Ce mémoire propose une analyse de la relation entre la philosophie politique et l’opinion publique. Plus particulièrement, il a pour objectif de définir le rôle de l’opinion publique en philosophie politique en se penchant sur la question de la justice distributive. Le mémoire est divisé en trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre pose les bases théoriques sur la justice sociale et distributive, ainsi que sur la place de la recherche empirique philosophie politique. Le second chapitre constitue une étude de l’opinion publique sur la structure et les déterminants des attitudes sur la justice distributive au Canada, au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis. Le troisième chapitre offre une proposition théorique originale du rôle de l’opinion publique en philosophie politique. Nous y présentons quatre arguments en faveur de l’inclusion de l’opinion publique en philosophie politique par le biais de la notion d’équilibre réflexif public. / This Master’s thesis offers an analysis of the relationship between political philosophy and public opinion. More specifically, its objective is to define the role of public opinion in political philosophy in relation to the issue of distributive justice. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter lays the theoretical foundations on the issues of social and distributive justice, as well as on the place of empirical research in political philosophy. The second chapter is an empirical public opinion research on the structure and determinants of attitudes toward distributive justice in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The third chapter presents an original theoretical proposition of the role of public opinion in political philosophy. We put forward four arguments in favor of the inclusion of public opinion in political philosophy through the notion of public reflective equilibrium.

Cette thèse développe une théorie de nos devoirs globaux de justice en accord avec notre expérience commune du devoir en général comme ayant une origine purement a priori. La base de cette théorie consiste en un nouveau type de constructivisme, que j’appelle « constructivisme téléologique » dans la mesure où il réhabilite la notion kantienne de téléologie pure pratique. Dans l’introduction, je jette les bases du constructivisme téléologique en montrant que toutes les théories déontologiques d’inspiration kantienne sont intérieurement téléologiques, dans la mesure où les principes de justice, bien que premiers par rapport au bien, sont eux-mêmes définis en lien avec les fins prescrites a priori par la raison. Dans le chapitre 1, je m’appuie sur la doctrine Rawlsienne du Droit des Peuples pour développer une théorie de la justice internationale qui reconnaît le rôle normatif joué dans la déduction de nos devoirs de justice par une certaine idée de la société internationale. Dans le chapitre 2, je détermine les conditions auxquelles cette théorie est compatible avec le constructivisme téléologique. Dans les chapitres 3 et 4, je définis le constructivisme téléologique comme une approche qui fait dépendre le choix des premiers principes non seulement du respect pour une procédure de réflexion idéale, mais aussi de la reconnaissance de la fin morale finale prescrite purement a priori par la raison. Finalement, dans le chapitre 5, j’explique comment le constructivisme téléologique différencie entre les devoirs éthiques et les devoirs de justice. En conclusion, je reviens sur la spécificité du constructivisme téléologique en tant qu’approche distincte en théorie politique. / This dissertation provides an account of our global duties of right and justice in line with our common experience of duty in general as having a purely a priori origin. The basis of this account is formed by a new type of constructivism, which I call “teleological constructivism” insofar as it rehabilitates the Kantian notion of pure practical teleology. In the introduction, I prepare the ground for teleological constructivism by showing that all Kantian-inspired deontological theories are internally teleological insofar as the principles of right and justice, though prior to the good, are themselves defined in relation to a final end prescribed purely a priori by reason. In chapter 1, I draw on Rawls’ doctrine of the Law of Peoples to develop an institutionalist account of international justice which recognizes the normative role played by a certain idea of international society in the deduction of our distributive obligations. In chapter 2, I further specify the terms of this account to make it compatible with teleological constructivism. In chapters 3 and 4, I go deeper into the definition of teleological constructivism as an approach that makes the choice of the first principles depend not only on respect for a procedure of ideal reflection, but also on the recognition of a final moral end prescribed purely a priori by reason. Finally, in chapter 5, I explain how teleological constructivism differentiates between ethical and juridical duties and argue for the superiority of the contractualist view over the property-based account of our duties of justice. In conclusion, I discuss the specificity of teleological constructivism as a distinct approach in political theory.

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Does choice excuse inequality? Some contemporary egalitarians – often referred to as “Luck Egalitarians” – believe it does. However, many seemingly chosen inequalities obtain between men and women as a group. A recent surge of empirical literature has sought to demonstrate the role that individual choice plays in producing and maintaining a subset of existing gender inequalities (e.g. the gender wage gap). This thesis considers the status of such inequalities in the context of the Luck Egalitarian project. More precisely, it considers whether the claim that choice excuses inequality is appropriate to the phenomenon of gendered choice. In Chapter 1, I argue that Luck Egalitarianism, as it currently stands, does not adequately deal with the topic of gendered choice. I maintain that this is due largely to the fact that it is not sufficiently attentive to the social forces shaping gendered choices (e.g. socialization, hostile social climates). In Chapter 2, I discuss whether attending more fully to factors that facilitate autonomy gives Luck Egalitarianism a way to incorporate a more robust discussion of gender into its account of responsible choice. I argue that contextualizing the choice/circumstance principle is the key to ensuring that it tracks truly autonomous choice, and avoids treating choices shaped by gender norms as justifiably disadvantage-conferring. In Chapter 3, I begin the project of articulating a set of background conditions against which we can deem choices authentic. I draw on feminist approaches to the philosophy of autonomy to inform this project. I come to the conclusion that choice excuses inequality only if such choices are made against conditions which actively work against gender-specific constraints on choice. / Graduate / 0422 / emma.e.byrnes@gmail.com

In the last four decades, luck egalitarianism has emerged as a hotly debated theory of distributive justice. The tenet, in its most normative sense, calls for distribution or assistance when circumstances of disadvantage arise from bad luck that is independent of human influence. Disadvantages that can be traced back to individual choice and responsibility, on the other hand, are left for the sufferer to bear. In this paper, I argue that luck egalitarianism should be abandoned as a standard for determining whether a disadvantage should be addressed, because the assumption that there are instances of disadvantage completely attributable to individual choice is flawed. Brute luck, or luck that emerges from beyond human control, influences most human outcomes, making it difficult to confidently attribute outcomes to option luck, or luck that stems from human choice. Without option luck, luck egalitarianism becomes obsolete as the principle rests on the distinction between brute and option luck.

