Thesis--University of California, Berkeley. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 350-351).

Le concept de l'abus de droit a connu un important essor dans la plupart des disciplines. Non seulement l'interdiction d'abus de droit est présente dans de nombreux systèmes juridiques mais elle se retrouve dans les principaux instruments de protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux, qu'il s'agisse des instruments internationaux, universels ou régionaux, ou des instruments internes. Toutefois, la spécificité de cette branche du droit ainsi que la nature particulière du concept d'abus de droit posent la difficile question de la compatibilité de toute clause d'interdiction d'abus de droit avec la philosophie des droits fondamentaux. Cette interrogation implique de relever non seulement le défi de l'identification de la notion dans le domaine des droits fondamentaux mais aussi le défi de sa conceptualisation.L'identification de l'abus des droits fondamentaux est problématique dans la mesure où l'on est en présence d'une notion à contenu indéterminé révélant sa plasticité et sa malléabilité. Ces caractéristiques ont pour effet d'intégrer dans le droit positif un concept controversé, à la fois instable, mobile et confus et imposent à déterminer les éléments concourant à sa définition et à clarifier le champ d'application de l'interdiction d'abus de droit et les sanctions susceptibles de l'accompagner. La conceptualisation de l'abus de droit peut être édifiée à partir du rôle que ce dernier est amené à jouer dans le domaine des droits fondamentaux. L'interdiction de l'abus de droit se révèle en effet un élément important de l'ordre juridique des droits fondamentaux, dont l'usage, devant rester exceptionnel, permet non seulement d'assurer la régulation de l'exercice des droits individuels mais également de protéger les valeurs essentielles à leur sauvegarde et notamment celles inhérentes à la société démocratique. L'interdiction de l'abus vise également à assurer la complétude et concourt à la sauvegarde de la cohérence de l'ordre juridique des droits fondamentaux. / The concept of the abuse of the right is spread in most disciplines. This prohibition is, not only, present in several legal systems, but it can also be found in the principal instruments of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Nevertheless the specificity of this branch of the law and the particular nature of the concept of the abuse of right impose the difficult issue of the compatibility of every clause prohibiting the abuse of right and the philosophy of the fundamental rights. Therefore, this interrogation requires raising the challenge of its identification in the fundamental rights area, and the challenge of its conceptualization.The identification of the abuse of the fundamental rights is problematic, since that, we are facing a notion with undetermined content revealing its plasticity and its malleability. These characteristics have the effect of integrating, in the positive law, a controversial concept, unstable and at the same time mobile and confused, they also impose the determination of the elements that contribute to the definition and the clarification of the application field of the prohibition of the abuse of the fundamental rights. The abuse of the right conceptualization can be built if we head from the basic role, that it is managed to assume in the fundamental rights area. The prohibition of abuse of fundamental rights appears to be an important element of fundamental rights legal system, whose custom has to remain exceptional, allowing not only to regulate the exercise of the individual rights but also to defend the essential values in their protection process, and in particular those inherent to every democratic society. The prohibition of abuse of right ensures the coherence and the fullness of fundamental rights legal system.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1989. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 2004. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2937. Typescript. Abstract precedes thesis as 3 preliminary leaves (iii-v). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 51-54).

The problem of this thesis is to determine what implications a democratic society and the biological explanation of growth and learning make to an educational program and to measure the program planned for the Intermediate School of Edinburg, Texas, by these implications.

