This thesis analyses UMNO factionalism from the perspective of the elite’s manipulation of the various modes of nationalisms. This thesis argues that UMNO factionalism, which is seemingly a power struggle between competing UMNO elites, has been significantly shaped by contesting nationalist ideologies that reflect the unresolved questions of national identity in Malaysia. These two issues, that is, nationalism and UMNO factionalism, have shaped Malaysian politics in significant ways. UMNO factionalism has been related to such major political events as the 1969 ethnic riots, the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the UMNO split in 1987 and the Reformasi (Reform) movement in 1998. Frequently, the impact of these disputes extended beyond UMNO politics and affected wider Malaysian politics. At the same time, due to unresolved questions of national identity, nationalism has occupied a central position in Malaysian political discourse. There are ambiguities regarding the relationships among the various ethnic identities and national identity and between the individual and the larger Malaysian community that enable elites to construct and manipulate nationalist ideologies. In this thesis, the conflicting nationalisms are captured by five different concepts of nationalism – ethnocultural, civic and multicultural nationalisms in one group and collectivist-authoritarian and individualistic-libertarian nationalisms in another. The Malaysian Prime Ministers have constructed nationalist ideology to define the Malaysian nation in their attempts to resolve the unresolved problems of national identity. The challengers’ arguments, to mobilise the community, mirror the community’s (negative) responses to the Malaysian Prime Ministers’ nationalist visions. In addition, the ideological arguments in the disputes extend the dispute beyond the elites, involving the community as well. Furthermore, because of the ideological conflicts, these factional disputes affect the direction of government policies in significant ways. This study shows that UMNO factional disputes have followed this pattern of ideological conflicts, although the exact contents may vary. The 1969 factional dispute was a clash between Tunku Abdul Rahman’s shift towards multicultural nationalism and its challengers’ ethnocultural nationalism. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s nationalist vision moved away from ethnocultural nationalism in pursuit of national integration. The challengers, reflecting the Malay community’s response to the Prime Minister’s vision, took a strong ethnocultural Malay nationalist stance. The successful mobilisation of the Malay community by ethnocultural Malay nationalists contributed to the policy shift towards ethnocultural nationalism in the 1970s. In the 1987 dispute, Mahathir’s economic policy, which moved away from ethnocultural nationalism, was challenged by Razaleigh’s ethnocultural nationalist argument. After the dispute, Mahathir could only mobilise the community by tactically employing the rhetoric of ethnocultural Malay nationalism. In the 1990s, Mahathir’s attempt to define the national identity of Malaysia by constructing a civic Malaysian nation, Bangsa Malaysia, relieved the tension surrounding the ambiguous national identity of Malaysia. It was facilitated by rapid economic growth that ameliorated ethnic contests over limited economic resources. However, the collectivist-authoritarian aspect of Mahathir’s nationalism raised another nationalist question concerning the subordination of individual liberty and rights to the collective community’s will and interests – a nationalism that justified his authoritarian rule. There was tension between an increasingly confident civic Malaysian society and Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian control of the society. The 1998 UMNO dispute was a clash between Mahathir’s collectivist-authoritarian nationalism and Anwar Ibrahim’s individualistic-libertarian nationalism. The latter attempted to mobilise Malaysian society with his nationalist position (the Reformasi movement) which was expressed in the demand for liberal political reform. After the dispute, Mahathir was able to regain lost political ground through the politics of fear. It seems, however, that the fundamental question remains unresolved. This unresolved tension between the demand for individual liberty and rights and authoritarian control by state elites is likely to shape the ideological arguments in future UMNO factional disputes.

