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No description available.

Hugh Gaitskell was leader of the Labour Party between 1955-63. The Cold War was at a critical level and bi-partisanship in international affairs was expected. With Gaitskell's accession this appeared to end, marked in particular by the disputes over Suez, the independent nuclear deterrent and Britain's application to join the European Economic Community. Simultaneously, he was challenged by the Left over nearly every aspect of Labour's foreign and defence policy. Despite these major controversies, Gaitskell's influence over international affairs remains a neglected area of research, and he is remembered more for the domestic controversies over nationalisation, his ill-fated attempt to revise Clause IV and defeat at the 1960 Scarborough conference. This thesis addresses that imbalance by examining Gaitskell's contribution to foreign affairs and the following inter-related areas: bi-partisanship; policy formulation; internal divisions and the power struggle between Left and Right. In addition, it also considers how the structure of the Labour Party benefited the leadership during this turbulent period. The conclusions revise Gaitskell's reputation as a figure of unyielding principle, and demonstrates that his leadership was marked by a mixture of finesse and blunder. His responsibility for the end of bi-partisanship can be discounted, as Labour remained firmly committed to the policies laid down and followed since 1945. Yet, the personal control over policy that he exercised, allied to his determination to mould the Labour Party in his own image, needlessly accelerated the internal struggles for power. While the Scarborough defeat illustrates the limitations of his authority, Suez and Europe display his acute political awareness of the requirements needed to balance national interests, electoral prospects and maintain party unity.

Britain's second attempt to seek membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967 has widely been regarded as inevitable. This thesis traces the development of Britain's policy towards the EEC from the accession of the Labour Government in 1964 to the failure of the application for membership in December 1967. Drawing primarily on official British records, it takes as its premise that policy decisions must be reconstructed as they appeared to participants at the time. It therefore places as central the roles and attitudes of key ministers and officials. It seeks to elucidate three main historical themes. First, by assessing the detailed progress of policy, it examines Harold Wilson's own ambiguous attitude towards European membership. Second, it considers how the British approached the Community, analysing Cabinet's acceptance of the policy as well as the conduct of Britain's diplomacy towards the members of the Six. Third, it places Britain's turn to Europe within the context of wider decisions about Britain's foreign and economic policies. It shows that Wilson's policy towards membership of the EEC developed only gradually and under duress, as he initially hoped to create a free trade area in Europe. Wilson did agree to study the implications of membership early in 1966, yet the decisive turning point was the July 1966 sterling crisis. It offers a new interpretation of Britain's approach to the Community, arguing that Wilson's attitude towards the tems of entry emerged only gradually. Britain's diplomacy with the Six foundered on Britain's economic weakness and the ability of General de Gaulle to manipulate his European partners. Although this was a period of considerable transformation in Britain's global orientation, British policy did not represent a decisive break with the past. Decisions were taken reluctantly and piecemeal, in response to economic crisis.

<p>The Swedish Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, made a speech on the 22 of August 1961 in which he dismissed speculation that Sweden was seeking to abandon its neutral stance and non-alignment in foreign policy with a view to requesting membership of the European Economic Community. The reason was that the EEC was supposed to have a political part where a connection with NATO should have existed. This speech led to a domestic discussion which has been called the most intense debate of foreign affairs in recent history. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reactions of the other parliamentary parties to Erlander’s speech. The theoretical points draw from social constructivism, which is being operationalised into states’ identity and interests. These interests are states’ physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being. All of these three interests were present in Erlander’s speech.</p><p>The study shows that the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) was in agreement with Erlander’s stance and coincided that it was impossible to reconcile membership of the EEC with the state’s neutral stance. Both the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) and the Centre Party gave priority to the interest of autonomy over economic well-being. However, there were aspects of the interest of physical survival in the opinions of the Social Democrats, which might be connected with their role as the government party and therefore having the ultimate responsibility. The biggest critics were the non-socialist parties: the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) and the Conservative Party (Högerpartiet). The latter two believed that the country should seek the oppurtunity to make an exception to the neutral stance when applying for membership and then evaluate whether it would be possible to reconcile it with non-allignment. They both had economic well-being as their major interest. Further criticism came from the Communist Party (Kommunistpartiet), who were opponents of any aspect of European cooperation. They even drew parallels between the EEC and Hitler’s vision for Europe. The Communist Party included interests of physical survival and autonomy in their argumentation. All parties were consistent in keeping to their interests throughout the period of this research.</p>

No description available.

