Västerländska och ryska perspektivär oförenliga. Detsamma gäller för uppfattningenom mjuk makt. När möjliga framtida scenarion av rysk utrikes-och säkerhetspolitik analyserasär ettav det mest framträdande skapandet av nya och kreativa metoder för att försvaga motståndare utan att tillgripa militära medel. Aktiva åtgärder är en uppsättning av sådana instrument. Ur ett akademiskt perspektiv är det förbryllande att en av de främsta experterna på rysk mjuk makt, holländaren Marcel H. van Herpen, förbisåg aktiva åtgärder som metod för att främja rysk mjuk makt i sin teori som beskrivs i Putin’s Propaganda Machine. Studien har en teoritestande ansats och undersöker samma instanser av mjuk makt som Herpen i den tidigare nämnda boken men adderar ytterligare en dimension till forskningen, nämligen aktiva åtgärder. Dessa analyseras med stöd av ett modifierat metodologiskt ramverk av Jonas J. Driedger. Slutsatsen av denna studie är främst att Herpens teori är tekniskt korrekt men de facto saknar relevanta dimensioner. Således kan teorin enbart demonstrera fall av rysk mjuk makt, men inte förklara eller operationalisera. Genom att addera perspektivet aktiva åtgärder för att analysera fallen i källor, metoder och konsekvenser, stärks den vetenskapliga förståelsen för mjuka maktmedel i den ryska arsenalen. Studien resulterar även i utvecklingen av en metod för att upptäcka ryska mjuka maktmedel med hjälp av identifiering av aktiva åtgärder. Vidare påvisas även att flertalet mjuka maktförstärkande strategier används för att genomföra Kremls aktiva åtgärder samt ryska utrikespolitiska mål i allmänhet, vilket framgår av de kvalitativa fallstudier som presenteras. Slutligen ifrågasätter resultaten av studien och efterföljande analys den västerländska uppfattningen om mjuk makt som en global företeelse. / Западная и российская точки зрения несовместимы. То же самое относится и к понятию мягкой силы. При анализе возможных будущих сценариев внешней политики и политики безопасности России одним из наиболее примечательных является создание новых и креативных методов ослабления противников без применения военных средств. Активные меры представляют собой набор таких инструментов. С академической точки зрения вызывает недоумение тот факт, что один из ведущих экспертов по российской мягкой силе, голландец Марсель ван Херпен, упустил это из виду в своей теории, описанной вкниге «Путинская пропагандистская машина».  Настоящее, исследование основано на проверке теории и, таким образом, рассматривает те же примеры мягкой силы, что и Херпен в ранее упомянутой книге, но добавляет к исследованию  ещё одно параметр, а именно активные мероприятия. Они проанализированы при поддержке модифицированной методологической базы Джонаса Дж. Дредджера. Вывод исследования в основном состоит в том, что теория Херпена технически верна, но в теории фактически не хватает некоторых важных аспектов. Таким образом, теория может только продемонстрировать случаи российской мягкой силы, но не объяснить или операционализировать их. Другим результатом исследования является разработка метода выявления российских мягких средств силы посредством выявления активных мероприятий. Кроме этого, нами показано, что большинство стратегий усиления мягкой силы используется для реализации активных мероприятий Кремля, а также целей внешней политики России в целом, что видно из представленных в работе качественных тематических исследований. Результаты исследования и последующего анализа ставят под сомнение западное представление о мягкой силе как о глобальном явлении.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.