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Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsible with regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising from certain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claims we are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying of thousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitely responsible for the other. It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishes between an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other. The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we are summoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the 'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific other and disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginning of impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocity between the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general other with whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who commands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in a symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoy legitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to the other less so. To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debate about transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from a Levinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poor global other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him, are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the subject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a political response to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitan and communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds us of our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete. Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor, the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for it overlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the interpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitancommunitarian debate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to the globally poor than is presently the case is possible. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vra waarom ons onsself nie skuldiger en meer verantwoordelik beskou teenoor die duisende mense wat elke dag, sonder enige toedoen van hul eie, as gevolg van voorkombare, armoed-verwante oorsake, sterf nie. Vanuit sekere perspektiewe is sulke nalatigheid te wagte. Wanneer ons egter die kwessie vanuit die perspektief van Emmanuel Levinas se etiese filosofie benader, kom ons voor 'n teenstrydigheid te staan, aangesien Levinas aandring dat ons oneindiglik en onvermydelik verantwoordelik is vir die ander, terwyl die daaglikse voorkombare sterftes van duisende arm mense aandui dat ons nie optree asof ons onsself as oneindiglik verantwoordelik teenoor die ander beskou nie. Dit wil voorkom asof Levinas eenvoudig verkeerd is. Levinas tref egter 'n onderskeid tussen 'n interpersoonlike etiese verhouding en 'n onpersoonlike politiese verhouding met die ander. Eersgenoemde is 'n verhouding van asimmetriese en oneindige verantwoordelikheid waartoe ons beveel word deur die uniekheid van die ander se 'gesig.' Laasgenoemde is 'n verhouding waarby ook 'n 'derde' betrokke is, en daarom moet die self sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die spesifieke ander beperk om so ook sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor 'n veelheid van andere na te kom. Die teenwoordigheid van die derde dui die beginpunt van onpersoonlike geregtigheid, institusies, politiek, kennis, asook gelykheid en wederkerigheid tussen die self en die ander, aan. Elke person wat ek teëkom is 'n algemene ander met wie ek in 'n politiese verhouding staan, asook, tegelykertyd, 'n spesifieke ander teenoor wie ek oneindiglik verantwoordelik is. Teenoor elke ander staan ek terselfdetyd in 'n simmetriese politiese verhouding en 'n asimmetriese etiese verhouding. Die dubbelsinnigheid van die samelewing lê daarin dat ek moet besluit of ek polities of eties teenoor die ander gaan optree. Beide opsies geniet 'n mate van legitimiteit, alhoewel, 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander minder legitiem is vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse oogpunt. In 'n poging om ons apatie teenoor die wêreld se armes te verstaan, word die sentrale debat rondom die kwessie van transnasionale verantwoordelikheid, die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat, vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Drie wyses waarop die etiese verhouding met die ander onderdruk word, en sodoende bydra tot ons etiese apatie teenoor die ander, word geïdentifiseer. Eerstens poog skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat om die subjek so 'n groot mate van outonomie en vryheid as moontlik te handhaaf en te bewaar, en 'legitimiseer' in die proses 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander. Tweedens, wanneer die kwessie van globale geregtigheid deur skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat aangeraak word, word die andersheid van die ander, wat ons aan ons etiese verantwoordelikheid teenoor die ander, asook aan die onvoltooide aard van geregtigheid, herinner, onderdruk. Derdens, in soverre kosmopolitaanse skrywers hulself beywer om 'n groter mate van besorgdheid teenoor arm persone regoor die wêreld te ontlok, blyk die strategie wat deur hulle gevolg word (hulle beklemtoon menslike gelykheid) teenproduktief te wees, aangesien hierdie strategie die uniekheid van die subjek en die ander in die etiese verhouding misken en onderdruk. Die kritiek teenoor hierdie drie aspekte van die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat word dan uitgebrei na aansprake dat 'n meer etiese houding teenoor die wêreld se armes moontlik is.