No description available.

The Swedish Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, made a speech on the 22 of August 1961 in which he dismissed speculation that Sweden was seeking to abandon its neutral stance and non-alignment in foreign policy with a view to requesting membership of the European Economic Community. The reason was that the EEC was supposed to have a political part where a connection with NATO should have existed. This speech led to a domestic discussion which has been called the most intense debate of foreign affairs in recent history. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reactions of the other parliamentary parties to Erlander’s speech. The theoretical points draw from social constructivism, which is being operationalised into states’ identity and interests. These interests are states’ physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being. All of these three interests were present in Erlander’s speech. The study shows that the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) was in agreement with Erlander’s stance and coincided that it was impossible to reconcile membership of the EEC with the state’s neutral stance. Both the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) and the Centre Party gave priority to the interest of autonomy over economic well-being. However, there were aspects of the interest of physical survival in the opinions of the Social Democrats, which might be connected with their role as the government party and therefore having the ultimate responsibility. The biggest critics were the non-socialist parties: the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) and the Conservative Party (Högerpartiet). The latter two believed that the country should seek the oppurtunity to make an exception to the neutral stance when applying for membership and then evaluate whether it would be possible to reconcile it with non-allignment. They both had economic well-being as their major interest. Further criticism came from the Communist Party (Kommunistpartiet), who were opponents of any aspect of European cooperation. They even drew parallels between the EEC and Hitler’s vision for Europe. The Communist Party included interests of physical survival and autonomy in their argumentation. All parties were consistent in keeping to their interests throughout the period of this research.

This thesis addresses the German position in the negotiations on the British proposal for a Europe-wide free trade area, on the acceleration of the tariff schedule of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1960, the formation of EFTA, and the first British application for membership of the EEC. To do this it analyses the attitudes, interests and lobbying efforts of German industry, West Germany's European policy from 1957 to 1963 after the establishment of the EEC and industrial influence on the respective decisions by the Federal Government. The main focus is on the trade relations with Western European countries outside the EEC. Previous historiography has stressed the overriding German economic interest in and corresponding industrial pressures for avoiding trade discrimination by the EEC vis-a-vis the other European members of the OEEC/OECD. It has however failed to address the problem that, despite an alleged political consensus in line with these economic interests. Chancellor Adenauer was able to deliver a policy precluding the Europe-wide solution demanded by parliament, German business, and Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics. It seems to suggest that this policy outcome was mainly a function of Adenauer's personal authority and his constitutional prerogatives as Chancellor. In order to address this central problem, the thesis examines industrial interests at the sectoral level. These are analysed on the basis of a quantitative study of sectoral foreign trade in manufactured products with the countries of EEC and EFTA respectively in the 1950s and 1960s. From other sources it examines the influence which German industry exerted on government policy towards European economic integration. This reveals that industrial interest at the sectoral level in fact gave rise to lobbying pressures for the policy outcome sought by Adenauer, to prevent the large Europe-wide free trade area and to prevent British accession to the EEC. The quantitative analysis shows that for those sectors in favour of the proposed free trade area and British accession the opportunity costs of the failure of these two projects were practically invisible. For sectors in decline and in structural difficulties, on the other hand, both these projects constituted a major threat. The EEC of the Six, however, offered them not only protection against competition from outside, but at the same time considerable export opportunities, particularly in the French and Italian markets. The intra-governmental power struggle over these issues is analysed first with regard to industrial pressure and second to the international framework and the respective constraints and opportunities it provided for domestic policy makers in West Germany. The eventual policy outcome is explained in three dimensions: first in terms of the particular structure of industrial interest and respective pressures; second an alliance between protectionist interests and the specific political agenda of the head of the executive; third in terms of opportunities for the Federal Chancellor arising from the interplay of policy and power at the international level. It is argued that this is a more convincing interpretation and more securely based on the historical evidence.