chapter examines the link between producer's productivity and export participation. Empirical work reveals that exporters have substantially higher productivity than non-exporters. The two explanations proposed for the apparent gap are self-selection of firms into competitive export markets and learning by exporting. Knowing the direction of causality between productivity and exporting has important policy implications. If firms become exporters simply because they are more productive and there are no further gains from being an exporter, then policies that aim to increase the number of exporters are not appropriate. I test these hypotheses by applying matching techniques on plant-level data from the Chilean manufacturing sector. I find clear evidence for self-selection, relatively more efficient firms become exporters. However, I do not detect further improvement of productivity following the entry into export markets. / text

O alcance do interesse pÃblico nÃo se concretiza apenas com as etapas do planejamento, da licitaÃÃo e da contrataÃÃo. Chega-se ao momento de proceder à execuÃÃo do contrato e, sob o aspecto legal, o administrador pÃblico deve designar servidor para fiscalizar essa execuÃÃo. A fiscalizaÃÃo funciona como mecanismo garantidor da melhor execuÃÃo do contrato e da fidelidade ao seu objeto, alÃm de assegurar o cumprimento do princÃpio da eficiÃncia na AdministraÃÃo PÃblica. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a fiscalizaÃÃo de contratos administrativos de natureza contÃnua, no perÃodo de 2012 a 2014, na Universidade Federal do CearÃ. A abordagem teÃrica està baseada nos conceitos do processo da contrataÃÃo pÃblica brasileira e suas fases, de contratos administrativos e suas caracterÃsticas e de gestÃo e fiscalizaÃÃo de contratos, focada na atuaÃÃo e responsabilidades dos fiscais. Caracteriza-se como pesquisa descritiva, com abordagem qualitativa e estudo de caso, feito com suporte bibliogrÃfico, documental e de campo. Como instrumento de pesquisa foi utilizado questionÃrio, o qual foi aplicado aos fiscais e ex-fiscais de contratos administrativos de natureza continuada da instituiÃÃo. Os resultados encontrados apontam que o gestor da UFC escolheu acertadamente o agente executor do contrato, porÃm, falta a ele apoio administrativo, o conhecimento e a aplicaÃÃo de instrumentos padronizados de fiscalizaÃÃo e, principalmente treinamento e capacitaÃÃo. / The scope of the public interest is not realized only through the steps of planning, bidding and contracting. You get to the point to carry out the contract and under the legal aspect, the public administrator must designate server to monitor their implementation. The supervision functions as guarantor mechanism of best execution of the contract and fidelity to its object, and ensure compliance with the principle of efficiency in public administration. This study aims to analyze the supervision of administrative contracts of continuous nature, in the period 2012-2014, the Universidade Federal do CearÃ. The theoretical approach is based on the process of the concepts of the Brazilian public procurement and its phases of administrative contracts and their characteristics and management and supervision of contracts, focused on the role and responsibilities of tax. It is characterized as descriptive research with qualitative approach and case study, done with bibliographic support, documentary and field. The research instrument was used questionnaire, which was applied to tax and former tax administrative contracts continuing nature of the institution. The results show that the UFC manager rightly chose the executive agent of the contract, however, he lacks administrative support, knowledge and the application of standardized instruments of surveillance and especially training and capacity building.

The Thesis analyses the impact that humanly devised institutions, defined as “formal and informal constraints on political, economic, and social interactions”, have on international trade and the patterns comparative advantage. The key assumption of the Thesis is that although institutions impact on the whole economy they may influence some sectors more than others. Industry‘s dependence on institutions is a technological feature of production. Hence, for example, industries that require a large number of intermediate inputs for production will be more dependent on the quality of contract enforcement regulation for their growth. The Thesis analyses 4 different sub-components of institutional quality: contract enforcement, financial development, property rights and labour market institutions. The Thesis’ hypotheses regarding each of these sub-components are as follows: 1. Countries with more efficient contract enforcement regulations will specialize (have a comparative advantage) in more complex sectors that depend on contracts with suppliers/producers for their growth.2. Countries with more secure property rights will specialize in sectors that are more dependent on intangible assets for production.3. Countries with higher financial development will have a comparative advantage in sectors that are more dependent on external finance for their growth.4. Countries with more flexible labour markets will specialize in more volatile industries. In order to test these assumptions we construct three econometric models (Chapters 4-6). In Chapter 4 we assess how contract enforcement regulations, financial development, property rights and labour market institutions impact on trade volumes using a well-known gravity model. In Chapter 5 we test whether these sub-components have an impact on growth of value-added at industry level. Finally, in chapter 6 the impact on firms’ productivity is tested. The results show that contract enforcement regulations and financial development affect countries’ comparative advantage by affecting countries trade flows, value-added and productivity in a way consistent with the hypothesis. The results regarding the other two institutional sub-components are mixed but we do find some evidence the countries with more secure property rights export more and have higher value-added growth in sectors that are more dependent on intangible assets. These results are robust to different specifications. Using a novel set of instrumental variables we show that causality runs from institutions to trade, value-added and productivity rather than the reverse. We supplement the empirical evidence with a case-study of Lesotho’s textiles and garment industry and also find some evidence that this export-oriented industry emerged in Lesotho at least partly due to this country’s good institutions that are better than its African competitors. From a policy perspective our results imply that institutional and regulatory reform - especially in enforcement of contracts and financial sector regulations - may enhance the capacity of poor countries to move up to specialization into higher-valued products and to reap benefits from international integration.