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: After being sidelined for a number of years, South Africa finds itself readmitted to the international community. One of the many issues at stake now is the reform of the United Nations Security Council. This study looks at South Africa's aim to make substantial changes in the international system, with the Security Council being one of the target institutions. This is a mammoth task for South Africa and the study points out the challenges that go with engaging in this process. The study points out an element of ambiguity in South Africa's foreign policy and the challenges that go with making multilateralism a cornerstone of such a policy. While it is not yet clear as to whether South Africa will succeed in changing the behaviour of states and the practice of multilateral institutions, it is at the moment participating in debates that might lead to such changes. South Africa's participation in the Open Ended Working Committee on the reform of the United Nations Security Council constitutes one move among others to ensure a change in the practice of the Security Council. The limits of making multilateralism a cornerstone of foreign policy are outlined with the aim of making policy-makers aware of the implications of the broad scope of their ambiguous foreign policy. While it is necessary to avoid engaging in assignments that might be difficult to manage, the need for South Africa to focus only on what is achievable and not to try and punch above its weight is one aspect this paper emphasises. The paper ends by making recommendations, which include (among others) that South Africa should attempt to secure a seat in the reformed Security Council should such an opportunity arise, but only after a careful consideration of her abilities. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Na jare van politieke isolasie is Suid-Afrika weer 'n volwaardige lid van die internasionale gemeenskap. Die hervorming van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) se Veiligheidsraad, het binne die konteks van buitelandse beleid, een van die land se vernaamste uitdagings geword. Hierdie studie plaas Suid-Afrika se hervormingspogings van die internasionale stelselonder die soeklig, en fokus veralop die rol van die VN Veiligheidsraad. Die omvang van dié proses kan nie onderskat word nie, en die studie poog om die vernaamste uitdagings van hierdie hervormings te identifiseer. Die opdrag poog om te wys op 'n mate van teenstrydigheid wat in Suid- Afrika se buitelandse beleid te bespeur is, asook die uitdagings verbonde aan die vestiging van multilaterale betrekkinge as hoeksteen van sodanige beleid. Hoewel daar nog nie duidelikheid bestaan oor die mate van sukses wat die land behaal het met betrekking tot die gedrag van state en die praktyk van multilaterale betrekkinge nie, neem dit tans deel aan debate wat mag lei tot beleidsverandering in hierdie velde. Suid-Afrika se deelname aan die VN Veiligheidraad se Ope Werkskonunittees, rakende die hervorming van hierdie liggaam, is een voorbeeld van die land se verbintenis tot die verandering van Veiligheidsraad praktyke. Die beperkings rakende mulilaterale betrekkinge, 'n steunpilaar van internasionale beleid, word uitgelig ten einde beleidsmakers bewus te maak van die omvattende aard van 'n dikwels, onduidelike, buitelandse beleid. Die opdrag benadruk die feit dat Suid-Afrika sal moet poog om slegs betrokke te raak in internasionale aksies wat binne sy vermoëns val. Dit word afgesluit met 'n aantal aanbevelings. Een hiervan is 'n pleidooi dat Suid-Afrika permanente lidmaatskap van die 'n hervormde Veiligheidsraad verkry indien die geleentheid dit voordoen. Sodanige deelname kan egter eers geskied na deeglike oorweging van die land se vermoës binne hierdie sfeer.

Thesis (PhD) -- Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world economic order has passed through a transformation which can be characterised as a shift away from the idea of the "Keynesian compromise" to the idea or principle of greater openness and a revision of the role of the state in macroeconomic policy formulation. As a result, and to achieve the goal of global competitiveness, states have become more "outward" orientated. The last twenty years have also seen an increase in the levels of inequality within and between states, which means that the effect of economic growth on the reduction of poverty is much reduced. Critics of the "openness" principle point out that the policies of developing states should be more inwardly focused to ensure that economic openness contributes more directly to the alleviation of poverty and inequality. Southern Africa is a region where the problem of inequality (particularly within states) is prevalent. The Critical Theory ofRobert W Cox (CCT) suggests that one of the ways in which increasing levels in inequality can be observed and analysed is to determine how people are related to the dynamics (via their national economies) of the contemporary world economic order. Are they marginalised, in a precarious position, or integrated? Furthermore, Cox assumes that the marginalised are a social force which could bring about transformation "from below." Following on from this assumption a number of claims about the marginalised can be deduced from CCT: they are inclined to political protest, they are dissatisfied with the political economic system of their country, they are politically apathetic, they are prone to low levels of political efficacy, they have turned "their back on the state" and belong to self-help associations, they are more inclined to participate in the activities of civil society and they are critical of neoliberal economic policies. The study's primary empirical question investigates whether the attitudes which Cox attributes to the marginalised are accurate. This is done through a detailed exposition of his core theoretical framework and a thorough