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Unelected bureaucrats make a broad range of important policy decisions raising concerns of accountability in a democratic society. Many classics in the literature highlight the need to understand agency decisions at stages prior to the final vote by agency appointees, but few studies of the bureaucracy do so. To this point, scholars have treated the issue of shirking as one where laziness and inefficiency are the driving forces. However, it is more realistic to expect that shirking comes in the form of ideological resistance by administrators. I develop a theory that the independence afforded to the bureaucracy is functionally comparable to that of the judiciary, allowing for the insertion of individual attitudinal preferences by bureaucrats. Drawing from the attitudinal model of judicial research, I look at whether attitudes affect the decision making of administrative law judges at the National Labor Relations Board, the influence administrative law judge decisions have on reviewing bodies, and whether attitudinal decision making can be controlled by external political and legal actors. Results demonstrate that Democratic judges are more likely than Republican judges to rule for labor in unfair labor practice cases, administrative law judge decisions provide the basis for subsequent decisions of reviewing bodies, and that few political and legal controls exist over this set of bureaucrats. This research provides evidence that lower level bureaucrats make decisions based on their own political preferences and that these preferences have far ranging consequences for policy and law.

The attitudinal model of judicial behavior dominates judicial politics scholarship, including studies of federal courts and agencies. Extant research finds limited support for legal constraints as determinants of judge behavior when agency decisions are under review. Attitudinal scholars suggest judges substitute their policy preferences in place of agency preferences. Contrarily, the legal model suggests judges defer to agencies because of procedures and doctrine rooted in the rule of law. This study tests hypotheses predicting whether federal agency review decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals during 1982-2002 are a function of judges‘ attitudes, namely ideology, or a function of legal constraints, including agency adherence to legally prescribed procedures and agency passing standard-of-review muster. Using logistic regression, I examine the impact of legal and ideological variables on the outcome of judges‘ reviews of agency decisions. Results support several hypotheses. Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act, increases the likelihood that a review panel will defer to the agency. If review panels and judges answer standard-of-review questions favorably toward agencies, review panels and judges are more likely to support agencies in final case outcomes. Individual judge votes to support agencies are influenced by the ideology of other judges on the review panel: if the ideology of the review panel is in agreement with the agency position, individual judges are more likely to support agencies in final case outcomes. Finally, a judge is more likely to dissent when he/she is in ideological (dis)agreement with the agency position. In sum, results suggest that judges‘ regard for law and regard for their judge colleagues informs decisionmaking. Judges often defer to federal administrative agencies, even when their personal policy preferences are not found to be significantly associated with decisions. Judges‘ ideological preferences appear to be less important in the U.S. Courts of Appeals than previous scholarship indicates, but ideology may influence judges‘ decisions through the ideological composition of the review panel and in dissent behavior. The implication is that the legal model of judicial behavior may be more prominent than the attitudinal model in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

Background: The Swedish penal code has viewed self-induced temporary insanity, caused by intoxication, depending on which Sociology of Punishment is currently active. Starting from a lenient view of drug-induced insanity in the Middle Ages towards a harsher penal climate today.  Aims: This thesis aims to investigate how the Courts of Appeals views self-induced temporary insanity. Specifically, the investigation highlights how the courts navigate between the conflicting rationalities governing criminal intent on the one hand and drug abuse on the other. Results: A thematic analysis using NVivo showed that the Court of Appeals verdicts are inconsistent regarding sentencing when addiction is involved. The results also show a lack of knowledge about addiction as an illness within the Court of Appeals and that the courts sentence substance abusers much harder than others with temporary insanity. The thesis concludes that the Rule of Law is at risk when inconsistent verdicts are commonplace.

Based on society's established norms, girls and boys are expected to behave differently. Certain behaviours are also differently accepted due to gender. This makes it possible to question if the principle of the best interests of the child in cases regarding The Compulsory Care of Young Persons Act (1990:52) (LVU), applies in the gender-neutral way that it's intended to do. To answer this, we have collected data through “collection of materials''. More specifically, we have used cases from a sample of administrative courts and courts of appeals which all deal with 3§ LVU. The data has been analysed through the method “qualitative content analysis” in which different patterns could be read out. The main conclusion of our study is that girls tend to be judged more harshly than boys. The courts assessments in girl cases/judgments includes factors that in boys cases/judgments goes unnoticed, like factors related to mental illness and self-harm. Another conclusion is that the principle creates space for many different interpretations which includes gender norms upon application of the 3§ LVU. When the principle is gender neutral, like it's intended to do, a discrimination because of sex can be hidden.