Admati und Hellwig erklärten 2013, dass sie nie eine kohärente Antwort auf die Frage bekommen hätten, warum Banken nicht 20 oder 30 % ihres Assetwertes an EK halten sollten. Dies war Anlass der vorliegenden Studie, die untersucht, wie man eine Quote von 30 % harten Kernkapitals ganz praktisch realisieren könnte. Wir haben fünf Gruppen von Lösungen für das 30 %-Problem gefunden, die man einsetzen könnte. Die fünf Gruppen sind: I. Stammaktien. Aktienkapital einer Aktiengattung. II. Gattungsaktien. Mehrere Gattungen von Aktien. III. Bail-in. Aktienkapital und nachrangige Verbindlichkeiten, die zusammen zu haftendem Eigenkapital im regulatorischen Sinne erklärt werden („Bail-in-Lösung“). IV. Innen-Außenverhältnis. Aktienkapital im Außenverhältnis und Zusatzvereinbarungen der Aktionäre im Innenverhältnis mit Tranchenbildung und Wasserfallprinzip. V. Zweckgesellschaft. Aktienkapital einer Gattung bereitgestellt durch eine Zweckgesellschaft, die sich mit diversen Schuldtiteln nach dem Wasserfallprinzip refinanziert. Persönlich glauben wir, dass bereits Konzept I (Stammaktien) gute Chancen hätte, realisiert werden zu können: 30 % Stammaktien sind zwar auf den ersten Blick ein wenig attraktiver, langweiliger, rendite- und risikoarmer Kapitalblock. Aber in den Core-Portfolien großer Fonds können sie trotzdem einen attraktiven Baustein darstellen – viel attraktiver als die heute oft verwendeten Staatsanleihen sicherer Länder. Mehr Variabilität der Finanzierungsformen wird möglich, wenn der Gesetzgeber vielfältigere Aktienkategorien (Konzept II) erlaubt. Hier glauben wir, dass ein solcher Ansatz zu starr ist und der Entwicklung der Finanzmärkte zu unflexibel folgen kann. Als Konzept III haben wir das vom Gesetzgeber/Regulator derzeit verfolgte Vorgehen, nämlich Bail-in-Instrumente zu nutzen, diskutiert. Dieses Konzept halten wir für weniger geeignet, weil die betroffenen Kapitalgeber Eigenkaptalrisiken tragen, dafür aber kein Stimmrecht bekommen und dazu noch den nicht marktmäßigen Entscheidungen der Aufsichtsorgane ausgesetzt sind. Das Konzept IV erfordert es, zwischen dem Innen- und dem Außenverhältnis der Gruppe der Aktionäre zu unterscheiden. Durch spezielle Regelungen im Innenverhältnis kann man die Vielfalt der Finanzierungsformen stark erhöhen und im Außenverhältnis trotzdem hartes Kernkapital bereitstellen. Und wenn man schließlich zur Finanzierung des Banken-Eigenkapitals mittels Zweckgesellschaft übergeht (Konzept V), kann man sich von allen Restriktionen befreien. / Admati and Hellwig stated in 2013 that they never received a consistent answer why banks should not have 20 or 30 % core or tier one capital of their asset value. This was the motivation to begin an assessment how to realize 30 % core capital in practice. We found five groups of solutions: (i) ordinary shares, (ii) shares of several categories or classes, (iii) bail-in-capital, (iv) shares with different relations among shareholders internally and with the outer world, (v) special purpose vehicle. Financing all equity with ordinary shares (i) seems not be appealing to investors at first sight. It appears to be a large boring block of homogeneous shares. However, we believe that this would be ideal for the core portfolios of large mutual funds. The second alternative would be to define a variety of different classes of shares as they already exist in many countries. In Germany ordinary and preference shares exist. Creating a wider variety of share classes could meet investors’ preferences better. The third alternative would be the bail-in-system which supervisory bodies are trying to install. However, we believe that this solution would be the least favorable of all because investors in bail-in-capital would bear risk like shareholders but would have no voting rights and depend on the actions of supervisors. The fourth solution is based upon ordinary shares. However, subgroups of shares are created by the use of specific arrangements among shareholders internally. Thanks to the application of the waterfall principle, profits and losses can be distributed asymmetrically among shareholders to meet their preferences more closely. The fifth solution is a variant of the fourth. The bank creates a special purpose vehicle which acquires all bank shares and refinances itself with a variety of financial contracts.

