States under threat may choose to initiate war not only because their interests are hurt, but also because they want to establish or defend their credibility, so that they do not have to fight later wars. This dissertation looks at deterrence situations where the defender of the status quo responds to challenges with force and links its concern with credibility to the decision. When states are expressly worried about the repercussions of backing down, they are more likely to fight. By shining a spotlight on the defender rather than the challenger, this study enriches the discussion on why and how deterrence fails. By linking the decision to fight to a concern about reputation, this study also provides a new framework for analyzing deterrence and foreign policy. In addition, the dissertation joins the debate on Chinese use of force. All three case studies cast China as the defender that ultimately decided to fight the challenger decisively. In each case, aside from the real and perceived security interests at stake, China's concern with its reputation for resolve contributed to the decision. The reputation for resolve became a security interest in and of itself, serving to dispel future infringements and well worth fighting for. China was particularly worried about its reputation when it feared a collusion of foreign and domestic enemies and sought to internalize the lesson that fighting now means enjoying peace later. This study uses in-depth, qualitative case studies with a heavy reliance on textural analysis of first and secondary sources. The three case studies are China's intervention in the Korean War in 1950, China's border war with India in 1962, and Sino-Soviet clashes in 1969. While only three case studies are selected, they are structured along the same questions on deterrence and credibility to focus the reader's attention on the hypothesis. The case studies are selected because they were robust tests; they were all drawn-out deterrence situations in which Chinese leaders pondered explicitly on the role of credibility.

Programme evaluation research examined the criminological and socio-legal issues of a Claimant Fraud Investigation Program (CFIP) operating inside the workers' compensation system. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to evaluate the programmes' choice of deterrence as an instrumental mechanism for achieving compliance. Key aspects of the programme were analysed from both criminological and socio-legal standpoints. Justice and liberty tensions were examined in reference to the programmes' deterrence mechanisms and the perceptions of fourteen participants' were thematically analysed. The study develops an analytically useful concept of light blue-collar crime that could be applied to other organisations and scenarios. The study concluded the programme is not effective and has more of a symbolic than instrumental value. It conducts itself ethically, however, there are problems with its' choice of deterrence and the study indicates there is a low probability for a deterrent effect. Recommendations are made for other actors and institutions to play non-deterrence based roles intended to achieve compliance.

While the concept of deterrence has been applied to punishment in America’s criminal justice system, the empirical data is mixed on whether is effectively deters crime. This lack of consensus may be a result of missing elements from deterrence theory; namely, that punishment is often neither swift nor certain. Similar to the criminal justice system, professional sports leagues aim to control behavior of athletes by having guidelines that, when violated, result in punishment. However, these punishments are delivered much quicker and there is a higher level of certainty. The current study examines specific deterrence in the National Basketball Association by using longitudinal data of fines and suspension from the 2000-2001 season to the 2015-2016 season to test whether punishment that is swift and certain can deter rule-breaking behavior. Results from the study showed no deterrent effect when deterrence was analyzed by punishment type (suspension or fine) and severity of punishment.

In this thesis we analyse the economic effects of a policy proposal in Sweden, which implies a removal of the sentence reduction for 18- to 20-year-old offenders. We use a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to systematically assess its effects. Our results indicate that the policy proposal is most likely beneficial to society, a conclusion which is strengthened by our sensitivity analysis. Our CBA builds upon Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime, and the extensive literature it has inspired which explores the effects of harsher punishment on crime. In order to assess how a harsher sentencing regime affects society, we use crime-punishment elasticities and costs of crime based on previous studies and own estimations. Our main contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we provide an economic dimension to a current political issue. Second, we employ a CBA to a research area in Sweden in which the method has been used sparingly. Knowing how an increase in punishment affects crime rates is of great importance for policy making. Hence, we encourage further analysis in this area, especially in Sweden.

This thesis tests one of the major propositions of deterrence theory: that increases in the severity of punishment can reduce the likelihood of offending. To this end, a case study in which the statutory penalties were doubled for almost all drink-driving offences in New South Wales, Australia, is examined. Two quasi-experimental studies were undertaken to assess the impact of these legislative changes: an interrupted time-series analysis of road crash rates (Study 1) and an analysis of drink-driving reoffending rates before and after the penalty changes were implemented (Study 2). Study 1 showed a significant increase in a surrogate measure of alcohol-related road crashes after the tougher drink-driving penalties were introduced. Further analyses suggested that this increase was driven primarily by a secular rise in non alcohol-related crashes that coincided with the policy???s implementation. Two possible conclusions about the deterrent effect of the policy are drawn from these findings: (1) that there was a reduction in alcohol-related road crashes which was overwhelmed by the rise in non alcohol-related crashes occurring around the same time or (2) that there was no change in crash rates. Study 2 found that drink-drivers who were convicted under the new penalty regime were less likely, and took longer, to reoffend than drink-drivers convicted before the introduction of the new penalties. This reduction in reoffending was only apparent for drink-drivers residing in country and regional areas and was small in magnitude.These latter findings are consistent with the possibility that the penalty changes coincided with a reduction in alcohol-related crashes but suggest that any decrease is likely to have been relatively small. A third study using a scenario-based survey methodology was also undertaken to examine the relationship between legal sanctions and willingness to drink-drive, controlling for other factors. The results of this study showed that participants who were more knowledgeable about drink-driving penalties were less likely to state that they would offend in the drink-driving scenario than participants who were less knowledgeable about the law. The implications of these findings for deterrence theory and criminal justice policy are discussed.