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Throughout Chinese history the dominant political philosophy has been that of the ¡§rule of men¡¨. This tradition has an indirect influence on scholars researching the problems of the CCP¡¦s political succession, as they often emphasize Chinese political culture, ¡¥guanxi¡¦ and faction theory, in which they analyze the patters of factional struggles and factional development through the perspective of a conflict. However, Susan Shrik tries to explain that the struggle for power involves other factors such as a person¡¦s departmental distribution of interests. Andrew Nathan discusses the development of factions from a systemic point of view. The group of scholars that focus on the latter perspective seem to be breaking away from the ¡¥social¡¦ aspect of political science, making it difficult to define the motivations of actors within different factions in humanistic terms. In this paper we decided to analyze the problems of political succession within the CCP not only through traditional theoretic patters but also incorporating ¡¥social capitol theory¡¦ as well. In this way we can better analyze how factions and their members build and manage their ¡¥guanxi¡¦ during the process of political succession. Through the analysis of the social context, institutions, and norms involved in factionalism and political succession we can better understand how factions and their members pursue power and legitimacy through the building of social capital in the political succession process. Thus, this paper seeks to use social capital theory to create a clear idea of the role of factions and their members within the CCP during the political succession process.

The African state has received numerous analyses in academic literature. The vast majority of these studies focus on the essence of the state rather than how it is experienced and lived by its citizens and therefore sacrifice empirical knowledge of state function in favour of abstract conceptualisation. Much academic literature, especially the neopatrimonial approach dominant in political science, examines African states through the prism of Weberian logic and suggests that, because states do not conform to a rational-legal ideal, they must therefore be deficient. These analyses also frequently downplay the impact of colonial rule and postcolonial state formation and politics on the character of contemporary African states, instead stressing the continuities between pre-colonial and modern patterns of rule. This thesis eschews a normative understanding of the state in favour of an approach grounded in everyday action through analysis of the workings of the Nigerian higher education sector. I argue that this sector is a microcosm of broader state-society relations. The thesis draws on primary data collected through ethnographic methods to analyse how providers and users of a university in south-eastern Nigeria negotiate their passage into, and through, a highly complex and flexible institution. The thesis argues that, among both students and staff, achieving success in Nigerian higher education is dependent on a combination of merit, personal connections and money. The importance of these three elements suggests a system in which norms rooted in bureaucracy (merit), patron-clientism (personal connections) and financial corruption (money) intersect. My empirical research suggests that characterisations of African states as wholly captured by society and functioning as little more than vehicles for particularistic advancement, both central elements of much neopatrimonial state literature, are therefore inaccurate. The thesis also places the Nigerian state in historical context, arguing that, while some patterns of pre-colonial behaviour remain important in contemporary Nigeria, they have been fundamentally altered by colonialism and its aftermath. This thesis offers an important corrective to the rather abstract and normative ideas that underpin the theory of the African neopatrimonial state. It argues that a better understanding of the state requires a stronger focus on the routine and real experiences of service providers and users and their daily interactions.

The purpose of this study is to depict and analyze the foreign policy perspectives of political factions in Iran. The focus will be on the goals of the factions while the mechanics of the factional contention will be discussed only to the extent that it is related to this issue. The argument will be that the views of the factions with regards to foreign policy of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) are determined by the needs of the domestic agenda of each faction namely its economic and cultural policies. To develop the thesis, firstly the concept of factionalism will be reviewed within the context of Iranian politics. Secondly, the foreign policy perspectives of the factions in the first two and a half decades of the Islamic Republic will be outlined. Next, an account of the most recent factional positions regarding the foreign policy will be provided. To conclude, an analysis will be made to demonstrate the main arguments of the thesis.

This thesis analyses the emergence of Cuba as a sovereign nation, and the political corruption that plagued the republic. It investigates in detail, not only the independence movement that established this republic in its various wars against the Spanish empire, and its fracture and fission under the emerging power of the United States, but also the impact that this had on Cuban politics, and the consequences for Cuba’s native would-be rulers. The aim is to develop an understanding of what became of the veterans of the wars of liberation, and further the somewhat neglected subject of the relationship of the official Veterans’ organisations with the political parties and associations of the republican period. A short conclusion summarises the arguments and suggests further avenues of research.