This thesis The Failure of the New Left in the US: The Case of SDS analyzes the causes and reasons of the failure of the New Left in the United States. The left-leaning students who were discontent with the social order and reality of the country gathered under the idea of participatory democracy in a group called Students for a Democratic Society. Their aim was to change and improve the system through universities being agents of social change, thus making a clear difference with the Old Left. The worker no longer stood in the center of social progress, but the student did. SDS promptly plunged into several burning issues of the era, such as civil rights movement and inferior position of the blacks and poor in the society. The Vietnam War and antiwar protest movement have also been great issues in which SDSers directed their energy. As the Vietnam War escalated in terms of American soldiers being sent overseas, the intensity of student protests grew as well. Inevitably SDS resorted to usage of violent means of expressing dissent and clashed with the forces of the establishment. The thesis seeks to answer what reasons, events and realities led them to finally adopting revolutionary Marxism as their flag ideology. Soon after that SDS broke up and its once great influence waned away.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal. / Dans les décisions où entre en jeu la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, les juges construisent leurs raisonnements à partir des droits et libertés énumérés dans son libellé, mais également à partir de valeurs. Parmi ces valeurs afférentes à la Charte se retrouvent notamment la protection des groupes vulnérables, la protection de la vie privée et de la réputation de la personne, le respect de la dignité inhérente de l'être humain, la promotion de la justice et de l'égalité sociale de même que l'encouragement à l'épanouissement personnel. Contrairement aux droits et libertés, lesquels furent directement inscrits par le constituant dans le libellé de la Charte, les valeurs représentent une création de l'appareil judiciaire. Malgré la composante subjective que l'on attribue généralement aux valeurs, nous constatons que la sécurité du droit ne se trouve pas fragilisée par l'incorporation d'une dimension axiologique dans le raisonnement judiciaire en matière de Charte. Au contraire, le recours aux valeurs favorise la constance et la prévisibilité dans l'application et l'interprétation de cet instrument de protection des droits et libertés. D'une part, les valeurs afférentes à la Charte sont utilisées de façon rigoureuse dans le contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionnalité des lois, dans l'adaptation des règles de common law et dans l'interprétation des lois. Les juges invoquent fréquemment les mêmes valeurs, à quelques variantes près, assurant ainsi une certaine stabilité dans le traitement des composantes axiologiques de la Charte. D'autre part, les juges sont largement capables de dissocier de leurs convictions personnelles les valeurs qu'ils invoquent dans leurs décisions. Les valeurs tirées des comportements sociaux actuels, du droit international et du droit comparé, de même que des ouvrages des philosophes politiques et des théoriciens du droit, sont des valeurs qui ont peu à voir avec les sentiments, les opinions ou les intérêts personnels des juges. / In cases involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, judges include in their reasoning not only rights and freedoms, but also values. Among these Charter values we find protection of vulnerable groups, respect for the inherent dignity of human beings, cultivation oUndividual self-fulfillment and human flourishing, commitment to social justice and protection of privacy rights and reputation. Contrary to rights and freedoms, which are specifically enumerated in the Charter, values represent a creation of the judicial apparatus. Notwithstanding their inherent subjective component, values do not weaken the law's predictability nor do they endanger judicial reasoning concerning the Charter. On the contrary, applying values brings constancy and certainty in the interpretation of the Charter. On the one hand, Charter values are used in rigorous ways in the judicial review of constitutionality, in the adaptation of common law mIes and in the interpretation of laws and by-Iaws. Judges have recourse to more or less the same values, thus bringing stability in the Charter's analysis. On the other hand, judges are able to dissociate their personal beliefs from the values they caU upon in their judgments. Values drawn from contemporary social behaviors, international law and comparative law, as weU as political and legal philosophers' works, are values quite distant from judges' feelings, opinions and personal interests.

