This thesis explores the relationship between development, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the military in order to determine both the nature and effects of that relationship, and how the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner to support development. This study was conducted with regard to the current links between security and development within international relations and concerns that ODA is being drawn from a primarily development role to one that more explicitly supports national foreign and security policy ends instead. This issue is explored by defining development, ODA and the military as separate variables and then employing a grounded theory approach to develop an understanding of the relationship between them. The results of the study show that the involvement of the military within ODA and development may occur throughout the full range of operational contexts in which the military may be employed and can encompass activities throughout the scope of the functions of development. This involvement can in turn create a range of positive and negative impacts upon the conduct of ODA and development as the military serves to moderate the direction and strength of the relationship between the two. From this, the role of the military within ODA is identified as potentially an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency – primarily during times of crisis and conflict. The study then relates this role back to the wider context through considering the management of the military’s role and identifying the policies, parameters and procedures that may help to ensure that this role is conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.

Between 1870 and 1901, seventeen officers from the British army were appointed by the governments of the Australian colonies and New Zealand as commanders of their colonial military forces. There has been considerable speculation about the roles of these officers as imperial agents, developing colonial forces as a wartime reserve to imperial forces, but little in depth research. This thesis examines the role of the imperial commandants with an embryonic system of imperial defence and their contribution to the development of the colonial military forces. It is therefore a topic in British imperial history as much as Australian and New Zealand military history. British officers were appointed by colonial governments to overcome a shortfall in professional military expertise but increasingly came to be viewed by successive British administrations as a means of fulfilling an imperial defence agenda. The commandants as ???men-on-the-spot???, however, viewed themselves as independent reformers and got offside with both the imperial and colonial governments. This fact reveals that the commandants occupied a difficult position between the aspirations of London and the reality of the colonies. They certainly brought an imperial perspective to their commands and looked forward to the colonies playing a role on the imperial stage but generally did so in terms of a personal agenda rather than one set by London. This assessment is best demonstrated in the commandants??? independent stance at the outset of the South African War. The practice of appointing British commandants in Australasia was fraught with problems because of an inherent conflict in the goals of the commandants and their colonial governments. It resembles the Canadian experience of the British officers which reveals that the system of imperials military appointments as a whole was flawed. The problem remained that until a sufficient number of colonial officers had the prerequisite professional expertise for high command there was no alternative. The commandants were therefore the beginning rather than the end of a traditional reliance upon British military expertise. The lasting legacy of the commandants for the military forces of Australia and New Zealand was the development of colonial officers, transference of British military traditions, and the encouragement of a colonial military identity premised on the expectation of future participation in defence of the empire. The study provides a major revision to the existing historiography of imperial officers in the colonies, one which concludes that far from being ???imperial agents??? they were largely marching to their own drum.

Throughout history women have shown a willingness to participate actively in the defence of their country, home, and beliefs, and gave lie to the assertion that they were intrinsically less able than men when it came to achieving the ends through violent means. As Western civilization progressed however, women became restricted to ???womanly??? duties and separated from the official military sphere. The power to make war became exclusively men???s. In Australia immigration patterns, geographic features, and a particular historical period combined to create a virulently male dominated society. This was particularly apparent in the armed services. Australia did not allow women to enlist in its defence forces until 1941, a time of unprecedented national peril. Female volunteers were the final option. The Women???s Services were disbanded following World War II and not re-established until the armed forces again could not fulfil their defence commitment. The Royal Australian navy was the last service to permit a female branch, and between 1942 and 1960 the development of the Women???s Royal Australian Naval Service was inhibited by both societal values and attitudes and the traditions and priorities of the Navy.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