This dissertation explores the role of information in justice, with an eye to taking choice seriously. Information is neither free nor ubiquitous, as has been obvious to economists for some time. Related puzzles are also prominent in epistemology and cognitive science, from framing effects to "fast and frugal heuristics". I import these concerns into distributive justice theory. One important goal of justice theory is to formulate what makes a socioeconomic institution just or unjust and provide criteria for judging whether one distribution of benefits and burdens is less unjust than another. Given the attention that voluntary choice has received in providing moral justification for unequal distributions, it is surprising that the related question of informed choice has been overlooked. Informed consent, for example, has more justificatory power than consent simpliciter. Information affects choice and choice affects outcomes. But if the costs and benefits of informing oneself are unknown to the agent before the point of choice but yet differ from agent to agent, then which allocation of information costs is just? This is a central question in this dissertation. Because the closest attempt to dealing with choices made under risk and uncertainty is Ronald Dworkin's brute/option luck distinction, I focus on option luck, framing distributive justice as interplay between process and pattern (chapter 2). I advance arguments for the following: option luck is insufficient for justice even if we presuppose ideal epistemic agents (chapter 3), how information is presented matters for justice between non-ideal epistemic agents (chapter 4), and informed choice requires cognitive fit between the agent and the agent's socioeconomic environment (chapter 5).I argue that Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market cannot guarantee any form of sufficientarianism even for affluent societies (chapter 6), proposing a different argument for sufficientarianism by combining (a) the perfect duty of beneficence with (b) the assumption that unfair disadvantages are unjust (chapter 7).I argue that the notion of option luck is ill-suited for cooperative contexts of socio-economic interactions (chapter 8) and outline how we could evaluate the justice of a given assignment of epistemic responsibilities, using buyer beware as a case study (chapter 9).

A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the application of its own distributive procedures, the luck egalitarian approach actually undermines its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck.

This thesis is concerned with rights-based justifications for redistribution. Orthodox views are critically examined in three of the chapters. The case against fundamental moral rights to welfare, not derived from other more fundamental moral rights or principles, is pressed in chapter three. Chapter five distinguishes between rights-based and equality-based justifications for redistribution and argues that Ronald Dworkin's idea of a right to equal respect and concern is best understood as an equality-based justification. The enabling model of rights and deprivation is introduced in chapter six. This model says that liberty rights require that others ensure that the right-holder enjoys the means to do what he or she has the right to do as well as not interfere with him or her doing what he or she has the right to do. It is found to break down because it is unable to accommodate the right to do wrong. The other four chapters are concerned with defending an alternative model of rights and deprivation. The groundwork for this alternative model - the development model of rights and deprivation - is laid in chapters two and four. Chapter two presents a person-affecting theory of rights. The two principal conclusions of the development model of rights and deprivation are defended in chapter seven. It is argued, first, that from both of the abstract moral rights to liberty introduced in chapter four flow certain derivative rights against others to have one's needs met and, second, that the state is required to promote and protect particular forms of culture as well as to meet certain sorts of personal needs including special needs, collective needs, and the unmet personal needs that arise when the prevailing methods of meeting those needs breaks down. The final chapter discusses two general issues relating to the development model of rights and deprivation.

Public goods are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. One person enjoying the benefits of a public good will not reduce the value of the good for others. And nobody within a particular population can be excluded from enjoying those benefits. While we often think of the relevant population being co-citizens of a state - national defence is taken to be the archetypal public good - in recent years the importance of public goods that benefit individuals across different countries has increasingly been recognised. We can refer to these as "global public goods". When global public goods are supplied, various costs and benefits are generated, and these costs and benefits can be shared among countries in different ways. This thesis explores how justice requires us to share them; I develop a theory of distributive justice for global public goods. I begin by developing two principles for assigning the costs and benefits of supplying public goods within a state, and then argue that these should, for the most part, also govern the distribution of costs and benefits arising from global public good production. Finally, I assess how certain private goods that the supply of public goods make possible should be shared among states. The fact that these goods rely for their production on the supply of global public goods, I argue, will affect the principles of distributive justice that should govern these.

Distributive justice in the health sector in the context of the rationalization of health care This paper should briefly introduce the major principle of health service in the Czech Republic but also practised in most developed countries. Distributive justice is a system of accumulating and redistributing wealth in order to seek balance in society. In health sector it is most commonly associated with rationing i.e. distribution of limited and costly medical sources among those who are in need of medical care in a justifiable way. Not to be mistaken distributive justice with social justice even though there is a fine line between the two. The thesis is divided into fifteen chapters each describing certain aspect of distributive justice in the health sector or a related issue. Opening chapters are dedicated to theoretical, historical and philosophical overview; following part contains single elements of distributive justice both in general and in context of health care. Issues of medical standards and regulatory charges are discussed in subsequent chapters with regard to recent case law of the Constitutional court. In conclusion the problem of distributive justice in health care can be approached from two different points - communitarian and liberal. These issues are also political, philosophical and...