Many states lack domestic access to crucial energy supplies and must deal with the challenge of formulating an energy security policy that informs their relations with energy producing states. While secure and uninterrupted access to energy is crucial to state security and welfare, some states fail to implement energy security policies and remain dangerously dependent on a foreign supplier. In the post-Soviet region many states even actively resist attempts by the European Union and others to diversify their supplies. Why and under what conditions do states pursue energy security? Conversely, why do some highly dependent states fail to maximize their security vis-à-vis a dominant supplier? I argue that that to understand the complex nature of energy dependence and security it is necessary to look beyond energy markets to domestic political capture and institutional design. More specifically, I argue that initial reform choices guiding transition had long-lasting affects on the ability to make coherent policy choices. States that did not move away from Soviet era property rights empowered actors with an interest in maintaining the status quo of dependence. Others that instituted de facto democratic property rights to guide their energy transitions were able to block energy veto players and move towards a security maximizing diversification policy. I term this the Strong Players, Weak Rules Theory. Although the institutional legacies of the Soviet Union had long-lasting effects on all states in the region, I argued that all states were not doomed to path dependency. Change is possible in both directions: towards and away from the institutional reform that facilitates energy security. To illustrate this logic I first present an original dataset, which facilitates an innovative method of accurately measuring the complex nature of energy dependence in the region. To examine the conditions under which states choose various energy security policies, it is first necessary to understand the extent to which they are dependent on their primary supplier. I argue that current measures of energy dependence are inadequate, and miss out key political and country level variables including provisions in bi-lateral contracts overseeing the provision of natural gas supplies across borders and ownership structures of key downstream infrastructure. I first review the components of an original index of energy dependency and then present my findings both within case over time and comparatively across countries. In Chapter Four I present initial quantitative evidence of a correlation between weak property rights, corruption and energy dependence. Due the magnitude of data collection and methodological issues regarding measurement of institutional development, this chapter is just the first step towards showing a relationship between institutional development and energy outcomes. I first review measures of the dependent and independent variable and then present findings as well as areas for future research. In Chapters Five through Seven I evaluate three cases of energy dependence post-1991: Ukraine, Lithuania and Hungary. Ukraine illustrates a classic case of Strong Players, Weak Rules. Lithuania shows how a state can break from path dependency to pursue energy security, and Hungary demonstrates how a state can regress from a policy of energy diversification to one of dependency. I find that institutional legacies of the Soviet period have long-lasting effects energy security even decades after independence. I further find that globalization has provided new avenues for corruption and reinforced Soviet patterns of elite resource distribution that can hamper a state’s ability to maximize its security. I conclude this study with broader applications and directions for future research and policy implications.

U.S. energy security and the need for greater energy independence is one of the most important issues facing the United States today. Failure to address the U.S.’s energy dependence has undermined foreign policy, increased threats to national security, and created an inflexible hydrocarbon dependent economy. In 2010 the Energy Information Administration reported that U.S petroleum consumption had reached an average of 19.15 million barrels per day.[1] More importantly, 49 percent of daily consumption is imported and this creates an energy dependency that cannot be presently avoided. Dependence on foreign oil imports has resulted in America’s politics, economic vitality, environmental sustainability, and social culture being directly influenced by the countries that control our oil supply. [1] "Petroleum Statistics," Energy Information Administration, Updated July 2011

The economic development, environmental sustainability and energy security stay on the top of government agenda, which guarantee the citizen¡¦s standards of living . EU's indigenous energy production is depleting, and each states has different priorities. The European Union push new European energy policies improving security of energy supply ,which are aiming at reducing the risks being dependent on external supply. Those new european energy policies transform Europe into a highly energy efficiency and low CO2 economy,creating an internal energy market and diversifying energy supplies. The EU¡¦s internal policies include enhancing powers and independence of regulatory authorities at Community level, improving the integrated and flexible energy networks,establishing adequate minimum security of gas supply standards and emergency measures and executing the Action Plan for energy efficiency. The EU¡¦s external policies include enhancing energy partnership and continuing energy dialogue with Russia, Central Asia and Mediterranean area, improving investment and growth, developing common trade,transit and environment rules, building the energy supply chain and diversifying energy supplies. In this thesis the security of EU¡¦s energy supply will be examined by the perspective of neo-functionalism.

