Recent surveys have found that Afro-Venezuelans vote disproportionately for Hugo Chávez as President. This paper seeks to explain why Chávez has received significant support from non-white voters. I argue that this support is not only due to his mixed racial background, but more importantly due to the tangible benefits from the Chávez regime in the form of policies directed specifically at redressing racial discrimination and class inequalities. These policies include legislation against racial discrimination, educational reform, the mass enfranchisement of Afro-Venezuelan voters, and the recruitment of Afro-Venezuelan political leaders within the Chávez administration. / text

Election boycotts are a common occurrence in unconsolidated democracies, particularly in the developing world, with prominent examples from recent years occurring in Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Despite the frequent occurrence of boycotts, there are few studies available in the scholarly literature concerning the effectiveness of electoral boycotts, particularly as a strategy of opposition parties seeking to bring about the end of electoral authoritarian governments. This paper is based in the democratization literature, with a particular focus on the behavior and vulnerabilities of hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes. Using an original dataset with global coverage including hybrid regimes from 1981 to 2006, this paper uses event-history analysis to determine the efficacy of boycotts in national elections among other risk factors thought to undermine electoral authoritarian regimes as well as the possibilities for subsequent democratization occurring following both contested and boycotted electoral processes.

In November 2007 the right of centre Saskatchewan Party defeated Saskatchewan’s social democratic party, which had been in government for seventeen years. Unlike previous defeats, the New Democratic Party’s (NDP) loss in 2007 clearly showed that a new intra-urban political polarization in Saskatoon and Regina had emerged with the outer suburbs abandoning the NDP and the core areas maintaining previous levels of support. This study employs correlation analysis and logistic and linear regression analysis, using survey data from the 2003 and 2007 general election campaigns from Saskatchewan. Urban zones are constructed based on the morphological (urban form) hypothesis in order to create categories for spatial analysis. The different types of urban places are analyzed incorporating survey and Statscan data. Statistically significant differences between the urban zones are discussed in light of possible mechanisms found in the literature in order to explain recent political turns in Saskatchewan.

In November 2007 the right of centre Saskatchewan Party defeated Saskatchewan’s social democratic party, which had been in government for seventeen years. Unlike previous defeats, the New Democratic Party’s (NDP) loss in 2007 clearly showed that a new intra-urban political polarization in Saskatoon and Regina had emerged with the outer suburbs abandoning the NDP and the core areas maintaining previous levels of support. This study employs correlation analysis and logistic and linear regression analysis, using survey data from the 2003 and 2007 general election campaigns from Saskatchewan. Urban zones are constructed based on the morphological (urban form) hypothesis in order to create categories for spatial analysis. The different types of urban places are analyzed incorporating survey and Statscan data. Statistically significant differences between the urban zones are discussed in light of possible mechanisms found in the literature in order to explain recent political turns in Saskatchewan.

As we near the 60th anniversary of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision, questions still remain about its salience and our ability to provide equal educational opportunities to students of all races and ethnicities. Additionally, scholars and observers alike note the continual shift toward resegregation in American schools, but few have probed exactly why this occurs and the empirical implications of this shift. As such, this dissertation project explores the “new” political domain of school desegregation policy to understand why some school districts are resegregating while others maintain their racial balance, and the substantive implications of this divide for minority students. The goal of this research is two-fold. First, I investigate the determinants of desegregation policy, arguing that a set of institutional (representation), structural, and management factors best predict a district’s level of racial balance as an indicator of the active pursuit of desegregation. Second, I examine student outcomes and performance under both educational settings—racially balanced and imbalanced—to determine where students fare better and how much the racial context matters to student outcomes. I frame this question theoretically in the organizational theory research on external control, in which I argue that the policy environment, in this case, the racial context as denoted by the level of racial balance, influences the extent to which structure, representation, and management affect outcomes. I compare outcomes under the two policy environments, racially balanced and imbalanced districts, to see their effect on the noted factors and where students fare better. The general results show that the broad assumption and desegregation literature finding that racially balanced schools are better for minority students is not supported. Minority students can also gain the same if not better outcomes in racially imbalanced districts. I also find that while the tested predictors play an important role, the policy environment significantly contributes to their role and outcomes. For policy makers and practitioners this means that one way to gain the equality that the Brown decision sought is to shift the focus on improving board and teacher representation or management strategies and practices. The dissertation challenges assumptions of political decisions and outcomes that fail to consider the external policy environment.

