This thesis attempts to convince Air Force leadership to shift its approach to expeditionary airpower in counterinsurgency (COIN) from one that emphasizes advanced technology for striking targets to one which focuses on airmen to influence indigenous populations. Judging history, airpower will certainly play a supporting role in any effort to quell insurgency through reconnaissance, airlift, and close air support. Thus, wherever the American military deploys for COIN, the Air Force will not only operate, but will also deploy substantial numbers of expeditionary airmen. This forward presence of American airmen at expeditionary airbases enables the Air Force to participate in pacification where it most counts on the ground, in the surrounding community, and among the indigenous population. To contribute more fully, airmen must comprehend the nature of insurgency to reveal the unique challenges it poses for airpower. To meet these challenges, airmen must develop an appropriate strategic framework for waging COIN so as to correctly shape the expeditionary Air Force by exploiting its own human capital to solve human problems. By bolstering its aviation advisors and security forces, and creating its own cadre of civil affairs airmen, the Air Force can most significantly improve its effectiveness in COIN.

This thesis explores organizational features, which facilitate counterinsurgency operations on a company level. The framework used is the infantry company. Two factors were found through literature studies to be extra important for conducting successful counterinsurgency operations: intelligence and presence. Regarding intelligence, the results show beneficial effects from organizing a company level intelligence cell. The recommended size is three individuals. The next factor, presence, originates from the concept of maintaining a persistent presence as opposed to conducting raids in the assigned area of operations. Here, a force structure of four subordinates at both company and platoon level was found to be effective. Further, a Swedish and an Austrian European Union Battlegroup company was studied and compared to each other from the previously found aspects. Next, the two companies receive suggestions for how to reorganize themselves with the already existing personnel and equipment available. In the final part, the thesis discusses the structural rigidity of military organizations evident in the lack of organizational adaption to counterinsurgency even though such operations have been conducted in the past, present and most certainly will be a part of the future. / <p>Erasmus</p><p>Received award for best thesis.</p>

This dissertation is an examination of the UK’s counter-terrorism policies and practices that have been adopted since the attacks of 9/11 in the United States. Using a theoretical framework of ‘power’ and ‘hegemony’ to guide the research, and an investigative research approach, the dissertation examines how the UK has, in the name of confronting an ideologically and religiously motivated global opponent, enacted a two pronged approach that integrates key aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. The first ties into the use of ‘coercion’ that is undertaken under the policy heading of ‘Pursue’ and covers activities that revolve around the use of policing, military, juridical and executive powers to investigate, prosecute and take preventative and pre-emptive action against suspected terrorists and the second ties into the use of ‘propaganda’ and ‘communication’ that is undertaken through the ‘Prevent’ policy, which attempts to challenge and counter those individuals who do not promulgate unlawful or violent views but support al-Qaida’s grievances and ideology and are thus claimed to be more likely to become involved in terrorism. In order to inform Prevent activity, information and intelligence – a cardinal principle of counterinsurgency – is a prerequisite. This dissertation therefore shows how intelligence and information is collected and used by examining Prevent activity at UK universities. It then proceeds to contextualise counter-terrorism policy and practice through an examination of counterinsurgency doctrine, and in particular, ‘strategic communication’. The dissertation argues that the integration of key elements of counterinsurgency doctrine into counter-terrorism policy and practice suggests that the policy, rather than being a mere response to terrorism, is an organised and strategic effort to use coercion and propaganda to control the behaviour and activity of Muslim communities and thereby constitutes a form of state-terrorism.

<p>Inom ramen för ISAF genomförs nu en massiv utbildningsinsats i counterinsurgency, detta för att den nya strategin som tillämpas skall få stort genomslag. Den doktrin som används vid utbildning och vid genomförande är den amerikanska FM 3-24. Den bygger på flera andra doktriner, men är som egen helhet ny och relativt oprövad.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om faktorer i doktrinens operationslinjer bidrar till framgång. Detta görs genom att besvara frågan: I vilken utsträckning var det faktorer som framgår av FM 3-24 ”logiska operationslinjer” som gav framgång vid försvenskningen av Skånelandskapen?</p><p>Designen för undersökningen är en fallstudie, där operationslinjerna i doktrinen har översatts och operationaliserats och sedan jämförts med ett urval av litteratur om försvenskningen av Skånelandskapen.</p><p>Resultatet stödjer att utifrån detta enskilda fall leder användandet av FM 3-24 operationslinjer till ökad sannolikhet för framgång. Vilket ger en ökad legitimitet i doktrinens nyttjande. Uppsatsen har även ett underliggande syfte, att påvisa att det finns svenskt nationellt exempel på COIN.</p>

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Kalev Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-89). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Hy S. Rothstein, Kalev K. Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 162-175). Also available online.

Idag är det flera teoretiker inom counterinsurgency (COIN) arenan som har uppfattningen att entusiasmen för klassisk COIN teori är missriktad. Flera menar att dagens insurgent grupper skiljer sig markant från de som har verkat tidigare då dagens konflikter är mera komplexa. En av dessa är den australiske counterinsurgency officeren David Kilcullen. Han har utvecklat en teori eller ramverk som bygger på tre pelare nämligen säkerhet, politik och ekonomi. Dessa tre pelare måste utvecklas parallellt och är lika viktiga för att nå framgång i en COIN operation. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om Frankrikes misslyckande i Algeriet kriget 1954-62 kan förklaras utifrån Kilcullens moderna teori med tre pelare modellen för upprorsbekämpning. Efter erfarenheter från kriget i Indokina hade fransmännen utvecklat en COIN doktrin som de kallade "counterrevolutionary warfare". Denna doktrin innebar att counterinsurgency styrkorna inte bara skulle fokusera på militära medel utan dessa skulle kombineras med politiska och ekonomiska åtgärder för att slå ner ett uppror. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att fransmännen utnyttjade en tre delad strategi bestående av militära, ekonomiska och politiska medel för att försöka vinna över den lokala muslimska befolkningen från upprorsmakarnas sida. Undersökningen visar vidare att på den taktiska och operativa nivån hade doktrinen framgång, men på den strategiska nivån när FLN lyckades göra konflikten internationell genom att visa på franska säkerhetsstyrkors övervåld, nyttjande av tortyr och omflyttning av befolkningen minskade Frankrikes legitimitet att fortsätta konflikten och till slut lämnade fransmännen Algeriet. Studien har visat att det går att förklara Frankrikes misslyckade insats i Algeriet utifrån Kilcullens COIN teori och att en modern COIN teori kan appliceras på ett gammalt krig.

Thesis (M.S. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Tollefson, Scott. Second Reader: Teti, Frank. "June 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on March 23, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): Low Intensity Conflict, Counterinsurgency, El Salvador, Theses. Author(s) subject terms: Low-Intensity Conflict, Counterinsurgency, El Salvador, US LIC Strategy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 211-216). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hy Rothstein. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-81). Also available online.

Thesis (M. P. A.)--Texas State University-San Marcos, 2009. / "Spring 2009." Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-114).