The early Husserl wants to know what logic is, or what we should call ‘logic.’ He poses the question in a way that knowingly encompasses both what the 19th century (after Kant but before Frege) and the 20th century (since Frege) call ‘logic.’ But that he asks the question, and with such scope, has yet to be widely recognized. In particular, Husserl scholars still lack an overview of how Husserl’s early, explicitly logical inquiries, driven more by this single question than any worry about doctrinal consistency, does at least two things at once: probe what will later be called ‘pure phenomenology’ or ‘transcendental logic,’ and delimit logic as a positive yet mathematical discipline. With the aim of providing the neglected overview of this project, this dissertation takes the measure of Husserl’s two-volume Logical Investigations (1900-01) in four studies. Chapter I argues that the first volume, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), intends at once to resolve a 19th-century conflict and to establish logic’s possibility as its own discipline, all by means of demonstrating the confusion of psychologism (the view that empirical psychology could set the terms for logic as a discipline). Chapter II then contends that most of the Prolegomena’s first chapter falls outside this intention, departing from the book’s Bolzano-inspired argumentative framework yet thereby anticipating Husserl’s later ‘transcendental logic.’ Chapter III presents Frege and Husserl as two images of indecision as to how it falls to logic to know truth’s laws. Chapter IV concludes by expounding Husserl’s conception of logic as noetics, the self-clarification of knowing, thus completing the picture of Husserl’s indecision, while also laying groundwork to track the development of his thinking after the Logical Investigations.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIL - Edson Dognaldo Gil.pdf: 1469522 bytes, checksum: 93803423295828ce6d57adf7e6ced90d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The aim of this dissertation is to present and toanalyse the first principle of Fichteʹs Doctrine of Science, namely, that of the self‐position of the I, in the same way the German idealist philosopher expounds it in the firstparagraph of his masterpiece Grundlage der gesammten issenschaftslehre [Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge], published in 1794‐1795. The historical presentation situates Fichteʹs issue in the context of the modern philosophy in general, and of German idealism in particular. Remarks are provided on the relation and mutual influence of German thinkers, especially on the continuity between the transcendental philosophy of Kant and that of Fichte, pointing out, however, the originality of the project of the Doctrine of Science. Some attention is also given to the current state of the Fichte‐Forschung. The systematic analysis, wish constitutes the core of the work, concentrates on the thorough reading of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, pointing out its implications to the question of the relation between being and thinking, morespecifically, the respective transcendental transformation of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, the I, in so far as it is (characterized as) pure intelligence, is the genetic, originary and pre-predicative Act (Tathandlung). Therefore, it is previous toboth discursive thought and objective consciousness (ofa substantiated Cartesian subject), and yet it is accessible by means of an intuitive method; it is nonetheless purely intellectual and authentically meditative meditative philosophy, philosophy as art (ars). There is enclosed a reproduction of the original text of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, as well as the respective translation, of my authorship. There is also a small glossary of the most important terms used by Fichte translated from German into Portuguese / O escopo desta dissertação consiste em apresentar e analisaro chamado Primeiro Princípio da autoposição do Eu da Doutrina da Ciência de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, tal qual o idealista alemão o expõe no primeiro parágrafo de sua obra‐prima Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschriftfür seine Zuhörer [Fundamento de toda a Doutrina da Ciência como manual para seus ouvintes], publicada em 1794‐1795. A apresentação histórica visa a situar a problemáticafichteana no contexto da filosofia moderna, em geral, e, em particular, do idealismo alemão. Tecem‐se considerações sobre a relação e a influência mútua dos pensadores alemães, especialmente sobre a continuidade entre a filosofia transcendental deKant e a de Fichte, destacando‐se porém a originalidade do projeto da Doutrina da Ciência. Dedicam‐se, além disso, algumas palavras ao estado atual da Fichte‐Forschung. A análise sistemática, que constitui o cerne do trabalho, concentra‐se na leitura minuciosa do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, destacando‐se suas implicações no que respeita à questão da relação entre ser e pensar, mais especificamente, a respectiva transformação transcendental do cogito cartesiano. Conclui‐se que, para Fichte, o eu, enquanto inteligência pura, é Ato genético, originário (Tathandlung), pré‐predicativo e, portanto, anterior ao pensamento discursivo e à consciência objetiva (de um sujeito hipostasiado, cartesiano), ao qual se tem acesso por meio de um método intuitivo, mas puramente intelectual, autenticamente meditativo filosofia meditativa, filosofia como arte (ars). Como anexos, seguem‐se a reprodução do texto original do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, bem como a respectiva tradução, de minha autoria. Além disso, um pequeno vocabulário, alemão‐português, dos termos mais importantes utilizados por Fichte