Thesis--Freiburg im Breisgau. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 288-290).

Meister Eckhart understands that human beings are thrown into meaning, that we live out our lives in meaning and that the source of this meaning is beyond our understanding. We always have an understanding of the world in which we live but we do not determine this understanding and we do not have the ability to understand the source of this understanding. This is the basic principal of philosophical hermeneutics which we also find in the work of Heidegger and Gadamer. However, there did come a time when human beings became arrogant enough to view the world as ‘n collection of objects which can be fully and finally known by manking. During the age of enlightenment man understood himself as the source of meaning and asserted his power over understanding. This arrogance would not last long. During the nineteenth century scalars like Dilthey recognized the fundamental historicity of human being. Dilthey understood that man is bound to the meaning of his age. However, he could not reject the arrogance of the scientific worldview which staked a claim on the possibility of absolute knowledge. Thus he chose to carry this prejudice into the sphere of the human sciences and constructed a new foundation for man’s power over meaning. We who study hermeneutics enjoy praising Heidegger for his insight and contribution towards hermeneutics. It is said that Heidegger discovered the absolute finitude and historicity of human being. This may well be true, but it is a shame that scholars mostly ignore the contribution of Edmund Husserl. In this document I claim that it was Husserl who laid the foundation for the new movement in hermeneutics in Germany of which Heidegger and Gadamer has been the major exponents. In the words of Gadamer, this movement may be called “Philosophical Hermeneutics” since it does not only include a method for understanding but also encompasses a way of thinking about human being in general. In my view the current discourse on the origin and development of philosophical hermeneutics represents a great injustice since the philosophy of Husserl is neglected in this discourse. In this writing I shall try to rectify this injustice by illuminating the contribution that Husserl has made to philosophical hermeneutics. Firstly I will show that Husserl’s philosophy is fundamentally about meaning. In his early distributive psychology he struggles with the question of the origin of concepts. With his concept of intentionally he rejects the traditional ontology of the object in order to make place for the ontological integrity of meaning. Unlike his predecessors he claim that objects are determined by meaning instead of the other way around. In his transcendental phenomenology he goes a step further by proclaiming that the Ego is nothing but pure existence and that consciousness in nothing but he existence of meaning. These insights are easy to overlook due to Husserl’s obsession with epistemology. His philosophy is all but consistent. But it is especially by means of this inconsistency that Husserl makes his contribution to philosophical hermeneutics. We may compare Husserl with Moses. Like Moses he reaches the top of the mountain Sinai where he can look upon the Promised Land. But, unlike Moses, he turns his back on this new land and stares back at the desert of epistemology. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Philosophy / unrestricted

La récurrence avec laquelle Wilhelm Dilthey visite les thèmes et les problèmes de la métaphysique dans ses principaux écrits paraît de prime abord jurer avec la thèse, absolument centrale dans son oeuvre, selon laquelle les procédés et les visées de la pensée métaphysique appartiennent à une époque définitivement révolue. Le présent travail vise simultanément à explorer l’ambiguïté qui caractérise le traitement diltheyen de la philosophie métaphysique et à montrer que cette ambiguïté est inséparable du sens général de la « philosophie de la vie » esquissée par Dilthey, laquelle est trop souvent réduite à une simple épistémologie du monde de l’esprit. Afin de mener à bien cette démonstration, nous nous proposons d’abord de resituer les méditations de Dilthey au sein de la crise globale que traverse la philosophie allemande dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Nous cherchons ensuite à reconstituer l’argumentaire par lequel Dilthey, dans la « phénoménologie de la métaphysique » qu’il compose pour son Introduction aux sciences de l’esprit (1883), cherche à enrayer toute forme de résurgence métaphysique. Nous tâchons pour finir de montrer que ce texte largement négligé par les interprètes constitue la matrice implicite de la doctrine tardive des « visions du monde » (1907-1911). En relisant ces écrits à l’aune du « problème de la métaphysique », nous souhaitons contribuer à la redécouverte de leurs horizons propres, et exposer du même coup l’une des tensions les plus fondamentales de la philosophie diltheyenne.

In this thesis, I argue for the viability of Wilhelm Dilthey’s theory of world-views as a form of meta-philosophy by defending its response to the challenge of history that arose in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century. I show that Dilthey’s account of philosophy as a universal activity that is rooted in our psychological need for stability successfully integrates history’s insight into the contingency and plurality of philosophical systems without abandoning their truthfulness or tradition. To demonstrate and qualify the success of Dilthey’s theory, I apply it to Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus which I argue fails to sufficiently address its own historical contingency when it presents its account of and response to the problem of absurdity as a descriptive fact of critical consciousness. I show that Dilthey’s concept of reflective historical consciousness has the necessary resources to overcome Camus’ lack of reflection upon historical contingency. I argue further that Camus’ work reveals the inadequacy of Dilthey’s typology of philosophical world-views by resisting classification by its categories. My thesis therefore contributes to contemporary work on meta-philosophy by showing that Dilthey’s theory of world-views, while limited by its typologies, offers its history of philosophy as a viable form of meta-philosophy. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / In this thesis, I aim to clarify how philosophy should attune itself to historical knowledge by analyzing Wilhelm Dilthey’s theory of world-views. More specifically, I aim to investigate the utility of Dilthey’s theory as a response to history’s insight into the contingent nature of philosophy. I argue that Dilthey’s view of philosophy as a natural extension of our psychological need for stability is capable of accounting for the contingency and plurality of philosophical systems without sacrificing philosophy’s claim to a unique and universal essence. To support my argument, I use Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus as a characteristic case of philosophy failing to incorporate historical knowledge and show that Dilthey’s theory can overcome this failure through its account of reflective historical consciousness.

No description available.

Zugl.: Hannover, University, Diss., 2006.

Thesis--Münster--State university, 1974.

Ce mémoire défend l’hypothèse que le sens de la critique de la raison historique de Dilthey peut être déterminé à partir du projet critique de Kant, à la condition que ce projet ait le sens que lui donne l’interprétation de Deleuze. Le premier chapitre tire de l’interprétation deleuzienne de Kant trois idées qui trouvent leur équivalent dans la philosophie de Dilthey, à savoir (1) que l’objet de la critique de la raison historique est la réalité humaine vivante, (2) que sa méthode, l’autoréflexion, distingue en elle trois dimensions essentielles (l’agir, le savoir et le sentir) et (3) que, malgré l’universalité de ces dimensions, la réalité humaine vivante présente une irréductible variabilité. Les trois chapitres suivants reconstituent successivement l’autoréflexion diltheyenne de l’agir, du savoir et du sentir. / This thesis argues that the meaning of Dilthey’s critique of historical reason can be determined by relying on Kant’s critical project, provided that this project receives its own meaning from Deleuze’s interpretation. The first chapter draws from this interpretation three ideas which find their equivalent in Dilthey’s philosophy, namely (1) that the object of the critique of historical reason is living human reality, (2) that its method, called self-reflection, distinguishes in it three essential dimensions (action, thought, feeling), (3) that, despite the universality of these dimensions, the living human reality presents an irreducible variability. The next three chapters successively reconstitute Dilthey’s self-reflection of action, thought and feeling.

[pt] Em que sentido pode-se considerar a psicanálise uma ciência? Esta é a questão que norteia este trabalho. Embora saiba-se que Freud, durante toda sua obra, tenha concebido a psicanálise como uma ciência, o estatuto epistemológico da psicanálise permaneceu controverso ao longo do debate filosófico das ciências no último século. Este debate orientou-se, em geral, pela diferenciação entre as ciências humanas e as ciências naturais, originada na segunda metade do século XIX. Contrapondo a teoria positivista das ciências à nova epistemologia proposta por Wilhelm Dilthey em sua Introdução às ciências do espírito, esta dissertação pretende mostrar que a noção freudiana de ciência se aproxima em alguns aspectos importantes da epistemologia das ciências do espírito pensada por Dilthey. / [en] In what sense may we regard psychoanalysis as a science? This is the question which leads this dissertation. Although its known that Freud, during all his works, has conceived psychoanalysis as a science, epistemological meaning of psychoanalysis remained controversial during last centurys philosophical debate on sciences. This debate has been generally oriented by differenciation between human sciences and nature sciences, which origins are to be sought in the second half of nineteenth century. Confronting positivisms theory of sciences and the new epistemology proposed by Wilhelm Dilthey in his Introduction on spirit sciences, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that Freuds notion of science approaches in some main aspects the epistemology of spirit sciences brought out by Dilthey.

