This research study used negative binomial regression to examine the individual and interactive effects of deterrence and procedural justice on frequency of offending counts among serious juvenile offenders. To test the research question, this study utilized the Pathways to Desistance study to test the efficacy of the integration of deterrence theory and procedural justice theory. Deterrence theory is grounded in the classical school of criminology and its rational choice perspective. It argues that individuals will weigh the costs and benefits associated with a criminal act and choose to act in such a manner that will maximize benefits and minimize costs (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). A growing body of research suggests that fairness (i.e., procedural justice) process within the criminal justice process can be effective in the fight against crime, disorder, and recidivism. Procedural justice, sometimes referred to as procedural fairness, refers to perceived fairness within the criminal justice process, even when outcomes are not viewed as favorable (Gold & Bradley, 2013). It accomplishes this by fostering a “buy-in” to laws and directives that enhances cooperation and consent.Because laws are only as good as our ability to enforce them, substituting procedural justice for deterrence would essentially remove the teeth from such laws. However, that does not preclude the development of a theoretical integration of the two. Specifically, such an integration might be more effective in reducing crime and disorder than each would be able to achieve on its own. To test the research question, this study integrated the theories of deterrence and procedural justice and examined whether the additive interaction of procedural justice and deterrence predicted decreased offending counts to a greater extent than what was obtained separately.Study results indicated that overall, deterrence, procedural justice, and their interaction all predicted decreases in offending. That said, overall findings suggested their interaction more consistently supported decreases in offending. That said, study findings also suggested that deterrence was driving the predictions of decreased frequency of offending counts with procedural justice playing a supportive role. Thus, the recommendation is that procedural justice should be integrated into the current deterrence framework. This can be accomplished through training criminal justice actors in the nuances of procedural justice that can be incorporated into their interactions with citizens to foster immediate acceptance and long-term compliance.

No description available.

Recent research literatures focused on the development and principles of using nuclear weapons in People Republic of China(PRC). For instance, the one-sidely withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States, the construction of ballistic missile defense system, the value of capability of hitting power for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and persistence of outer space weapons development. Most of them studied the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and highlighted the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the principle of using nuclear weapons, and the deterrence strategy, rare did research focus on the integrative nuclear weapons strategy. The study aims to analyze PRC nuclear weapons strategy including nuclear weapons policies, the principles of use, approaches of deterrence, approaches and objects of hitting, methods of commend and control, and policies of controlling nuclear arms. Moreover, the study foresees the future of PRC nuclear weapons strategy based on the analysis of the similarity of the development of nuclear weapons strategy in main countries on the global, the influence of inner and outer factors to nuclear weapons strategy, the situation of PRC¡¦s abiding by international regimes about nuclear weapons, related research literatures with regard to the challenge of PRC nuclear weapons strategy, and the associations between both the development of outer space military and nuclear weapons strategy.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.B.S.)--Multnomah Graduate School of Ministry, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-97).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 239-246).

The main purpose of the current study is to evaluate the deterrent effects of the two juvenile law revisions in Japan. The time series data of delinquency rates in Japan (1965-2014) are investigated through auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) modeling. Results demonstrates that there are insignificant deterrent effects of the revisions on the whole juvenile delinquencies, repeat offenses, or murder cases, after controlling for serial dependency and other factors. In terms of practical implications, these results suggest that the public and politicians should acknowledge that harsher policies are less likely to deter juvenile delinquency. While the current macro-level analysis is informative in that it provides a big picture of delinquency in a society, further research efforts are needed to explain why the law revisions failed to deter juvenile delinquency.

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory: unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as "persuading the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism." It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor's population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents' military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the aggressor's military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a considerably stronger opponent. This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog's victory in war. Two case studies: (1) the Vietnam War of 1964-73 and (2) the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 are explored as examples of the weak denying the strong their objectives.

Quite apart from its apparent political obsolescence, the policy of nuclear deterrence is vulnerable to attack for its seemingly obvious immorality. Nuclear war is blatantly immoral, and nuclear deterrenec requires a genuine intention to resort to the nuclear retaliation which would precipitate such a war. Therefore, since it is wrong to intend that which is wrong to do, deterrence is immoral. This thesis seeks to examine the nature of the deterrent intention as a means of verifying the soundness of the above deontological argument. This examination is carried out by first suggesting an acceptable notion of intention in general and then, after analysing the views of deterrent intention by other writers, proceeding to demonstrate the uniqueness of that intention. Having done this, and having explored the possibility that deterrence need not contain a genuine intention to retaliate, the thesis moves on to suggest and defend a moral principle which states that endeavours requiring the formation of an immoral intention may nevertheless be moral. Called the Principle of Double Intention (and based on the Principle of Double Effect), it offers a method for the moral assessment of agents who form immoral intentions within larger contexts. By applying this principle to nuclear deterrence, it is demonstrated that agents who undertake such a policy may be morally justified in doing so, provided certain conditions are met. The thesis closes with a refutation of the objection that an agent cannot rationally form an intention (such as that required in deterrence) which he has no reason to carry out. By highlighting the objection's reliance on a claimed isomorphism between intention and belief, it is shown that the objection, while generally sound, does not apply to the special case of nuclear deterrence. The conclusion suggests a framework for disarmament which results in a deterrent force structure which is both strategically effective and morally acceptable.