Studies on Presidential-Executive relations fails to empirically analyze whether or not modern presidential scandal can impact presidential-congressional relations. Meinke and Anderson (2001) find that presidential scandal impacts House of Representatives voting behavior on key votes cited by Congressional Quarterly. A slight revision and replication of Meinke and Anderson's research finds presidential scandal impacts Senate aggregate key votes reported by Congressional Quarterly. In addition, political party plays a more important role than scandal in determining the logged odds of Senate key votes and presidential agreement. / Master of Arts

This dissertation deals with court-executive relations in post-authoritarian Argentina (1983-2006). Specifically, I analyse Supreme Court behaviour in highly sensitive cases to determine whether the tribunal has cooperated with or obstructed the government’s policy preferences in three key policy areas: human rights, economic emergency and pensions. This innovative type of approach – i.e., focusing on a small number of highly sensitive decisions – allows me to concentrate on cases that are genuinely important for the government or, more precisely, for the country’s political administration. There are cases that are significant for the State apparatus but irrelevant for the president (thinking of politicians as self-interested actors). My research uses a rational choice approach to courts, underscoring the strategic nature of judicial behaviour. This vision of judges provides a more accurate account of judicial-executive relations by bringing politics into the study of courts. By focusing exclusively on attitudes and apolitical jurisprudence, other visions take for granted the institutional context. Political stability, for example, cannot be assumed in many developing democracies. My findings indicate that the Argentine Supreme Court has consistently avoided obstructing the president’s policy preferences. Such behaviour is motivated by strategic considerations: judges are risk-averse actors that avoid clashing with the executive. For most of the time, the Supreme Court has operated under unified government, which increases the chances of being punished for anti-government decisions. Two other factors also account for the court’s risk-averse behaviour. First, procedural rules grant the Supreme Court wide discretion over its docket. The tribunal has used such discretion to strategically select the timing of its decisions. Second, recurrent democratic breakdowns have repeatedly led to attacks against the court, such as impeachment, irregular dismissals, and/or enlargements. Third, politicians exert broad control of judicial promotions, allowing them to block the careers of independent, courageous judges that act as a check on political power.

Si la science politique et l’histoire ont su montrer les effets de l’expansion de la bureaucratie sur la présidence et le Congrès en assez grands détails, la vision du pouvoir judiciaire dans sa relation avec l’État américain moderne reste singulièrement appauvrie. Un examen de l’historiographie de l’État et du pouvoir judiciaire montre que la question de l’impact du fait administratif sur le fonctionnement de ce dernier n’a finalement jamais été clairement posée. Cette thèse entend démontrer que les relations entre le judiciaire et l’État fédéral se sont jouées non sur un conflit de principe quand au rôle et à la place de la bureaucratie fédérale dans le schéma constitutionnel américain mais plutôt dans le cadre du processus de reconstruction du judiciaire fédéral initié à la fin du dix- neuvième siècle avec le Evarts Act de 1891. / Even though political scientists and historians have been able to make sense of the impact of bureaucracy on the Congress and the Presidency, the question of the relation of the federal judiciary with the federal state remains largely untouched, as if the constitutional confrontation of 1937 had settled the issue once and for all, with the traditional narrative of judicial restraint and executive triumph firmly in place. This work aims to suggest and explore another avenue for research, by underlining the importance of earlier, turn-of-the-century developments regarding the institutional evolution of the federal judiciary itself and the development of early administrative law. By shifting the focus of attention away from the New Deal crisis, we show that the complicated relation between the federal judiciary and the federal state did not primarily concern the place of administrative power in the constitutional structure, but rather the institutional identity of a federal judiciary which underwent profound changes before the New Deal. In other words, the federal judiciary has a history, and this has to count for something.

本研究以行政院在立法上的影響力為焦點。筆者認為立法委員有動機成就好的立法，在行政部門的資訊優勢下，立法委員會傾向接受行政部門陳述的觀點，並導致行政部門對於立法產生相當突出的影響力。本文先以深入訪談法瞭解與佐證行政部門的資訊優勢確實存在且影響卓越，再以內容分析法分析行政部門的態度對於立法結果的影響。 研究結果發現，行政部門對於立法院的優勢呈現在其對於資訊的壟斷、行政執行經驗及專業程度等優勢上。另外，經驗分析顯示，行政部門的意見確實對於重大法案的結果，具有相當重要的影響，筆者認為，行政部門的立法影響力，已近乎於否決者的角色。換句話說，若一個法案想要順利通過，行政部門的肯認，或至少不表達反對，已成為立法成功的必要條件之一。 最後，過去相關的文獻曾指出一個提案的提案者黨籍、是否為委員會成員及召集委員、有無經過黨團協商等因素，皆與該提案能否順利三讀通過有關。本文的經驗數據也呈現相似的結論。更進一步地，本研究發現，在考量上述因素後，行政部門對於立法的影響依然最為深遠。 / This thesis focuses on the legislative influence of the Executive Yuan. The author believes the legislators are motivated to achieve the high quality of law-making. Because of the informational advantage of the executive branch, the legislators tend to accept the perspective made by the executive branch, which leads to the significant influence in the Legislation. First, this paper uses intensive interviews to find out and justify the existence of the informational advantage of the executive branch and its profound influence on the legislation. Furthermore, by using content analysis, this paper intends to dissect what the attitude of the executive branch has an effect on the legislative outcomes. The result revealed the relative advantage of the executive branch over the Legislative Yuan lies on the informational monopoly, administrative executive experiences and the high-level of professionalization. Additionally, the empirical analysis shows the executive branch does have the significant impact on the outcomes of major bills. In the author’s opinion, the effect of the executive branch has come close to the role of veto players. In other words, the approval of the executive branch, or at least the attitude of non-objection, has become one of the necessary conditions for successful legislation. Finally, relevant literature reviews have pointed out several factors that are associated with whether a bill can pass or not. Those factors include the partisanship, committee member, committee chair and the process of party negotiation, etc. The empirical analysis of this thesis disclosed similar conclusions as other literature reviews. Further, this thesis discovers, by taking the above factors into consideration, the executive branch plays the most significant role in the legislation.

Quid d’un principe constitutionnel concernant l’organisation institutionnelle de l’État, tel que la séparation des pouvoirs, dans la jurisprudence d’une cour internationale des droits de l’homme, telle que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ? S’il serait audacieux de prouver que le juge de Strasbourg applique une certaine théorie de séparation des pouvoirs, il est pourtant pertinent de répondre à la question de savoir si les solutions adoptées par le juge européen des droits de l’homme dessinent une vision cohérente de ce que doivent, selon lui, être les relations entre les pouvoirs. En outre, il ne faut pas faire abstraction du fait que la théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs telle qu’elle est conçue dans l’État libéral contemporain n’implique la consécration que d’un socle minimal de solutions soit acquis. / What of the idea that a constitutional principle concerning the institutional organization of the State, such as the separation of powers, could be found in the jurisprudence of an international court of human rights, namely the European Court of Human Rights ? Even if it were to be audacious to prove that the judges of the Strasbourg Court apply a precise theory of separation of powers, it, nonetheless remains relevant to answer the question whether the solutions adopted by the aforementioned judges outline a coherent vision of what should be, in their view, the relations between the branches of government. Yet, one should always bear in mind that the theory of the separation of powers, as conceived in the contemporary liberal State, implies the consecration of only a minimum nucleus of solutions.