Partindo das teorias políticas predominantes no século XVIII, o contratualismo e a obediência passiva, personificadas pelos dois principais partidos políticos da Inglaterra àquela época (Whig e Tory), a presente dissertação pretende mostrar como Hume discorda de ambas. Porém, o objetivo central é, sem dúvida, sua refutação ao contratualismo. Para tanto, o texto traz duas linhas de argumentos aptos a tanto: a primeira delas, referente ao conceito de artifício em Hume, significativamente diferente do artifício criado pelos contratualistas, oposição esta a que a tradição de comentaristas da filosofia política humeana de maneira geral não faz referência, especificamente quando se trata da refutação ao contratualismo; a segunda linha de argumentação refere-se à refutação mais direta feita por Hume, a que se pode chamar \"oficial\", em que estão presentes as discussões a respeito do papel do consentimento, da existência de estado de natureza e do pacto expresso ou tácito, da obrigação decorrente das promessas, da origem do governo e da obediência. / Starting from the most popular political theories in the 17th century, contractualism and that of passive obedience, represented by the two main political parties in England at that time (Whig and Tory), this paper intends to show how Hume disagrees with both. However, his main objective is, without a doubt, refuse contractualism. To achieve its end, the text brings two sets of arguments: the first one concerns the concept of artifice in Hume\'s theory, which is very different from the artifice created by the contractarians. This opposition is not in general mencioned by the tradition of commentators, especially when the subject is the refutation of contractualism. The second set of arguments concerns the more direct refutation made by Hume, which we can term the \"official\" one. Here we can include the discussions about the role of consent, the existence of the state of nature and the explicit or tacit contract, the obligation derived from promises, the origin of government and allegiance.

A obra de David Hume é marcada por dois momentos distintos: o Tratado da Natureza Humana, brilhante obra de sua juventude, e as investigações e os ensaios, entre outros textos mais maduros. No contexto dessa transição, suas teorias moral e política sofrem pequenas, porém significativas, modificações. Uma delas diz respeito ao desaparecimento, na segunda Investigação, da dicotomia obrigação naturalmoral de justiça existente no Tratado, e, sobretudo, ao uso mais frequente do sentimento de humanidade, naquela obra, como móbil da ação. Essa tese de fundo, que defende a mencionada modificação na teoria humeana, possibilita ainda que se afirme a existência de duas outras teses: a) que Hume tem mais um argumento para refutar o contratualismo, além daquele declarado expressamente em seus textos; b) que Hume dificilmente pode ser considerado um utilitarista, já que suas teorias do valor, da ação (ou do que é certo) e do motivo são sensivelmente diferentes das teorias utilitaristas clássicas, cabendo-lhe melhor o rótulo de precursor do utilitarismo. / In the works of David Hume, two distinct moments are clearly defined: the A Treatise of Human Nature, a brilliant book from his youth, and the enquiries and the essays, which show more maturity. In the course of this transition, his moral and political theories suffered minor, but important, changes. One of them concerns the elimination, in the second Enquiry, of the dichotomy natural-moral obligation of justice, which existed in the Treatise, and a more frequent use, in that work, of humanity as a cause for action. This argument, which puts forth the aforementioned modification in Hume\'s theory, makes the existence of two other propositions possible: a) that Hume has another argument to refute contractualism, besides the one that is explicitly stated in his texts; b) that Hume can hardly be considered a utilitarian, since his theories of value, of action (or of what is right) and of the motive are significantly different from classical utilitarian theories, making it preferable to label him as a precursor to utilitarianism.

A obra de David Hume é marcada por dois momentos distintos: o Tratado da Natureza Humana, brilhante obra de sua juventude, e as investigações e os ensaios, entre outros textos mais maduros. No contexto dessa transição, suas teorias moral e política sofrem pequenas, porém significativas, modificações. Uma delas diz respeito ao desaparecimento, na segunda Investigação, da dicotomia obrigação naturalmoral de justiça existente no Tratado, e, sobretudo, ao uso mais frequente do sentimento de humanidade, naquela obra, como móbil da ação. Essa tese de fundo, que defende a mencionada modificação na teoria humeana, possibilita ainda que se afirme a existência de duas outras teses: a) que Hume tem mais um argumento para refutar o contratualismo, além daquele declarado expressamente em seus textos; b) que Hume dificilmente pode ser considerado um utilitarista, já que suas teorias do valor, da ação (ou do que é certo) e do motivo são sensivelmente diferentes das teorias utilitaristas clássicas, cabendo-lhe melhor o rótulo de precursor do utilitarismo. / In the works of David Hume, two distinct moments are clearly defined: the A Treatise of Human Nature, a brilliant book from his youth, and the enquiries and the essays, which show more maturity. In the course of this transition, his moral and political theories suffered minor, but important, changes. One of them concerns the elimination, in the second Enquiry, of the dichotomy natural-moral obligation of justice, which existed in the Treatise, and a more frequent use, in that work, of humanity as a cause for action. This argument, which puts forth the aforementioned modification in Hume\'s theory, makes the existence of two other propositions possible: a) that Hume has another argument to refute contractualism, besides the one that is explicitly stated in his texts; b) that Hume can hardly be considered a utilitarian, since his theories of value, of action (or of what is right) and of the motive are significantly different from classical utilitarian theories, making it preferable to label him as a precursor to utilitarianism.

Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.

David Mamet is best known as a playwright, but he also has a thriving film career, both as screenwriter and as director. He has taken very seriously each of these roles, formulating theories that, he suggests, account for the creative choices he makes. Though Mamet sometimes contradicts himself, as when he suggests that viewers should have the satisfaction of constructing their own meaning of a work, but at the same time is devoted to montage, which works by juxtaposing images that lead to a single interpretation, he clearly sees the story as a critical avenue into the spectator's unconscious, where he hopes it will resonate with a truth that speaks directly to the individual. His films House of Games, Things Change, and Homicide clearly reflect his ideas on the best ways of conveying a story on film. In House of Games, Mamet draws on Bruno Bettelheim's theories to construct a fairy tale designed to act on adult viewers in the same way that fairy tales act on the child. In Things Change, he creates a fable that explores issues of friendship and honor within the milieu of the gangster genre. And in Homicide, Mamet uses the expectations viewers bring to the theatre in anticipation of a genre film to explore themes of loyalty and identity. In Oleanna, however, Mamet relies heavily on exposition and dialogue, rather than the visual elements that separate the film from drama, which renders the film the antithesis of his long-held philosophy of film narrative. Mamet's best film work, in House of Games and Homicide, has been innovative and thought-provoking, bringing depth to the new noir and redefining the cop film. His work in Oleanna, though it may prove to be an anomaly, may suggest a surrender of his principles of filmmaking or a reformulation of them to fit some new vision.

In his first published collection of poetry, Cortejo y epinicio (1949), Chilean author David Rosenmann-Taub (1927) references Jewish culture, prayers and beliefs. This project seeks to foreground the Jewishness in his work, as well as the cross-cultural spaces it creates. One of the central means in which Rosenmann-Taub explores Jewish forms of relating to God is through the use of apostrophe. The first section of this essay offers a theoretical framework for discussing apostrophe in poetry and prayer. The three following sections focus on three poems – “Elegía y Kadisch,” “Gólgota,” and “Schabat” – that depict speakers talking to or about God. Their reactions range from continued pleading with God, in the hope of hearing some response, to an attempt to speak for God to a refusal to address God at all. With each section, I consider the poem alongside the Jewish prayers and conventions that serve as a reference point for the poem’s rewritten prayers to God. This comparison not only highlights the notable presence of Jewish forms in Rosenmann-Taub’s poetry, but also points to how he challenges and reframes them. Rosenmann-Taub dramatizes the thresholds between belief and disbelief, divine and earthly, to point to the construction of faith as a mode of being that collapses these boundaries. In the final section of the essay, I situate Rosenmann-Taub’s work within its historical and literary context to highlight the ways in which his inquiries resonate with other poetic works emerging in Chile at that moment in time, as well as how he builds on them by representing Jewishness, heterogeneity, and heterodoxy as part of Chilean culture. / text

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Die Aortenklappenrekonstruktion nach David existiert bereits seit 1988 als eine insbesondere für junge Patienten vorteilhafte Alternative zum Klappenersatz. Mit der Optimierung der OP-Technik in den letzten Jahren erfuhr auch das Patientenspektrum eine Erweiterung. Ziel der Arbeit war deshalb eine Analyse der potenziellen Prädiktoren Alter, Geschlecht, BMI, Marfan-Syndrom, Typ-A-Dissektion, Aortenklappenmorphologie, Cusp intervention, OP-Verfahren sowie OP-Methode auf die früh und mittelfristigen Ergebnisse nach AKR nach David. Im Fokus stand dabei der Verlauf einzelner echokardiografischer Parameter über den Zeitraum der drei Untersuchungen Prä-OP-, Post-OP- und Follow-up-Echo sowie die Prüfung einer potenziellen Beeinflussung der jeweiligen Verläufe durch die o. g. Prädiktoren. Zu diesem Zweck wurden die echokardiografischen Befunde von 179 Patienten, welche von Januar 2003 bis Juni 2011 im Herzzentrum Leipzig eine AKR nach David erhalten hatten, ausgewertet. Es konnte festgestellt werden, dass die Aortenklappenrekonstruktion nach David auch bei dem inzwischen erweiterten Patientenspektrum mit teilweise zusätzlichen Vorerkrankungen, welche oftmals additive Interventionen notwendig machen, mit guten kurz- und mittelfristigen Resultaten durchgeführt werden kann. Selbst bei vorliegenden Risikoerkrankungen, wie der Typ-A-Dissektion, war keine Beeinträchtigung des Outcome zu verzeichnen.

The objective of this investigation is to compile a chronological history of the St. Charles Theatre of New Orleans from 1880 to 1888, the last successful years of the theatre when it was under the management of David Bidwell. In order to clarify the role of the St. Charles Theatre as it reflected theatre art in New Orleans during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, special attention will be given to the physical improvements of the theatre, the kind of entertainment provided, the personalities who appeared, and the critical comments of the local newspapers.