Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): David. C. Tucker. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-70). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2005. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-108).

This thesis will examine the content of American nuclear strategy between 1954 and 1968, and will analyze the factors shaping that strategy. The first problem will be examined within the theoretical context of the maximalist-minimalist strategic continuum. Minimalism, the pole toward which Washington was inclined at the beginning of the thermonuclear age, involved a countervalue threat, or a threat to enemy population and industry, and a relatively low assessment of the forces required for this mission. Maximalism, on the other hand, involved a counterforce strategy, that is to say a strategy directed primarily against enemy strategic forces, and a relatively high estimate of the forces required. Although never entirely embraced by the highest American decision-makers, this latter pole represented the general direction in which American nuclear strategy evolved in the first nine years after Dulles enunciated the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1954. This tendency was evident in Eisenhower's gradual acceptance of the necessity for planning on the basis of a greater than expected threat; it was also manifest in his reluctant acceptance of coercive deterrence, a strategy dependent primarily upon deterrence through a countervalue threat but also involving a marginal capacity for damage limitation. Even more marked changes came with the advent of Kennedy and McNamara to power in 1961. Between then and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 there was a distinctly more pessimistic assessment of the greater than expected threat against which provision had to be made. Of yet greater significance, there was also a more energetic pursuit of a capability for coercive deterrence and an important refinement of that strategy in the form of the "hostage city" doctrine, a doctrine which provided for city-avoidance in a thermonuclear exchange. After the missile crisis, however, this tendency was reversed to a substantial extent, and by early 1968, when McNamara left office, American nuclear strategy was in large measure similar to that of the latter Eisenhower years in its emphasis on a nuclear "sufficiency" and on a countervalue policy. The second problem - the factors underlying these developments - will be examined in terms of four main variable clusters. Idiosyncratic factors, those characteristics of the decision-makers which are peculiar to them as individuals, exerted some influence in the policy process; Eisenhower's tendency to believe that he could "muddle through" and the more vigorous and rationalizing tendencies of Kennedy and McNamara played a distinct role in the evolution of American nuclear strategy. Technical factors, the state of military research and of the strategic balance, were nevertheless of greater importance. Counterforce arguments, for example, could not gain even marginal acceptance until there had been an improvement in offensive weapons technology. More important, the central fact facing American decision-makers was that it was highly probable that both superpowers would suffer unacceptable damage in a thermonuclear war and that even their greatest efforts could not save them. In the light of this latter consideration, prevention of a thermo nuclear conflict was ever the first priority of the United States. Societal and external factors, though, were most crucial. Influences which were external to the United States, such as the course of Soviet diplomacy and the state of the N.A.T.O alliance, played an essential part in defining the role which nuclear strategy must fulfill. It was generally agreed, for example, that the Russians did not desire a thermonuclear war, but their desire for expansion of their political influence carried with it some danger of escalation into such a conflict. Given the former consideration, it was hard to justify an all-out effort to attain a warfighting capability; given the latter, it was still necessary to provide at least a countervalue capability, and a case might even be made at times for developing a damage limiting capability. Finally, the nature of the society itself was a central influence. As was seen during the debate over the "missile gap," the tradition of military superiority still coloured the thinking of the people of the United States, causing them to exaggerate the threat to their security and to hanker after some form of 'nuclear superiority" even when they realized that a thermonuclear war would probably result in a mutual disaster. Itself a component of the credibility of the American deterrent, the climate of public opinion was brought to bear in Congress and at election time. Eisenhower, whose policies failed to sufficiently reassure his people, found this failure to be a substantial domestic liability, and a military-diplomatic liability of even greater magnitude. His successor was inclined to adopt policies more in accord with the temper of the American people, both from conviction and a sense of political expedience. Thus, the increasing effectiveness of American offensive forces, the seemingly unremitting hostility of the Soviet Union and the concomitant divisions within N.A.T.O. combined with the optimistic activism of the Kennedy administration and the domestic currents underlying that spirit to create the more aggressive policies pursued by that administration. Its partial retreat from those policies during its last year, and the more extensive retreat during the Johnson administration was the result of the increasingly apparent futility of the arms race, the Soviet-American detente, and a public opinion which was less concerned with the quest for superiority. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) controversy was one of the most intense intra-Alliance debates experienced by NATO. The depth of the dispute, especially between the US and the European NATO members, threatened the very unity and cohesion of the Alliance itself. The INF controversy was the result of two factors: first, the establishment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union which brought into question the credibility of the US security guarantee to Europe; and second, the widening gap in the political and strategic interests of the US and its European allies. These factors combined to produce the two central--and conflicting--forces at work during the INF debate. The Europeans sought strategic reassurance, in the form of theatre-nuclear systems, to restore the integrity of the seamless web of deterrence. The divergence of political and strategic interests between the US and Europe, however, meant conflict over the posture and character of any new force. In the interests of preserving the unity of the Alliance, these problems were "solved" in typical Alliance fashion; through compromising to a consensus. The December 12 decision was based on erroneous and outdated conceptions of the significance of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe. What NATO planners, and many western analysts, have failed to recognize is the diminishing effectiveness of US nuclear weapons in maintaining effective deterrence in Western Europe. Deterrence in Europe is not primarily dependent on US nuclear forces and the threat of deliberate nuclear escalation they imply. Rather, deterrence in Europe should be understood as a compound product of many risk factors. Henceforth, thinking about NATO's deterrent requirements must recognize the limited utility of successive deployments of US nuclear forces as a deterrent. Greater reliance must be placed on the deterrent value of other risk factors which exist in the European theatre, most notably the increasingly powerful and discriminating capabilities of the French and British nuclear forces. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / gm2015 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM / Unrestricted

