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The Renaissance Florentine Captain of the People began as a court, which defended the common people or popolo from the magnates and tried crimes such as assault, murder and fraud. This study reveals how factionalism, economic stress and the rise of citizen magistrate courts eroded the jurisdiction and ended the Court of the Captain. The creation of the Captain in 1250 occurred during the external fight for dominance between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope and the struggle between the Guelfs and Ghibellines within the city of Florence. The rise of the Ciompi in 1379, worried the Florentine aristocracy who believed the Ciompi was a threat to their power and they created the Otto di Guardia, a citizen magistrate court. This court began as a way to manage gaps in jurisdiction not covered by the Captain and his fellow rectors. However, by 1433 the Otto eroded the power of the Captain and his fellow rectors. Historians have argued that the Roman law jurists in this period became the tool for the aristocracy but in fact, the citizen magistrate courts acted as a source of power for the aristocracy. In the 1430s, the Albizzi and Medici fought for power. The Albizzi utilized a government mandate, which had the case already carried out or a bullectini to exile Medici adherents. However, by 1433, the Medici triumphed and Cosimo de Medici returned to the city of Florence. He expanded the power of the Otto in order to utilize the bullectini to exile his enemies. The expansion of jurisdiction of the Otto further eroded the power of the Captain. Factionalism, economic stress and the rise of the citizen magistrate courts eroded the power of the Captain of the people.

Au travers de cette thèse, nous nous sommes attachés à comprendre la politique gouvernementale menée par Richelieu vis-à-vis des parlements méridionaux (Toulouse, Bordeaux et Aix), ainsi que ses conséquences jusqu’aux guerres civiles de la Fronde. De 1624 – date de l’accès du premier cardinal ministre au Conseil de Louis XIII – à 1654 – date de rétablissement d’un parlement à Bordeaux après la Fronde –, ces années cardinales furent celles du choix de la guerre contre la monarchie espagnole. Elles furent aussi marquées par la constitution d’une alliance politique au sommet de l’État entre Richelieu et le prince de Condé. Une alliance robuste qui laissa la place à un système polycratique instable durant les années de la régence d’Anne d’Autriche, organisé autour du triumvirat Condé, Mazarin, Orléans. Ce double contexte, militaire et politique, eut d’importants échos dans les provinces méridionales et leurs parlements. Cependant, nous n’avons pas limité notre champ d’investigation au seul point de vue gouvernemental. Nous avons veillé à reconstruire les dynamiques politiques provinciales afin de comprendre au mieux les prises de position au sein des parlements. Pour cela, nous avons mis les factions et le factionnalisme au cœur de notre analyse en tentant de produire une véritable « histoire-cabales » des parlements méridionaux durant les années cardinales. Nous avons défini les factions parlementaires comme des coalitions temporaires, nébuleuses de magistrats ou de familles de magistrats, dont on pouvait distinguer un noyau dur d’adhérents fortement impliqués dans les confrontations et des marges plus ou moins actives en fonction des enjeux et des recompositions d’alliances. Leurs interactions et leurs affrontements caractérisaient le factionnalisme. Notre étude a donc porté dans une première partie sur le cadre de la vie politique provinciale. Nous y avons reconstitué le microcosme politique dans lequel évoluaient les magistrats et dans lequel se formaient leurs factions. Une attention particulière a ainsi été portée à reconstruire les tensions institutionnelles, les différents réseaux, ainsi que le contexte politique des années cardinales à la cour comme en province. Dans une seconde partie, la politique de Richelieu vis-à-vis des parlements méridionaux a été analysée. Trois séquences politiques ont été ainsi reconstruites avec minutie afin de faire apparaître comment le cardinal et ses hommes exploitaient les conflictualités locales à leur profit, y attisant le factionnalisme. Enfin, dans une dernière partie, l’ébranlement du système Richelieu et les conséquences de ce phénomène dans les guerres civiles de la Fronde ont été analysés au travers du prisme des factions. Ce travail vise ainsi à mettre les factions et le factionnalisme au cœur de l’analyse de la politique parlementaire sous l’Ancien Régime. / Through this thesis, we endeavoured to understand Richelieu's government policy towards the southern parliaments (Toulouse, Bordeaux and Aix), as well as its consequences until the civil wars of the Fronde. From 1624 – date of the first cardinal minister's access to the Council of Louis XIII – to 1654 – date of re-establishment of a parliament in Bordeaux after the Fronde – these cardinal years were those of the choice of war against the Spanish monarchy. They were also marked by the constitution of a political alliance at the summit of the State between Richelieu and the Prince de Condé. A robust alliance that gave way to an unstable polycratic system during the years of the regency of Anne of Austria, organized around the triumvirate Condé, Mazarin, Orléans. This dual context, military and political, had important echoes in the southern provinces and their parliaments. However, we have not limited our scope of investigation solely to the government's point of view. We have been working to rebuild provincial political dynamics in order to better understand the positions taken by parliaments. To this end, we have put factions and factionalism at the heart of our analysis by attempting to produce a genuine "cabal story" of the southern parliaments during the cardinal years. We have defined parliamentary factions as temporary coalitions, nebulas of magistrates or families of magistrates, of which we could distinguish a hard core of members strongly involved in confrontations and margins more or less active according to the stakes and recompositions of alliances. Their interactions and confrontations characterized factionalism. Our study therefore focused in a first part on the framework of provincial political life. We have reconstituted the political microcosm in which the magistrates evolved and in which their factions were formed. Particular attention has been paid to reconstructing the institutional tensions, the different networks and the political context of the cardinal years at court and in the provinces. In a second part, Richelieu's policy towards southern parliaments was analyzed. Three political sequences were thus carefully reconstructed in order to show how the cardinal and his men exploited local conflicts for their benefit, fuelling factionalism. Finally, in a final section, the shock of the Richelieu system and the consequences of this phenomenon in the civil wars of the Fronde were analyzed through the prism of the factions. This work aims to put factions and factionalism at the heart of the analysis of parliamentary policy under the Old Regime France.