This thesis studies interconnections between macroeconomic environment and non-performing loans ratio (NPL) of banking loans provided to households in the Czech Republic in years 2005-2014. This analysis serves as tool for macroprudential policy to detect potential risks before negative consequences occur. The thesis examines mutual relations between households' non-performing loans ratio and variables capturing macroeconomic environment such as GDP growth, unemployment rate, CPI, interest rate and exchange rate. For purposes of this analysis, vector autoregressive approach and vector error correction model are applied. Based on impulse response analysis, most of expected relations are confirmed. Generally, favorable macroeconomic conditions increase payback capacity of households and reduce share of non-performing loans. According to forecast variance decomposition, increase in unemployment rate is the most serious threat for financial stability of the country from the perspective of non-performing rate increase. JEL Classification C32, C52, E21, G21 Keywords Households, indebtedness, financial stability, non-performing loans, Czech Republic, VAR, VECM Author's e-mail h.kroupa@seznam.cz Supervisor's e-mail seidler@email.cz

This thesis studies the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy using a DSGE model with real and financial frictions under government and financial shock scenarios. Countercyclical capital requirements are used as a macroprudential policy tool combined with a Taylor rule for monetary policy. In the case of the government shock, our findings indicate that policies' coordination reduces the volatility of the output vis-à-vis a "monetary policy only" regime. Analysis of financial shocks indicates that monetary policy alone can suffice to ensure financial stability. Lastly, welfare analysis suggests there is no optimal policy combination for all agents and highlights a redistributive effect of both shocks, showing that policy that is beneficial for one group of agents can decrease welfare for another. JEL Classification E44, E52, E61 Keywords monetary policy, macroprudential policy, capital requirements, financial stability Author's e-mail kateryna.kireichenko@gmail.com Supervisor's e-mail martina.jasova@fsv.cuni.cz

This thesis examines the central banking transparency and financial stability communication. The main goal is to find the determinants of the updated Monetary policy transparency index and the index for financial stability trans- parency, which cover 110 countries during the period 2000-2011. We analyse the individual components of transparencies and perform regression models with the set of economic and political variables in order to find drivers of all aspects of transparency. As a basic observation we verified the increasing trend in both types of transparencies during last two decades. We found out that economi- cally well developed countries with flexible exchange rates, quality government and stable political institutions tend to be more open about their monetary policies. Moreover, high degree of monetary policy transparency and the occu- rance of past systemic banking crisis implies higher openness of central banks about financial stability issues. The drivers of Financial stability transparency index components display significant variations, especially variables like rule of law or past financial distress. It is concluded that financial stability trans- parency is still a young field of study and many central banks are still in the developing phase of learning. Keywords central banking,...

L’environnement national et international dans lequel évolue le droit bancaire impose à la banque d’adopter une nouvelle vision de son métier et de ses missions. Lorsque la banque exerce ses activités, des considérations autres que son intérêt privé et la rentabilité de ses affaires doivent désormais être prises en compte. La crise bancaire et financière de l’année 2008 a fortement accéléré les mutations de la matière allant dans ce sens, en faisant peser sur le banquier de nouvelles missions imprégnées de considérations d’ordre moral, social et économique. Ces missions imposent au banquier inéluctablement de renoncer à son attachement aux principes traditionnels du droit bancaire qui ont longtemps guidé son action et constitué, pour lui, les repères généraux dans l’exercice de son métier. À travers un certain nombre d’illustrations, notre thèse tend à mesurer l’impact de ces missions sur les principes traditionnels du droit bancaire. La métamorphose de ces principes se révèle bien avancée. Ainsi, le banquier se trouve dans une position délicate entre ses vieux repères et ses nouvelles missions. La complexité croissante de la matière accentuée par l’inflation des textes et l’absence de vision d’ensemble rendent difficile la recherche de nouveaux principes fondamentaux en la matière. / The national and international environment of the banking law requires the bank to adopt a new vision of its business and its missions. Nowadays, when the bank operates, considerations other than its private interest and the profitability of its business must now be considered. The banking and financial crisis of 2008 has greatly accelerated mutations in this direction, by imposing on the banker new missions related to moral, social and economic. These missions require the banker inevitably to abandon its commitment to the traditional benchmarks in the exercise of his profession. Through a number of illustrations, this thesis tends to measure the impact of these missions on traditional principles of banking law. The metamorphosis of these principles appears well advanced. Thus, the banker is in a delicate position between its old landmarks and its new missions. The increasing complexity of the matte is accented by text material inflation and the lack of overall vision, that makes it difficult to search new fundamental principles.