Según Dilthey, el análisis formalista llevado adelante por la gnoseología de Kant no logra comprender el mundo humano, por su parte, Hegel si aborda al hombre histórico, pero subsume su mundo al despliegue de la razón o el saber absoluto. El proyecto de una fundamentación de las ciencias del espíritu llevado adelante por Dilthey busca adentrarse en el mundo humano concibiéndolo como el conjunto de manifestaciones objetivadas de la vida. Kant y Hegel se convierten en sus interlocutores, pero también Comte con quien se enfrenta en pos de fundamentar la autonomía metodológica de las ciencias del espíritu. Sostengo que la noción tardía de «espíritu objetivo», que Dilthey toma de Hegel, pero que la concibe como el devenir de la vida política y cultural, permite releer toda la filosofía de Dilthey con otra perspectiva. El presente estudio no busca realizar un análisis comparativo entre Dilthey y Hegel, sino partir de la recepción que el primero hace del segundo a los efectos de comprender su filosofía. En este sentido, para Dilthey el «espíritu objetivo» está constituido por el conjunto de las organizaciones exteriores de la sociedad –la estructura político-jurídica de la sociedad- y por las formas culturales como arte, religión y filosofía. El hombre es quien, según Dilthey, produce estas instituciones las cuales a su vez le anteceden y le sucederán en su existencia. En este sentido Dilthey concibe al hombre como un ser histórico y un «punto de cruce» de las distintas objetivaciones históricas. Este mundo compartido es el mundo histórico –expresado a través de las nociones como Gemeinsamkeit, objektive Geist, verwebt y kreuzungspunkt-, aquel que contiene el conjunto de experiencia de vidas acumuladas y las expectativas de futuro. En síntesis, se sostiene que para Dilthey el mundo es manifestación objetiva de la vida –fenomenología del espíritu-, siendo el espíritu objetivo o la vida objetivada, un producto del devenir de la vida humana. Es decir, en el mundo histórico actúan individuos -dotados de voluntad- en una conexión estructural con su entorno, como «puntos de cruce» de las distintas objetivaciones. Es decir, la preocupación histórico-sistemática diltheyana gira en torno al tema del hombre –sujeto individual, «punto de cruce»- y lo socio-histórico –mundo intersubjetivo y espíritu objetivo, manifestación objetivada de la vida-. Así, el hombre juega, para Dilthey, un papel central en la historia y en el despliegue de la vida. Todos los estudios gnoseológicos, epistemológicos, históricos y toda fundamentación sistemática es producto de las conexiones de vida. La importancia de los individuos, sus propias manifestaciones de vida y el «espíritu objetivo» -centros de análisis de las ciencias del espíritu-, permite comprender a la filosofía diltheyana como una filosofía de la intersubjetividad, en oposición a las interpretaciones clásicas que hacían que ella cayera en un psicologismo-empático. Asimismo, el plano de la exteriorización de las acciones individuales y sociales le permite a Dilthey encontrar un saber objetivo para las ciencias del espíritu. / Dilthey points out that while the formalist analysis carried out by Kant's gnoseology fails to understand the human world, Hegel does speak about the historical man, but subsumes his world to the manifestation of reason or absolute knowledge. The project of a foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften carried out by Dilthey seeks to penetrate the human world conceiving it as a set of objectified manifestations of life. Kant and Hegel become their interlocutors, but also Comte with whom Dilthey face in order to sustain the methodical autonomy foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften. I assume that the late notion of "objektive Geist", which Dilthey takes from Hegel, but which he sees as the process/activity of the political and cultural life, allows for a rereading of the whole philosophy of Dilthey in a new perspective. This study does not seek to make a comparative analysis between Dilthey and Hegel, but to set a starting point from/of go along the im put that the first author makes over the latter so as to understand his philosophy. In this regard, for Dilthey, the "objektive Geist" is constituted by the external organizations of society (political-legal structure of society) and the cultural forms as art, religion and philosophy. It is man who, according to Dilthey, produces these institutions, which precede and will surpass the existence of the individual man. Dilthey conceives man as a historical being and as a "crossing point" of the various historical objectifications. This shared world is the historical-world (expressed through the notions of Gemeinsamkeit, objektive Geist, verwebt and kreuzungspunkt), that which contains all the accumulated life experience and future expectations. In short, it is argued that for Dilthey the world is objective manifestation of life (phenomenology of Geist) being objektive Geist or objectified life a product of the manifestation of human life. I.e, in the historical world individuals act -gifted with will- in a structural connection with their environment, as "crossing points" of different objectifications. That is, the historical and systematic Diltheyan concern revolves around the theme of man (individual subject, «crossing point») and the socio-historical world (intersubjective world, objektive Geist, objectified manifestation of life). So, the man plays, for Dilthey, a central role in the history and in the manifestation of life. All gnoseological, epistemological, historical studies and any systematic foundation is a product of life connections. The importance of individuals, their own expressions of life and the «objektive Geist» (the centre of analysis of de Geisteswissenschaften), enable a better understanding of Dilthey's philosophy as a philosophy of intersubjectivity, as opposed to classical interpretations that made its fell into a psychologism-empathetic study. Furthermore, the level of externalization of individual and social actions allows Dilthey to find objective knowledge for the Geisteswissenschaften.