A pedagogia de John Dewey (1859-1952) é referência para compreender as alterações no pensamento e na prática do campo educacional do século XX. Suas propostas questionam o modelo escolar tradicional predominante na época, realocando a criança para o centro do processo pedagógico. Apesar de ilustre por suas contribuições à Educação, Dewey assegura seu lugar nas discussões filosóficas tanto pela amplitude temática de seu pensamento quanto pela riqueza analítica de suas ideias. Tido como um dos pioneiros do pragmatismo (ao lado de William James e C. S. Pierce), o filósofo se debruça sobre as mais prementes questões políticas e sociais de seu tempo: o avanço desenfreado do capitalismo lança uma série de novos desafios ao homem, ao mesmo tempo em que ascendem totalitarismos de esquerda e direita na Europa e na Rússia. O horizonte da emancipação humana, representado pela democracia, está sob ameaça de diferentes modos. Essa importante pauta recebe o tratamento de Dewey em escritos que transcendem as fronteiras pedagógicas. Entendemos que a pedagogia de John Dewey é melhor compreendida quando matizada pela concepção de sociedade democrática presente nessas reflexões filosóficas mais amplas. Com o intuito de delinear essa concepção, este trabalho partiu da leitura analítica de Velho e novo individualismo e Liberdade e Cultura. A primeira trata dos descompassos entre indivíduo e sociedade, acentuados diante da lógica capitalista de prevalência do interesse particular sobre o comum. A democracia aparece como forma de organização social que possibilita a harmonia desses lados, zelando tanto pela garantia do desenvolvimento do indivíduo quanto pela busca dos fins sociais. Já o segundo texto afirma que liberdade e democracia devem ser tomadas como aposta moral e não como fins naturalmente prezados pelo homem. A cultura, em interação com a natureza humana, é elemento formador de hábitos, disposições e valores. Com isso, Dewey coloca a manutenção e expansão dos ideais democráticos em mãos humanas enquanto missão que precisa ser deliberadamente empreendida. Uma sociedade livre exige uma cultura livre o que, por sua vez, só se dá pela existência de instituições sociais igualmente libertárias. Em função dessas descobertas, alguns dos principais pontos de sua reflexão pedagógica são repensados a partir de Meu credo pedagógico e Democracia e Educação. Em primeiro lugar, destacamos o papel da educação, enquanto processo social na formação da cultura da sociedade. Se a democracia é uma escolha, a educação pode beneficiar ou dificultar sua construção de acordo com o tipo de cultura que promove. Assim, a preocupação com o interesse da criança diante da matéria e da atividade escolar assume nova tonalidade, pois é expressão de sua preocupação tanto com a preservação da dimensão individual na sociedade massificada, quanto pelo repúdio a práticas antidemocráticas geradoras de sujeitos passivos e acostumados a tarefas não reflexivas. Por outro lado, cabe à escola levar o aluno a compreender-se como ser social, significando seu papel e suas ações em função dos fins da comunidade. Para Dewey, a centralidade do método pedagógico se dá porque meios são tão importantes quanto fins. A democracia não pode ser alcançada senão por meios democráticos: a escola, enquanto instituição social, não pode se furtar desse imperativo. / John Deweys (1859-1952) pedagogy is a key to comprehend changes in educational thought and practice throughout the 20th century. His propositions call in question the predominant traditional school model, shifting the child back to the center of the pedagogical process. Though well known for his contribution on Education, Dewey is present in philosophical discussions due to his wide thematic scope as well as for the analytical power of his ideas. Regarded as one of the pioneering American pragmatist, the philosopher laid effort on the most urgent political and social matters of his time: the ungoverned advance of capitalism puts at stake new challenges to mankind, as left and right-wing totalitarian systems emerge in Europe and Russia. Human emancipation, represented by democracy, is threatened in different ways. Dewey tackles this important issue in works that transcend the pedagogical field. The authors pedagogy seems to be better comprehended when contextualized by his concept of democratic society, stated in broad philosophical reflections. This dissertation clears out this conception through analytical readings of Individualism, Old and New and Freedom and Culture. The former brings out the differences between individuals and society, intensified by the prevalence of private interests over common well-being. Democracy emerges as a form of social organization which makes it possible to achieve balance between those two sides, guaranteeing both individual development and the search for social aims. The latter asserts that liberty and democracy shall be understood as moral choice, instead of as mens natural longing. Thus, Dewey understands the maintenance and expansion of democratic ideals as deliberately undertaken by human hands. A free society requires a free culture that, in its turn, can only exist through free social institutions. Having in mind these findings, some of his main pedagogical ideas from My Pedagogic Creed and Democracy and Education were revisited in this research. Firstly, the role of education is pointed out, as a social process in the formation of culture. If democracy is actually a choice, education can favor or hinder its construction according to the kind of culture it promotes. Hence, the concern for childrens interest on academic content and activities rises new implications, for it reveals an attempt to preserve the individual dimension in mass society, as well as to deny non-democratic procedures that form passive human beings, accustomed to non-reflexive tasks. On the other hand, it is the schools duty to help students understand themselves as social beings, making sense of their roles and actions on account of communal purposes. Dewey believed that pedagogical methods were important because means are as relevant as its ends. Democracy can only be reached through democratic means: school, as a social institution, cannot avoid such principle.

