This thesis explores the patterns of electoral manipulation in Ghana. Inspired by Andreas Schedler's essay, The Menu of Manipulation, in which he provides a "list of electoral sins" (Schedler 2002, 45), the thesis asks the following research question: how do African politicians choose from the menu of manipulation? To answer this question, the thesis develops a theory about the costs and benefits of electoral manipulation. The theory is based on three arguments: first, that in addition to the direct benefits of electoral manipulation, meaning the increased chance of winning, there are important indirect benefits that drive some politicians to rig, even when victory is guaranteed or entirely beyond reach; second, that electoral manipulation is expensive and that the direct costs, meaning what politicians spend, discourage them as much as the indirect costs, i.e. the risk of getting caught; and, third, that different types of electoral manipulation have different cost-benefit profiles, allowing politicians to tailor their rigging strategies. The thesis tests this theory against original data from Ghana. First, drawing on a dataset, containing information about every, regular, constituency-level parliamentary election over the 2008 and 2012 electoral cycles, it shows that different types of electoral manipulation have different patterns, caused by their different cost-benefit profiles; that not all types are driven by electoral uncertainty; and that there are trade-offs between the direct and indirect costs of rigging. Second, drawing on participant observations from two parliamentary constituencies in eastern Ghana, the thesis shows that consider both their electoral prospects and clientelistic networks, when they choose between different types of electoral manipulation, and that they revert to riskier types only as a last resort: when there are no other options available on the menu of manipulation. The thesis contributes to the academic literature in two ways. First, it adds to the growing body of work pointing to the direct costs and the indirect benefits of electoral manipulation. Second, it proposes a framework for approximating the properties of different types of electoral manipulation and making predictions about their patterns.

A teoria do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional sugere que os governantes são tentados a manipular os instrumentos de política fiscal aumentando o gasto público ao seguirem o calendário eleitoral. A percepção, por parte do eleitorado, de que o governante mais capaz corresponde àquele que provê o maior número de bens públicos através das funções governamentais, apresenta a evolução recente da teoria. O presente estudo objetiva testar a hipótese de ocorrência do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional nas variáveis representantes de bens públicos, identificando aquelas onde parece haver evidência de manipulação eleitoral, nos municípios brasileiros, entre os anos de 2002 e 2015. Foram utilizados métodos econométricos de regressão de dados em painel nos anos que precedem às eleições, nos anos eleitorais e nos pós-pleitos. Os resultados não descartam a hipótese de que o ciclo político orçamentário no gasto ocorreria e que se privilegiariam algumas funções, possivelmente, alterando a percepção do eleitorado sobre a competência dos prefeitos. / The theory of the traditional budgetary policy cycle suggests that rulers are tempted to manipulate fiscal policy instruments by increasing public spending by following the electoral calendar. The perception by the electorate that the most capable ruler corresponds to the one who provides the greatest number of public goods through governmental functions, presents the recent evolution of the theory. The present study aims to test the hypothesis of the occurrence of the traditional budget political cycle in the variables representing public goods, identifying those where there seems to be evidence of electoral manipulation in Brazilian municipalities between 2002 and 2015. Econometric regression Panel Data Models were used in the years leading up to the elections, electoral years and post-election. The results shows the hypothesis that the political budget cycle in spending would occur and that some functions would be privileged, possibly changing the perception of the electorate on the competence of mayors.

A teoria do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional sugere que os governantes são tentados a manipular os instrumentos de política fiscal aumentando o gasto público ao seguirem o calendário eleitoral. A percepção, por parte do eleitorado, de que o governante mais capaz corresponde àquele que provê o maior número de bens públicos através das funções governamentais, apresenta a evolução recente da teoria. O presente estudo objetiva testar a hipótese de ocorrência do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional nas variáveis representantes de bens públicos, identificando aquelas onde parece haver evidência de manipulação eleitoral, nos municípios brasileiros, entre os anos de 2002 e 2015. Foram utilizados métodos econométricos de regressão de dados em painel nos anos que precedem às eleições, nos anos eleitorais e nos pós-pleitos. Os resultados não descartam a hipótese de que o ciclo político orçamentário no gasto ocorreria e que se privilegiariam algumas funções, possivelmente, alterando a percepção do eleitorado sobre a competência dos prefeitos. / The theory of the traditional budgetary policy cycle suggests that rulers are tempted to manipulate fiscal policy instruments by increasing public spending by following the electoral calendar. The perception by the electorate that the most capable ruler corresponds to the one who provides the greatest number of public goods through governmental functions, presents the recent evolution of the theory. The present study aims to test the hypothesis of the occurrence of the traditional budget political cycle in the variables representing public goods, identifying those where there seems to be evidence of electoral manipulation in Brazilian municipalities between 2002 and 2015. Econometric regression Panel Data Models were used in the years leading up to the elections, electoral years and post-election. The results shows the hypothesis that the political budget cycle in spending would occur and that some functions would be privileged, possibly changing the perception of the electorate on the competence of mayors.

