This article seeks to explore the present language scenario in courts of law. The article makes use of section 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), as a point of departure. At face value this section seems to entrench the language rights of individuals. This would mean that individuals could request trials to be held in their mother tongues, with fluent and competent speakers of that mother tongue sitting on the bench. However, this has not materialised. Contrary to popular opinion, the article argues that individual language rights are to some extent entrenched in the Constitution, but there are no mechanisms to secure such rights in the public domain. The article argues that it is often only language privileges that are preserved in institutions such as the justice system. Legally speaking, there is an obligation on the State to provide interpreters to facilitate access to all eleven official languages in courts of law. This in itself presents numerous challenges. The article argues further that the corollary to this is that there is very little space for intercultural communication in courts of law (as defined by Ting-Toomey, 1999, and Gibson, 2002). There has been little or no capacity building in this regard. It is English, to some extent Afrikaans, and the western cultural paradigm, which prevails. The result is further communication breakdown and language intolerance. In this article, the notion of language rights in courts of law is explored against the backdrop of existing theories of intercultural communication.

The issue of the enforcement of judgments in family cases is a topical issue in our society, since the various changes this legal area has recently experienced. The main change in the procedural field was the separation of so-called undisputed proceedings into a new Act on Special court proceedings, while the Civil Procedure Code remained a subsidiary act. This new Act also contains the sole regulation of the enforcement proceeding in cases relating to domestic violence and in cases of child custody, since these two areas are the most distinct from the enforcement of other pecuniary and non-pecuniary performance. In the first two chapters, the thesis focuses on the background of the enforcement proceedings as well as on its development, principles and functions. The second chapter ends with the outline of the enforcement in the Act on Special court proceedings. The third chapter deals with the enforcement of judgements in domestic violence cases, focusing particularly on the Police Eviction Instrument and the Special Preliminary ruling on the Protection against Domestic Violence. Their subsequent enforcement is then evaluated and analyzed. The fourth chapter focuses on the legal regulation of the child custody, with an emphasis on the comparison of the different modes of enforcing the decisions, as...