It is increasingly recognized that banks might not be pricing adequately climate risks in the value of their loans contracts. This represents a barrier to scale up the green investments needed to align the economy to sustainability and to preserve financial stability. To overcome this barrier, climate-aligned policies, such as a revision of the microprudential banking framework (for example a Green Supporting Factor (GSF )), and the introduction of stable green fiscal policies (for example a Carbon Tax (CT )), have been advocated. However, understanding the conditions under which a GSF or a CT could represent an opportunity for scaling up green investments, while preventing trade-offs on risk for financial stability, is still insufficient. We contribute to fill this knowledge gap threefold. First, we analyse the risk transmission channels from climate-aligned policies, a GSF and a CT, to the credit market and the real economy via loans contracts. Second, we assess the reinforcing feedbacks leading to cascading macro-financial shocks. Third, we consider how banks could react to the policies, i.e., their climate sentiments. In this regard, we embed for the first- time banks climate sentiments, modelled as a non-linear adaptive forecasting function into a Stock-Flow Consistent model that represents agents and sectors of the real economy and the credit market as a network of interconnected balance sheets. Our results suggest that the GSF is not sufficient to effectively scale up green investments via a change in lending conditions to green firms. In contrast, the CT could shift the bank's loans and the green/brown firms' investments towards the green sector. Nevertheless, it could imply short-term negative transition effects on GDP growth and financial stability, according to how the policy is implemented. Finally, our results show that bank's anticipation of a climate-aligned policy, through stronger climate sentiments, could smooth the risk for financial stability and foster green investments. Thus, our results contribute to understand the conditions for the onset and the mitigation of climate-related financial risks and opportunities. / Series: Ecological Economic Papers

A tese tem como propósito conectar os objetivos de eficiência da indústria bancária, resiliência financeira e estabilidade macroeconômica em um arcabouço integrado e multidimensional, para entender como as fricções financeiras geram trade-offs e como políticas de intervenção do Estado, baseadas em cada uma das dimensões, interagem com os demais conceitos. É desenvolvido um modelo DSGE de escala média que descreve explicitamente o setor bancário e inclui fricções no escopo da firma e da indústria bancária em adição às rigidezes tradicionais dessa classe de modelos. Os objetivos são interpretados a partir de relações endógenas do modelo. Exercícios de comparação de estado estacionário e simulação dinâmica estocástica de ajustamento a choque contracionista de política monetária são utilizados para entender a interação conceitual. Os resultados mostram que as fricções financeiras implicam pass-through imperfeito da política monetária porque o ajustamento dentro da estrutura do passivo bancário é diferente, implicando novas condições de resiliência financeira e induzindo ganhos de eficiência tecnológica. As intervenções do Estado analisadas são as barreiras à entrada, os recolhimentos compulsórios de reservas e os requerimentos de capital. Cada política baseada em um conceito específico de intervenção modifica de maneira particular o comportamento ótimo dos bancos, com efeitos sobre os conceitos adjacentes. As consequências da pesquisa estão relacionadas à formatação de políticas coordenadas e eficazes de intervenção e indicam uma nova fronteira de estudo de políticas ótimas no escopo da Economia Bancária. / The purpose of this dissertation is to connect three banking-related concepts which are banking efficiency, financial resilience, and macroeconomic stability in a single integrated framework. It tries to understand how financial frictions settle trade-offs, whose nature and importance are investigated, and how institutional single-concept-based policies could generate untoward effects. A canonical medium-scale DSGE model is constructed featuring several banking frictions in addition to traditional real and nominal rigidities embodied in macro-models. Concepts are measured and interpreted in terms of endogenous metrics. Steady state comparisons and dynamic simulations for tighten monetary policy are performed. Results show that the concepts considered have very interesting linkages in the banking sector. Financial frictions induce an imperfect pass-through of monetary policy weather adjustments of deposits and bank capital are quite different. Changings in bank allocations and prices lead to new financial resilience conditions and efficiency gains. Institutional interventions such as barriers to entry, compulsory deposit rules and capital requirements, could impose very particular changes in bank\'s choices whose effects would spill over all the concepts. Findings lead to important issues for policy makers regarding the effectiveness and absent coordination of interventions for banking sector. Furthermore, results address a new research area of optimal policy in a multidimensional perspective.

