abstract: 当前，上市公司的盈余管理问题已是我国资本市场中普遍存在的突出问题。一般来说，一些企业为了满足资本市场对于上市、增发等条件的要求,以及为有效推动企业的并购、重组等行为的顺利实现,甚至为了谋求公司管理层的个别利益,往往运用盈余管理等举措实施公司财报及关键指标的粉饰修正，让不知情的股民蒙受一定的损失。普遍分析显示，我国股市中民营企业比其他企业遭遇的问题和压力更多、更大、更突出,因此民营企业从客观上来说拥有更强的盈余管理动机。而从当前我国资本市场的实际情况来看，我国相关专家学者对盈余管理的系统性深入研究，一般都瞄准了上市企业群体或持续亏损企业，对盈余管理的研究不系统、不全面、不深入，这将对我国进一步提升盈余管理监管水平构成一定不利影响。当前，由于我国民企在自身管理及发展动力方面的特殊性,我国民企的管理、盈余管理特点和国外上市公司还存在着很大的不同,进一步深入研究我国民企上市公司自身管理方面的突出特点，以及其对企业盈余管理等方面的深层次影响,有助于监管层对症下药，更有针对性地研究出台全新的监管措施,进一步提升管理水平。这还可以为公司发展的决策层及相关会计信息使用人员提供一定的决策参考, 因此其拥有十分重要的意义。 本文首先认真总结分析了有关上市企业治理结构和盈余管理等方面的历史文献资料，依托当前资本市场上普遍运用的委托代理、内部人控制和契约等理论，系统研究了我国民企上市公司在自身治理结构方面的突出特征以及其对盈余管理方面所构成影响的深层次原理。在此基础上，本文通过2015-2017年我国上市企业数据，基于截面Jones模型对民营企业和非民营企业盈余管理程度进行测算和比较分析，发现民营企业盈余管理程度更高；从四个层面系统研究民企公司自身的治理结构突出特点,设立回归模型论证了民营企业独特的公司治理结构特征对盈余管理程度确实会产生影响；最后,本文进一步利用修正的费尔萨姆一奥尔森估价模型对民营上市公司盈余管理有公司价值的关系进行了验证，发现两者具有显著相关性。 / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2019

<p><strong>Problem:</strong> How do the born global firms overcome challenges and sustain performance in international markets through their competences, routines, and corporate governance structure?</p><p><strong>Purpose:</strong> The purpose of this thesis is to explore the competences, routines, and corporate governance structure of born global companies, and understand their role in overcoming challenges of early internationalization and sustaining performance in international markets from early days.</p><p><strong>Method:</strong> This research is conducted as multi-disciplinary, consisting of literature from International Business and Strategic Management. Relevant data is collected through six in-depth interviews with executives of born global companies from Sweden and Norway. Qualitative analysis has been used at data analysis stage.</p><p><strong>Originality: </strong>This study contributes to literature by examining relatively neglected areas of born global companies; competences, routines, and corporate governance structure. It is also original in distilling a wide literature to explore challenges of born globals.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>Our research reveals that despite their small size and limited resources, born global companies engage in competence building and leveraging activities, establish early international routines, and construct flexible governance structures to overcome challenges and achieve performance in the global arena.</p>

Problem: How do the born global firms overcome challenges and sustain performance in international markets through their competences, routines, and corporate governance structure? Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to explore the competences, routines, and corporate governance structure of born global companies, and understand their role in overcoming challenges of early internationalization and sustaining performance in international markets from early days. Method: This research is conducted as multi-disciplinary, consisting of literature from International Business and Strategic Management. Relevant data is collected through six in-depth interviews with executives of born global companies from Sweden and Norway. Qualitative analysis has been used at data analysis stage. Originality: This study contributes to literature by examining relatively neglected areas of born global companies; competences, routines, and corporate governance structure. It is also original in distilling a wide literature to explore challenges of born globals. Conclusion: Our research reveals that despite their small size and limited resources, born global companies engage in competence building and leveraging activities, establish early international routines, and construct flexible governance structures to overcome challenges and achieve performance in the global arena.

Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2017-03-28T18:56:41Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) dissertação versão final - corrigida - biblioteca.pdf: 1221712 bytes, checksum: b2f58c09c11987847061e8feca60f1b8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-28T18:56:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) dissertação versão final - corrigida - biblioteca.pdf: 1221712 bytes, checksum: b2f58c09c11987847061e8feca60f1b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-30 / A discussão acerca dos honorários de auditoria é um tema bastante amplo na literatura nacional e internacional, porém seus estudos vem se intensificando no Brasil com a obrigatoriedade da prestação de informações por meio de Formulário de Referência da CVM ocorrida em 2009. Atrelado a isso, vem também a disponibilidade de dados em mercados mais desenvolvidos, que tem contribuído não apenas para o desenvolvimento de pesquisas acadêmicas, mas também para a própria regulação do mercado. Nesse contexto o objetivo desta dissertação foi investigar a influência da governança corporativa e estrutura de propriedade sobre os honorários da auditoria independente em empresas listadas no mercado BM&FBovespa de forma separada, analogamente às discussões já existentes. Os dados coletados abrangem o período de 2012 a 2014, porém a não disponibilidade de dados em alguns dos períodos limitou a amostra em 214 empresas. Utilizou-se um estudo de dados em painel, compreendendo o período selecionado, para responder a questão problema, onde a teoria central testada, é que a governança corporativa e a estrutura de propriedade seriam fatores determinantes dos honorários pagos os auditores independentes. Analisou-se dentro do modelo, uma variável de estrutura de propriedade de cada vez, de forma separada como proposto nesta pesquisa, sendo feito um modelo de regressão para cada variável. Os resultados permitem inferir que existe relação entre fatores de governança corporativa e estrutura de propriedades com os honorários da auditoria independe. Conclui-se que governança corporativa e estrutura de propriedade influenciam os honorários da auditoria independente, onde empresas que possuem melhores práticas de governança geram mais controles para serem auditados, aumentando os custos com auditoria independente. Em contrapartida, empresas com um elevado grau de concentração de propriedade, caracterizadas por terem maior facilidade de existência de conflitos de agência, tendem a possuir menos controles, consequentemente com menos dados a serem auditados, sendo mais fácil para o acionista majoritário fazer prevalecer seu próprio interesse, diminuindo assim os custos com auditoria independente. / The discussion of audit fees is a very broad topic in the national and international literature, but his studies has intensified in Brazil with the mandatory provision of information through CVM Reference Form held in 2009. Coupled to this, comes also the availability of data in more developed markets, which has contributed not only to the development of academic research, but also for the regulation of the market. In this context the aim of this work was to investigate the influence of corporate governance and ownership structure of the independent audit fees for companies listed on the BM & FBovespa market separately, similar to existing discussions. The collected data cover the period 2012-2014, but the non-availability of data in some of the periods limited the sample in 214 companies. We used a panel data study, comprising the selected period to answer the question problem, where the central theory tested, is that the corporate governance and ownership structure would be determinants of the fees paid to independent auditors. We analyzed within the model, a property variable structure at a time, so separated as proposed in this study, and made a regression model for each variable. Results show that there is a relationship between corporate governance factors and structural properties with the fees of the independent audit. It concludes that corporate governance and ownership structure influence the fees of the independent auditors, where companies with best governance practices generate more controls to be audited, increasing costs on independent auditing. By contrast, companies with a high degree of concentration of ownership, characterized by having greater ease of existence of agency conflicts, tend to have fewer controls, hence less data to be audited, and easier for the majority shareholder to enforce his own interest, thereby lowering costs with independent audit.

本研究旨在探討台灣上市、上櫃及公開發行及其他類型公司在不同治理單位架構下，內部稽核單位的角色是否會有所差異。本研究深入分析前項差異，藉以瞭解我國公司內部稽核之功能及其影響因素。本研究發現： 1.內部稽核協助「內部控制」、「風險管理」及「公司治理」之功能並未因公司治理單位架構的改變而有顯著差異。內部稽核功能已受到企業一定程度之重視，即使公司治理架構正處於轉型過程，內部稽核單位仍可發揮其功能。 2.設置審計委員會之公司提供較多預算及人力，有助於年度稽核計畫與業務的執行，顯示公司治理單位架構的改變，會影響稽核預算及人力配置。 3.公司設置審計委員會，有助於提升「內稽單位給予的建議更容易被採納」、「內稽單位與治理單位互動增加」、「內稽主管更多機會參與策略制定」、「內稽單位查核工作之執行更為順利」、「內稽單位獨立性增加」、「內部稽核預算增加」及「內稽單位更能協助企業進行風險管理」等七項內部稽核功能。 / This purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of a public company’s corporate governance structure on its internal audit activity’s role in Taiwan. This research analyzes the above effect to understand the functions of public companies’ internal audit activities and the factors affecting these functions. The main results of this study are as follows. 1.The internal audit’s functions of assuring "internal control", "risk management" and "corporate governance" do not show significant differences with changes in corporate governance structure. The internal audit functions are well recognized. Even if the corporate governance structure in Taiwan is in a transformation process, the internal audit activity can still fulfill its functions. 2.The company with an audit committee provides more budget and manpower to facilitate the performance of annual audit plan and related activities. That is, the changes in corporate governance structure do have an effect on the internal audit activity’s budget and staffing. 3.For the companies with audit committees, they have the following characteristics, i.e., ”internal audit activity’s recommendations are more likely to be accepted”, ”increased interaction between the internal audit activity and corporate governance members”, ”the chief internal auditor has more opportunities to participate in strategy formation”, ”the internal audit activity perform their works more smoothly”, ”higher independence for the internal audit activity”, ”higher budget for the internal audit activity”, and ”the internal audit activity can further assist the company in managing risks”.

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.