In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues that moral judgments are the product of sentiment. The mechanism of sympathy allows individuals to enter into a common point of view in order to produce judgments that are truly moral, and not merely self-interested. Hume argues that the common point of view is the standard that moral judgments are subjected to. I argue that the common point of view is an inadequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. The common point of view is inadequate because it is subjective and unreflective. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith offers an account of moral judgment that has an adequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. Smith avoids the problems with Hume’s account due to his distinction between partial and impartial spectators and the role that self-command plays in his theory of moral judgment.

This study presents an overview of the compositional style of David Maslanka and an analysis of his piece for wind band Unending Stream of Life. The sevenmovement work is based in part on the melody of the hymn tune “Lasst uns Erfreuen”, which is commonly known as “All Creatures of Our God and King.” David Maslanka has developed a unique compositional style that has been strongly influenced by the chorales of J.S. Bach and the writings of Swiss psychologist Carl Jung. Through the process of “active imagining” (Jung, 1964) Maslanka creates original works for wind band. The use of a hymn tune melody and short motives, both conventional and contemporary harmonic progressions, baroque and classical forms, tonal centricity, strong rhythmic drive, expanded instrumentation, and the theme of transformation are all essential to Maslanka’s compositional style. The study is intended to inform scholars and conductors about the: (1) melodic material, (2) harmony and tonality, (3) form, rhythm and tempo relations, (4) orchestration, and (5) unifying elements and musical nuances of David Maslanka’s Unending Stream of Life. / Introduction to the study -- Review of related literature -- Compositional style of David Maslanka -- History and analysis of the hymn tune Lasst uns erfreuen -- Background and analysis of Unending stream of life -- Summary and conclusions. / School of Music

Canadian remembrance of the Great War (1914-1918) in the early twenty-first century is often associated with grand gestures at national monuments like the opening of the new Canadian War Museum in 2005 and the restoration of the Vimy Ridge Memorial in 2007. However, these sites of memory, what Pierre Nora terms lieux de mémoire, are not part of the everyday environments of memory, the milieux de mémoire, of most Canadians. In my investigation of three contemporary works of Canadian literature: The Danger Tree by David Macfarlane, Broken Ground by Jack Hodgins, and Unity (1918) by Kevin Kerr, locally-based storytellers describe the continued influence of the Great War on their individual Canadian communities. The fictionalized narrating personas in these three works create what I refer to as bio-geographies: first-person accounts of the narrator’s particular social and memory environments. While the bio-geographers in these three texts lack first-hand experience of the Great War, their writing reflects the continued repercussions of the conflict in the weeks, years, and decades after the 1918 armistice. The Great War differentially affected thousands of communities in Canada and Newfoundland. Constructing a coherent national narrative that accounts for the multiple lived experiences of individuals in communities across North America is virtually impossible. Turning to local representations of the Great War (in the case of the three bio-geographic texts: depictions of communities in Newfoundland, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan) provides a sense of the nation as a diverse landscape of memory with multiple vantage points. Negotiating the complex terrain of self, place, and memory, the bio-geographers in the three works I examine create representations of the past that reveal how sites of memory, lieux de mémoire, come to be firmly embedded in the ongoing lived experiences of comunity members, the milieux de mémoire.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att kritisera David Copps collective moral autonomy thesis. Denna tes säger att det är möjligt för kollektiv att ha moraliska förpliktelser och vara moraliskt ansvariga trots att ingen av dess medlemmar har motsvarande egenskaper. Copp har fört fram två argument och tre exempel till stöd för sin tes. Jag kommer att diskutera dessa utifrån den kritik som förts fram mot tesen. Min slutsats är att Copps tes, om ändå konceptuellt möjlig, inte stöds av de argument och exempel som Copp presenterar. Jag kommer huvudsakligen argumentera för att dessa är fall där ingen agent – varken ett kollektiv eller en individ – kan hållas moraliskt ansvarig.

Dans le premier livre du Traité de la nature humaine (1739), David Hume avance plusieurs arguments paraissant avoir des conséquences sceptiques radicales à l'effet que les procédures inférentielles à la base de nos croyances tant empiriques que non empiriques ne sont pas fondées par la raison, en conséquence de quoi ces croyances ne sont pas épistémiquement justifiées. Pourtant, le Traité poursuit un projet positif de type naturaliste, celui de construire une science de la nature humaine par la méthode expérimentale, et ce projet amène Hume à défendre des principes théoriques empiriques se voulant de bonnes explications des phénomènes cognitifs, passionnels et moraux humains. Or, il semble que Hume ne puisse pas défendre une telle théorie sans se commettre à la thèse que certains procédés inférentiels sont fondés et permettent de produire des croyances justifiées, ce que semble contredire son scepticisme. Comment Hume peut-il tenir une position philosophique cohérente en défendant à la fois un scepticisme épistémique radical et une théorie de la nature humaine? Notre étude de ce problème s'intéresse à deux arguments de type sceptique présentés par Hume: son argument sur les croyances causales, couramment désigné comme son argument sceptique sur l'induction, et son argument sceptique sur la raison basé sur la faillibilité de nos facultés inférentielles. Nous présentons une analyse de ces arguments montrant en quoi ce sont des arguments sceptiques radicaux mettant en cause la justification de nos croyances. Nous montrons ensuite que le texte de Hume ne permet pas de trancher clairement la question interprétative de savoir comment celui-ci envisage de défendre la poursuite de son projet d'une théorie de la nature humaine face à ses arguments sceptiques, mais que seulement deux possibilités demeurent à cet égard: la possibilité que Hume soit conduit à une conception non épistémique du fondement normatif des croyances, et la possibilité que Hume croie pouvoir encore, malgré ses arguments sceptiques, défendre le caractère raisonnable des croyances issues de sa recherche en référence à des caractéristiques qui différencient épistémiquement sa méthode philosophique expérimentale de ses concurrentes. Nous montrons toutefois qu'aucune de ces deux possibilités ne semble épargner à Hume des difficultés importantes. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Hume, Scepticisme, Croyances, Justification, Théorie de la connaissance.

This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral judgments are propositions. Following this discussion, I defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently contradictory. I conclude that one can coherently maintain both positions without a contradiction.

Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.

Texte remanié de: Dissertation--Trier, Allemagne--Universität Trier, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 142-149.

Habilitationsschrift--Fach Judaistik - Jüdische Studien, Fachbereich Kunst-, Orient und Altertumswissenschaften--Halle, Wittenberg--Martin-Luther-Universität, 2003. / Bibliogr. p. 333-350.

Texte remanié de: Thesis Ph. D.--Londres--King's college. / Bibliogr. p. 214-237. Index.