Contemporary peacekeeping missions are complex, demanding, and potentially hazardous. There is general agreement that psychological factors are crucial to effective individual and collective performance of the military personnel deployed in support of these missions. This research has examined the human dimensions associated with capability, functioning, and health across the deployment cycle. The aim of this research was to increase understanding of the psychological issues associated with peace support operations at the individual, group, and organisational levels. The study applied precepts of the transactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) to the context of military deployment on peace support operations. The overarching Human Dimensions of Operations model for this research incorporated stressor, buffer, and outcome components within the multi-level structure of the military organisation and across the stages (pre, peri, post) of deployment. Participants were Canadian and Australian military personnel deployed on Peace Support Operations. The dissertation comprised seven chapters. Chapter One provided an introduction to the psychological challenges posed by peace support operations and the research opportunities these missions afford. The second chapter detailed the methodology and psychometric evaluation of several measurement scales that were developed as part of this research in order to address the unique characteristics of peace support operations. Each of the six scales examined proved to have a meaningful component structure and adequate subscale reliabilities. The third chapter was devoted to an examination of the psychometric properties of a measure of psychological climate factors, the Unit Climate Profile (UCP), which was the cornerstone instrument of this research. The UCP demonstrated a robust, multi-dimensional structure that was conceptually concordant with its theoretical development and design. In addition, the component structure of the UCP changed in meaningful ways according to its level of analysis - individual or group. The next three chapters examined human dimension constructs at different stages of deployment, notably psychological readiness for operations, psychological resilience during deployment, and readjustment following return from deployment. In Chapter Four, the most compelling structural model that examined collective psychological readiness demonstrated that perceptions of readiness at the group level, along with effective senior leadership, could significantly impact morale. The results in Chapter Five revealed that leadership both buffered the immediate impact of stressors, and also fostered meaning and morale, thereby reducing strain. Positive aspects of deployment and the personal meaning assumed to be derived from these experiences were also found to bolster morale significantly during deployment. In Chapter Six, the stressors specific to the postdeployment transition phase, rather than stressors encountered during deployment, had the strongest impact on postdeployment adjustment. Social support and a positive psychological climate in the unit (particularly evidenced by cohesiveness and caring behaviour by proximal leaders) moderated the impact of homecoming stressors. A concluding chapter summarised the dissertation and discussed its practical significance and avenues for the dissemination of its findings. Broadly, the outcomes demonstrated that an understanding of the human factors in military units within the context of the stressors-strain relationship can provide potentially useful information to commanders who want to enhance the well-being, performance, and commitment of Service members deployed on peace support operations. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1331630 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- School of Psychology, 2008

In previous studies silicon has been associated with reduced disease severity and incidence, the enhanced accumulation of phenolic compounds and lignin, and with changes in the defence-related enzyme activity and transcript abundance of defence and stress related genes. All of these aspects of plant defence were considered in this study on cotton infected with Fusarium oxysporum f. sp. vasinfectum (Fov), and the results obtained have greatly enhanced our understanding of the effects of silicon on this interaction. In all experiments conducted, defence responses were only significantly enhanced by silicon treatment following inoculation with Fov, strongly suggesting that silicon can prime defence responses in cotton infected with Fov. Sicot F-1 was the cultivar most resistant to Fov infection at the commencement of this research, whilst Sicot 189 was considered to have moderate resistance to the pathogen. Vascular discolouration was significantly reduced in the more resistant cultivar, Sicot F-1 following treatment with potassium silicate, compared to mock inoculated plants and inoculated plants treated with potassium sulphate or calcium sulphate. No significant differences between treatments were observed in the moderately resistant cultivar, Sicot 189, though further trials may need to be conducted to confirm this result. In both cultivars, silicon content was significantly greater in plants which had been treated regularly with liquid potassium silicate, rather than with calcium silicate powder. Histological investigation of cotton infected with Fov, with and without silicon treatment, was conducted to ascertain the effects of this element on the accumulation of fungitoxic phenolic compounds, cell ultrastructural changes and fungal infection structures. Fov proliferated through the cortex and stele of plants from both the resistant (Sicot F-1), and moderately resistant (Sicot 189) cultivars, regardless of silicon treatment. However, defences were more rapidly and intensely induced in endodermal and vascular regions of inoculated, potassium silicate treated Sicot F-1 plants. Significantly more phenolic compounds were present at seven days post infection (dpi) in root extracts of inoculated, potassium silicate treated Sicot F-1 plants. Phenolic compounds were not significantly increased in inoculated, potassium silicate treated root extracts of Sicot 189 plants at three or seven dpi. Lignin assays demonstrated that the dry weight percentage of lignin in root material from inoculated, potassium silicate treated Sicot F-1 plants was significantly higher than that of extracts from inoculated plants not receiving silicon treatment at three dpi. This trend was also observed at seven dpi; however lignin content was not significantly different in this case. Percentage lignin content in the roots of Sicot 189 plants was not significantly different between inoculated potassium silicate treated plants and those not treated with silicon. Histological alterations were not observed in mock inoculated water or potassium silicate treated plants, nor were any significant increases in phenolic compounds or lignin accumulation detected in control treatments not inoculated with the pathogen. The expression of several defence related genes was assessed with quantitative reverse transcriptase real-time polymerase chain reaction. The results obtained verify that potassium silicate can enhance defence responses in Sicot 189 and Sicot F-1 plants inoculated with Fov, with silicon having a more pronounced effect on the more resistant cultivar, Sicot F-1. Genes upregulated at three and four dpi in potassium silicate treated, Fov inoculated Sicot F-1 plants included peroxidase, cadinene synthase and polygalacturonase inhibiting protein (PGIP), with peroxidase associated with phenol oxidation and lignification and cadinene synthase with phytoalexin biosynthesis. Osmotin-like protein and chitinase class I were consistently upregulated in potassium silicate treated, inoculated Sicot 189 plants; both genes coding for pathogenesis related (PR) proteins, with chitinase also classified as an antifungal protein. In both cultivars, silicon treatment without Fov inoculation did not result in the significant up-regulation of any of the defence genes assessed, providing further evidence for the role of silicon in priming in this interaction. The activities of three defence related enzymes, peroxidase, chitinase and β-1, 3- glucanase was assessed in root and shoot material by colourimetric assays. Regular application of potassium silicate significantly increased the activity of peroxidase in root extracts from the highly resistant cultivar Sicot F-1, at three, four and seven dpi with Fov, and in root extracts from the moderately resistant Sicot 189 at three and four dpi. Significant increases in chitinase activity in inoculated, silicon treated Sicot 189 plants were observed in root extracts at three dpi, and in shoot extracts at four dpi. Soluble potassium silicate treatment resulted in significant increases in β-1, 3- glucanase activity in Sicot 189 root extracts at four dpi. Few significant differences between treatments in terms of chitinase and β-1, 3- glucanase activity were detected in Sicot F-1 plants, though higher levels of each of these enzymes were present in root and shoot extracts from this cultivar. In this study the effects of acibenzolar-S-methyl, applied in the form of Bion®, on defence gene expression and enzyme activity in cotton infected with Fov were more pronounced in plants cultivated from treated seed, rather than in plants treated via foliar spray; a finding which is particularly relevant to the industry presently. Significant up-regulation of chitinase class I, peroxidase, and β-1, 3-glucanase transcripts and enzyme activities occurred in the Bion® seed soak treatment with Fov inoculation compared to all other treatments. It was possible to compare the actions of silicon with those of Bion® in this study. Bion® primed defence responses in cotton infected with Fov, in a manner similar to that observed in silicon treated cotton. The use of silicon and Bion® treatments, both alone and in combination as part of integrated disease management programmes, may potentially contribute to increased protection against this pathogen in Australian cotton fields in the future.