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:21:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 10 / Nenhuma / As reflexões alinhadas no presente trabalho poderiam ser resumidas na seguinte pergunta: o que a teoria do Direito de Ronald Dworkin, filtrada pela Crítica Hermenêutica do Direitode Lenio Streck, tem a dizer sobre o processo jurisdicional (civil) que se pratica no Brasil? Dworkin desenvolveu a noção, por todos conhecida, de que há, nos quadros de um Direito democraticamente produzido, uma “única resposta correta” (the one right answer) para cada um dos casos que o interpelam. Movia-lhe,desde o início, o propósito de identificar os direitos (principalmente, os individuais) que as pessoas realmente têm num ambiente democrático, e o entendimento de que o “tribunal” deveria torná-los, o quanto possível, acessíveis aos seus titulares. Agora, dezenas de anos depois, e no Brasil, vem Lenio Luiz Streck e afirma serem não só possíveis, mas também necessárias as tais “respostas corretas” em Direito. Esta pesquisa propõe-se a compreender melhor estas mensagens (tanto a de Dworkin como a de Streck) e a, com elas, conduzir uma reflexão sobre o processo jurisdicional brasileiro, que deverá ser redefinido a partir da necessidade de proporcionar a produção das tais “respostas corretas” em Direito. Trabalhar com “respostas corretas em Direito” implica reconhecer o acentuado grau de autonomia por este atingido, desde a assunção de um perfil não-autoritário (neoconstitucionalismo). Implica, portanto, entre outras coisas, reconhecer que o Direito é (bem) mais do que aquilo que os juízes dizem que ele é. As boas respostas são do Direito, compreendido como integridade, e não do juiz, individualmente considerado. De modo que uma compreensão hermenêutica do processo civil brasileiro, comprometida com estas noções todas, deverá dar conta de quebrar o “dogma” do protagonismo judicial (movimento de expansão dos poderes e liberdades do juiz na condução e solução das causas que chegam ao “tribunal”). Levar o Direito a sério, pois, é dissolver, no paradigma hermenêutico, a subjetividade do julgador em meio à intersubjetividade que é própria de um Estado Democrático. No âmbito do processo, levar o Direito a sério determina o compartilhamento decisório entre os sujeitos processuais, que deverão argumentar em favor de direitos, e em prol da construção da teoria que melhor justifique, principiologicamente, o Direito como um todo. O mínimo que se exige para que esse ideal seja atingido é a garantia de que o procedimento seja desenvolvido em efetivo contraditório, de modo que os argumentos das partes sejam decisivos para a construção da decisão judicial (o que se verificará, substantivamente, desde a exigência de uma fundamentação “completa” do provimento jurisdicional, que abranja não só os argumentos vencedores, mas também as razões pelas quais foram rejeitados os argumentos em sentido contrário). Por fim, o ato sentencial, para que reflita uma “resposta correta”, deverá espelhar um entendimento compartilhado não só entre os sujeitos processuais, mas também com os juízes do passado (história jurídico institucional exitosa). / The reflections aligned in this work could be summarized in the following question: what does the Ronald Dwokin ́s theory of law, filtered by the Lenio Streck’s Hermeneutics Critical of Law, has to say about the (civil) court process which is practiced in Brazil? Dworkin has developed the concept, known by all, that there is, at the tables of a democratically constituted law, a “single correct answer” (the one right answer) for each one of the cases that reaches the forum. He was moved, from the beginning, by the purpose of identifying the rights (especially, the individual ones) that people really have at a democratic environment, and the understanding that the “court” should make these rights, as much as possible, accessible to their holders. Now, after dozens of years, in Brazil, comes Lenio Luiz Streck and says that those “right answers” are not only possible, but also necessary in Law. This research aims to better understand these messages (both Dworkin’s and Streck’s) and, with them, lead a discussion about the brazilian judicial process, which should be redefined from the need to provide the production of such “right answers” in Law. Working with “right answers in Law” means to recognize the strong degree of autonomy that Law has achieved, since the assumption of a non-authoritarian profile (neoconstitucionalism). Therefore, it implies, amongst other things, that Law is (far) more than what judges say it is. Good answers are the ones given by the Law, understood as integrity, not by the judge, individually considered. So that a hermeneutic understanding of Brazilian procedural law, committed to all these concepts, should be able to break the “dogma” of the judicial protagonism (movement that expands the powers and freedoms of the judge in the conduction and settlement of cases that come to the “court”). Therefore, in the hermeneutic paradigm, to take Law seriously is to dissolve the subjectivity of judging in the intersubjectivity that characterizes the Democratic State. In the midst of the process, taking Law seriously implies sharing the decision between the procedural actors, which should argue in favor of rights, and for the construction of the theory that best justifies, by principles, Law as a whole. The minimum that is required for this ideal to be achieved is to guarantee the procedure to be developed in effective contradictory, so that the parties' arguments are decisivefor the construction of the court’s decision (which should be confirmed, substantively, from the requirement of a “complete” reasoning of the judicial decision, covering not only the winning arguments, but also the reasons why the arguments in the opposite direction were rejected). At last, the final decision, in order to reflect a “correct answer”, should mirror a shared understanding amongst not only the procedural actors, but also between them and the judges from the past (successful juridical and institutional history).

The issue of the enforcement of judgments in family cases is of a specific nature and differs from the enforcement of other civil law decisions by the specific legal regulation and the nature of the subject matter of the enforcement of decisions, where the subject matter are persons, especially minors, and not thed pecuniary and non-pecuniary performance as in other cases of enforcement. In connection with the recodification of private substantive law, a new Act No. 292/2013 Coll., on Special court proceedings, which contains special legal regulations on the enforcement of judgments in matters of protection against domestic violence and in matters of custody of minors, was adopted. At the same time, Act No. 99/1963 Coll., The Code of Civil Procedure, was novelized and remained a subsidiary act. This thesis deals with special procedures for the enforcement of judgements in family cases, which we find in the second part of the fifth section of the Special court proceedings Act. In the first chapter, the thesis deals with the issue of civil proceedings, the enforcement proceedings and execution of decisions, with emphasis on its development, principles, functions and legal regulations. The second chapter focuses on the enforcement of judgements in family cases and on their specifics. The third chapter...