Why do countries tax the same fuels at widely different rates, even among similarly situated countries in the global political economy? Given the potentially destabilizing effects of climate change, and the political and economic risks associated with a reliance on geographically concentrated, finite fossil fuels, International Organizations and economists of all political stripes have consistently called for increasing tax rates on fossil-based energy. Despite much enthusiasm among policy experts, however, politicians concerned with distributional consequences, economic performance and competitiveness impacts continue to be wary of raising taxes on carbon-based fuels. In this context, this thesis investigates the political economy of tax rates affecting the price of fossil fuels in advanced capitalist democracies. Through an examination of the political limits of government capacity to implement stricter carbon-energy policy, as well as the identification of the correlates of higher carbon-based energy taxes, it throws new light on the conditions under which carbon-energy tax reform becomes politically possible. Based on recent data collected from the OECD, EEA and IEA, I develop an estimate of the relative size of implicit carbon taxes across OECD member countries on six carbon-based fuels and across the household and industrial sectors. I exploit large cross-national differences in these carbon-energy tax rates in order to identify the correlates of, and constraints on, carbon-energy tax reform. Applying multiple regression analysis to both cross-section and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, this thesis leverages considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate how and why electoral systems matter for energy and environmental tax policy outcomes. In particular, I find considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that systems of proportional representation (PR), in addition to the partisan preferences of the electorate, work together to explain differential rates of carbon-energy taxation. By opening up the ideological space to a broader spectrum of “green” parties, I argue that PR systems create a favourable institutional context within which higher rates of carbon-energy taxation become politically possible. After specifying a key causal mechanism within different types of electoral systems – the seat-vote elasticity – I argue further that, voters in disproportional systems actually have more leverage over politicians, and that an increase in environmental voting can have an impact on rates of carbon energy taxation, even in the absence of PR. While the accession to power of green political parties in PR systems is more likely to lead to higher rates of carbon energy taxation, voting for green parties in highly disproportional systems creates incentives for other parties to adopt “green” policies, leading to a similar outcome. In this way, the effect of green votes and green seats will have the opposite effect on policy according to the type of electoral system in use.

Why do countries tax the same fuels at widely different rates, even among similarly situated countries in the global political economy? Given the potentially destabilizing effects of climate change, and the political and economic risks associated with a reliance on geographically concentrated, finite fossil fuels, International Organizations and economists of all political stripes have consistently called for increasing tax rates on fossil-based energy. Despite much enthusiasm among policy experts, however, politicians concerned with distributional consequences, economic performance and competitiveness impacts continue to be wary of raising taxes on carbon-based fuels. In this context, this thesis investigates the political economy of tax rates affecting the price of fossil fuels in advanced capitalist democracies. Through an examination of the political limits of government capacity to implement stricter carbon-energy policy, as well as the identification of the correlates of higher carbon-based energy taxes, it throws new light on the conditions under which carbon-energy tax reform becomes politically possible. Based on recent data collected from the OECD, EEA and IEA, I develop an estimate of the relative size of implicit carbon taxes across OECD member countries on six carbon-based fuels and across the household and industrial sectors. I exploit large cross-national differences in these carbon-energy tax rates in order to identify the correlates of, and constraints on, carbon-energy tax reform. Applying multiple regression analysis to both cross-section and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, this thesis leverages considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate how and why electoral systems matter for energy and environmental tax policy outcomes. In particular, I find considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that systems of proportional representation (PR), in addition to the partisan preferences of the electorate, work together to explain differential rates of carbon-energy taxation. By opening up the ideological space to a broader spectrum of “green” parties, I argue that PR systems create a favourable institutional context within which higher rates of carbon-energy taxation become politically possible. After specifying a key causal mechanism within different types of electoral systems – the seat-vote elasticity – I argue further that, voters in disproportional systems actually have more leverage over politicians, and that an increase in environmental voting can have an impact on rates of carbon energy taxation, even in the absence of PR. While the accession to power of green political parties in PR systems is more likely to lead to higher rates of carbon energy taxation, voting for green parties in highly disproportional systems creates incentives for other parties to adopt “green” policies, leading to a similar outcome. In this way, the effect of green votes and green seats will have the opposite effect on policy according to the type of electoral system in use.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Glasgow, 2008. / Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Department of Politics, Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences, University of Glasgow, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.