The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the greatest threats to world peace and has generateda scholarly debate concerning what underlying factors drive nuclear proliferation.Iran had for many years been accused of trying to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons programwhich has been a source of great concernon the world stage.The aim of thispaper is to understand Iran ́s decision to sign the JCPOA and thereby refraining from building nuclear weapons.Three non-proliferation models;the security model, the domestic model and the norms modelwill be used to analyze Iran ́s decision and to test theirrespectiveexplanatory power. The findings of this paper show thatseveral factors contributed to Iran ́s decision to sign the JCPOA. First, economic sanctionscontributed to a strong publicopposition to the regimes nuclear policies. Second, a negative image of the nuclear program in the eyes of the population further amplified public opposition.These two factors put pressure on the regime to find a solution to the nuclear issuebecause they saw this public opposition as a threat to their survival.Third, anincreased influence ofanti-nuclear factionsin Iran ́s political systemput increased pressure on the Supreme Leader to find a solution to the nuclear issue. Fourth, the regimes perception that a nuclear weapon would decreaseIran ́s security which reduced the incentives to proliferate. All these factors put together created the circumstances for Iran to sign the JCPOA and chose the path of nuclear restraint. These findings support the assumptions of the domestic-and norm model while putting the importance of the security model in question.Iran ́s continued nuclear restraint relies on increasing theeconomic and politicalcostsof pursuing a nuclear weapon whiledecreasingthesecurity incentivesof having one.

This paper examines contemporary American politics through the lens of The Federalist Papers, focusing on two specific issues: factionalism as addressed in Federalist Papers 9-10 and taxation, the subject of Federalist Papers 30-36.

What explains the resilience of formerly nationally dominant parties at the subnational level? This dissertation demonstrates that factionalism is key. When intra-party factions are united, subnational dominant parties retain power even under adverse electoral conditions. By contrast, divisions and conflicts among internal groups lead these parties to lose even in favorable electoral contexts. I test these claims using a variety of quantitative and qualitative evidence from Mexico, focusing on the electoral performance of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in contemporary gubernatorial elections. Democratization potentially undermines unity in dominant parties because it provides politicians with viable exit options (i.e., joining the opposition) and because authoritarian central party committees no longer control subnational politics. Yet, I argue that factions can cooperate under democracy when they were more autonomous from the center during the authoritarian period. The negotiation skills acquired in the past help them "get along" in the absence of an external enforcer. By contrast, previously subordinated factions never acquired such skills and quickly became antagonistic to each other under democracy. As I show, collaboration had positive electoral consequences in subnational elections whereas antagonism had pernicious ones. / text

While political parties in Europe are incredibly adaptable organizations, they have varied in the extent to which they are able to adapt to social and political transformations. I explain parties' adaptability in two steps. 1) Adaptability depends on factionalism in a nonlinear way. Giving too much room and no room at all to factions undermines a party's ability to adapt. 2) Factionalism depends on early organizational characteristics. The more centralized the initially introduced leadership selection process is, the more party elites will be incentivized to form factions. This argument applies to political parties that allow for internal competition and elect their leaders according to formal rules. I use statistical tools, a medium- and small-N analysis and systematic process tracing to test my framework against competing explanations. I focus on Christian democracy to use a most-similar system design. The main empirical part of the thesis relies on a structured focused comparison of the Italian DC, Austrian ÖVP and German CDU. It is guided by a nested analysis and builds on a large amount of primary data which has not been analyzed before. I test my theory on the additional cases of the Portuguese, Dutch and Luxembourgian Christian Democrats and the French MRP. My main finding is that early organizational choices matter. The initial form the leadership selection process takes has a decisive impact on the incentives of intra-party actors to form factions. The initial level of factionalism becomes deeply entrenched in the party's organization and internal code of practice. This explains why party elites are unlikely to change it when they realize that their party's level of factionalism undermines its adaptability. Moving beyond the focus of path dependence on a single level has thus important implications for the literature on party politics, factionalism, party organizations and institutional development.