Cette thèse propose un modèle théorique capable de rendre compte du passage d'un système international à un système interne. Elle s'appuie sur des études empiriques empruntées à l'histoire de l'intégration européenne. Son modèle est fondé sur deux facteurs principaux : la balance entre offensive et défensive et le degré d'interdépendance entre acteurs. Lorsque l'offensive a l'avantage, les acteurs sont incités à résoudre leurs problèmes d'interdépendance via l'usage de la violence, qui s'avère efficace. Ce n'es que lorsque la défense a l'avantage que l'interdépendance peut conduire à l'intégration. Cependant, cette condition n'est pas suffisante. Lorsque l'interdépendance est faible, les acteurs cherchent à la limiter en vue de préserver leur indépendance. Ce n'est que lorsque la défense a l'avantage et que l'interdépendance est prépondérante et incontournable que l'intégration peut être une solution viable. Ce modèle est utilisé pour expliquer le passage d'une stratégie traditionnelle d'indépendance à une politique de délégation à des institutions supranationales, à travers trois catégories d'acteurs: les gouvernements, les parlementaires et le juges. L'intégration gouvernementale est étudiée à travers les origines de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (1951) et l'échec de la Communauté européenne de défense (1954). L'intégration parlementaire est étudiée à travers les premiers renforcements du Parlement européen en matière budgétaire (1970) et législative (1986). Enfin, l'intégration juridique est étudiée à travers l'évolution des juridictions allemandes et françaises quant à la reconnaissance de la primauté du droit communautaire. / This thesis proposes a theoretical framework able to account for the transition from an international system to a domestic one. It relies on empirical studies from the history of European integration. Its model is based on two principal factors: the offense-defense balance and the degree of interdependence among actor When offense has the advantage, incentives drive the actors to solve their interdependence problems by usin violence because it is quite effective. It is only when defense has the advantage that interdependence can lead to integration. However, that latter condition is not sufficient. When interdependence is weak, actors see to limit it, to preserve their independence. It is only when defense has the advantage and interdependence is overwhelming and unavoidable, that integration becomes a viable solution. This model was applied to explain the transition from a traditional independence-preserving strategy to a delegation-of-powers policy in favor of supranational institutions, by examining three categories of actors: governments, members of parliaments an judges. The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the failure of the European Defense Corn munit y (1954) were used to investigate governmental integration. The first reinforcements of the European Parliament conceming budgetary (1970) and legislative matters (1986) served to study parliamentary integration. lastly, the analysis of judicial integration was explored through the evolution of German and French national courts towards the aeee tance of the su remac of Communit law.

This Research is aimed at becoming a theoretical contribution to the field of European Integration Theory and IR for two reasons. Firstly, this Research proposes the theoretical perspective of Talcott Parsons from sociology and organizational research to scholars within IR Theory. By employing the historical institutionalist and social constructivist IR perspectives and Parsons's 'four-function paradigm' theory, scholars can identify the two effects of a successful institutional design of international political organizations such as the EU: effectiveness and a good public reputation. The Literature Review in Chapter 2 is a theoretical discussion about compatibility of the Parsonians concepts of 'adaptation', a 'holistic approach to policymaking', 'success', and the 'European institutional design' with the European Integration Theory and IR fields. The same Chapter stresses the need to consider the 'ideas' of political leaders in analysing change of institutional design. The second reason for which this Research is a contribution to IR theory is the presentation of eight specific strategies that are likely to generate an organization's success. The eight strategies are institutional conditions making up the 'eight-condition model' of Charles Edquist. This Research adopts an objective and deductive approach that applies the Parsonians theory and the Edquist's 'eight-condition model' to empirical data about European institutions in a cross-sectional and longitudinal research design in the Analysis Chapters 4, 5, and 6. A 'holistic innovation policy approach' to supranational policymaking is employed by the Researcher for the salient circumstances of success to be identified, in order to guide data collection and analysis. The results show that success occurred three times: fully, in the years between 1945 and 1958 and from 1959 to 2002, and partially from 2003 until our days. The concepts of 'adaptation', 'success', 'ideas', the 'four-function paradigm' theory of Parsons and the 'eight-condition model' of Edquist are discussed and ultimately claimed to be both epistemologically compatible and methodologically valid for studies about the success of European integration in the Discussions and Conclusions Chapter.

No abstract available / Political Sciences / M. A. (International Politics)

No abstract available / Political Sciences / M. A. (International Politics)