This thesis explores the patterns of electoral manipulation in Ghana. Inspired by Andreas Schedler's essay, The Menu of Manipulation, in which he provides a "list of electoral sins" (Schedler 2002, 45), the thesis asks the following research question: how do African politicians choose from the menu of manipulation? To answer this question, the thesis develops a theory about the costs and benefits of electoral manipulation. The theory is based on three arguments: first, that in addition to the direct benefits of electoral manipulation, meaning the increased chance of winning, there are important indirect benefits that drive some politicians to rig, even when victory is guaranteed or entirely beyond reach; second, that electoral manipulation is expensive and that the direct costs, meaning what politicians spend, discourage them as much as the indirect costs, i.e. the risk of getting caught; and, third, that different types of electoral manipulation have different cost-benefit profiles, allowing politicians to tailor their rigging strategies. The thesis tests this theory against original data from Ghana. First, drawing on a dataset, containing information about every, regular, constituency-level parliamentary election over the 2008 and 2012 electoral cycles, it shows that different types of electoral manipulation have different patterns, caused by their different cost-benefit profiles; that not all types are driven by electoral uncertainty; and that there are trade-offs between the direct and indirect costs of rigging. Second, drawing on participant observations from two parliamentary constituencies in eastern Ghana, the thesis shows that consider both their electoral prospects and clientelistic networks, when they choose between different types of electoral manipulation, and that they revert to riskier types only as a last resort: when there are no other options available on the menu of manipulation. The thesis contributes to the academic literature in two ways. First, it adds to the growing body of work pointing to the direct costs and the indirect benefits of electoral manipulation. Second, it proposes a framework for approximating the properties of different types of electoral manipulation and making predictions about their patterns.

This dissertation examines how voters react towards candidates with records of misuse of public funds in the context of sub-national elections in Brazil. Its contribution to the extant literature on corruption and electoral accountability is twofold. First, it is the first study to inquire whether voters punish candidates with malfeasance records running for both executive and legislative office in the same electoral context and whether a number of contextual factors affect electoral accountability in these offices. Second, it presents and tests new hypotheses on the type of motivation that ground voters' rejection towards corrupt candidates. In chapter 2, I examine whether voters punish candidates for mayor and city councilman with accounts rejected by the Brazilian Audit Courts and whether additional contextual factors affect electoral accountability. In particular, I study whether electoral accountability decreases as candidates (for mayor) have better records of social provision; whether local media promotes electoral accountability; and whether candidates with negative antecedents receive fewer campaign donations and are less likely to re-run. I combine large-N observational analysis, using an original dataset with candidates' accounts rejection records, with interviews with Brazilian Audit Court members and local politicians. In chapter 3 I use three online survey experiments with a convenience sample of Brazilian voters to examine whether likelihood to support a corrupt incumbent is affected by the details that subjects learn about the corruption incident. I use these additional details to inquire whether subjects are sensitive to information emphasizing the public costs of corruption, the candidate's moral misbehavior, or his illicit enrichment. Results presented in chapter 2 suggest that prior records of misuse of public funds have electoral consequences both for candidates for mayor and for city councilman. In addition, they suggest that the existence of local media does not increase electoral punishment; that public spending does not reduce electoral punishment; and that candidates with accounts rejected often receive fewer funds and are less likely to re-run. Results presented in chapter 3 suggest that voters' rejection towards corrupt candidates is stronger when they learn additional details on the candidate's ilegal enrichment.