A pedagogia de John Dewey (1859-1952) é referência para compreender as alterações no pensamento e na prática do campo educacional do século XX. Suas propostas questionam o modelo escolar tradicional predominante na época, realocando a criança para o centro do processo pedagógico. Apesar de ilustre por suas contribuições à Educação, Dewey assegura seu lugar nas discussões filosóficas tanto pela amplitude temática de seu pensamento quanto pela riqueza analítica de suas ideias. Tido como um dos pioneiros do pragmatismo (ao lado de William James e C. S. Pierce), o filósofo se debruça sobre as mais prementes questões políticas e sociais de seu tempo: o avanço desenfreado do capitalismo lança uma série de novos desafios ao homem, ao mesmo tempo em que ascendem totalitarismos de esquerda e direita na Europa e na Rússia. O horizonte da emancipação humana, representado pela democracia, está sob ameaça de diferentes modos. Essa importante pauta recebe o tratamento de Dewey em escritos que transcendem as fronteiras pedagógicas. Entendemos que a pedagogia de John Dewey é melhor compreendida quando matizada pela concepção de sociedade democrática presente nessas reflexões filosóficas mais amplas. Com o intuito de delinear essa concepção, este trabalho partiu da leitura analítica de Velho e novo individualismo e Liberdade e Cultura. A primeira trata dos descompassos entre indivíduo e sociedade, acentuados diante da lógica capitalista de prevalência do interesse particular sobre o comum. A democracia aparece como forma de organização social que possibilita a harmonia desses lados, zelando tanto pela garantia do desenvolvimento do indivíduo quanto pela busca dos fins sociais. Já o segundo texto afirma que liberdade e democracia devem ser tomadas como aposta moral e não como fins naturalmente prezados pelo homem. A cultura, em interação com a natureza humana, é elemento formador de hábitos, disposições e valores. Com isso, Dewey coloca a manutenção e expansão dos ideais democráticos em mãos humanas enquanto missão que precisa ser deliberadamente empreendida. Uma sociedade livre exige uma cultura livre o que, por sua vez, só se dá pela existência de instituições sociais igualmente libertárias. Em função dessas descobertas, alguns dos principais pontos de sua reflexão pedagógica são repensados a partir de Meu credo pedagógico e Democracia e Educação. Em primeiro lugar, destacamos o papel da educação, enquanto processo social na formação da cultura da sociedade. Se a democracia é uma escolha, a educação pode beneficiar ou dificultar sua construção de acordo com o tipo de cultura que promove. Assim, a preocupação com o interesse da criança diante da matéria e da atividade escolar assume nova tonalidade, pois é expressão de sua preocupação tanto com a preservação da dimensão individual na sociedade massificada, quanto pelo repúdio a práticas antidemocráticas geradoras de sujeitos passivos e acostumados a tarefas não reflexivas. Por outro lado, cabe à escola levar o aluno a compreender-se como ser social, significando seu papel e suas ações em função dos fins da comunidade. Para Dewey, a centralidade do método pedagógico se dá porque meios são tão importantes quanto fins. A democracia não pode ser alcançada senão por meios democráticos: a escola, enquanto instituição social, não pode se furtar desse imperativo. / John Deweys (1859-1952) pedagogy is a key to comprehend changes in educational thought and practice throughout the 20th century. His propositions call in question the predominant traditional school model, shifting the child back to the center of the pedagogical process. Though well known for his contribution on Education, Dewey is present in philosophical discussions due to his wide thematic scope as well as for the analytical power of his ideas. Regarded as one of the pioneering American pragmatist, the philosopher laid effort on the most urgent political and social matters of his time: the ungoverned advance of capitalism puts at stake new challenges to mankind, as left and right-wing totalitarian systems emerge in Europe and Russia. Human emancipation, represented by democracy, is threatened in different ways. Dewey tackles this important issue in works that transcend the pedagogical field. The authors pedagogy seems to be better comprehended when contextualized by his concept of democratic society, stated in broad philosophical reflections. This dissertation clears out this conception through analytical readings of Individualism, Old and New and Freedom and Culture. The former brings out the differences between individuals and society, intensified by the prevalence of private interests over common well-being. Democracy emerges as a form of social organization which makes it possible to achieve balance between those two sides, guaranteeing both individual development and the search for social aims. The latter asserts that