conceptualisationloperationalisation of the marginalised, precarious and integrated. The area which is focused on is southern Africa. The vast majority of people in the region belong to the marginalised and the precarious components of Cox's economic hierarchy. They derive little or no economic benefit from greater openness and outward orientated forms of state. The question is whether they can be mobilised into a "counter-hegemonic social movement" (as Cox foresees) and how they view the role of the state. The second question is theoretical and is concerned with the usefulness and strong points of Cox's explanatory framework compared to other approaches which either (1) ignore the state as a point of entry for analysis, (2) regard it as the primary actor in the international system, (3) or "bypass" it because they predict its demise in a future post-sovereign world. I argue that it is incorrect to associate Cox's approach with the work of Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater and Mark Neufeld and to group them into a Critical Theory of International Relations school. Two important differences between Cox and these scholars are his incorporation of the state in a flexible, multiple points of entry framework and his resourceful combination of a diverse number of sources. The theoretical question is addressed by a substantive literature review of Cox's major publications in English and a representative review of the contributions made by Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld. In the reading of Cox's work, I focused on the development of his thinking, his major influences and on the epistemology and ontology of his core theoretical framework. The empirical question was investigated through a nationally representative survey of seven southern African states (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) which was undertaken by a research consortium of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa's Public Opinion Service during 1999-2000. In terms of Cox's theoretical expectations ofthe marginalised the study found that, in southern Africa; their political protest potential is lower than the integrated, they participate less in politics and in civil society, they are not more inclined to belong to self-help associations, they are inclined to accord slightly more legitimacy to the state than the integrated, their economic values cannot be summarised as generally unsympathetic to "market" orientated policies, and that the majority (significantly more so than the integrated) think that the state should be the major provider of social services. The marginalised are more tolerant of authoritarian political alternatives, but are not significantly more dissatisfied (relatively) with the economy than the other groups. We cannot, therefore, uncritically accept Cox's assumption that the marginalised will act as a potential source of transformation "from below." Furthermore, in the countries which were part of the survey, the marginalised still regard the state as the primary source for development assistance and social services. There was, however, strong support for the claim that the marginalised are inclined to be more politically apathetic and less politically efficacious. A close reading of Cox's work and comparison with Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman and Neufeld revealed that they share some tenets with CCT. However, they cannot be grouped with Cox in a school of critical thought because their intellectual debt is mainly located in the work of Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, while CCT is influenced by a variety of sources (cf. Braudel, Carr, Gramsci, Khaldun, Marx, Sorel and Vico). This is an important and essential distinction to make because the empirical results of the survey data analysis validate Cox's focus on the mutual influence between social forces, forms of state and world orders. It is, therefore, more accurate to regard CCT as a "critical realist" theory of International Relations (cf. Richard Falk, 1997). It is recommended that, in a world order which is characterised by increasing inequality and the outward orientated form of state, public policy practitioners in developing states must reconsider the standard TINA (There is no Alternative) response to the critics of the openness principle. A more balanced approach to addressing inequality and poverty, which requires an outward/inward policy orientation is essential. What is needed, is a form of state which creates opportunities for the integrated but protects and assists those who are marginalised. This essential inward orientation remains one of the state's primary responsibilities, even in a postW estphalian world where there are other centres of authority. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Tydens die laatste twee dekades van die twintigste eeu het die wereld ekonomiese orde deur 'n verandering gegaan. Hierdie verandering is gekenmerk deur 'n verskuiwing vanaf die "Keynesiaanse kompromie" idee, na die idee of beginsel van meer oopheid en 'n hersiening van die rol van die staat in makroekonomiese beleidsformulering. Gevolglik, en om die doelwit van globale mededingendheid te bereik, het state meer "uitwaartsgeorienteerd" geword. Die laatste twintig jaar is ook gekenmerk deur 'n toename in ongelykheid binne en tussen state. Hierdie ongelykheid het die impak van ekonomiese groei op armoede baie verminder. Die kritici van die "oopheid" beginsel wys daarop dat die beleid van ontwikkelende state meer na binne gerig moet word ten einde te verseker dat ekonomiese oopheid meer direk hydra tot die vermindering van armoede en ongelykheid. In die Suider-Afrikaanse streek kom die ongelykheidsprobleem (spesifiek binne state) algemeen voor. Die Kritiese Teorie van Robert W Cox (CKT, Coxiaanse Kritiese Teorie) doen aan die hand dat een van die maniere