Language rights in South Africa are entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa (Chapter 1, Section 6, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). However, the concomitant infrastructure and organisational realities make this policy difficult to implement, especially in law courts (Kaschula and Ralarala 2004). Creating effective communicative environments has historically been constrained by lack of effective training of legal practitioners and by the lack of capacity for building translation structures. With the advancement of technology, potential solutions are becoming more apparent and it is incumbent upon the academic community to embark on a rigorous investigation into possible solutions and how these Information Communication Technology (ICT) solutions could be applied to the execution of justice in South African law courts. This article aims to open the discourse of possible solutions, via assessments of computer based translation solutions, ICT context simulations and other potential opportunities. The authors hope to initiate the interest of other language and legal practitioners to explore how the new technological capabilities could be harnessed to support the entrenchment of language rights in our law courts.

The law of civil procedure is an important branch of South African law as it resolves individual civil disputes through a regulated judicial system. Mandatory statutes and rules regulate the processes when bringing disputes to court. For example, the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, regulates the superior courts, while the provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, as well as the Small Claims Court Act 61 of 1984, control the lower courts. Further, a series of court rules ensure efficient operation of different courts and support the overarching legislation. For example, the Constitutional Court Rules, Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Uniform Rules of Court, Magistrates’ Courts’ Rules, and the Rules of Small Claims Court support the implementation of legislation. The researcher submits, however, that the current legislative provisions, and their enabling rules, are not fully complementing the Electronic Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 and are thereby impeding the growth of e-technology law in South Africa. Put differently, they do not embrace the use of e-technology and digital devices. It appears that in future civil proceedings will occur electronically through digital and e-technology devices. Present legislation does not cater for this practical reality. This calls for South African courts to, for example, install satellite devices that will ease the use of e- technology in civil proceedings. The researcher avers that there have been attempts by the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal to enable electronic communication through their websites, but this is insufficient to effectively implement the provisions of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 especially insofar as service of process. The courts have effectively moved away from the decision in Narlis v SA Bank of Athens, which excluded computer-generated evidence and there have been attempts by South African courts in recent decisions to appreciate the use of e-technology. For example, in CMC Woodworking Machinery v Odendaal Kitchens the court, for the first time, acknowledged service of court papers via Facebook. Further, in Spring Forest Trading v Wilbery, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that electronic communication such e-mail, can be used to cancel agreements, even where parties incorporated a non-variation clause into the agreement. However, there is an urgent need to review and amend South African statutes and rules to fully acknowledge the fact that e-technology is a constantly evolving modern reality. Therefore, South African laws and rules ought to be in-line with e-technology developments and competitive with international jurisdictions such as England, the United States of America and Canada. The rules of these jurisdictions realise the use of e-technology and digital e-technology, particularly in England where a pilot project that facilitates the use of e-technology and digital e-technology in civil proceedings, is already in place. The time has come to fully employ e-technology and digital e- technology law within South African law of civil procedure. This research investigates the possibility, and practical implications, thereof. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D.

La justice pénale a historiquement, et à juste titre, été l’affaire de l’État. Octroyer à l’autorité publique le monopole de l’administration de la justice permet entre autres d’harmoniser les rapports sociaux tout en assurant une réponse structurée et dépersonnalisée au phénomène criminel. La confiance du public dans sa capacité d’accomplir judicieusement cette tâche est cruciale au maintien de ce monopole. Certaines réalités découlant du contexte médiatique moderne mettent toutefois en lumière une certaine crise de confiance du public dans l’appareil judiciaire et contribuent à déposséder l’État de son monopole sur l’administration de la justice pénale. Nous estimons que la télédiffusion des procédures judiciaires pénales de première instance est un des moyens par lesquels l’autorité publique peut rapatrier ce monopole. Ce mémoire s’intéressa à certains aspects de ces questions. / The State has historically overseen criminal justice, and with good reason. Delegating to state authorities full and exclusive administration of criminal justice ensures social harmony and allows for a structured and depersonalised response to crime. Public confidence in its ability to effectively do so is however crucial. The current media environment has contributed to a crisis of confidence in the system, depriving the State of its monopoly. We believe televising court proceedings and making them widely available to the public is one of the ways by which the State can strengthen confidence and reaffirm its legitimate control on the administration of criminal justice.