This thesis carefully examines the question of the effect of nuclear weapons possession on international relations through a detailed examination of all international crises between nuclear powers, as identified by the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB). It distinguishes itself from similar studies in four key areas. First, by including the recent dyadic nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, this study significantly expands the number of cases under consideration. Next, the India-Pakistan crises provide an opportunity for a novel comparison to the US-USSR crises of the Cold War. / Third, this work is unique among studies of nuclear deterrence in its combined use of qualitative and quantitative methodology. The quantitative analysis uses ordered logit with the ICB data set on a variety of variables, discussed below, that do not lend themselves to standard regression techniques. The qualitative analysis examines whether or not nuclear weapons caused decision-makers on both sides of each crises to refrain from escalation due to fear of nuclear catastrophe. Finally, this study compares the effect of mutual nuclear weapons capability with the effects of democracy and interdependence on the level of violence in crises. / Ultimately, this thesis finds that nuclear proliferation is far less successful at preventing war among states in dyadic nuclear crises than is commonly believed. In only one of 17 crises (the Cuban Missile Crisis) is it clear that mutual possession of nuclear weapons caused leaders on both sides to eschew war. Relative to nuclear weapons possession, democracy and trade were found to be significantly more effective at limiting violence in crises and preventing war. Moreover, regimes suffering a lack of legitimacy in either the international community or among their neighbors had a significantly higher level of violence in crises. / Taken together, these findings have significant implications for public policy regarding nuclear proliferation, suggesting that the international community should work even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, while working to strengthen democratic regimes, increase interstate trade, and reduce the international isolation of states such as North Korea and Iran.

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A major Norwegian defence procurement project takes decades from project initiation to the desired military capability is delivered and has reached full operational capability. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ primary mission is to maintain a credible deterrence and prevent armed conflicts arising, meaning that the capability acquired through military procurement projects must play into future general deterrence. Do Norway’s strategic military capability procurement projects contribute to a credible and capable deterrence? The purpose of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of the deterrence potential of two chosen Norwegian military procurement projects of strategic importance. The capabilities studied are the acquisition of the US fifth generation fighter, F-35 Lightning II and the 212CD submarine to be designed and built by Germany. The two projects have a combined estimated investment cost of 113 billion NOK. Deterrence is a large area in social science and the discipline of War Studies. This study applies a deterrence theory lens, primarily based on the conclusion in Zagare’s and Kilgour’s perfect deterrence theory regarding the importance of capable and credible threats, operationalised through Dalsjö’s five dimensions of threshold defence. The analysis identifies a clear credibility issue with one of the projects and the paradox that cost saving decisions intended to ensure operational availability and increase credibility also make the capability more vulnerable and less credible due to lack of redundancy.

Dramatic changes in the international system since the early nineties, namely the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 ascendancy of the Bush Doctrine, have left many to wonder whether Cold War era influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement are viable against new U.S. threats-rogue states. This thesis will examine U.S. efforts between 1986 and 2004 to convince Libya to cease its support for international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. influence strategy towards Libya was a short term failure and a long term success. The compellence and deterrence policies established by President Reagan and strengthened by later administrations served to isolate Libya economically and diplomatically and set the conditions for successful conditional engagement. Positive behavior change by Libya began first with the Clinton Administration's introduction of conditional engagement. The Bush Administration, benefiting from years of Libyan isolation and the positive response to conditional engagement, continued to engage Libya in an incremental fashion. Libya renounced its terrorist ties in August 2003 and weapons of mass destruction in December 2003. Since then Tripoli has taken actionable steps to verify this change of policy and both governments are currently on course for reconciliation.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Lithuania's security rests at present on several pillars, including membership in NATO and the European Union and its relations with Russia. Without doubt Lithuania's membership in NATO and the European Union is the most promising way to preserve its independence and to promote its security. At the same time, however, Lithuania wishes to maintain constructive relations with Russia and to address Moscow's legitimate political, military, and economic concerns. In view of the importance of domestic political factors, this thesis examines the hypothesis that Lithuania should base its security on a mix of deterrence strategies and reassurance policies pursued in cooperation with fellow members of NATO and the European Union. The thesis therefore analyzes post-Cold War trends in Lithuanian-Russian relations in light of theories of deterrence and reassurance. Three cases-NATO enlargement from 1997 to 2004, the Russian military troop withdrawal from Lithuania in 1991-1993, and Lithuanian-Russian relations concerning Kaliningrad-are discussed to assess the effects of reassurance and cooperative policies and to infer possible implications for the future. / Major, Lithuanian Army

adversary efforts in a direction desired by Washington. Several things become clear during this investigation. First, very little scholarly work exists discussing the concept of dissuasion and the mechanisms used to formulate, implement, and execute it as a defense policy. Second, that while an admirable attempt to lessen the need for more costly policy options such as deterrence and defeat, dissuasion will not prevent China from developing counter space weapons, especially since ground-based jammers that target satellite links have already proven effective. Third, the best chance of dissuading China's efforts to acquire space-based OCS systems is through international treaties and laws.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / eaders and governments using mechanisms to maintain national interest, power, and security. One such instrument is the use of coercive force or compellence. Compellence is a strategy of control designed to impose change, using limited military or non-military methods, upon an opponent. The United States implements compellence policy through a mixture of key actors who portray powerful images to the rest of the world. Its leaders reinforce these images internally (with self, local, regional, cultural ties) and externally (with others based, foreign perception on a larger international scope). As U.S.-led forces in Iraq affect America's image throughout the Middle East and the world, its image of Iraq remains opaque due to U.S. perception and misperception. Is compellence policy conducive to future U.S.-Iraqi relations? How effective is it? And why did U.S. compellence policy in Iraq succeed on some levels and not on others? This thesis examines the effectiveness of U.S. compellence policy as a viable method in U.S.-Iraqi relations from 1990 to 2003. Key operations and players will be evaluated and an analysis will explore political, social and economic levels of effectiveness of compellence policy in Iraq. / Civilian, Department of Navy

Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / Becker (1968) provides a formal framework for analyzing various policies in criminal law. Within this framework there are potential criminals, who have varying benefits from committing an illegal act. They are subject to sanctions when they are caught and are found guilty for committing such acts. Accordingly, increased expected sanctions lead to greater deterrence. There are also costs associated with achieving such deterrence. Hence, there are optimal policy variables which balance costs and gains associated with increased deterrence. In my dissertation, in five independent but closely related essays, I address various issues related to criminal law by making use of optimal crime and deterrence models, which are similar to Becker (1968). First, I analyze the standard of proof in criminal trials and extend a justification as to why there are higher standards of proof in criminal trials versus civil trials. Next, I introduce the concept of mixed warning strategies, and justify the use of mixed as well as pure warning strategies in law enforcement. In a related essay, I show that it is optimal to punish repeat offenders more severely than first time offenders, provided that offenders gain experience in evading detection by committing offenses. In my fourth essay, I identify reasons as to why it is welfare improving to allow individuals to self-report conduct crimes. Finally, I propose a simple framework to incorporate the concept of remorse in the economic analysis of criminal law, and show that the Beckerian maximal fine result need not hold when some individuals feel remorse. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.