In 1955, the New Zealand Government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British counterparts in Malaya to defeat a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Between 1956 and 1971 elements of the New Zealand Special Air Service (SAS) were deployed on active service four times. These operational deployments included periods of time in Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and South Vietnam. The research illustrates the chronological progression of the New Zealand SAS through two of its most influential active service campaigns by examining how commitments to the Borneo ‘Confrontation’ in 1965 and 1966 directly and indirectly influenced the deployment to South Vietnam between December 1968 and February 1971. The mission of the New Zealand SAS in South Vietnam was to ‘assist in providing long range reconnaissance patrols’ that would support the larger infantry elements in defeating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army enemy. New Zealand SAS soldiers participated in 169 Australian SAS patrols in South Vietnam. Of those, 137 were commanded by the New Zealanders themselves. The research describes what the New Zealand SAS encountered during nearly two and a half years in South Vietnam; from the tactical intensity associated with small five-man patrols often observing or contacting much larger enemy formations, to the uncompromising professional standards that were expected of all members regardless of situation or circumstances and the influences of experienced Patrol Commanders, and the frustrations and inflexibility which characterised the relationship with their Australian counterparts. The research also further examines the underlying issue of overall strategic success and value of a small nationally-identifiable and strongly independent military unit that was compelled to operate under the command of larger Special Forces coalition counterparts and the impact different political, doctrinal, tactical cultural and cognitive characteristics had on these joint-operational deployments. The size of the New Zealand SAS contribution to the Australian SAS Squadron combined with the command arrangements placed upon it, also dictated that the deployments were never likely to be able to exert influence in any ‘independent’ or nationally-identifiable sense, and the relationships, the types of patrol operations conducted, and the value of these operations, would ultimately see many New Zealand SAS veterans largely dissatisfied with the overall performance of the deployment. Nevertheless, the strength of New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam came from its practical application of unique New Zealand Special Forces methodology and field-craft which had been fundamentally shaped and developed in Borneo. The New Zealand SAS operations in South Vietnam and Borneo - the demonstration of the highest standards of patrol techniques, tracking, reconnaissance, ambushing and fire discipline, and above all, operational professionalism that has been the hallmark of New Zealand's military history – provided the evolutionary ‘platforms’ from which today’s highly skilled and enviable New Zealand Special Forces have emerged.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniv., 2007. / Härtill 5 uppsatser.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-204). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.