liberty and democracy shall be understood as moral choice, instead of as mens natural longing. Thus, Dewey understands the maintenance and expansion of democratic ideals as deliberately undertaken by human hands. A free society requires a free culture that, in its turn, can only exist through free social institutions. Having in mind these findings, some of his main pedagogical ideas from My Pedagogic Creed and Democracy and Education were revisited in this research. Firstly, the role of education is pointed out, as a social process in the formation of culture. If democracy is actually a choice, education can favor or hinder its construction according to the kind of culture it promotes. Hence, the concern for childrens interest on academic content and activities rises new implications, for it reveals an attempt to preserve the individual dimension in mass society, as well as to deny non-democratic procedures that form passive human beings, accustomed to non-reflexive tasks. On the other hand, it is the schools duty to help students understand themselves as social beings, making sense of their roles and actions on account of communal purposes. Dewey believed that pedagogical methods were important because means are as relevant as its ends. Democracy can only be reached through democratic means: school, as a social institution, cannot avoid such principle.

Dans les décisions où entre en jeu la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, les juges construisent leurs raisonnements à partir des droits et libertés énumérés dans son libellé, mais également à partir de valeurs. Parmi ces valeurs afférentes à la Charte se retrouvent notamment la protection des groupes vulnérables, la protection de la vie privée et de la réputation de la personne, le respect de la dignité inhérente de l'être humain, la promotion de la justice et de l'égalité sociale de même que l'encouragement à l'épanouissement personnel. Contrairement aux droits et libertés, lesquels furent directement inscrits par le constituant dans le libellé de la Charte, les valeurs représentent une création de l'appareil judiciaire. Malgré la composante subjective que l'on attribue généralement aux valeurs, nous constatons que la sécurité du droit ne se trouve pas fragilisée par l'incorporation d'une dimension axiologique dans le raisonnement judiciaire en matière de Charte. Au contraire, le recours aux valeurs favorise la constance et la prévisibilité dans l'application et l'interprétation de cet instrument de protection des droits et libertés. D'une part, les valeurs afférentes à la Charte sont utilisées de façon rigoureuse dans le contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionnalité des lois, dans l'adaptation des règles de common law et dans l'interprétation des lois. Les juges invoquent fréquemment les mêmes valeurs, à quelques variantes près, assurant ainsi une certaine stabilité dans le traitement des composantes axiologiques de la Charte. D'autre part, les juges sont largement capables de dissocier de leurs convictions personnelles les valeurs qu'ils invoquent dans leurs décisions. Les valeurs tirées des comportements sociaux actuels, du droit international et du droit comparé, de même que des ouvrages des philosophes politiques et des théoriciens du droit, sont des valeurs qui ont peu à voir avec les sentiments, les opinions ou les intérêts personnels des juges. / In cases involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, judges include in their reasoning not only rights and freedoms, but also values. Among these Charter values we find protection of vulnerable groups, respect for the inherent dignity of human beings, cultivation oUndividual self-fulfillment and human flourishing, commitment to social justice and protection of privacy rights and reputation. Contrary to rights and freedoms, which are specifically enumerated in the Charter, values represent a creation of the judicial apparatus. Notwithstanding their inherent subjective component, values do not weaken the law's predictability nor do they endanger judicial reasoning concerning the Charter. On the contrary, applying values brings constancy and certainty in the interpretation of the Charter. On the one hand, Charter values are used in rigorous ways in the judicial review of constitutionality, in the adaptation of common law mIes and in the interpretation of laws and by-Iaws. Judges have recourse to more or less the same values, thus bringing stability in the Charter's analysis. On the other hand, judges are able to dissociate their personal beliefs from the values they caU upon in their judgments. Values drawn from contemporary social behaviors, international law and comparative law, as weU as political and legal philosophers' works, are values quite distant from judges' feelings, opinions and personal interests. / Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal