This study aims to examine how the emergence of modern warfare are challenging International Humanitarian Law when it comes to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Thereby gaining a better understanding of how modern warfare is putting civilians at risk and how International Humanitarian Law is being challenged by the development of warfare. This study is a multidisciplinary study of Peace and Conflict Studies and International Law, which gives a rare perspective on civilian’s position in modern warfare. Thereby this study is not only showing the legal challenges in armed conflict but also bringing in the perspective of civilian’s position in modern warfare. This study will make use of three case studies: urban warfare, non-state actors and the use of drones in armed conflict. This study concludes that the challenges which International Humanitarian Law meets in modern warfare, is related to the need of clarifications but also a need for a greater enforcement and respect of the law by all parties of the conflict, both state and non-state actors. Lastly, there is a need for strengthening the inclusion of non-state actors in international law and strengthen International Humanitarian Law to meet the challenges of modern warfare to protect the civilians.

Adaptivt kamouflage är en signaturanpassningsteknik som ger stridsfordon förmågan att anpassa sin värmesignatur utefter omgivningen eller imitera andra objekts signatur, i syfte att undgå upptäckt eller identifiering.I denna studie genomförs en analys om vilka folkrättsliga problem som kan uppstå vid användandet av adaptivt kamouflage.Studiens resultat visar att de folkrättsliga problem som kan uppstå vid användningen av adaptivt kamouflage är distinktionsproblem, då tekniken möjliggör för stridsfordon att imitera signaturen av civila personbilar. Denna användning av adaptivt kamouflage kan anses som brott mot distinktionsprincipen. / Adaptiv camouflage is a camouflage system which gives combat vehicles the ability to mimic the heat signature of its surroundings or copy the signature of other objects, to avoid detection or identification.This study conducts an analysis concerning the international legal problems that may arise from the use of adaptive camouflage.The result of the study show that the international legal problems that may arise from the use of adaptive camouflage are; distinction problems, when a combat vehicle can copy the heat signature of a civilian car. This use of adaptive camouflage can be seen as a violation against the principle of distinction.

Atskyrimo principas ginkluotuose konfliktuose yra tarptautinės humanitarinės teisės pagrindas, reikalaujantis, kad konflikto šalys visuomet skirtų civilius gyventojus ir kombatantus, civilinius ir karinius objektus. Tačiau dėl visuotinės privatizacijos padidėjus civilių ir privačių kompanijų, dalyvaujančių ginkluotuose konfliktuose, skaičiui bei nuolat tobulėjant karinėms technologijoms, riba tarp civilių ir kombatantų ėmė nykti. Norėdami pritaikyti atskyrimo principą šiuolaikiniams ginkluotiems konfliktams, šiame darbe, visų pirma, analizavome tiesioginio dalyvavimo karo veiksmuose įtaką šio principo taikymui ir nustatėm, kad asmeniui, tiesiogiai dalyvaujančiam karo veiksmuose, atskyrimo principas nebetaikomas, jis tampa teisėtu kariniu taikiniu ir praranda apsaugą nuo karo veiksmų keliamų pavojų. Tiesioginiu dalyvavimu karo veiksmuose siūlėme laikyti veiksmus, atitinkančius žalos masto, tiesioginio priežastinio ryšio tarp atliekamo veiksmo ir kilusios ar kilsiančios žalos ir ryšio su ginkluotu konfliktu bei viena iš konflikto šalių reikalavimus. Visų antra, nagrinėjome atskyrimo principo ginkluotuose konfliktuose taikymą PKSK personalo atžvilgiu. Nustatėme, kad dalis PKSK darbuotojų galėtų būti laikomi kombatantais ir dėl to taptų teisėtais kariniais taikiniai, jiems atskyrimo principas taikomas nebūtų, tačiau kita dalis PKSK turėtų būti laikomi civiliais ir tol, kol jie tiesiogiai nedalyvauja karo veiksmuose, jiems būtų taikoma apsauga nuo karo veiksmų keliamų pavojų... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The principle of distinction in armed conflicts is the corner stone of international humanitarian law, requiring that the Parties to the conflict would at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. But because of the increased number of civilians and private companies participating in armed conflicts due to the global privatisation and permanent technological improvement of military equipment, the line between civilians and combatants begin to blur. In order to apply the principle of distinction to modern armed conflicts, firstly, we analysed an influence of direct participation in hostilities to the application of the principle of distinction and determined that for person who directly participates in armed conflicts the principle of distinction is no longer applicable and this person becomes a legal military target with no general protection against dangers arising from military operations. An act which is considered to be direct participation in hostilities should meet the requirements of threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus. Secondly, we studied the application of the principle of distinction to the personnel of private military and security companies in armed conflicts and determined that part of this personnel might be considered combatants and because of that become lawful military targets to whom the principle of distinction in no longer applicable. The other part of... [to full text]