To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How do they inform us about the phenomenon of deterrence? To understand the nature of a phenomenon through models requires idealization, which in turn presupposes assumptions. This licentiate thesis investigates the type of knowledge we attain when approaching deterrence from a game theoretic perspective. The two articles presented address two separate but related issues. The first article reviews a debate regarding which deterrence model best capture the phenomena of deterrence, i.e. how models can be compared to one and other. The article presents a framework for comparing models and then appraises how these different deterrence models inform us about deterrence. The second article uses one of the more central deterrence models in order to evaluate how and to what extent the naval operation Atalanta managed to deter the Somali piracy.

The Relationship between Russia and NATO is a subject which finds itself continuously popular and relevant throughout discussion of international security. Yet, there is relatively large disagreements on how a conflict between the two actors would play out and how strong their given strategies are, in this case being how successful or strong should NATO's deterrence strategy be considered. Due to this, this paper will explore the main point of: What are the causes or reasonings behind the shortcomings of NATO deterrence strategy when facing a Russian Hybrid Strategy? In order to explore this, a deeper look is undertaken into the strengths of weaknesses behind both Russian and NATO capabilities and credibility within their given strategies. Furthermore, the primary region which will be explored within the relationship between Russia and NATO is that of the Baltic states, as this is the most likely area which NATO's deterrence strategy will be tested by Russian hybrid Warfare. This exploration will use qualitative studies along with wargaming scenarios which take into account the joint hybrid and conventional nature of Russia's hybrid strategy. Through this analysis, several causes of shortcomings are identified. These causes are the weakness derived from the chosen deterrence theory model undertaken...

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To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How do they inform us about the phenomenon of deterrence? To understand the nature of a phenomenon through models requires idealization, which in turn presupposes assumptions. This licentiate thesis investigates the type of knowledge we attain when approaching deterrence from a game theoretic perspective. The two articles presented address two separate but related issues. The first article reviews a debate regarding which deterrence model best capture the phenomena of deterrence, i.e. how models can be compared to one and other. The article presents a framework for comparing models and then appraises how these different deterrence models inform us about deterrence. The second article uses one of the more central deterrence models in order to evaluate how and to what extent the naval operation Atalanta managed to deter the Somali piracy. / <p>QC 20190201</p>

Controversy continues over the use of polygraph testing to deter and detect potential leakers as critics argue that the technique is based on faulty assumptions. The purpose of this descriptive and exploratory research study was to determine whether there was a perceived deterrence effect related to the use of polygraphs between a group of participants who were subjected to a polygraph examination within the past year compared to those who have not experienced a polygraph examination within the same time period. Paternoster and Simpson's, as well as Vance and Siponen's, rational choice models and Bandura's social learning theory served as the theoretical foundation for this study. Specifically, this study assessed groups' perceptions about adhering to security regulations if a polygraph is required, changes in their behavior and attitude, and beliefs about polygraph deterrent effect. Data were obtained through a 15-minute researcher- created survey with a cluster sample of 326 participants. Data were analyzed with a t test to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the groups. A factor analysis was also conducted. Results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference (p < .001) between the groups, suggesting that participants perceive a deterrent effect associated with the use of polygraphs as well as a change of behavior and attitude if a polygraph can be randomly administered at work. The implications for positive social change stemming from this study include recommendations to the nation's national security agencies to continue enforcing the polygraph examinations required of certain security personnel and exploring the possibility of expanding the use of such strategies in order to fortify the national intelligence infrastructure.