Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Auburn University, 2006. / Abstract. Vita. Includes bibliographic references (p.99-106).

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Magister Legum - LLM / In this mini-thesis, I will present a historical development of the manner in which South African courts have tested the fairness of dismissals, for misconduct. South African Labour history has been marred by confusion and inconsistency in relation to the test to be adopted in determining the fairness of dismissals. This has been so, because there have been two dominant schools of thought, one referred to as the ‘own opinion’ approach, whereby the commissioner/court has the discretion to express his/her own view based upon value judgments on the fairness of the dismissal. The other approach is known as the reasonable employer test ( ‘ defer to the employer’ approach), whereby the commissioner had to defer to the decision of the employer, unless the dismissal is one that no reasonable employer would impose, or is so excessive that it would shock one’s sense of fairness, then the commissioner may interfere.This thesis will reveal the inconsistency that has been caused, by these two approaches, and the South African courts dissent as to the approach consistent with our law. This dissent, as shall be shown in this thesis, has led to our courts contradicting themselves as to the test consistent with the law.There will be a critical discussion on the source of the reasonable employer test and its application in South Africa during the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 ( old LRA ) and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 ( new LRA). With a further discourse on the development of the ‘own opinion’ approach during the periods of both the old LRA and the new LRA.This will lead to me looking at the provisions of the South African Constitution, together with the meaning of the right to fair labour practice as provided in the Constitution. Based upon a critical analysis of past jurisprudence, the provisions of the ILO Convention, the provisions of the old LRA and new LRA, foreign law and the Constitutional imperatives, I will attempt to illustrate the approach most consistent with our law.This thesis will culminate with a critical analysis of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment, in the case of Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd vs Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and the ruling of the Constitutional court in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others.The purpose of providing this historical journey, is to further highlight the rulings of past judgments, that have developed the concept of fairness, as was consistent with the Constitution. It is envisaged that the body of judgments cited in this thesis, may be used as authority, whenever the issue of determining the fairness of dismissal for misconduct arises, before a court or tribunal, such as the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration(CCMA). It is may further be used by employers and employees, in obtaining clarity of the law in relation to the test for fairness of dismissals for misconduct.

Real estate development investment requires a large capital funding but it has slow payback with many risks and uncertainties in the investment. The current approach by using NPV to evaluate this type of investment is not adequate anymore. This is because NPV does not thoroughly capture the uncertainties in the investment and the method ignores the management flexibility whether to postpone or abandon the project in the future. An alternative approach that addresses these issues is to use real options to evaluate this type of investment. The thesis uses the real option model that was proposed by McDonald and Siegel (1986) to evaluate real estate development investment. The model captures value and cost uncertainty in the investment and considers that managements have the flexibility to defer the investment into the future. The thesis analyzes the model critically by sensitivity analyses and shows that using the model requires the input parameters to be carefully determined, especially the ones that relate to unit rental rate.  Furthermore, the paper uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the optimal ratio between value and cost which suggests that the investment should be deferred or invested now. The result shows that, in general, a real estate project should be invested when the value of the project doubles the cost. Also, the result from the simulation allows investors to adjust the ratio according to their risk behavior. Lastly, the thesis performs another Monte Carlo simulation in order to quantitatively identify the effect of the real option model on the investment decision. The result shows that using only the traditional NPV to evaluate the investment can lead to the wrong investment decision more than 90% of the time. Therefore, using both real options and NPV together can improve investment decisions on the real estate development project.

[pt] Esta pesquisa modela a estratégia exploratória sequencial de prospectos de óleo e gás em diferentes níveis de incerteza. Considera a consolidação da carteira pelo conceito de revelação da informação e as vantagens do uso da teoria do Valor da Informação para a sequência ótima de perfuração. Inclui a incerteza de preços com o Movimento Geométrico Browniano para o preço spot do barril de petróleo. Dado o tempo do contrato de concessão de exploração de petróleo, são analisados os valores das opções de investir nos ativos e no portfólio exploratório. Além dessas incertezas, o modelo considera o efeito competitivo de outra empresa em um jogo conhecido como Guerra de Atrito, examinado com uso de diversos estudos de caso. Esse jogo ocorre quando os ativos têm correlações e as empresas aguardam informação pública e gratuita de ocorrência de hidrocarboneto da perfuração do ativo pela operadora vizinha. Os resultados apontam que é melhor para a empresa analisar suas oportunidades exploratórias com a teoria das opções reais, sendo melhor a análise por portfólio exploratório, que combina o valor da espera com o valor da informação. Os efeitos da interação estratégica são relevantes, essencialmente quando os portfólios das duas empresas têm os gatilhos exploratórios similares. Em jogos assimétricos, o que define a degeneração para ação de perfurar de uma das operadoras é a relação entre os gatilhos exploratórios e os gatilhos de perfuração simultânea, efeito que também pode ser analisado na comparação do benefício da espera por informações das empresas em conflito. Caso haja perpetuação na guerra de atrito, é proposto uma mudança para o jogo de barganha cooperativa. Nessa mudança, deve haver troca de informações entre as empresas em negociação, sendo a informação privada de melhor qualidade que a informação pública, elevando a medida de aprendizado dos ativos da carteira. No caso de pequena melhora na medida de aprendizado, a mudança para a barganha cooperativa já se torna vantajosa para ambos os jogadores. / [en] This research models the sequential exploratory strategy of oil and gas prospects at different levels of uncertainty. To do so, it considers portfolio consolidation by the concept of information disclosure and the advantages of using Information Value theory for the optimal drilling sequence. The price uncertainty of the spot price of a barrel of oil is modeled as a Geometric Brownian Motion. Given the length of the oil exploration concession contract, the option values of investing in the assets and exploration portfolio are analyzed. In addition to these uncertainties, the model considers the competitive effect of another company in a game known as the War of Attrition, examined using several case studies. This game occurs when assets are correlated, and companies wait as free-riders for information of hydrocarbon occurrence from the drilling of the asset by the neighboring operator. The results point out that the firm should analyze its exploratory opportunities under the real options approach, and improves with exploratory portfolio analysis, which combines the value of waiting with the value of information. The impact of strategic interactions is relevant, especially when the two firms portfolios have similar exploratory triggers. In asymmetric games, the ratio between the exploratory triggers and the simultaneous drilling triggers defines the degeneration to drilling action of one of the operators. This effect can also be analyzed when comparing the benefit of waiting for information from the conflicting companies. If there is perpetuation in the war of attrition, agents can change to a cooperative bargaining game. In this case, there should be an information exchange between the trading firms, with private information being more relevant than public information. In the case of a marginal improvement in the learning measure, the change to cooperative bargaining already becomes advantageous for both players.