La notion de participation directe aux hostilités n’a jamais été définie de manière précise au regard du droit international humanitaire. Cette ambiguïté a conduit à des interprétations divergentes du concept d’hostilités et des critères juridiques utilisés pour définir une participation directe par opposition à une participation indirecte (effort de guerre).D’ailleurs, les conflits contemporains posent de nouveaux défis quant à la définition et la mise en oeuvre de la notion de la participation directe aux hostilités. Les moyens de guerre de haute technicité (l’attaque de réseaux informatiques) et l’externalisation des forces armées (sociétés militaire privées), illustrent l’imbrication croissante des activités civiles et militaires et la difficulté à identifier précisément qui participe directement aux hostilités et quelles sont les mesures à prendre pour protéger ceux qui n’y participent pas directement. / The notion of direct participation in hostilities has never been precisely defined in international humanitarian law. This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of the concept of hostilities and legal criteria imply a distinction from direct participation in hostilities as opposed indirect participation (war effort).Indeed, contemporary conflicts have given rise to further challenges in terms of defining and implementing the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The use of high-tech warfare (computer network attack), privatization of the armed forces (private military company), among others, illustrate the increased intermingling of civilian and military activities which make it difficult to determine who is taking a direct part in hostilities and what measures should be taken to protect those who are not directly participating.

Avant les Conventions de Genève de 1949, seuls les conflits armés internationaux étaient réglementés par le droit de la guerre. Ce dernier ne pouvait s’appliquer dans les guerres civiles qu’après la reconnaissance des forces rebelles comme partie belligérante. Or, depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale on a assisté à une multiplication des conflits armés non internationaux. Mais les Conventions de Genève de 1949 leur ont consacré seulement l’article 3 commun ; puis le Protocole II additionnel de 1977 est venu le compléter. Ces deux textes comportent de nombreuses lacunes, notamment l’absence de définition des « combattants » et des « civils », rendant ainsi difficile le respect du principe de distinction pourtant essentiel à la protection des populations civiles. Ces dispositions ne réglementent pas non plus les moyens et méthodes de guerre. Outre les lacunes normatives, il y a des problèmes matériels qui compliquent la mise en œuvre efficace des règles pertinentes. Il s’agit notamment de la participation des populations civiles aux hostilités, y compris les enfants-Soldats et les mercenaires. L’absence du statut de combattant dans les conflits armés non internationaux apparaît comme le problème principal compromettant l’efficacité du DIH. Celle-Ci ne contribue-T-Elle pas au non respect de ce droit par les groupes armés ? Faudrait-Il conférer ce statut à ces derniers en vue de les amener à appliquer le droit international humanitaire ou envisager d’autres moyens ? Lesquels ? / Before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, only the international armed conflicts were regulated by the law of the war. This last one could apply in the civil wars only after the recognition of the rebel forces as belligerent party. Now, since the Second World War we attended an increase in non-International armed conflicts. But the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dedicated them only the common article 3; then the additional Protocol II of 1977 came to complete it. These two texts contain numerous gaps, in particular the absence of definition of the "combatants" and the "civilians", making so difficult the respect for the principle of distinction nevertheless essential for the protection of the civil populations. These rules do not regulate either the means and the war methods. Besides the normative gaps, there are material problems which complicate the effective implementation of the relevant rules. It is in particular about the participation of the civil populations in the hostilities, including the children-Soldiers and the mercenaries. The absence of combatant's status in the non-International armed conflicts appears as the main problem compromising the efficiency of the international humanitarian law. Does not this one contribute to the non compliance with this law by the armed groups? Would it be necessary to confer this status to these last ones to bring them to apply the international humanitarian law or to envisage the other means? Which one?