The purpose of this thesis was to conduct qualitative and semi-structured interviews with officials at the Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anticorruption Commission (FEACC) in order to describe its strategies and efforts in curbing corruption in Ethiopia. My interview questions were based on a comprehensive analytical framework, drawn from the experience of seminal scholars within the study of corruption as well as three empirical cases of successful anticorruption agencies (ACAs). Therefore, this study is a rare, bordering to unique, attempt to combine established research with empirics in order to study the Ethiopian case and by offering a method for carrying out future studies with similar aims. The result of my fieldwork paints a detailed picture of FEACC operations and their strengths and weaknesses in carrying out FEACC's mandate. Consequently, I am able to assess FEACC's capacity building needs as well as offering suggestions for future research concerning the furthering our knowledge about how to design and implement anticorruption strategies and efforts.

One research path has been to see whether the type of political regime, namely a democratic versus an authoritarian regime, influences economic growth. Much of the past literature has produced ambiguous results. But more recent studies using more sophisticated statistical techniques have often shown a positive effect of democratization upon economic growth. These studies have made welcome contributions. However, they often fail to examine how the effects of democratization could differ across countries or over time. In my dissertation, I will look more closely at how the effects of democratization could differ depending upon country characteristics - corruption and adherence to rule of law - or when democratization occurs. Chapter 1 investigates whether the association between corruption and economic growth differs between democracies and authoritarian regimes. Consider illegal corruption and legal lobbying, both forms of rent seeking, as imperfect substitutes. Suppose lobbying is easier to do in democracies. Then, lowering corruption in authoritarian regimes could have greater growth benefits because of the lower substitutability between corruption and lobbying in these countries. Using cross-country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress economic growth on: the control of corruption, the degree of democracy, and an interaction term combining the two. We find that coefficients are positive on the first two variables. However, the coefficient on the interactive term is negative, suggesting that the benefits upon growth of controlling corruption are actually greater in authoritarian regimes. Chapter 2 examines both short and long-run effects of democratization upon economic growth and measures the extent they differ. For example, democratization could initially lower economic growth due to transitional costs. Effects could then turn positive as democratic reforms take hold and provide greater freedoms to the populace. But over time, greater amounts of rent seeking could occur and so diminish benefits of democratization. Or, do other patterns rise? Utilizing difference-in-difference estimations and controlling for time and country specific fixed effects, we analyze a panel data sample of 174 countries from 1960 to 2003. Our results show that democratizations are not associated with high transitional costs. Instead, we find that democratization enhances long-run growth more in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions. Finally, we find evidence that the effects of democratization upon growth differ between partial and full democratization episodes. Chapter 3 considers whether or not democratization improves institutions that have so often been argued to increase economic growth. Utilizing a panel dataset from 1984 to 2007 for 127 countries, we examine whether democratization promotes the rule of law. We generally find a positive influence from democratization upon the rule of law although effects are strongest for sub-Saharan Africa.

Past theoretical research has explored whether bribes paid by firms to government officials are greater under a decentralized bureaucracy where the firm faces numerous government officials or under a monopolistic one. Presumably, bribes are bid down in the former as officials compete for bribes. However, a tragedy of the commons could occur where decentralized officials "overgraze" and charge higher bribes than a single bureaucrat would. Using the BEEPS I, a firm level survey covering 24 transition countries, the chapter 1 examines whether reported bribe payments by firms are higher when firms face numerous officials or only a single one. We find that bribe payments are higher under a more decentralized bureaucratic structure. In chapter 2 we investigate the link between private market competition and bribery. Greater competition could lower profits thereby limiting the amount corruption since rents are lower but greater competition could also provide more incentives for firms to pay bribes to obtain advantages over their rivals. We consider bribes to obtain government contracts. Using the BEEPS III dataset on 27 transition countries and the Censored Quantile Regression methodology we empirically found that as the number of competitors increases the amount bribes paid tend to increase as well. We also found that this relationship follows an inverted U. The marginal effect increases with the amount of bribes paid up to a maximum, then decreases, but remains positive. We believe that this relationship is driven by more competitors raising demand for these contracts. In chapter 3 we investigate the association between corruption and two types of investment. Past research focuses only on the total level of investment. Using the same dataset as used in chapter 2, we obtain mixed results. Using a tobit model, we find evidence that corruption "greases the wheels" of physical investment but has no significant effect on the level of R&D investment. However, results from a probit model suggest that corruption does negatively impact whether or not the firm undertakes R&D. These findings indicate corruption can affect not only the level but also the decision of whether to invest. They also show that these effects might differ across the type of investment so that the "grease wheels" and "sand wheels" perspectives are not incompatible as most the studies using the aggregate level of investment tend to imply.