waarvolgens toenemende vlakke van ongelykheid waargeneem en geanaliseer kan word, is om te bepaal wat die verhouding is tussen mense en die dinamika (via die nasionale ekonomie) van die hedendaagse wereld ekonomiese orde. Is hulle gemarginaliseerd, in 'n onsekere posisie, of gei'ntegreerd? Daarby, is dit 'n aanname van Cox dat die gemarginaliseerdes 'n sosiale mag is wat "van onder af' verandering sou kon teweegbring. Voortvloeiend uit hierdie aanname, kan 'n aantal beweringe oor die gemarginaliseerdes afgelei word uit CKT: hulle is geneig tot politieke protes, hulle is ontevrede met hulland se politiek-ekonomiese stelsel, hulle is polities apaties, hulle is geneig tot lae vlakke van politieke doeltreffendheid, hulle het hul "rug gedraai op die staat" en behoort aan selfhelp-organisasies, hulle is meer geneig om deel te neem aan burgerlike samelewing aktiwiteite en hulle staan krities teenoor neoliberale ekonomiese beleidsrigtings. Die primere empiriese vraag wat die studie ondersoek is om te bepaal of die houdings wat Cox toeskryf aan die gemarginaliseerdes akkuraat is. Dit word gedoen deur 'n breedvoerige uiteensetting van sy verklarende raamwerk en 'n deeglike konseptualisering/operasionalisering van die drie ekonomiese kategoriee (gemarginaliseerd, onseker, gei'ntegreerd). Die fokus-area is Suider-Afrika. Die oorgrote meerderheid mense in die streek behoort tot die gemarginaliseerde en onsekere komponente van Cox se ekonomiese hierargie. Hulle trek min of geen ekonomiese voordeel uit meer "oopheid" en uitwaartsgeorienteerde staatsvorme nie. Die vraag is of hulle gemobiliseer kan word in 'n "teen-hegemoniese sosiale beweging" (soo Cox in die vooruitsig stel) en hoe hulle die rol van die staat beskou. Die tweede vraag is teoreties van aard en is gerig op 'n evaluering van die bruikbaarheid en sterk punte van Cox se verklarende raamwerk, in vergelyking met ander benaderings wat of (1) die staat ignoreer as 'n vlak van analise, (2) die staat beskou as die belangrikste akteur in die intemasionale stelsel, (3) die staat "omseil" omdat hulle die ondergang daarvan voorspel in 'n toekomstige post-soewereine wereld. Ek argumenteer dat dit verkeerd is om Cox se benadering te assosieer met die bydraes van Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater en Mark Neufeld, en om hulle saam te voeg binne 'n Kritiese Teorie van Intemasionale Betrekkinge denkskool. Twee belangrike verskille tussen Cox en die ander bydraes is sy inkorporering van die staat in 'n buigsame, veelvoudige vlak-van-analise raamwerk en sy vindingryke samevoeging van 'n diverse aantal bronne. Die teoretiese vraag is ondersoek deur middel van 'n uitgebreide literatuuroorsig van Cox se belangrikste publikasies in Engels en 'n verteenwoordigende oorsig van Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater en Neufeld se bydraes. Die evaluering van Cox fokus op die ontwikkeling van sy denke, die identifisering van diegene wat horn beYnvloed het, en die kennisleer en ontologie van sy kem-teoretiese raamwerk. Die empiriese vraag is nagevors deur die analise van 'n verteenwoordigende nasionale opname in sewe Suider-Afrikaanse state (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibie, Suid-Afrika, Zambie en Zimbabwe). Die opname is ondemeem deur 'n navorsingkonsortium van die Instituut vir Demokrasie in Suid-Afrika se Openbare Meningsdiens tydens 1999-2000. Aangaande Cox se teoretiese verwagtinge van die gemarginaliseerdes, het die empiriese analise van die Suider-Afrikaanse data-stel bevind dat hulle politieke protes potensiaal laer is as die van die geYntegreerdes, dat hulle minder deelneem aan die politiek en 'n minder aktiewe rol speel in die burgerlike samelewing, dat hulle nie geneig is om aan selfhelp-organisasies te behoort nie, dat hulle geneig is om die staat as ietwat meer legitiem te beskou as die geYntegreerdes, dat hulle ekonomiese waardes nie veralgemeen kan word as onsimpatiek tot mark-georienteerde beleidsopsies nie, en dat die meerderheid (betekenisvol meer as die geYntegreerdes) die staat beskou as die belangrikste verskaffer van sosiale dienste. Die gemarginaliseerdes is meer verdraagsaam ten opsigte van outoritere politieke altematiewe, maar is nie betekenisvol meer ontevrede (relatief gesproke) met die ekonomie as die ander groepe me. Ons kan dus nie Cox se aanname, dat die gemarginaliseerdes as 'n moontlike bron vir verandering "van onder af' sal optree, onkrities aanvaar nie. Daarby beskou die gemarginaliseerdes, in die lande wat deel was van die opname, steeds die staat as die primere bron vir ontwikkelingshulp en sosiale dienste. Daar was egter beduidende ondersteuning vir die bewering dat hulle meer geneig is tot politieke apatie en politieke ondoeltreffendheid. Die bestudering van Cox se benadering en die vergelyking daarvan met Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman en Neufeld, toon aan dat die vier skrywers sekere beginsels met CKT deel. Nietemin, kan hulle nie saam met Cox in 'n skool van kritiese denke gevoeg word nie, omdat hulle intellektuele inspirasie uit Habermas en die Frankfurt Skool van Kritiese Teorie geput word. Cox, daarenteen, is beYnvloed deur 'n verskeidenheid denkers (bv. Braudel, Carr, Gramsci, Khaldun, Marx, Sorel, en Vico). Hierdie onderskeid is belangrik en noodsaaklik omdat die empiriese resultate van die opname data-analise, Cox se fokus op die wedersydse invloed tussen sosiale magte, staatsvorme en wereldordes, ondersteun. Dit is dus meer korrek om CKT te beskou as 'n "krities-realistiese" teorie van Intemasionale Betrekkinge (bv. Richard Falk, 1997). Die studie beveel aan dat, in 'n wereld wat gekenmerk word deur toenemende ongelykheid en die voorkoms van die uitwaarts-georienteerde staat, openbare beleidmakers die standaard DIGA (Daar is geen Altematief) antwoord, in reaksie op diegene wat die "oopheid" beginsel kritiseer, in heroorweging moet neem. 