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This thesis contains an analysis of the impact on shareholder wealth of domestic and cross-border takeover bids for UK listed companies. The study covers the calendar years from 1986 to 1991 inclusive. For the cross-border acquisitions, data is available for an analysis of 143 targets, 71 bidders, and 55 matched pairs of targets and bidders. For domestic acquisitions, data was available for 568 targets, 414 bidders and 356 pairs of targets and bidders. Three different event study methodologies are applied; the capital asset pricing model, the market model, and the index model. UK target companies gained significantly from both domestic and cross-border takeover bids. Over the period from eight months prior, to one month after, the month of the bid announcement (t-8, t+1), cumulative abnormal returns exceeded +20.2% in cross-border and +16.6% in domestic acquisitions. Both domestic and overseas bidders underperformed during the five month period following the bid announcement. However, over the whole analysis period (t-8, t+5), UK bidders performed significantly better than overseas bidders. Analysis of joint abnormal returns to pairs of targets and bidders reveals that both cross-border and domestic acquisitions in the UK during the 1986-1991 period created significant shareholder wealth. However, the gains to target shareholders exceed the total gain, thus resulting in a transfer of wealth from bidders to targets.

This work is a comparative study of shareholders' powers to appoint and remove directors in the United Kingdom, United States and Germany as an internal corporate control mechanism. It highlights the entrenched positions of corporate managers in the face of shareholders' weakening powers in these systems. Having recognised the importance of shareholders' position as the contributors of corporate capital, the laws of these three systems give them the right to bring about changes in the control of companies by vesting power in the general meeting to determine the composition of corporate boards. Shareholders appoint directors to act on their behalf, the board in turn selects and monitors its executives to ensure that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are protected. The Anglo-American system is characterised by dispersed shareholding and management dominated boards, with the result that shareholders do not exercise their voting rights effectively. Under the German two-tier board system companies are accountable to a wide range of stakeholders and have a different structure of shareholding, where banks control the majority of shares. Despite the absence of management-dominated boards in that system the depository share system together with the practice of co-determination tend to restrict shareholders' participation in corporate control. The reality is that directors may 2 end up using certain devices to entrench themselves on the board so as to restrict the ability of shareholders to remove them. This thesis advocates a greater role for shareholders through improved opportunities for them to use their voting powers in determining the composition of their boards. It makes various recommendations in the different areas in which shareholders face difficulties in exercising these powers. It is hoped that the implementation of these suggestions will result in a system which will enable shareholders to exercise their voting powers more effectively for the purpose of controlling their companies.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

No description available.

No / This paper investigates the impact of corporate ownership and control on the outcome of financial distress. It is argued that the likelihood of financial distress resulting in insolvency depends on whether firms have controllers, the type of controllers and their cash flow ownership. Using a sample of 484 UK firms, 81 of which filed for insolvency, we show that financially distressed firms with controllers are more likely to be insolvent than widely held firms, where the probability of insolvency is greater when controllers are family or financial institutions. However, the probability of insolvency reduces significantly as the controllers’ cash flow ownership increases beyond 10%