This dissertation examines how voters react towards candidates with records of misuse of public funds in the context of sub-national elections in Brazil. Its contribution to the extant literature on corruption and electoral accountability is twofold. First, it is the first study to inquire whether voters punish candidates with malfeasance records running for both executive and legislative office in the same electoral context and whether a number of contextual factors affect electoral accountability in these offices. Second, it presents and tests new hypotheses on the type of motivation that ground voters' rejection towards corrupt candidates. In chapter 2, I examine whether voters punish candidates for mayor and city councilman with accounts rejected by the Brazilian Audit Courts and whether additional contextual factors affect electoral accountability. In particular, I study whether electoral accountability decreases as candidates (for mayor) have better records of social provision; whether local media promotes electoral accountability; and whether candidates with negative antecedents receive fewer campaign donations and are less likely to re-run. I combine large-N observational analysis, using an original dataset with candidates' accounts rejection records, with interviews with Brazilian Audit Court members and local politicians. In chapter 3 I use three online survey experiments with a convenience sample of Brazilian voters to examine whether likelihood to support a corrupt incumbent is affected by the details that subjects learn about the corruption incident. I use these additional details to inquire whether subjects are sensitive to information emphasizing the public costs of corruption, the candidate's moral misbehavior, or his illicit enrichment. Results presented in chapter 2 suggest that prior records of misuse of public funds have electoral consequences both for candidates for mayor and for city councilman. In addition, they suggest that the existence of local media does not increase electoral punishment; that public spending does not reduce electoral punishment; and that candidates with accounts rejected often receive fewer funds and are less likely to re-run. Results presented in chapter 3 suggest that voters' rejection towards corrupt candidates is stronger when they learn additional details on the candidate's ilegal enrichment.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD (Public Administration) / The pursuit of bureaucratic accountability and regulatory controls through political-administrative reforms have become problematic in contemporary public management. Public sector corruption, in particular, is identified as one of key endemic problems associated with the administrative structures, norms and processes in many states across the world. This is despite implementation of otherwise apposite accountability or regulatory reforms in public administration. More especially, in emerging economies in the global South. Using an analytical framework derived from organization theory and neo-institutionalism, this thesis examines the implementation of anti-corruption strategies as key composite of accountability reforms in public administration in Kenya. The broad objective of the study was to assess the impact of administrative culture in the implementation of anti-corruption strategies in governmental institutions, with a particular focus on how political-administrative designs, environments and culture influence compliance systems, the reporting of organizational wrongdoing, and the normalization of corruption in both the public sector and outside it. It also sought to establish the extent to which the administrative culture in public administration can influence the work of accountability institutions and the way in which they implement of anti-corruption strategies. The investigation also looked at the effect of devolution reforms on accountability systems at the level of local government and the complexities in inter-governmental coordination and control to which this has given rise.

No description available.

1 Abstract This thesis 'Prevention and control of corrupt conduct in the Czech Republic' suggests its aim and issues directly from its title. The corruption is still actual phenomenon that has been regularly mentioned in the media in recent years and remains opened for further research and discussion. There is no doubt that the need for another analysis exists. Only effective and continuous effort to prevent and control corruption can lead to reduction of crime rate and another negative impacts caused by corruption. The impacts of corruption mean not only administering punishments to the persons taking part in corruption but it is also possible to register economic impacts. Moreover, the corruption has adverse effects on our civic society represented by inauspicious influence on public opinion regarding the trust of population in the public administration, state policy or fair, just, equitable and impartial judicial ruling and deciding of other national institutions. This thesis deals with corruption using mostly criminological point of view. However, it was also necessary to use criminal substantive and procedural law knowledge. The corruption is a phenomenon that influences all society to the core, despite the fact that the most of our society is convinced that corruption is prejudicial. It was also...

In this study, I search to explore whether the effect of Protestantism on the level of corruption(understood as the misuse of public power for private gain) withstand when controlled forsecularism. This is done via a series of multiple regression analysis which conclude that theeffect of Protestantism on the perceived level of corruption persists when controlling forsecularism. Though the effect is greatly diminished, even when controlling for classicaleconomic factors. The level of secularization remains statistically significant when predictingthe perceived corruption. / <p>2017-06-01</p>

M.A. / none / Prof. D. J. Geldenhuys

This study examines if the media have an impact on the judiciary. A longitudinal dataset of media coverage is related to Supreme Court of India corruption case decisions during the time period 2001-2010. The study investigates two phenomena: media agenda setting on the issue of corruption and its impact on court decisions through priming judges to give harsher sentences and Pre-Trial Publicity (PTP) and its impact on court decisions. In the first level of analysis, agenda setting research on impact of issue salience is extended to the realm of the judiciary, looking at if increased issue salience of corruption has an impact on court decisions. The findings reveal that media coverage prior to a court decision primes judges to give harsher verdicts in corruption cases. For the second phenomena looking at PTP effects on judges, quantitative analysis centered on whether varying amount of PTP matters. The findings were statistically insignificant pointing towards no PTP impact on court decisions. The qualitative case study analysis focused on the tone of PTP coverage and provides an explanation for this result pointing towards neutral PTP. This finding further provides evidence of why PTP coverage does not have an impact on court decisions, since the media do not lobby for particular outcomes in individual corruption cases.