Zambia is one of only three countries in southern Africa which has experienced two alternations, but there has been little institutional reform since independence. A time-based comparison of Zambia’s constitution, legislation and institutions from 1991 to 2015 is conducted because the ‘moving picture’ reveals continuities which tend to be overlooked by a ‘snapshot’ analysis. New incumbents are reluctant to relinquish the increasing returns derived from executive dominance and weak oversight institutions such as the national assembly and judiciary. Therefore, institutional weaknesses from Zambia’s one-party state have infiltrated the multi-party era, where they continue to blur the separation of powers. Factionalism stemming from ethnic polarisation, which emerged in the colonial era, undermines all ruling parties in Zambia. The study finds that succession contests, triggered by term limits or the deaths of sitting presidents, are the primary mechanism which repeatedly weakens dominant parties. The outcomes of such intra-party conflicts have far-reaching consequences for the political party system by giving rise to new parties, re-orientating ethnic and political alliances, and contributing to turnover in elections. However, the dissertation reveals that both the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Patriotic Front governments in Zambia reneged on the reforms which they promised while in opposition and opted to maintain the constitutional clauses, repressive legislation and patronage system which they inherited. An extensive analysis of the 35 by-elections which occurred after the 2011 turnover ascertains that there was pervasive co-option of opposition members into the Patriotic Front, leading back to the dominant path. Therefore, the dissertation concludes that one-party dominance in Zambia is path dependent. Consequently, it is an alternation fallacy to expect the ousting of a dominant party to stimulate democratisation. Democracy advocates will need to confront the challenge of providing incentives that will persuade incumbents to undertake reforms which diminish executive dominance and strengthen the independence of oversight institutions.

Text in English / This thesis explores the representation of political conflict in the Zimbabwean press with a specific focus on the The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily News and The Standard. The thesis sought to unpack the representation of political conflict in the four selected newspapers and to compare and contrast state-owned and privately-owned press representation of power, succession struggles and factionalism in ZANU PF and opposition MDC. The theory is undergirded by the framing theory and data was analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis. The thesis contends that the representation of political conflict in Zimbabwe was sensational and polarized. With clearly separate agendas, the government controlled press, The Herald and The Sunday Mail; and the privately owned Daily News and The Standard, have drawn upon different framing practices to represent political conflict in Zimbabwe. By selecting to report on a particular issue and silencing another, through choice of certain headlines, and vocabulary employed, they have produced a construction of events in political parties that satisfy their political agendas in an increasingly polarized political environment. The newspapers became associated with diverging political opinions, showing political parties they support. On the one hand, the state-funded media represented ZANU PF in positive light while the opposition, particularly the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was represented negatively, mainly depicting the party as harbouring a regime change agenda. On the other hand, the privately-owned press was critical of the ruling party, ZANU PF and blamed the party for economic problems, corruption, mis-rule, and abuse of human rights. As a result of this partisan representation of political reality by the two press camps, they became directly implicated in the conflicts thereby ceasing to be credible sources of information. This clearly illustrates the enormity of challenges faced by the press in political conflicts in politically polarised environments such as Zimbabwe. The thesis argues that when reporting political conflicts ideological considerations of the press take precedents at the expense of the informational and educational mandate of the press as ethics and professional interests of the press are pushed to the back stage. Contrary to the view that the press is a neutral and impersonal purveyor of information, it is an active participant in the framing of political conflicts and its framing is ideological. The study has broadened the body of knowledge on the framing of political conflicts in polarised political environments. / Communication Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Communication Science)

