This doctrinal thesis centers around the topic of voluntary human shields as a complex phenomenon requiring further scholarly attention. Specifically, this paper acknowledges that the actions of certain voluntary shields renders their classification as civilians strenuous, in which it is explored if the notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities might apply. As such, the research question contemplates: To what extent, if at all, can voluntary human shields be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities when shielding lawful targets?  The analyses have concentrated on both a theoretical examination of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance, and on an empirical investigation into two cases of voluntary human shields: the Serbian citizens in 1999 and the Palestinian women in 2006. Evidently, the findings indicate that voluntary human shields can to some extent take a direct part in hostilities, while the generalizability of our results are appreciated. Ultimately, this thesis provides additional insights into the topic, as increasingly relevant and required within the contradictory and existing research field, while also anticipating avenues for future research.

Atskyrimo principas ginkluotuose konfliktuose yra tarptautinės humanitarinės teisės pagrindas, reikalaujantis, kad konflikto šalys visuomet skirtų civilius gyventojus ir kombatantus, civilinius ir karinius objektus. Tačiau dėl visuotinės privatizacijos padidėjus civilių ir privačių kompanijų, dalyvaujančių ginkluotuose konfliktuose, skaičiui bei nuolat tobulėjant karinėms technologijoms, riba tarp civilių ir kombatantų ėmė nykti. Norėdami pritaikyti atskyrimo principą šiuolaikiniams ginkluotiems konfliktams, šiame darbe, visų pirma, analizavome tiesioginio dalyvavimo karo veiksmuose įtaką šio principo taikymui ir nustatėm, kad asmeniui, tiesiogiai dalyvaujančiam karo veiksmuose, atskyrimo principas nebetaikomas, jis tampa teisėtu kariniu taikiniu ir praranda apsaugą nuo karo veiksmų keliamų pavojų. Tiesioginiu dalyvavimu karo veiksmuose siūlėme laikyti veiksmus, atitinkančius žalos masto, tiesioginio priežastinio ryšio tarp atliekamo veiksmo ir kilusios ar kilsiančios žalos ir ryšio su ginkluotu konfliktu bei viena iš konflikto šalių reikalavimus. Visų antra, nagrinėjome atskyrimo principo ginkluotuose konfliktuose taikymą PKSK personalo atžvilgiu. Nustatėme, kad dalis PKSK darbuotojų galėtų būti laikomi kombatantais ir dėl to taptų teisėtais kariniais taikiniai, jiems atskyrimo principas taikomas nebūtų, tačiau kita dalis PKSK turėtų būti laikomi civiliais ir tol, kol jie tiesiogiai nedalyvauja karo veiksmuose, jiems būtų taikoma apsauga nuo karo veiksmų keliamų pavojų... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The principle of distinction in armed conflicts is the corner stone of international humanitarian law, requiring that the Parties to the conflict would at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. But because of the increased number of civilians and private companies participating in armed conflicts due to the global privatisation and permanent technological improvement of military equipment, the line between civilians and combatants begin to blur. In order to apply the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts, firstly, we analysed an influence of direct participation in hostilities to the application of the principle of distinction and determined that for person who directly participates in armed conflicts the principle of distinction is no longer applicable and this person becomes a legal military target with no general protection against dangers arising from military operations. An act which is considered to be direct participation in hostilities should meet the requirements of threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus. Secondly, we studied the application of the principle of distinction to the personnel of private military and security companies in armed conflicts and determined that part of this personnel might be considered combatants and because of that become lawful military targets to whom the principle of distinction in no longer applicable. The other part of... [to full text]

La notion de participation directe aux hostilités n’a jamais été définie de manière précise au regard du droit international humanitaire. Cette ambiguïté a conduit à des interprétations divergentes du concept d’hostilités et des critères juridiques utilisés pour définir une participation directe par opposition à une participation indirecte (effort de guerre).D’ailleurs, les conflits contemporains posent de nouveaux défis quant à la définition et la mise en oeuvre de la notion de la participation directe aux hostilités. Les moyens de guerre de haute technicité (l’attaque de réseaux informatiques) et l’externalisation des forces armées (sociétés militaire privées), illustrent l’imbrication croissante des activités civiles et militaires et la difficulté à identifier précisément qui participe directement aux hostilités et quelles sont les mesures à prendre pour protéger ceux qui n’y participent pas directement. / The notion of direct participation in hostilities has never been precisely defined in international humanitarian law. This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of the concept of hostilities and legal criteria imply a distinction from direct participation in hostilities as opposed indirect participation (war effort).Indeed, contemporary conflicts have given rise to further challenges in terms of defining and implementing the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The use of high-tech warfare (computer network attack), privatization of the armed forces (private military company), among others, illustrate the increased intermingling of civilian and military activities which make it difficult to determine who is taking a direct part in hostilities and what measures should be taken to protect those who are not directly participating.

The main purpose of this work is to investigate if the US ́s killing of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 in Abbottabad in Pakistan was lawful. The background to the killing is what happened on 11 September 2001 when four US airplanes were hijacked and crashed into World Trade Center and Pentagon. Al Qaeda, a terrorist organisation led by Osama bin Laden, was immediately suspected for the attacks, which led to the starting point of the US ́s ‘global war on terror’. This work tries to give a short brief on ‘global war on terror’ and answer if there is a global war on terror and/or if a new category of war is needed. In order to get an answer to the main question of this work I had to investigate if US is in an international armed conflict or in a non-international armed conflict with Al Qaida. Another important question to investigate is if an armed conflict in one State can spill over to another State and still be consider as an armed conflict. Other important questions to answer are, if Osama bin Laden was a legitimate target under international humanitarian law, if he was a civilian or if he had a continuous combat function and what level of participation in hostilities he had? Not less important is also to investigate if human rights law is applicable when Osama bin Laden was killed, especially the fundamental right to life. Lastly I end my investigation with a quick review of the laws of jus ad bellum in order to get an answer if US had a right to resort to force in Pakistan. My conclusion is that the US was not involved in an armed conflict with al Qaeda in Pakistan where the killing took place. The conflict between the US and al Qaeda in Afghanistan is to be categorised as a non-international conflict. This conflict cannot be described as a conflict that has spilled over to Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden was killed. All people, including Osama bin Laden, has a right to life. Because of lack of information on what happened in Abbottabad when Osama bin Laden was killed it is impossible to give a clear legal answer if the US had the right to kill him. It could be lawful, but it could also be considered as a crime against international human rights law.