A presente tese tem por objeto o estudo da disciplina normativa e dos pressupostos teóricos do controle conjunto nas companhias brasileiras, conduzido a partir da diferenciação dos conceitos de controle conjunto e controle compartilhado, de grupo de controle e bloco de controle, e pela análise comparativa entre o poder de controle do tipo individual e o poder de controle do tipo conjunto nas sociedades anônimas. A figura do grupo controlador é examinada, ao longo do trabalho, a partir da contraposição entre suas perspectivas interna e externa, como ângulos analíticos sobre os quais é erigida grande parte das conclusões, assentadas na noção de titularidade unitária do controle. O estudo é motivado pela identificação de uma falha na Lei nº 6.404/76, a qual, apesar de referir o controle em sua forma plurissubjetiva, foi construída sobre a figura do controlador individual e, por isso, necessita ser adaptada. Tendo isso presente, o exame da disciplina do controle conjunto parte da diferenciação entre a hipótese de controle conjunto por grupo de pessoas vinculadas por acordo de voto e a de controle conjunto por grupo de pessoas sob controle comum, tal qual definido pelo artigo 116 da Lei nº 6.404/76, com especial destaque para a primeira, por sua maior complexidade. Feita a análise dos aspectos legais do controle conjunto, identificam-se os seus pressupostos teóricos, a saber, a titularidade unitária do controle, a pluralidade subjetiva, a comunhão de objetivos e a conjugação de interesses, e a coordenação decisória consensual. A partir desses pressupostos são elaboradas as regras para imputação do status de acionista controlador e da titularidade do poder de controle nos casos de controle conjunto. Em seguida, são apresentadas orientações interpretativas para adaptação de algumas regras societárias ao controle conjunto, pela aplicação da tese aos casos de conflito de interesses, de responsabilidade do controlador e de alienação de controle. Ao final, identificados os aspectos dogmáticos do controle conjunto, o objetivo é fornecer as diretrizes para distinguir os casos de controle conjunto daqueles que não o são e, assim, orientar a interpretação e a aplicação das regras relativas ao poder de controle e ao acionista controlador para os casos em que for devidamente identificada essa fattispecie de poder de controle nas sociedades anônimas brasileiras. / This doctoral thesis adresses the legal aspects and theorethical premises of joint corporate control in Brazilian corporations, and builds upon the distinctions between joint corporate control and shared corporate control, controlling group and controlling block, and the comparative analysis between individual corporate control, on the one hand, and joint corporate control, on the other. The control group is examined in light of the contrast between its internal and external perspectives, analytical angles from which a large part of the conclusions stem, based on the idea of corporate control as a unified power. The thesis is motivated by the identification of a failure in Law n. 6.404/76 (Brazilian Corporations Act), which, although expressly referring to the hypothesis of joint control, was built entirely upon the notion of individual control, and therefore needs to be adapted. Taking this into account, the legal regime of joint control considers two distinct hypotheses: the group of persons bound by voting agreements and the group of persons under common control, as defined by Article 116 of Law n. 6.404/76, with particular emphasis on the first, due to its complexity. Analysed the legal aspects of joint control, the thesis then identifies its theoretical premises: the unified nature of corporate control, the plurality of persons who are in control, the common objectives and conjunction of interests between them, and the decision-making coordination. From these premises, the thesis elaborates criteria to attribute controlling shareholder status and corporate control in joint control cases. Then, the thesis proposes interpretative guidelines to adapt certain rules of corporate law to deal with joint control, applying these guidelines to cases of conflict of interests, controlling shareholders responsibility and transfer of joint corporate control. Finally, having identified the doctrinal earmarks of joint control, the thesis aims to provide criteria to distinguish joint control from other types of corporate control, and to guide legal interpretation of the rules relating to corporate control and controlling shareholders in those cases where joint corporate control is identified.