本文是以新制度研究方法，來分析台灣派系政治的穩定與變遷。本文的論點是我們在(1)台灣的地方派系政治互動，存在著交易成本。(2)制度因素控制交易成本，進而影響威權時期與民主轉型期的派系政治互動的研究目標前提下，藉由補助金制度運作為例，來理解台灣派系政治的變化。因此我們將全文的探討，建立在下列的假設上：”威權時期的台灣地方派系政治，之所以能維持穩定的運作而成為國民黨有效的統治形式，補助金制度能降低交易成本是主要原因之一。而在民主轉型期間，派系政治所發生的變遷，也是因為補助金制度無法再有效控制交易成本所導致的結果。” 而在對於上述假設的探討上，我們首先發現在整體地方財政結構上的嚴重失衡，使得地方財政必須強烈依恃於中央的補助支持。但是由於補助金制度缺乏有效的監督機制，導致主事者可以藉由制度上的缺失，來進行自身政治目的的運作。 因此在威權時期，補助金制度之所以能控制交易成本，維持派系政治穩定運作主要是由於： (1)補助制度能有效的弱化地方政府的能力、藉由政策的滲透達到監督地方的效果，並且能有效的介入選舉運作。因此降低民選精英向國民黨挑戰的風險成本，而使得雙方的互動呈現低交易成本的穩定合作關係。 (2)由於補助金制度能提供地方政治精英一個穩定的資源汲取管道，使得其底下樁腳系統的向心力可以穩定的維持下去。另一方面，補助計畫必須透過層級申請的特性，也為政治精英帶來低成本的監督環境，使得其能有效的防止樁腳跑票行為。導致雙方在低交易成本的互動下，維持穩定合作關係。 (3)但地方派系與選民之間的互動，則是因為選民缺乏監督誘因以及集體行動的協調成本太高，使得雙方呈現出一種高交易成本的關係。然而由於補助金制度的運作下，派系的政治精英往往可以藉由補助計畫申請的方式，來規避對選民的政治承諾，並將地方建設的功勞予以個人化。使地方政治精英能在規避對選民的政治責任時，卻又同時還能獲得選民的高度認同，而維持一種穩定的選民動員能力。 然而在民主轉型期，補助金制度之所以無法控制交易成本，導致派系政治發生變化的主要原因是在於： (1)國民黨需要地方政治精英對中央政權的支持，但本身卻喪失藉由補助款來進行監督的功能，導致雙方呈現出一種高交易成本的互動模式。 (2)由於補助款制度所存在的制度機制以及反對黨對於地方執政權的競爭日益激烈，導致樁腳因為補助管道日益多元化，使得樁腳維持自主性的成本下降。但卻因此弱化了地方政治精英對樁腳進行監督的能力。這使得雙方的合作關係呈現出一種不穩定的高交易成本狀態。 (3)最後在選民與地方派系的互動上，由於反對黨藉由福利政策來直接訴諸選民，使得選民在存有比較利益機會的誘因下，願意耗費成本來對政治人物的承諾進行監督。在縣級行政首長選舉上，選民因為監督誘因的增加以及反對黨出現所帶來訊息成本的降低，對派系領領袖的互動就呈現低交易成本模式。但是在基層小單位選舉上，由於區域樁腳仍然具有多元的申請管道，來利用申請補助計畫的方式來經營選區，導致選民仍缺乏監督的誘因，而繼續維持雙方高交易成本的互動方式。而且由於這種方式容易規避政治責任，並且將政績予以個人化，因此樁腳仍然維持高度的選民動員能力。 由於民主轉型期間，補助金制度無法再維持一個低交易成本環境。使得派系政治中的相關行動者過去穩定的合作關係發生變化。這種改變受害最深的，莫過於想維繫政權生存的國民黨。高交易成本，使得身為委託者的國民黨無法再控制地方派系對政權支持的政治承諾。因此國民黨會憑仗著執政優勢，藉由國家政策工具來降低交易成本，以便維持派系政治的穩定運作。諸如凍省、統籌分配款收回中央等政策，都可以視為在這種情境下所作的考量。但相對的，當民進黨執政，為了維持民進黨縣市首長與選民之間低交易成本的有利競爭環境，也會藉由國家政策的主導，來弱化派系政治的發展。諸如鄉鎮市長官派的宣示、收回小型工程補助款的決議等，都是在自我利益考量下，所得出的結果。因此派系政治在轉變後，未來可能的發展，就在台灣兩大政治勢力自我利益考量的前提中，成為政策腳力的拉鋸戰。然而在可預見四年的民進黨執政日子裡，民進黨在考量自身利益下，應該會朝向弱化派系政治的政策來發展。 最後在政策建議上，基於弱化派系政治的政策立場進行考量。則在長程目標上，就是要提高地方財源自主性，包括中央與地方財源的重新劃分、考慮開放地方在一定程度上的租稅立法權等措施，來落實地方自治、強化責任政治以實現充分政黨競爭的理想。而在短期的制度修正上，則應該恢復補助金制度維持社會公平正義的補助精神，藉由降低計畫型補助與中央部會補助款，以及建立公開透明的補助審核制度等技術性手段，來降低補助制度中，人為政治因素干擾的誘因。

