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There was a long-standing consensus that Ockham was a Divine Command Theorist - one who holds that all of morality is ultimately grounded in God's commands. But contrary to this long-standing consensus, three arguments have recently surfaced that Ockham is not a divine command theorist. The thesis of this dissertation is that, contrary to these three arguments, Ockham is a divine command theorist. The first half of the dissertation is an analysis of the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for virtuous action, whereas the second half is a response to the three contemporary arguments that Ockham isn't a divine command theorist. In a way, the first half of the dissertation gives a prima facie case that Ockham is a divine command theorist; the second half concludes so ultima facie.

No description available.

No description available.

Recent literature seems to have opened up space for naturalistic theistic metaethics in a contemporary context, as proponents of divine command theories have tended to be restricted to either supernatural or theistic non-natural theories within existing taxonomies of normative theory. While perhaps encouraging for theists, would theism add anything substantive to theories of ethical naturalism? In this paper, I examine this question. I argue that theistic naturalism appears to incur certain objections as well as provide a plausible and explanatory constraint on content for theories of ethical naturalism. As a result, a corresponding challenge to non-theistic variants is raised. / Master of Arts / Realists, roughly summarized, are those metaethicists who believe that some moral propositions have truth values, that some (or at least one) of those propositions turn out to be true, and that if rational agents disagree on the truth value of a particular moral proposition, only one of them has the possibility of being correct. Broadly construed, moral realists tend to fall under one of two “tents”, preferring either naturalism (for which moral properties turn out to be wholly natural in constitution) or non-naturalism (which posits that at least some moral properties have, even if only partly, non-natural constituents as part of their make-up. Theists, who base their theories of morality on some facet of the nature or essence (or commands) of God, have tended to either be relegated in philosophical debate to a characterization of “supernaturalism” or to some seldom visited corner of the non-natural “tent” of moral realism. The former tends to limit theistic engagement in contemporary metaethical dialogue such that it can seem (at times) as if theists and non-theists are talking about two different subjects entirely. On the other hand, a non-naturalistic theory of theistic moral realism saddles the view with some fairly difficult metaphysical and epistemological baggage in the form of powerful objections levied against non-naturalistic theories in general. This paper explores another option for theism in light of very recent work by Gideon Rosen, namely his article examining the metaphysical implications of varieties of moral realism, particularly naturalistic ones. This article has already garnered a general characterization (within metaethical research, writ large) as being a “taxonomy” of naturalistic (and non-naturalistic, for that matter) theories. Specifically for my purposes here, Rosen suggests that divine command theory (and theistic metaethics in general) should be understood as being naturalistic in formulation. This would seem to be advantageous to theists, in that their metaethical theories might avoid either the bounded characterization of supernaturalism or the difficult challenges of non-naturalism. However, the theist, should she avail herself of naturalism in this regard, will need to tread carefully. Given that Rosen has couched his 'taxonomy' in terms of metaphysical grounding, I examine some resultant challenges for naturalistic theistic metaethics, concluding they can be overcome, as well as a related objection to non-theistic naturalism that arise as a result of the same grounding discussion coupled with the resources theists can leverage in a naturalistic context.

Divine Command Theory är en metaetisk position som innebär att vår moraliska kompass bör grunda sig i vad Gud anser är rätt eller fel. Givet att det existerar objektiva moraliska sanningar, är Divine Command Theory den mest lämpliga teorin för att på ett logiskt och kongruent sätt besvara på frågorna vart moraliska förpliktelser härstammar ifrån, hur vi känner till dessa förpliktelser och varför vi bör leva våra liv i enlighet med dem. Andra framträdande metaetiska positioner som evolutionsbaserad etik, moralisk realism och konstruktivism lyckas besvara olika enstaka aspekter av dessa frågor, men inte på ett kongruent, holistiskt och tillfredsställande vis. Således behöver vi Gud för att grunda objektiv moral. Invändningen Euthyphros dilemma besvaras med att det inte är ett dilemma. Invändningen the pluralism objection, besvaras med att det ensamt inte kan motbevisa giltigheten av teorin. Inom Shari’an förmedlas en sofistikerad samt holistisk syn på moral. Människans universella skyldighet att lyda Gud samt att följa profeten, i syfte att uppnå moralisk korrekthet, uttrycks i koranen. För att säkerställa detta fordrar det en korrekt tolkning av Shari’an. Relationen mellan moraliska förpliktelser och vilka som bär dess ansvar behandlas med utgångspunkt i individens förmågor, egenskaper, samt individuella omständigheter. Eftersom Gud är Allvetande känner han till varje individs situation. Andra aspekter av moral som sedvanliga metaetiska positioner typiskt inte behandlar, som intention och ansträngning lyfts i Shari’an. Vidare finner vi både positiva och negativa påföljder beroende på om man följer förpliktelserna eller inte. Påföljderna kategoriseras i två delar, den ena behandlar detta liv och den andra behandlar det nästkommande livet. Påföljderna svarar på den moralfilosofiska frågan varför man bör vara moralisk. Inom Islam inkluderas även djur och natur som subjekt vilka man har moraliskt ansvar för.