Esta dissertação revê as metodologias de teste de estresse em sistemas financeiros e descreve uma análise de cenário e um teste de estresse aplicado ao Brasil. Os cenários macroeconômicos são modelados por vetores auto-regressivos e o teste de estresse por um probit ordenado com efeitos aleatórios. Dados para o Brasil no período de 11/2002 a 11/2007 são usados para estimar os cenários macroeconômicos. A experiência brasileira de 2002 e início de 2003 parecem particularmente interessante para um teste de estresse por incluir uma grande volatilidade de mercado com taxas de inadimplência e perdas bancárias acima da média. A introdução de cenários macroeconômicos no teste de estresse do sistema financeiro brasileiro e o uso de regressões de dados categorizados com dados em painel são a principal contribuição deste trabalho. O modelo pode ser estendido para usar dados para um setor industrial especifico para identificar potenciais riscos de concentração de empréstimos. / This dissertation reviews financial system stress-testing methodologies and describes a scenario analysis and macro stress testing applied to Brazil. The macroeconomic scenarios are modeled by a vector autoregressive and the stress testing by a random effects ordered probit panel. Data for Brazil over the time period from 11/2002 to 11/2007 is used to estimate the macroeconomic scenarios. The Brazilian experience in 2002 and early 2003 appears particularly suited for macro stress-testing as it includes a great market volatility with significantly higher than average default rates and banks\' losses. Introducing macroeconomic scenarios in Brazilian financial system stress-testing and using categorical regression with panel data are the main contributions of the dissertation. The model can be extended to use industrial specific sector data to stress in order to identify potential risks of loans\' concentration.

Thesis advisor: Pierluigi Balduzzi / Thesis advisor: Jonathan Reuter / In the first essay of this dissertation, I study the impact of fund redemptions and resulting sell-offs on corporate bond yields. To control for unobserved changes in fundamentals, I study within-issuer variation of yield changes, resulting from differential exposure to redemptions and sell-offs. In contrast to previous findings for equity funds, I find no evidence indicating that bond funds destabilize the corporate bond market by moving prices beyond fundamental values. I attribute this finding to bond fund management. Although I find that investors demonstrate a bank-run like behavior, which is a potential source of destabilization, bond fund managers hold a significant level of liquid assets, allowing them to manage redemptions without excessively liquidating corporate bonds. Second essay of this dissertation looks at corporate bond Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) which are a new form of financial innovation. Since these investment vehicles are relatively new, little is known about their risks. In this paper, we study an event in the summer 2013, knows as the Taper Tantrum, when bond ETFs and mutual funds experienced massive unexpected outflows due to speculations about interest rate hikes. We find that ETF outflows during the Taper Tantrum lead to a significant increase in exposed corporate bond yields. The increase in yields lasts for seven months, which indicates a temporary fire sale effect. In contrast, we find no fire sale effect resulting from mutual fund outflows. We attribute this contrasting finding between the two vehicles to differences in portfolio construction and investor sensitivities. Finally, we study arbitrage opportunities, created by ETF shares mispricing, and their impact on bond yields. Third essay of this dissertation is about liquidity in the corporate bond market. In market distress, corporate bond investors tend to sell liquid assets and hold onto illiquid ones, a phenomenon which we call flight to illiquidity. We study the impact of flight to illiquidity on corporate bond prices/yields in cross-section as well as corporate bond returns in time-series. First, we show that liquidity price premium disappears in market distress, meaning that liquid bonds are not more expensive than illiquid bonds in distress times. Second, we show that illiquiduity return premium which exists during normal times, not only does not change sign or disappears, but also widens in market distress. In other words, liquid bonds deliver a lower return both on average and during market distress. This pattern is limited to investment grade corporate bonds. Our findings suggest that keeping the credit risk fixed, liquid bonds do not provide safety during the time it is needed the most. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