A teoria do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional sugere que os governantes são tentados a manipular os instrumentos de política fiscal aumentando o gasto público ao seguirem o calendário eleitoral. A percepção, por parte do eleitorado, de que o governante mais capaz corresponde àquele que provê o maior número de bens públicos através das funções governamentais, apresenta a evolução recente da teoria. O presente estudo objetiva testar a hipótese de ocorrência do ciclo político orçamentário tradicional nas variáveis representantes de bens públicos, identificando aquelas onde parece haver evidência de manipulação eleitoral, nos municípios brasileiros, entre os anos de 2002 e 2015. Foram utilizados métodos econométricos de regressão de dados em painel nos anos que precedem às eleições, nos anos eleitorais e nos pós-pleitos. Os resultados não descartam a hipótese de que o ciclo político orçamentário no gasto ocorreria e que se privilegiariam algumas funções, possivelmente, alterando a percepção do eleitorado sobre a competência dos prefeitos. / The theory of the traditional budgetary policy cycle suggests that rulers are tempted to manipulate fiscal policy instruments by increasing public spending by following the electoral calendar. The perception by the electorate that the most capable ruler corresponds to the one who provides the greatest number of public goods through governmental functions, presents the recent evolution of the theory. The present study aims to test the hypothesis of the occurrence of the traditional budget political cycle in the variables representing public goods, identifying those where there seems to be evidence of electoral manipulation in Brazilian municipalities between 2002 and 2015. Econometric regression Panel Data Models were used in the years leading up to the elections, electoral years and post-election. The results shows the hypothesis that the political budget cycle in spending would occur and that some functions would be privileged, possibly changing the perception of the electorate on the competence of mayors.

The role of unfair elections in breakdown or maintenance of electoral authoritarian regimes has been subject to debate in recent research. On the one hand, the conduct of elections may serve to enhance popular legitimacy and deter challenges to the regime. On the other hand, electoral manipulation may contribute to grievances that fuel mass protest. However, empirical research on the consequences of electoral manipulation for popular support has been limited by the availability of appropriate survey data and has mostly focused on summary or process-based assessments of electoral unfairness. The premise of this study is that electoral manipulation is difficult to assess due to its inherent complexity and ambiguity. As a result, citizens are likely to use cognitive shortcuts to interpret electoral manipulation. Applying psychological theories of justice and motivated political reasoning in this context, this project aims to investigate how both process- and outcome-based assessments of election unfairness influence summary judgments of election quality, regime support, and support for electoral protest. It further seeks to determine how voters' political preferences bias, or condition, the impact of election unfairness evaluations. These propositions are tested using novel data from the XIX New Russia Barometer survey, conducted shortly after the controversial 2011 Russian State Duma election that triggered mass electoral protests. This study finds that perceived election outcome unfairness affects reactions to elections alongside assessments of the electoral process; it also shows evidence of partisan reasoning in evaluations of election unfairness. Ultimately, this project points to some factors that may explain the diverging consequences of electoral manipulation for popular support.

Ukraine is currently in the throes of revolution. Will this popular uprising move Ukraine closer to the West and a democratic government or strengthen the country's ties to Putin and Russia? Viktor Yanukovich's second round victory in the 2004 presidential election was nullified by Ukraine's high court due to rampant electoral manipulation. Viktor Yushchenko, supported by hundreds of thousands of protesters in the 2004 Orange Revolution, became president and ushered in, what many hoped would be, a more democratic government. Infighting and competition among the Orange coalition soon rendered the Yushchenko government ineffective. Ukraine's progression towards democracy slowed and ties to Russia began to flourish once again when Yanukovich became Yushchenko's prime minister. In 2010, Yanukovich was elected president in another second round election against Yulia Tymoshenko that observers and academics deemed free and fair. Unfortunately, a new evaluation of both the 2004 and 2010 elections presents a much less encouraging view of Ukrainian politics. As shown in this paper, electoral manipulation was present in both the 2004 and 2010 elections. Additionally, both parties participated in manipulatory behavior in both elections. This finding challenges much of the academic literature to date on Ukrainian politics. In support of this finding of corruption by multiple candidates, a unique list experiment was administered to raion (county) level administrators in Ukraine. These administrators were asked about their views regarding electoral manipulation. The results of this experiment suggest that these administrators are still very influenced by and, arguably, willing to engage in electoral manipulation. The experiment shows that, at least at the raion level, Ukrainian governance has not become more democratic. Overall, the prognosis for democratization efforts in Ukraine is not good. / text