'n Meer ewewigtige benadering tot die aanspreek van ongelykheid en armoede is noodsaaklik, en dit vereis 'n uitwaartslbinnewaartse beleidsherorientering. Wat benodig word is 'n staatsvorm wat geleenthede skep vir die ge'integreerdes maar wat ook die gemarginaliseerdes help en beskerm. Selfs in 'n post-W estphaliaanse wereld waar daar ander magsentra voorkom, bly hierdie noodsaaklike binnewaartse orientasie een van die staat se primere verantwoordelikhede.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Globally as well as nationally, AIDS is politically contested. Since AIDS was first identified in 1981 there have been several responses to the pandemic, reflecting AIDS’ biomedical, political and social nature and implications. Although there are many ways to frame and approach AIDS, no single approach appears to be universally superior to any other, especially as these various approaches are essential for a comprehensive global response to the pandemic. However, these several responses can also represent contested constructs of how AIDS is inter-subjectively problematised based on different ontological understandings and epistemological preferences. The existence of such contested constructs suggests that multilateral AIDS governance is shaped by binaries and zero-sum games where the overall approach ought to be holistic. As such, some scholars claim that HIV is increasingly treated as something medical, and outside the context of overall development issues, sexual and reproductive health, human rights and structural violence. Recently, Vanwesenbeeck (2011) offered a simplified model of ‘high-road’ and ‘low-road’ solutions to the pandemic, problematising specifically the global policy/political response. Vanwesenbeeck’s model suggests that biomedical, vertically distributed and asexual high-road approaches are prioritised at the expense of the more community oriented, sexual and rights-based low-road approaches. This, Vanwesenbeeck argues, is because current ideas and norms of the market, moralism and medicalisation are more aligned with the de-contextual, de-sexual and quantifiable characteristics of high-road approaches. This study tests the analytical utility of Vanwesenbeeck’s model with a case study of the policy and political narratives emerging from the International AIDS Society’s nine International AIDS Conferences from 1996 until 2012. The research question this study investigates is thus: Can Vanwesenbeeck’s (2011) model of high-road and low-road solutions be identified in and illuminate the policy ideas, problem definitions and political binaries that play out in the discourse surrounding the biennial International AIDS Conferences between 1996 and 2012? This main research question is complemented by three sub-questions concerning 1) the strengths and limitations of Vanwesenbeeck’s model, 2) the general trends and developments in global AIDS policy/political responses during, before and after the biennial International AIDS Conferences and 3) the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the global AIDS response. Applying a qualitative methodology, the study finds that Vanwesenbeeck’s model can both be identified in and elucidate the political discourses, policy implementations and binaries surrounding the International AIDS Conferences between 1996 and 2012, albeit not all. The analytical utility of Vanwesenbeeck’s model is limited by oversimplification of the highroad/ low-road binary and the exclusion of alternative ideas for high-road prioritisation, such as humanitarianism, securitisation/sensationalism and the neoliberal ideological link between medicalisation and the market, as well as negligence of the impact of the Global Financial Crisis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Vigs is internasionaal sowel as nasionaal polities omstrede. Sedert Vigs die eerste keer in 1981 geïdentifiseer is, was daar al verskeie reaksies op die pandemie wat die biomediese, politieke en maatskaplike aard en implikasies van die siekte weerspieël. Hoewel daar verskillende maniere is om Vigs te beskou en te benader, blyk geen enkele benadering universeel superieur te wees nie, veral aangesien al hierdie verskillende benaderinge noodsaaklik is vir ’n omvattende globale reaksie op die pandemie. Tog kan hierdie verskillende reaksies ook as betwiste konstrukte beskou word van hoe Vigs intersubjektief op grond van verskillende ontologiese begrippe en epistemologiese voorkeure geproblematiseer word. Die bestaan van sulke betwiste konstrukte gee te kenne dat multilaterale Vigsbestuur deur binêre en nulsombenaderinge gekenmerk word, terwyl die algehele benadering veronderstel is om holisties te wees. Sommige vakkundiges beweer dan ook dat MIV al hoe meer as ’n mediese probleem hanteer word, buite die konteks van oorkoepelende ontwikkelingskwessies, seksuele en voortplantingsgesondheid, menseregte en strukturele geweld. Vanwesenbeeck (2011) het onlangs ’n vereenvoudigde model van sogenaamde ‘grootpad-’ en ‘smalpadoplossings’ vir die pandemie aan die hand gedoen wat spesifiek die algehele beleids-/politieke reaksie problematiseer. Vanwesenbeeck se model voer aan dat biomediese, vertikaal verspreide en aseksuele grootpadbenaderinge dikwels ten koste van die meer gemeenskapsgerigte, seksuele en regtegebaseerde smalpadbenaderinge gekies word. Dít, reken Vanwesenbeeck, is omdat huidige denke en norme met betrekking tot die mark, moraliteit en medikalisasie eerder met die kontekslose, geslaglose en kwantifiseerbare kenmerke van grootpadbenaderinge strook. Hierdie studie het die analitiese nut van Vanwesenbeeck se model getoets met behulp van ’n gevallestudie van die beleids- en politieke narratiewe uit die Internasionale Vigsvereniging se nege internasionale vigskonferensies vanaf 1996 tot 2012. Die navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie was dus: Kan Vanwesenbeeck (2011) se model van grootpaden