In predator-prey interactions, prey species have complex defensive behaviors to protect themselves from predators. Chemical defenses are one tool that is employed to protect against predators, especially for slow-moving or otherwise susceptible prey. Many of these chemical defenses have been studied and the effective compounds identified, but few studies were performed on their mechanisms of detection. In my research, I used the sea hare, Aplysia californica, as chemically defended prey. This slow moving mollusk is soft-bodied with no external shell, but it has adapted a number of defenses including chemical defenses. Ink is a sticky mixture of the products of the ink gland and the opaline gland which are mixed in the mantle cavity and released toward an attacker. I show that this ink secretion protects the sea hare from predation by a fish predator. Because many deterrent compounds taste bitter, bitter taste receptors are thought to protect predators from ingesting harmful compounds in prey. Studies of deterrent taste detection have commonly utilized bitter compounds from human hedonics to study the responses in animals, such as fruit flies, fishes, rats, and monkeys. In my dissertation, I argue that the study of chemical defenses allows us to ask more questions about detection of relevant deterrents and interactions between predators and prey at the individual and population levels. My results show that diet-derived pigments in Aplysia ink, aplysioviolin and phycoerythrobilin, are strongly deterrent to fish predators. Electrophysiological analyses of the gustatory system show that these compounds are equipotent and cross-adapt each others’ responses completely. Aplysioviolin and phycoerythrobilin produced incomplete reciprocal cross-adaptation with amino acids and adapted bile salt responses but were not significantly adapted by these latter stimuli. These results showed multiple pathways that are sensitive to aplysioviolin and phycoerythrobilin, which may have different effects on the physiology and behavior of the predatory fish. My findings demonstrate the value to the fields of chemical ecology and chemosensory biology of studying sensory processing of relevant deterrent compounds. This work lays the foundation for how a diet-derived photopigment is adapted by a species to protect itself from predators by stimulating their chemosensory systems.

This thesis analyzes the Western missile defense initiatives and their role in Russia&#039 / s relations with NATO and the U.S. The main question of this thesis is whether the Western missile defense initiatives have paved the way for a new era of cooperation between Russia and the West or not. The main argument of this thesis is that Russia has failed to collaborate with NATO in a meaningful manner on missile defense issue as Russia has not adjusted its security policies and nuclear strategy, which are still based on the Cold War thinking, to the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold War era. The missile defense initiatives have a negative impact on the relations between Russia and the West due to the intransigent stance of Russia on this issue. A robust cooperation can only be achieved between Russia and NATO if Moscow changes its Cold War mentality about global security issues.

Abstract Since being developed in 1956, no matter it¡¦s category, function or quantity, Chinese ballistic missiles have kept renewing and increasing. For example, the development of its strategic missiles has undergone the 1st through the 3rd generation with models from Dongfeng-1 to currently developing Dongfeng-41 Ballistic Missile, and its warhead has been gradually developed from carrier of single nuclear head to combination of both traditional and nuclear warheads and to multiple warheads now. Under such multiple developments, Chinese nuclear strategy according to their official speech has still adopted ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ claimed by the 1960¡¦s and 1970¡¦s until now, and which has already led to external speculations. They think that Chinese has devoted to modernization of ballistic missiles lately, actively developed more land-based strategic missiles and sea-based nuclear submarines, techniques of multiple warheads and space-based weapons, and reinforced the practicality of tactical nuclear missiles etc. that such development has already exceeded the ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ strategy, which even develops towards the ¡§limited deterrence¡¨ strategy. Therefore, whether China¡¦s deterrence strategy is changing is one of the assumptions in this study. If China¡¦s deterrence strategy is no longer equipped with the minimum deterrence, then whether the most important features of the minimum deterrence by ¡§no use of nuclear weapons at first¡¨ and China¡¦s¡§three nos principle on nuclear weapons¡¨will be changed accordingly is the second assumption in this study. Chinese ballistic missiles apart from being used as deterrence can also be used to practice coercive and annihilative strategies. Especially in the issue of Taiwan, when Chinese deterrence strategy fails in terms of Taiwan, it may use coercive or annihilative strategies to achieve their political and military objectives. As the ability of Taiwan¡¦s anti-ballistic missile is obviously insufficient; so if Taiwan suffers the attack from Chinese missiles, the result will be unimaginable. Therefore, how to prevent the attack from its missiles is what I would like to discuss in this paper. For the probable battle by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future, in order to quickly facilitate the victory, whether Chinese will use micro-kiloton nuclear warhead to destroy the important and stable military targets in Taiwan to help smooth the warfare and further crash the myth that Chinese will not use nuclear weapons against Taiwan is the 3rd assumption in this paper. Finally how to increase our defense against ballistic missiles and whether we should participate in the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) provided by America, I will provide several suggestions for references of the related units, hoping to make certain contributions towards Taiwanese prevention against the threat from Chinese ballistic missile.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Knopf, Jeffrey. Second Reader: Davis, Zachary. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 1, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Nuclear terrorism, nuclear forensics, attribution, deterrence, risk of nuclear terrorism, probability of nuclear terrorism, consequences of nuclear terrorism, post-detonation response. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-95). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): James A. Russell, Jeff Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-80). Also available online.