This dissertation contains three essays on the impact of other-regarding behavior on human decision-making. Chapter II uses experimental methods to analyze the relative performance of a variety of compensation contracts. This study creates an environment in which individuals are paid via common payment mechanisms employed in the dual-principal agent relationships (Piece Rate, Flat Rate, Salary, Bonus and Socialization) and examines the effect that different incentive structures have on agent behavior. In Chapter III I explore the potential outcomes of blended payment structures in a dual-principal agent environment. I draw from the previously conducted experimental study in Chapter II and simulate agent behavior induced by blended payment mechanisms. In Chapter IV, I move away from studying payment mechanisms to investigate the impact of intentionality and responsibility on an individual's decision-making process. I explore the effects of direct and indirect responsibility as well as selfish and kind intentions using experimental methodology. Each of these essays provides further evidence that other-regarding behavior has a significant impact on the outcome of an economic situation; therefore, emphasizing the need to address such behavior in theoretical designs. / Ph. D.

This thesis consists of three independent papers, ordered chronologically with respect to when they were initiated. Empirical research has established that there are large and persistent productivity differences among firms in narrowly defined industries (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Other studies, in particular Bernard and Jensen (1999), have shown the existence of a causal link running from ex-ante firm productivity to export decisions. Furthermore, exposure to trade has been found to enhance growth opportunities only for some firms, reallocating market shares and resources toward the more productive ones and contributing thus to aggregate productivity growth (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). These findings have led to the development of new theoretical models emphasizing the interaction between firm heterogeneity and fixed market entry costs in generating international trade and inducing aggregate productivity growth. The first and third chapters of this thesis extend the framework developed by Melitz (2003) to analyze the implications of  firm heterogeneity for old and new issues in international trade. The first paper studies the effect of trade liberalization between countries that differ in their relative endowment of skilled workers when growth-promoting R&amp;D activities are skill intensive with respect to goods production. In particular, the analysis focuses on the changes that falling trade costs induce on consumer welfare and on the number of firms active in the different markets. The third paper uses the heterogeneous firm framework to study the interaction between financial constraints and the market entry behavior of firms. It also analyzes whether the impact of trade liberalization on average firm productivity and on individual welfare is affected by the presence of credit frictions. The second chapter presents an empirical work that contributes to the recent but fast growing literature that studies how different institutions and their level of development affect countries comparative advantage. The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the role of legal and financial institution in driving the specialization in contract-intensive goods and on how the degree of institutional development interacts with the propensity of firms to vertical integrate with their suppliers. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2011

SILVA, Maria de Jesus Lopes. Fiscalização de contratos administrativos na Universidade Federal do Ceará. 2015. 85f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Políticas Públicas e Gestão da Educação Superior, Fortaleza (CE), 2015. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-06-09T13:02:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_mjlsilva.pdf: 998631 bytes, checksum: 2a0824e9c65ced55d43a693cc818ef31 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-06-09T16:48:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_mjlsilva.pdf: 998631 bytes, checksum: 2a0824e9c65ced55d43a693cc818ef31 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-09T16:48:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2015_dis_mjlsilva.pdf: 998631 bytes, checksum: 2a0824e9c65ced55d43a693cc818ef31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / The scope of the public interest is not realized only through the steps of planning, bidding and contracting. You get to the point to carry out the contract and under the legal aspect, the public administrator must designate server to monitor their implementation. The supervision functions as guarantor mechanism of best execution of the contract and fidelity to its object, and ensure compliance with the principle of efficiency in public administration. This study aims to analyze the supervision of administrative contracts of continuous nature, in the period 2012-2014, the Universidade Federal do Ceará. The theoretical approach is based on the process of the concepts of the Brazilian public procurement and its phases of administrative contracts and their characteristics and management and supervision of contracts, focused on the role and responsibilities of tax. It is characterized as descriptive research with qualitative approach and case study, done with bibliographic support, documentary and field. The research instrument was used questionnaire, which was applied to tax and former tax administrative contracts continuing nature of the institution. The results show that the UFC manager rightly chose the executive agent of the contract, however, he lacks administrative support, knowledge and the application of standardized instruments of surveillance and especially training and capacity building. / O alcance do interesse público não se concretiza apenas com as etapas do planejamento, da licitação e da contratação. Chega-se ao momento de proceder à execução do contrato e, sob o aspecto legal, o administrador público deve designar servidor para fiscalizar essa execução. A fiscalização funciona como mecanismo garantidor da melhor execução do contrato e da fidelidade ao seu objeto, além de assegurar o cumprimento do princípio da eficiência na Administração Pública. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a fiscalização de contratos administrativos de natureza contínua, no período de 2012 a 2014, na Universidade Federal do Ceará. A abordagem teórica está baseada nos conceitos do processo da contratação pública brasileira e suas fases, de contratos administrativos e suas características e de gestão e fiscalização de contratos, focada na atuação e responsabilidades dos fiscais. Caracteriza-se como pesquisa descritiva, com abordagem qualitativa e estudo de caso, feito com suporte bibliográfico, documental e de campo. Como instrumento de pesquisa foi utilizado questionário, o qual foi aplicado aos fiscais e ex-fiscais de contratos administrativos de natureza continuada da instituição. Os resultados encontrados apontam que o gestor da UFC escolheu acertadamente o agente executor do contrato, porém, falta a ele apoio administrativo, o conhecimento e a aplicação de instrumentos padronizados de fiscalização e, principalmente treinamento e capacitação.