smalpadoplossings geïdentifiseer word in, en lig werp op, die beleidsidees, probleemomskrywings en politieke teenpole wat uit die diskoers by die tweejaarlikse internasionale vigskonferensies vanaf 1996 tot 2012 gespruit het? Hierdie hoofnavorsingsvraag is aangevul deur drie verdere vrae oor (i) die sterkpunte en beperkinge van Vanwesenbeeck se model, (ii) die algemene tendense en ontwikkelings in wêreldwye beleids-/politieke reaksies op Vigs gedurende, voor en na die tweejaarlikse internasionale Vigskonferensies, en (iii) die impak van die wêreldwye finansiële krisis op die wêreldwye Vigsreaksie. Met behulp van ’n kwalitatiewe metodologie het hierdie studie bevind dat Vanwesenbeeck se model wél geïdentifiseer kan word in, en lig werp op, sommige van die politieke diskoerse, beleidsinwerkingstelling en teenpole waartoe die internasionale vigskonferensies tussen 1996 en 2012 gelei het. Die analitiese nut van Vanwesenbeeck se model word egter beperk deur die oorvereenvoudiging van die grootpad-/smalpad-teenpole en die uitsluiting van alternatiewe idees oor die prioritisering van grootpadoplossings, soos filantropie, sekuritasie/sensasionalisme en die neoliberale ideologiese verband tussen medikalisasie en die mark, sowel as die verontagsaming van die impak van die wêreldwye finansiële krisis.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The horrific terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in America, and the bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, have forced may people to seriously consider the impact of religion on political conflict. This literature review readdresses the serious neglect of religion in political studies by examining the three theoretical approaches to religion and political conflict, on the domestic and international level, that can be identified. Primordialists argue that differences in religious traditions should be viewed as one of the most important factors in explaining violent interactions in and between nations. They stress how differences in cultural identity and cosmologies can lead to violent conflict in and between nations. They illustrate how the deep malaise of modem secular society is leading to a backlash of alternative worldviews. This approach is culturally too simplistic in not providing a complex enough framework for understanding the dynamic social forces that constitute cultural identity. Instrumentalists admit that conflicts might be aggravated by diverging religious creeds but are rarel y if ever caused by them; instead most conflicts are about power and wealth. They emphasize the role played by political entrepreneurs, who use religion as an instrument to further their own goals. This approach is guilty of the other extreme - downplaying the role of religion and culture. Constructivists regard social conflicts as being embedded in cognitive structures like ideology, religion, nationalism and ethnicity. Constructivists can theorize about cultural identity, social structures, actors and forces together with the material world of power and wealth and are therefore best suited to give an adequate description of religion and political conflict. Despite its great promise constructivism still needs to step up to the board and deliver theories about religion and political conflict. The serious neglect of religion in political studies needs to be addressed and the most likely framework within which to do so seems to be constructivism. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die skokkende terroriste aanvalle op die World Trade Center en die Pentagon in Amerika en die bom in 'n nagklub in Bali, Indonesië, het baie mense gedwing om die impak van godsdiens op politieke konflik ernstig te oorweeg. Die literatuuroorsig herondersoek die ernstige verwaarloosing van godsdiens in politieke wetenskap weer eens, deur te kyk na die drie benaderings wat ten opsigte van godsdiens en politieke konflik, op plaaslike en internasionale vlak geïdentifiseer kan word. Primordialiste glo dat verskille tussen gosdienstradisies gesien moet word as een van die vernaamste faktore vir politieke konflik binne en tussen nasies. Hulle beklemtoon die wyse waarop verskille in kulturele identiteit en kosmologie kan bydra tot gewelddadige konflik binne en tussen nasies. Hulle illustreer verder hoe die diep malaise van die moderne sekulêre samelewing besig is om te lei tot 'n teenreaksie van alternatiewe wêreldbeskouings. Die benadering is egter kultureel gesproke te simplisties deurdat dit nie 'n raamwerk kan skep wat kompleks genoeg is ten einde die dinamies sosiale kragte wat kulturele identiteit vorm, te verstaan nie. Instrumentaliste gee toe dat politieke konflik dalk deur uiteenloopende godsdienstige tradisies vererger kan word, maar dat dit selde indien ooit daardeur veroorsaak word. Inteendeel, die meeste konflik handel steeds oor mag en rykdom. Hulle beklemtoon die rol wat gespeel word deur politieke entrepreneurs, wat geloof as 'n instrument gebruik in die bevordering van hulle eie doelwitte. Die benadering is skuldig aan die ander uiterste - die rol van kultuur en godsdiens word as minder belangrik beskou. Konstruktiviste beskou sosiale konflik as gewortel in kognitiewe strukture soos ideologie, godsdiens, nasionalisme en etnisiteit. Konstruktiviste kan teoretiseer oor kulturele identiteit, sosiale strukture, akteurs en kragte saam met die materiële wêreld wat bestaan uit mag en rykdom, en is daarom die beste geskik om 'n voldoende beskrywing te gee van godsdiens en politieke konflik. Ten spyte van die belowende potensiaal van konstruktivisme moet die perspektief nog begin om teorieë oor godsdiens en politieke konflik te verskaf. Die ernstige verwaarloosing van godsdiens in politieke wetenskap moet ondersoek word en die beste benadering hiervoor blyk konstruktivisme te wees.