Why do countries tax the same fuels at widely different rates, even among similarly situated countries in the global political economy? Given the potentially destabilizing effects of climate change, and the political and economic risks associated with a reliance on geographically concentrated, finite fossil fuels, International Organizations and economists of all political stripes have consistently called for increasing tax rates on fossil-based energy. Despite much enthusiasm among policy experts, however, politicians concerned with distributional consequences, economic performance and competitiveness impacts continue to be wary of raising taxes on carbon-based fuels. In this context, this thesis investigates the political economy of tax rates affecting the price of fossil fuels in advanced capitalist democracies. Through an examination of the political limits of government capacity to implement stricter carbon-energy policy, as well as the identification of the correlates of higher carbon-based energy taxes, it throws new light on the conditions under which carbon-energy tax reform becomes politically possible. Based on recent data collected from the OECD, EEA and IEA, I develop an estimate of the relative size of implicit carbon taxes across OECD member countries on six carbon-based fuels and across the household and industrial sectors. I exploit large cross-national differences in these carbon-energy tax rates in order to identify the correlates of, and constraints on, carbon-energy tax reform. Applying multiple regression analysis to both cross-section and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, this thesis leverages considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate how and why electoral systems matter for energy and environmental tax policy outcomes. In particular, I find considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that systems of proportional representation (PR), in addition to the partisan preferences of the electorate, work together to explain differential rates of carbon-energy taxation. By opening up the ideological space to a broader spectrum of “green” parties, I argue that PR systems create a favourable institutional context within which higher rates of carbon-energy taxation become politically possible. After specifying a key causal mechanism within different types of electoral systems – the seat-vote elasticity – I argue further that, voters in disproportional systems actually have more leverage over politicians, and that an increase in environmental voting can have an impact on rates of carbon energy taxation, even in the absence of PR. While the accession to power of green political parties in PR systems is more likely to lead to higher rates of carbon energy taxation, voting for green parties in highly disproportional systems creates incentives for other parties to adopt “green” policies, leading to a similar outcome. In this way, the effect of green votes and green seats will have the opposite effect on policy according to the type of electoral system in use.

Why do countries tax the same fuels at widely different rates, even among similarly situated countries in the global political economy? Given the potentially destabilizing effects of climate change, and the political and economic risks associated with a reliance on geographically concentrated, finite fossil fuels, International Organizations and economists of all political stripes have consistently called for increasing tax rates on fossil-based energy. Despite much enthusiasm among policy experts, however, politicians concerned with distributional consequences, economic performance and competitiveness impacts continue to be wary of raising taxes on carbon-based fuels. In this context, this thesis investigates the political economy of tax rates affecting the price of fossil fuels in advanced capitalist democracies. Through an examination of the political limits of government capacity to implement stricter carbon-energy policy, as well as the identification of the correlates of higher carbon-based energy taxes, it throws new light on the conditions under which carbon-energy tax reform becomes politically possible. Based on recent data collected from the OECD, EEA and IEA, I develop an estimate of the relative size of implicit carbon taxes across OECD member countries on six carbon-based fuels and across the household and industrial sectors. I exploit large cross-national differences in these carbon-energy tax rates in order to identify the correlates of, and constraints on, carbon-energy tax reform. Applying multiple regression analysis to both cross-section and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, this thesis leverages considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate how and why electoral systems matter for energy and environmental tax policy outcomes. In particular, I find considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that systems of proportional representation (PR), in addition to the partisan preferences of the electorate, work together to explain differential rates of carbon-energy taxation. By opening up the ideological space to a broader spectrum of “green” parties, I argue that PR systems create a favourable institutional context within which higher rates of carbon-energy taxation become politically possible. After specifying a key causal mechanism within different types of electoral systems – the seat-vote elasticity – I argue further that, voters in disproportional systems actually have more leverage over politicians, and that an increase in environmental voting can have an impact on rates of carbon energy taxation, even in the absence of PR. While the accession to power of green political parties in PR systems is more likely to lead to higher rates of carbon energy taxation, voting for green parties in highly disproportional systems creates incentives for other parties to adopt “green” policies, leading to a similar outcome. In this way, the effect of green votes and green seats will have the opposite effect on policy according to the type of electoral system in use.

No / Are oil-rich countries prone to war? And, if so, why? There is a widely held belief that contemporary wars are motivated by the desire of great powers like the United States or Russia to control precious oil resources and to ensure energy security. This book argues that the main reason why oil-rich countries are prone to war is because of the character of their society and economy. Sectarian groups compete for access to oil resources and finance their military adventures through smuggling oil, kidnapping oil executives, or blowing up pipelines. Outside intervention only makes things worse. The use of conventional military force as in Iraq can bring neither stability nor security of supply. This book examines the relationship between oil and war in six different regions: Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Russia. Each country has substantial oil reserves, and has a long history of conflict. The contributors assess what part oil plays in causing, aggravating or mitigating war in each region and how this relation has altered with the changing nature of war. It offers a novel conceptual approach bringing together Kaldor's work on 'new wars' and Karl's work on the petro-state.