Nesta dissertação, defender-se-á que o poder de controle se pareça com o que poderia ser denominado de um direito de propriedade indireto. Conforme será demonstrado, isto estaria de acordo com a diferença entre o poder de controle direto e o poder de controle indireto (arts. 243, §2º, LSA, e 1.098, II, CC) e com o conceito da transferência indireta dos bens da sociedade (art. 254-A, caput e §1º, LSA) utilizados na legislação brasileira. Para levar a cabo esta comparação, abordar-se-á, novamente, o problema do antigo direito de propriedade. Durante a pesquisa realizada para a feitura do presente trabalho monográfico, percebeu-se que a literatura brasileira especializada não costumava aludir à bibliografia antiga sobre o poder de controle no Brasil. Acredita-se, assim, ter contribuído para as discussões sobre o poder de controle no Brasil com a referência a estas obras de outrora. Em particular, crê-se ter contribuído para o debate sobre a permanência do poder de controle em face dos livros dos Professores W. Ferreira, J. E. Borges e C. Champaud. Este último, na verdade, não é um autor brasileiro, mas o seu trabalho foi especificamente analisado pelos Professores F. K. Comparato e O. Gomes na década de setenta antes da edição da Lei das Sociedades por Ações. Ao final, expõe-se a conclusão de que o poder de controle se assemelharia a um direito de propriedade indireto. / In this thesis, it shall be contended that corporate control is equivalent to an indirect property right. As it shall be demonstrated, this would be in accordance with the difference between direct corporate control and indirect corporate control (articles 243, §2º, BCL, and 1.098, II, BCC) and with the concept of the indirect transfer of goods (article 254-A, caput and §1º, BCL) mentioned in the Brazilian legislation. In order to make this comparison, the ancient problem of the property right shall be addressed. During the research made to elaborate this thesis, it was noticed that the Brazilian law literature did not usually direct attention to old references on corporate control in Brazil. As a result, it is believed that a contribution has been made to the discussion on corporate control in Brazil with reference to these previous works. In particular, it is understood that a contribution has been made to the debate about the permanence of corporate control in light of the works of Professors W. Ferreira, J. E. Borges and C. Champaud. This last Professor is not, in fact, a Brazilian scholar, but his work has been specifically reviewed by Professors F. K. Comparato and O. Gomes during the seventies, before the Brazilian Corporation Law was enacted. In conclusion, it is argued that corporate control is similar to an indirect property right.

Nesta dissertação, defender-se-á que o poder de controle se pareça com o que poderia ser denominado de um direito de propriedade indireto. Conforme será demonstrado, isto estaria de acordo com a diferença entre o poder de controle direto e o poder de controle indireto (arts. 243, §2º, LSA, e 1.098, II, CC) e com o conceito da transferência indireta dos bens da sociedade (art. 254-A, caput e §1º, LSA) utilizados na legislação brasileira. Para levar a cabo esta comparação, abordar-se-á, novamente, o problema do antigo direito de propriedade. Durante a pesquisa realizada para a feitura do presente trabalho monográfico, percebeu-se que a literatura brasileira especializada não costumava aludir à bibliografia antiga sobre o poder de controle no Brasil. Acredita-se, assim, ter contribuído para as discussões sobre o poder de controle no Brasil com a referência a estas obras de outrora. Em particular, crê-se ter contribuído para o debate sobre a permanência do poder de controle em face dos livros dos Professores W. Ferreira, J. E. Borges e C. Champaud. Este último, na verdade, não é um autor brasileiro, mas o seu trabalho foi especificamente analisado pelos Professores F. K. Comparato e O. Gomes na década de setenta antes da edição da Lei das Sociedades por Ações. Ao final, expõe-se a conclusão de que o poder de controle se assemelharia a um direito de propriedade indireto. / In this thesis, it shall be contended that corporate control is equivalent to an indirect property right. As it shall be demonstrated, this would be in accordance with the difference between direct corporate control and indirect corporate control (articles 243, §2º, BCL, and 1.098, II, BCC) and with the concept of the indirect transfer of goods (article 254-A, caput and §1º, BCL) mentioned in the Brazilian legislation. In order to make this comparison, the ancient problem of the property right shall be addressed. During the research made to elaborate this thesis, it was noticed that the Brazilian law literature did not usually direct attention to old references on corporate control in Brazil. As a result, it is believed that a contribution has been made to the discussion on corporate control in Brazil with reference to these previous works. In particular, it is understood that a contribution has been made to the debate about the permanence of corporate control in light of the works of Professors W. Ferreira, J. E. Borges and C. Champaud. This last Professor is not, in fact, a Brazilian scholar, but his work has been specifically reviewed by Professors F. K. Comparato and O. Gomes during the seventies, before the Brazilian Corporation Law was enacted. In conclusion, it is argued that corporate control is similar to an indirect property right.