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The global city discourse posits a new role for cities in light of increased economic integration and the rise of a global economy. Firms are increasingly investing capital in locations where profits are anticipated to be highest, creating a geographic dispersal of economic activity. As a result, the central command functions of firms – management, coordination, servicing, and financing of vast networks of operations – have become more complex and strategic. Firms thus outsource a portion of their central command functions to specialised service firms. Specialised service firms tend towards high levels of agglomeration and concentrate in a small number of locations, giving rise to command and control centres of the global economy or global cities. Cities of the South are increasingly fulfilling global city functions, yet are generally approached through a developmentalist framework. The global city discourse places salience on specialised services and exhibits a Western bias. This study develops an alternative analytical framework that recognises an array of activities and processes, across three spheres of globalisation – markets, mafias, and movements – that contribute to the global connectivity of cities. In this way the role of cities of the South in the global economy is better understood. This study focuses on Mexico City and Johannesburg as global cities of the South. What the research uncovers is that these cities fulfil many global city functions and are amongst the best connected cities in their respective regions in terms of their ability to service global capital through growing specialised service sectors. In this way Mexico City and Johannesburg emerge as global cities of the South that integrate large geographical areas, populations, and sub-global economies with the global economy. This study also illustrates that the way in which global cities are conceptualised limits the extent to which the concept can be applied in Southern context. Global cities of the South service far less global capital because of the nature of core/semi-periphery/periphery relations and underdevelopment, the role they fulfil in the global economy is, however, no less critical than that of global cities of the core. This study therefore proposes thinking of global cities as constituent units of a global urban network, garnering certain power by occupying a particular niche constitutive of the whole network.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2009. / In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the idea of the state as a universal (Western) type of governance structure, i.e. a set of bureaucratic institutions headed by a central government with the capacity and interest to govern all of its territory, is incongruent with realities on the ground, particularly within the African continent. The 1990s has been a critical period in the evolution of African statehood, during which old strategies of state control have broken down. While this has given rise to a debate on the ‘failure’ of African statehood, it has also led to attempts to revise and expand theories and concepts of statehood and set off a search for more indigenous and empirically viable alternatives to the state as it was devised by the European colonizers. This thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the challenges and potentials of contemporary African statehood by investigating the case of de facto statehood in Somaliland emerging on the backdrop of state failure in Somalia. The collapse of the de jure state of the Republic of Somalia in 1991 provided an opportunity for Somaliland to fundamentally redefine the pillars of statehood and governance. This entailed the combining of modern institution building with traditional practices of governance, to in this way bolster the capacity and legitimacy of the new de facto state in the north of what is formally recognized as Somalia. Drawing on the analytical framework of ‘mediated state’ provided by Ken Menkhaus, this thesis explores Somaliland’s self-reliant path to state formation as well as the governance structures which underpin its contemporary statehood. Particular attention is given to the role of traditional authorities as driving forces behind state formation and as a means of complementing the under-capacitated state institutions. The study thus relates to the debate on the resurgence of traditional leadership in Africa. The resurgence of traditional leadership within governance is a tendency which is part of a broader development of the reconfiguration of the state in Africa since the early 1990s – a tendency which introduces new possibilities, as well as new risks, in terms of reconstituting new viable governance structures. The study concludes that Somaliland’s approach to state formation demonstrates an impressive indigenous alternative to externally driven top-down attempts to revive centralized statehood, and that the case also challenges the perception that the breakdown of old strategies of state control necessarily leads to generalized anarchy. The study, however, also points out some risks involved in the exercise of the state and the traditional authorities ‘converting’ different forms of power between different realms of governance, and concludes that collaboration between the state and traditional authorities does not per se counteract undemocratic governance practices. On this basis the study suggests that the new ambiguous roles of traditional authorities within governance in Africa merit more academic attention.