The World Energy Outlook (WEO), an annual publication from the International Energy Agency (IEA), is often considered to be the most authoritative source of future energy scenarios for policy decision makers. The demand and supply scenarios for oil, one of the most irreplaceable resources in the global energy system, are central in each report. For the last decade, the outlook for oil supply in 2030 in the main IEA scenario has been reduced by almost 20 million barrels per day. The aim of this study is to examine the revisions to the oil supply scenarios, both at global and individual country level, and note if and how the IEA has motivated these revisions. The accuracy of past WEO scenarios is quantified by track record analysis and the latest WEO scenario is assessed in detail in relation to current scientific literature. Finally, implications of the latest WEO scenario for the long term oil supply are assessed. It is noted that the IEA generally motivate upward revisions to their scenarios, while downward revisions are often left unmentioned. Some recent revisions are attributed to the financial crises of 2008 and the largest revision in absolute terms is the gradual downward revision of OPEC production motivated by an underestimation of key producing countries’ will and ability to expand capacity. The track record analysis indicates that the accuracy of the IEA scenarios has increased on a five year prediction basis following the extended methodology applied in the WEO 2008. The analysis also shows that the accuracy of scenarios decrease with time. On a ten year horizon, the mean absolute error for the IEA aggregate ‘World oil supply” was estimated to 8.2%. The WEO2013 ‘New Policies Scenario’, with a time frame of 2012-2035, was assessed using decline and depletion rate analysis, and compared to empirically proven rates. The scenario was found to provide a realistic but optimistic view of the future of oil supply. An alternative scenario, with depletion rates in line with the fastest observed regional rates, resulted in somewhat lower production rates throughout the scenario time frame. A long term extrapolation to year 2100 of the WEO 2013 scenario, based strictly on resource and production data from the WEO reports, indicated that oil supply will reach a peak in 2035 and then enter decline for the remainder of the century. A sensitivity analysis showed that changes to the assumed resource base only moves the peak by a few years, but has a significant effect on the rate of the following decline.

Shale gas extraction is a technology that is recently arriving in Europe and Germany. The technology brings about a considerable amount of potential environmental threats, but the extraction of shale gas also promises energy security rewards. When the European and German systems for energy and environmental regulation were developed, shale gas extraction did not exist as a technical possibility. Both systems are, hence, not entirely adapted to this technology. This work highlights different ways in which the European and German legislator could act to close existing gaps in their regulatory systems. This could mainly be done by supplementing the existing system with new, shale gas specific regulations. These regulations should be summarized in a new-build shale gas law. The current work tracks the different stages of development of such a new shale gas law, starting from the level of rather abstract constitutional objectives, which translate into clearer defined environmental principles, which in turn translate into a concrete law. Experience from other European states with the legal handling of shale gas extraction teaches that there are essentially two different orientations for such a new-build shale gas law. One is the adoption of a prohibitive moratorium and the other is the implementation of a cautious, but permissive shale gas law. This work`s original contribution to knowledge is the insight that constitutional pre-settings on the interplay of environmental protection with energy security make a cautious, but permissive shale gas law a measure that is legally sounder than a shale gas moratorium. Legally sound, in this context, means complying, to the greatest extent possible, with the applicable constitutional and quasi-constitutional objectives. A shale gas moratorium only serves one purpose, environmental protection, and does not take sufficient account of the energy security objective. A shale gas moratorium only serves one purpose, environmental protection, and does not take sufficient account of the energy security objective. A cautious, but permissive shale gas law, by contrast, possesses the ability to reconcile the competing interests of environmental protection and energy security, which makes it more resilient to judicial review than a moratorium. Having said that, it must be emphasised that shale gas regulation is ultimately a political decision and the legislator is allowed to pick either of the described solutions. This work merely describes which solution is the legally soundest in the sense defined above. To sum up, results from this study will extent what is currently known about the constitutional pre-conditions for the development of shale gas regulation. It highlight that constitutional objectives have a significant impact on the shape of energy regulation.

This thesis examines the observed and anticipated impacts of climate change on energy security. Specifically, by incorporating emergent international legal obligations and regulations governing climate change, this thesis proposes a definitional and policy framework for energy security that can assist in making Nigeria’s energy supply more secure. This, in turn, can serve to improve Nigeria’s capacity to meet current and future climate change obligations. While the principal objective of this thesis is to explore how global climate change risk regulation provides opportunities for the state to improve energy security in Nigeria, this thesis emphasizes that Nigerian law should aim to create a balance between the dual objectives of energy security and climate change responses. Using the theory of legal transplantation, further insights for integrating climate and energy security goals to develop the definitional and policy framework of energy security in Nigeria are gained through an examination of bold initiatives taken by Germany. / October 2016

Much has been written during this century's energy security debate about the external threats the West faces to oil and natural gas supplies. This literature is often prescriptive, offering solutions to address these assumed threats. This research takes a much-needed look inward at the pressures placed on the multi-dimensional relationships within the transatlantic security community. An original contribution to knowledge is made through the exploration of these energy security tensions within the community and how they impact the two energy security prerequisites, availability and affordability. An examination of key oil and natural gas issues in the United States, Europe and the main transatlantic institutions demonstrates that the transatlantic community is very secure and often acts inadvertently to undermine its own energy security condition. Thus, the conventional wisdom that the supply of fossil fuel energy is a leading and high-priority security issue is challenged. Contrary to most literature, the conclusion is reached that energy security is actually not a high-level concern to the transatlantic security community, and that on occasions leading members of the community, who are high energy consumers, choose to put fossil fuel energy supply at risk to pursue political and strategic policies assigned a higher priority. In practice, producer states are found to be much more dependent on uninterrupted energy trade than consumer states, positively contributing to the reliability of oil and natural gas supply. In fact, through highly competitive political engagement with Russia and the Middle East North Africa region, the transatlantic states risk undermining the energy security of the community. Nevertheless, transatlantic energy security tensions have not risen to an actionable level. When placed in the overall context of transatlantic security issues, these energy security tensions do not threaten to divide the transatlantic community in any meaningful way.