The dissertation critically examines and compares the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts in cases dealing with the right to life, as contained in section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The dissertation analysis the issues of adjudication and the concept of justice in perspective. The main question is as follows: Are the Constitutional Court decisions objective, based on the interpretation of the constitutional text, or do they rather reflect the individual judge(s) personal perspective(s) or preference(s). The purpose of this dissertation is to undertake a comparative study and analysis of the Constitutional Court decisions on the right to life, same aspect from different perspective, and show that the right to life is not given proper effect to on account of the subjective approach to its interpretation undertaken by the judges. It examines and scrutinises the Constitutional Court’s adjudication process. It found that the law is indeterminable, because the court’s decisions are not based on the interpretation of the law, but on the individual judges’ background and personal preferences. This is so because the court uses the majority rule principle in its decisions: The perception of the majority of the judges becomes a decision of the court. It is argued that when taking a decision a judge does not apply the law but instead uses the law to justify his predetermined decision on the matter. The conclusion supports the critical legal scholars’ theory relating to the indeterminacy of the law. It tests the objectivity of the judges using their own previous decisions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LLM

Thesis (LLM (Private Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / End of life decisions regarding defective babies raise several controversial questions. The root of the problem in withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment from defective babies lies in the conflict between human emotions, technological advancements and legal considerations. As a result of advances in medical science and neonatal technology, the lives of defective babies can often be saved or indefinitely prolonged. The question has become not whether we can treat these babies, but rather whether we should. Whether or not a defective baby’s life must be prolonged raises serious moral and ethical issues. A life compromised by severe physical and mental handicaps is weighed against an early and painless death. The best interest of the baby is the primary consideration from a legal point of view. Various factors must be taken into account to give content to this concept. Another central question is to determine who the decision maker(s) should be and what weight should be given to their opinions. Due to the fact that defective babies can not participate in this decision making process or communicate their wishes and preferences, surrogate decision makers must decide on their behalf. In sharp contrast to England, America and Canada, there is hardly any literature and no reported case law in South Africa to demonstrate the complexity of end of life decisions regarding defective babies. Selective non-treatment of defective babies have received little attention in the South African law. The Bill of Rights, inspired by regional and international Conventions determine the framework from a juristic perspective wherein decisions must be made and justified. This framework requires that the focus must be on the most vulnerable and dependant, namely the defective baby.

The dissertation critically examines and compares the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts in cases dealing with the right to life, as contained in section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The dissertation analysis the issues of adjudication and the concept of justice in perspective. The main question is as follows: Are the Constitutional Court decisions objective, based on the interpretation of the constitutional text, or do they rather reflect the individual judge(s) personal perspective(s) or preference(s). The purpose of this dissertation is to undertake a comparative study and analysis of the Constitutional Court decisions on the right to life, same aspect from different perspective, and show that the right to life is not given proper effect to on account of the subjective approach to its interpretation undertaken by the judges. It examines and scrutinises the Constitutional Court’s adjudication process. It found that the law is indeterminable, because the court’s decisions are not based on the interpretation of the law, but on the individual judges’ background and personal preferences. This is so because the court uses the majority rule principle in its decisions: The perception of the majority of the judges becomes a decision of the court. It is argued that when taking a decision a judge does not apply the law but instead uses the law to justify his predetermined decision on the matter. The conclusion supports the critical legal scholars’ theory relating to the indeterminacy of the law. It tests the objectivity of the judges using their own previous decisions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / African Americans' tendency to choose life-prolonging treatments (LPT) over comfort focused care (CFC) at end-of-life is well documented but poorly understood. There is minimal knowledge about African American (AA) perceptions of decisions to continue or discontinue LPT. The purpose of this study was to examine AA family members' perceptions of factors that influenced end-of-life care decision-making for a relative who recently died from serious illness. A conceptual framework informed by the literature and the Ottawa Decision Support Framework was developed to guide this study. A retrospective, mixed methods design combined quantitative and qualitative descriptive approaches. Forty-nine bereaved AA family members of AA decedents with serious illness who died between 2 to 6 months prior to enrollment participated in a one-time telephone interview. Outcomes examined include end-of-life treatment decision, decision regret, and decisional conflict. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, independent-sample t-tests, Mann-Whitney U tests, chi-square tests, Spearman and Pearson correlations, and linear and logistic regressions. Qualitative data were analyzed using content analysis and qualitative descriptive methods. Family members' decisional conflict scores were negatively correlated with their quality of general communication (rs = -.503, p = .000) and end-of-life communication scores (rs = -.414, p = .003). There was a significant difference in decisional regret scores between family members of decedents who received CFC versus those who received LPT (p = .030). Family members' quality of general communication (p = .030) and end-of-life communication (p = .014) were significant predictors of family members' decisional conflict scores. Qualitative themes related to AA family members' experiences in end-of-life decision-making included understanding (e.g., feeling prepared or unprepared for death), relationships with healthcare providers (e.g., being shown care, distrust) and the quality of communication (e.g., being informed, openness, and inadequate information). Additional qualitative themes were related to perceptions of the decision to continue LPT (e.g., a lack of understanding, believe will benefit) or discontinue LPT (e.g., patient preferences, desire to prevent suffering). In conclusion, this study generated new knowledge of the factors that influenced AA bereaved family members' end-of-life decision-making for decedents with serious illnesses. Directions for future research were identified.