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / This thesis aims to assess what perceptions a sample population of Dutch students in Amsterdam have of South Africa from a broad range of social, political and cultural indicators. Until now, research into the existent perceptions regarding South Africa in the international community has been limited, which has implications for the formulation of its branding strategies and the possibility of their successful implementation at a crucial stage in the development of the country’s international reputation. Based on a theoretical framework which assumes the potential of nation branding for developing states, this thesis aims to provide an assessment of several historical and contemporary challenges faced by Brand South Africa, the most salient of which are linked to the fundamental need for consistency in the promotion of the nation’s identity. This analysis introduces the empirical research upon which the study is based and thereby explains the ambiguous nature of South Africa’s post-Apartheid brand identity.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The central research question of this study concerns the level of political risk that the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia poses for companies operating in, or intending to operating in the oil and gas industry of that region. The aim is to answer that question as well as two further subquestions. The first sub-question concerns issues pertaining to the factors and indicators that would be included in a political risk model specifically envisaged for the oil and gas industry, and the second concerns the practical application of political risk as a decision-making and management tool for investors. It is practically impossible to gather all the relevant information when undertaking a political risk analysis, to know all the unknowns. It would take an immense amount of time to attempt such an analysis and the costs would be exorbitant. In creating a political risk model specific to the oil and gas industry, a methodological approach is adopted to streamline this process. It is the aim of this research study to engage in this streamlining process; selecting the most salient variables that can then be incorporated into an industry specific model, which will yield realistic and practical results. In terms of the political risk indication, the political risk analysis of the Ogden returned a score putting the region in the high risk indication bracket. In terms of investment indication, the score indicates a moderate to high risk for investments the oil and gas industry. This does not mean that investors should stay away from the region. A high degree of risk, if sufficiently managed, can result in increased opportunities for higher returns for the investor. Beyond the traditional approaches to risk management there are other avenues that the investor may choose to follow, such as a commitment to engage with local stakeholders. These initiatives should extend beyond mere financial incentives to a more genuine form of community interaction, with extensive local consultation. Strategies, policies, and procedures should be developed that ensure that companies engage productively with NGOs and the media at local levels in order create a suitable environment for all involved. Political risk is more than simply providing a report with a risk rating tagged to the end of it. It should be a fully integrated part of the investor’s strategy, essential to the continued success and profitability of the investment. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die sentrale navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie handel oor die vlak van politieke risiko wat maatskappye wat besigheidsbelange in die Ogaden streek van oos Ethiopië het, of wat beplan om besigheidsbelange in die olie- en gasbedryf te begin, in die gesig staar. Die doel is om die vlak van politieke risiko te identifiseer en om verder twee sub-vrae te beantwoord. Die eerste sub-vraag is om die faktore en indikatore te identifiseer wat deel sal vorm van ‘n politieke risikomodel, spesifiek vir die olie- en gasbedryf en die tweede handel oor die praktiese aanwending van politieke risiko as ’n besluitnemings- en risikobestuur-instrument vir beleggers. Dit is prakties onmoontlik om alle relevante informasie in te samel wanneer ’n politieke risiko-analise gedoen word, of om bewus te wees van al die onbekende aspekte. Dit sal ‘n ongelooflike lang tydperk neem asook die kostes sal uiters hoog wees. Wanneer ‘n politieke risikomodel spesifiek vir die olie- en gasindustrie gebou word, word ’n metodologiese benadering om die proses te vergemaklik gevolg. Dit is die doel van hierdie studie om by te dra tot die vereenvoudiging van hierdie metodologiese proses deur die mees prominente aspekte te selekteer wat gevolglik geïnkorporeer kan word in ‘n industrie spesifieke model. Die model sal beide realistiese en praktiese resultate bied. Ten opsigte van die skaal vir belegging en politieke risiko indikasie, het politieke risiko analise van die Ogaden gedui op ’n hoë risiko indikasievlak. Vir belegging dui die risikovlak op ’n medium tot hoë risikovlak vir die olie- en gasindustrie. Dit beteken nie dat beleggers die area noodwendig moet vermy nie. Indien ’n hoë risikovlak aanwesig is, kan suksesvolle bestuur steeds verhoogde winsgeleenthede vir die belegger verseker. Behalwe vir die tradisionele benaderings tot risikobestuur en risikomitigasie is daar ook ander moontlikhede wat die belegger kan volg om die vlak van risiko te verlaag, soos ’n ooreenkoms om saam met plaaslike belanghebbendes te werk. Sulke meganismes moet verby finansiële belonings strek en ‘n opregte vorm van gemeenskapsinteraksie aanneem wat net kan gebeur deur middel van uitgebreide plaaslike konsultasie. Strategie, beleid en prosedure moet ontwikkel word, wat sal verseker dat maatskappye optimaal saamwerk met nie-regerings-organisasies en die media op plaaslike vlak. Dit sal verseker dat ’n geskikte omgewing vir alle partye geskep word. Poltieke risiko is veel meer as net risiko-evaluasie waar ’n vlak van risiko verskaf word. Dit behoort ten volle deel te wees van die belegging en is essensieël tot die sukses en winsvlak vir die belegger.