為瞭解地方縣市長選舉期間，候選人所爭相開立之競選支票對於地方經濟的影響，本研究將過去僅以中央政府為研究對象的政治景氣循環理論延伸至地方層級，期能藉此彌補相關文獻僅考量政治層面的不足。而關於政治景氣循環理論自Nordhaus(1970)正式提出至今，較具爭議之實證結果分歧的部分，本研究試圖以「執政者操控經濟之能力」的差異予以解釋。 另一方面，基於地方政府彼此間的競爭性，地方層級之政治景氣循環現象對於地方經濟的影響，應有別於中央層級。本研究遂以此現象對房地產價格之影響為焦點，藉以瞭解當政治景氣循環現象可能因執政者操控能力之有無而不必然出現時，各地方之經濟狀況是否將因此而有所差異。 經由理論模型之探討，以及蒐集台灣地區民國74年至87年各縣市之相關年資料以進行實證分析之後，本研究得到下列結論： 1. 就本研究的實證資料而言，我國地方層級存在政治景氣循環現象；而執政者為達成其連任目的而於選前採取擴張政策時，將同時考量其財政自主程度，顯示執政者之操控能力對於政治景氣循環現象的發生有相當的影響。 2. 地方層級之政治景氣循環現象，將伴隨房地產價格的過度資本化，而使房地產價格有相對上較高的傾向；由台灣地區相關資料所得之實證結果亦是如此。由此，可推論此一現象對於地方經濟發展有相當影響。 3. 由於政治景氣循環現象的存在，使得都市發展程度較高、財政自主程度較高的縣市，其房地產價格偏高的現象，似乎是現今民主政治制度下一種難以避免的趨勢。 4. 地方政府贏得選舉的動機，應是中央政府制訂相關政策目標或策略時所不容忽略的，特別是那些須經由地方政府所執行者，如促進區域均衡、促進城鄉發展之策略等。 此外，基於研究結果與限制，關於如何改善在總體經濟變數、政府支出等方面因政治景氣循環現象所引發之人為波動，乃是未來值得進一步探究之課題。或是突破資料之限制，改以季資料或月資料進行實證分析，應能使研究成果更為清晰。再者，關於中央政府對於地方政府行為的影響，亦可為後續研究方向。 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究方法 4 第三節 研究範圍 5 第四節 研究限制 5 第五節 研究流程 8 第二章 文獻回顧 9 第三章 理論模型 15 第一節 政治景氣循環理論之討論 15 第二節 結合政治景氣循環理論之資本化模型 17 第四章 地方層級政治景氣循環現象探討與實證分析 22 第一節 地方政府操控經濟之誘因與工具 22 第二節 地方政府執政者操控能力之差異 30 第三節 實證分析 36 第四節 小結 49 第五章 地方層級政治景氣循環現象對房地產價格之影響實證分析 51 第一節 各縣市房地產價格概況分析 51 第二節 實證分析 62 第三章 小結 70 第六章 綜合分析與檢討 72 第一節 中央補助款角色之探討 72 第二節 地方層級之政治景氣循環現象與區域均衡發展 74 第三節 實證資料之限制 76 第七章 結論 78 第一節 結論 78 第二節 後續研究方向 80 參考文獻 82 附錄 92 表目錄 表4-1：選民的政黨偏好與改變，1983-1992 23 表4-2：第十屆至第十三屆縣市長選舉當選人名單與得票率 25 表4-3：第十二屆至第十四屆縣市議會之多數黨及該黨籍議員比例 31 表4-4：各縣市之自有財源比例 33 表4-5：各縣市自有財源比例之ANOVA分析結果 35 表4-6：實證資料來源 39 表4-7：選舉循環之虛擬變數設計 40 表4-8：平均每人歲出之選舉循環估計結果 43 表4-9：每年新闢與維護之道路面積之選舉循環估計結果 45 表4-10：地價稅收之選舉循環估計結果 47 表5-1：各縣市房地產報酬率之ANOVA分析結果 57 表5-2：變數定義與資料來源說明 65 表5-3：OLS估計結果 68 表5-4：Parks法估計之結果 69 表a-1：「平均每人歲出」迴歸分析之基本統計量 92 表a-2：「每年新闢與維護之道路面積」迴歸分析之基本統計量 93 表a-3：「地價稅收」迴歸分析之基本統計量 94 表a-4：「房地產報酬率」迴歸分析之基本統計量 95 圖目錄 圖1-1：研究流程圖 8 圖5-1：北部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 52 圖5-2：中部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 53 圖5-3：南部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 54 圖5-4：東部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 55 圖5-5：北部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 58 圖5-6：中部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 59 圖5-7：南部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 60 圖5-8：東部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 61