Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2007. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 282-293).

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-73).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Canterbury, 2009. / "Feb 2009." Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-147). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2007. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 282-293).

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 2000.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1971. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Universiẗat, Diss. 2004--Freiburg i. Br.

Habilitation - Universität, Bonn, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references and register.

The modern principle of freedom of subjectivity sets a moral standard which radically departs from Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean: modern moral agents, exemplified by the rising middle class, are granted the right to develop extreme dispositions towards goods like honour and wealth. Given that Aristotle considers such goods divisible in the sense that when one person gets more another gets less―the basic definition of distributive injustice―it isn’t surprising that modern philosophers like Kant have trouble reconciling this right with duty to others. Failing to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily in ethical terms, Kant and others turn to aesthetics, but Kant, at least, takes no account there of moral agents’ interest in the actual existence of goods. In this respect, the alternative to the Kantian aesthetic response I document in my dissertation is more Stoic than modern. This response, the modern mediocre-artist narrative, features a mediocre artist who fails to achieve the new standard of distributive justice and a genius who ostensibly succeeds. Though other critics discuss the ethical dimension of mediocre-artist narratives, they don’t consider the possibility that the mediocre artist’s failure might be due to the ethical dilemma just described. They therefore tend to uphold uncritically the narratives’ negative judgments of mediocrity, ascribing the latter’s failure to egotism. By contrast, I examine the genius’ artistic efforts for evidence of a similar failure. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the genius does indeed fail, albeit less spectacularly, arguing on this basis that egotistical characterizations of mediocrity are unjust. But the mediocre aren’t the only victims: in “concealing” genius’ failure, mediocre-artist narratives ignore unmet claims on its fruits. Finally, I invoke Derrida’s notion of the “lesser violence” to outline a new genre that recognizes the unattainability of the modern standard of justice. I call this genre morally progressive, rejecting Jürgen Habermas’ view that freedom of subjectivity has hit a dead end, and that we must backtrack to a philosophical turning indicated but not taken by Hegel, namely, the path of intersubjective freedom. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

Cette thèse porte sur la théorie de la justice comme égal respect et sollicitude de Ronald Dworkin. Nous y étudions l’interaction entre ses principes et le développement de l’identité de l’agent. L’intuition qui l’anime concerne le problème de la commensurabilité posé par les compréhensions de la justice fondées en égale liberté : comment s’assurer que les individus disposent réellement d’une liberté égale? Nous suggérons que l’actualisation de l’égal respect et sollicitude aurait pour effet secondaire l’assimilation du sujet aux circonstances qui l’entourent à cause des comparaisons nécessaires à l’identification de son dû. Cette dynamique se manifesterait par une différenciation nuisible au maintien du lien politique de la communauté. L’égalité libérale devrait donc accorder une importance particulière à l’éducation comme développement de la capacité d’action. En appui sur les deux principes de dignité humaine, nous proposons une conception libérale de l’éducation. / This thesis is about Ronald Dworkin’s conception of justice as equal respect and concern from which we study the interaction between its principles and the development of personal identity. The idea behind it is that justice as equal liberty involves a problem of commensurability : how do we ascertain that each individual really has an equal share of freedom? Our hypothesis is that the structure through which equal respect and concern is made tangible may have the side effect of dictating membership, whereby one’s identity is fused with his circumstances, on account of the comparison needed to evaluate what he is entitled to. This dynamic would result in a differentiation which weaken the political bonds within the community. Therefore, liberal equality should give education a special place, as a mean of developing agency and its resilience. Using as stepping stones the two principles of human dignity, we define what a liberal education would entail.