Dissertation--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität Trier, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 261-269.

Texte remanié de: Dissertation--Fachbereich Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaft--Hamburg, 2003. Titre de soutenance : Das "Alphabetum vulgaris linguae Graecae" des deutschen Humanisten Martin Crusius (1526-1607) : Entstehungsgeschichte, Beschreibung der griechischen Informanten und ihrer Zusammenarbeit mit Crusius : Teilausgabe des aus Befragung von Informanten stammenden Materials. / Bibliogr. p. 353-378.

Prior to attacking a Wal-Mart in El Paso, Texas, Patrick Crusius posted a manifesto on the notorious 8chan website in which he justifies his attack as a self-defensive response to the “Hispanic invasion of Texas.” While this manifesto certainly contains the irrationality necessary to justify mass murder, it also repeats and reinforces language and worldviews present in public discourse, especially in discourse from white nationalists. Analyzing the Crusius manifesto in context of this white nationalist public discourse reveals how language used and worldviews perpetuated by white nationalists ultimately construct an apocalyptic meta-narrative that transforms immigrants and refugees into dangerous invaders. By repeatedly telling stories that frame immigrants or refugees as criminals, invaders, and terrorists, white nationalists have constructed a meta-narrative that subsumes localized narratives, which means that any story about an immigrant seeking refuge in the United States becomes a story of an invader and criminal. Crusius repeats and reinforces this meta-narrative in his manifesto, drawing on the foundational white-nationalist French scholar Renaud Camus, whose “Great Replacement” theory claims that non-white populations are systematically replacing white populations, leading to a “white genocide.” Ultimately, the apocalypse in this meta-narrative is not a violent, devastating end to the United States, but rather the end of a structure dominated by whiteness and Western culture. It’s this perceived apocalypse that inspires Crusius’ violent response. Ultimately, this meta-narrative capitalizes on fear to transform genuine love of nation into a volatile xenophobia that can encourage a perceived need for violent self-defense. On the scholarly front, this research may reinforce the suggestion of scholar Dana Cloud, who claims that scholars and rhetors cannot challenge white nationalist irrationality with a rational approach, but rather with localized narratives that ground the experiences of immigrants and refugees in concrete details that foster empathy and understanding.

Cette thèse de doctorat vise à traiter de l’influence des activités de l’Académie de Berlin sur la réflexion métaphysique de Kant durant la période précritique. Dans le premier chapitre, nous tentons de déterminer l’influence sur la Monadologia physica des activités qui ont eu lieu durant le concours sur les monades de l’Académie de Berlin. Nous considérons d’abord la controverse entre Euler et Formey avant de traiter de la réponse du gagnant du concours, Justi. On constate notamment que l’explication kantienne des propriétés de l’étendue à partir des forces internes et essentielles de la monade semble répondre aux objections qu’ont formulées Euler et Justi contre l’explication wolffienne de la génération de l’étendue à partir de l’ordre des éléments. Dans le second chapitre, nous explorons les différentes positions méthodologiques défendues par Formey, Maupertuis, Euler et Kant. Bien que la plupart des travaux de l’Académie de Berlin que nous étudions paraissent entre 1745 et 1756, la tenue d’un concours en 1763 sur l’évidence des vérités de la théologie et de la morale montre bien l’importance que revêt pour les académiciens l’enjeu de la justification des doctrines métaphysiques. L’analyse de la réponse kantienne permet de voir un lien avec le concours sur les monades dans la mesure où Kant a jugé opportun de rappeler comment la méthode analytique qu’il préconise permet de valider les conclusions qu’il a tirées dans la Monadologia physica. Finalement, nous étudions, dans le troisième chapitre, les positions de Formey, Maupertuis et Kant sur des problèmes d’ordre théologique à partir des considérations méthodologiques du chapitre précédent. Nous constatons alors que Kant tient une position originale qui le place à mi-chemin de Formey et de Maupertuis. S’il est d’accord avec Formey sur la rigueur logique et démonstrative que doit avoir un argument théologique, il ne juge pas cela indispensable. Sur ce point, Kant priorise, à l’instar de Maupertuis, la conviction sur la certitude démonstrative. / This thesis aims to deal with the influence of the activities of the Berlin Academy on the metaphysical thought of Kant during the precritical period. In the first chapter, we try to determine the influence on the Monadologia physica of the activities that took place during the prize essay competition on monads of the Berlin Academy. We first consider the controversy between Euler and Formey before discussing the essay of the winner, Justi. We note in particular that the Kantian explanation of the properties of extension from the internal and essential forces of the monad seems to answer the objections of Euler and Justi against the Wolffian explanation of the generation of extension from the order of elements. In the second chapter, we explore the different methodological positions defended by Formey, Maupertuis, Euler and Kant. Although most of the works from the Berlin Academy that we are studying are concentrated between 1745 and 1756, the holding in 1763 of a competition on the evidence of the truths of theology and morals, four years after the death of Maupertuis, suggests that the issue of the justification of metaphysical doctrines is still a central concern within the institution. The analysis of the Kantian response allows us to see a link with the competition on the monads insofar as he deems it appropriate to show that the results of his Monadologia physica are justified by his analytical method. Finally, we study, in the third chapter, the positions of Formey, Maupertuis and Kant on some theological problems from the methodological considerations of the second chapter. We can then see that Kant holds an original position which places him halfway between Formey and Maupertuis. If he agrees with Formey on the logical and demonstrative rigor that a theological argument must have, he does not consider this essential. On this point, Kant prioritizes, like Maupertuis, conviction over demonstrative certainty.

In dieser Arbeit werden vier zwischen 1712 und 1755 entstandene Kritiken von Leibniz’ Optimismus-Lehre der ‚besten aller möglichen Welten‘, wie diese in der Theodizee (1710) vorgestellt wird, dargestellt und kritisch untersucht. Nach der Meinung etlicher Kommentatoren wurde Leibniz’ philosophischer Optimismus erst nach dem Erdbeben von Lissabon 1755 und Voltaires Angriffen zum Ziel gewichtiger Kritiken seitens Philosophen und Theologen. Gegen dieses geläufige Bild zeigt diese Dissertation, dass jene Kritiken sehr bald nach der Veröffentlichung der Theodizee kamen, und dass zentrale Thesen des Leibniz’schen Optimismus schon in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jh. Gegenstand philosophiegeschichtlich bedeutender Polemiken waren. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Kritik an Leibniz’ Gottesbegriff – der in dieser Arbeit als ‚intellektualistisch‘ bezeichnet wird – eine fundamentale Rolle spielt, und dass ein beträchtlicher Teil des Konflikts zwischen dem Optimismus und dem frühen ‚Gegen-Optimismus‘ durch den Konflikt zwischen Intellektualismus und Voluntarismus erklärt werden kann. / This work describes and examines four critical reviews, all of them written between 1712 and 1755, of Leibniz’s theory of optimism or the system of ‘the best of all possible worlds’, as it is presented in the Theodicy (1710). Several commentators state that the first important criticisms of Leibnizian philosophical optimism by philosophers and theologians came only after the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 and Voltaire’s subsequent attacks. In opposition to this standard picture, this dissertation shows that criticisms emerged very soon after the publication of Theodicy, and that central theses of Leibniz’s optimism were already the target of significant philosophical criticisms in the first half of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the criticism of Leibniz’s concept of God – a concept described here as ‘intellectualist’ – plays a fundamental role, and that a considerable part of the conflict between optimism and early ‘counter-optimism’ can be explained by referring to the conflict between intellectualism and voluntarism.