Thesis advisor: Susanto Basu / The goal of this dissertation is to shed some light on three separate aspects of the financial system that can lead to greater instability in the banking sector and greater macroeconomic volatility. The starting point of the Great Recession was the collapse of the banking sector in late 2007; in the subsequent months, liquidity evaporated in many markets for short term funding. The process of creating liquidity carried out by the banking system involves the transformation of long term illiquid assets into short term liquid liabilities. This engine functions properly as long as cash lenders continue to roll over short term funding to banks; whenever these lenders fear that banks will not be able to pay back these obligations, they immediately stop funding banks' short term liabilities. This makes banks unable to repay maturing short term debt, which leads to large spikes in default risk. This is often referred to as a modern bank run. Virtually all the theories of bank runs suggest that the severity of a run depends on how well lenders can coordinate their beliefs: whenever a lender expects many others to run, he becomes more likely to run as well. In a joint work with Emanuele Brancati, the first chapter of my dissertation, we empirically document the role of coordination in explaining bank runs and default risk. We establish two new results. First, when information is more precise and agents can better coordinate their actions, a change in market expectations has a larger impact on default risk; this implies that more precise information increases the vulnerability or instability of the banking system. This result has a clear policy implication: if policymakers want to stabilize the banking system they should promote opacity instead of transparency, especially during periods of financial turmoil. Second, we show that when a bank is expected to perform poorly, lower dispersion of beliefs actually increases default risk; this result is in contrast with standard theories in finance and can be rationalized by thinking about the impact that more precise information has on the ability of creditors to coordinate on a bank run. Another aspect of the banking system that is creating a lot of instability in Europe is the so called "disastrous banks-sovereign nexus": many banks in troubled countries owned a disproportionately large amount of domestic sovereign bonds; therefore, in case of a default of the sovereign country, the whole domestic banking sector would incur insurmountable losses. This behavior is puzzling because these banks in troubled countries would greatly benefit from having a more diversified asset portfolio, but instead decide to load up with domestic sovereign debt only. In a joint work with Filippo De Marco, the second chapter of my dissertation, we show that banks receive political pressures from their respective governments to load up on domestic sovereigns. First, we show that banks with a larger fraction of politicians as shareholders display greater home bias. More importantly, we exploit the fact that low-performing banks received liquidity injections by their domestic governments to show that, among those banks, only the "political banks" drastically increased their home bias upon receiving government help. Furthermore, it appears that the extent of political pressure on banks is much stronger on those "political banks" belonging to troubled countries. These findings suggest that troubled countries that would need to pay a high premium to issue new debt force their "political banks" to purchase part of the debt issuance. This greater risk-synchronization can create a dangerous loop of higher sovereign default risk leading to insolvency of the domestic banking system, which in turn would require a bail-out from the local government, further exacerbating the sovereign de- fault risk. Finally, the third chapter of my dissertation, a joint work with Susanto Basu, investigates the sources of excess consumption volatility in emerging markets. It is a well documented fact that, in emerging markets, consumption is more volatile than output whereas the opposite is true in developed economies. We propose an explanation for this phenomenon that relies on a specific form of financial markets incompleteness: we assume that households would always want to front-load consumption and they can borrow from abroad up to a fraction of the value of posted collateral. With the value of collateral being procyclical, households are able to increase borrowing during an expansion and ultimately consume more than they produce; this mechanism is then able to generate a ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility grater than one. Most importantly, the model delivers the implication that a better ability to borrow vis-a-vis the same value of collateral generates greater relative consumption volatility. We then bring this model's implication to the data and find empirical support for it. We proxy the ability to borrow with various measures of effectiveness of lending regulation and more standard indicators of financial development. Consistent with the model's implication, more lending friendly regulation leads to greater relative consumption volatility in emerging markets; moreover, this link breaks down among developed countries. In addition, among emerging countries, it appears that deeper domestic capital markets have a destabilizing effect in terms of greater relative consumption volatility while a more developed domestic banking system does not exerts any such detrimental effect. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.