This thesis is a work of Christian theology. Its purpose is twofold: firstly to develop an adequate understanding of reconciliation at the level of peoples and nations; and secondly to make a practical contribution to resolving the problems in Australia for the welfare of all the peoples, and of the land itself. The history of the relationships between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia has left many problems, and no matter what the non-Indigenous people try to do, the Indigenous peoples of Australia continue to experience themselves as being in a state of siege. Trying to understand what is happening, and what can be done to resolve the problems for the peoples of Australia and the land, have been the implicit drivers for the theological development in this thesis. This thesis argues that the present generation in any trans-generational dispute is likely to continue to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past, which explains why Indigenous peoples in Australia find themselves in a stage of siege, even when the non-Indigenous peoples are trying to pursue policies which they believe are for the welfare of all. The only way to resolve this is for the peoples of Australia to seek reconciliation. In particular, the non-Indigenous peoples need to repent, both of their own sins, and the sins of their forebears. Reconciliation processes have become part of the international political landscape. However, there are real concerns about the justice of pursuing reconciliation. An important part of the theological development of this thesis is therefore to show that pursuing reconciliation establishes justice. It is shown that the nature of justice, and of repentance, can only be established by pursuing reconciliation. Reconciliation is possible because God has made it possible, and is working in the world to bring reconciliation. Because land is an essential part of Indigenous identity in Australia, the history of land in court cases and legislation in Australia over the past half century forms an important case study in this work. It is shown that, although there was significant repentance within the non-Indigenous legal system in Australia, the degree of repentance available through that legal system is inherently limited, and so a more radical approach is needed in order to seek reconciliation in Australia. A final chapter considers what the non-Indigenous people of Australia need to do in order to repent.

This thesis delineates the transformation of Iran’s so-called post-revolutionary ‘religious intellectuals’ (rowshanfekran-e dini) from ideological legitimators within the political class of the newly-established theocratic-populist regime to internal critics whose revised vision for the politico-religious order coalesced and converged with the growing disillusionment and frustration of the ‘Islamic left’, a constellation of political forces within the governing elite of the Islamic Republic, that following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini increasingly felt itself marginalised and on the outskirts of power. The historical evolution of this complex, quasi-institutionalised and routinized network, encompassing theologians, jurists, political strategists and journalists, which rose to prominence in the course of the 1990s, and its critical engagement with the ruling political theology of the ‘guardianship of the jurist’, the supremacy of Islamic jurisprudence, political Islamism and all forms of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘utopian’ political and social transformation, are scrutinised in detail. In this vein, the thesis examines the various issues provoked by the rowshanfekran-e dini’s strategic deployment and translation of the concepts and ideas of a number of Western thinkers, several of which played a pivotal role in the assault on the ideological foundations of Soviet-style communism in the 1950s and 1960s. It then moves to show how this network of intellectuals and politicos following the election of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency in May 1997 sought to disseminate their ideas at the popular level by means of the press and numerous party and political periodicals, and thereby achieve ideological and political hegemony. The thesis proceeds to demonstrate the intimate connection between the project of ‘religious intellectualism’ and elite-defined notions of ‘democracy’, ‘electoral participation’, ‘reform’ and ‘political development’ as part of an effort to accumulate symbolic capital and assert their intellectual and moral leadership of the polity.

This sociological study explores the past and current higher education (HE) experience of educationalists at Gaza’s universities and how this experience may be evolving in the shifting socio-political context in the Arab World. The thesis is motivated by three questions: 1. What are the perspectives of academic staff in the Faculties of Education at Gaza’s universities on their own past HE experiences? 2. What are the perspectives of students and their lecturers (academic staff) in the Faculties of Education at Gaza’s universities on students’ current HE experiences? 3. How do educationalists in the Faculties of Education at Gaza’s universities perceive the shifting socio-political context in the Arab World, and what current or future impact do they think it will have on the education context at Gaza’s universities? To examine these questions, I conducted an inductive qualitative study. Using 36 in-depth, semi- structured interviews which lasted between (90-300 min), I collected data from educationalists (15 academic staff; 21 students) at two of Gaza’s universities. Due to difficulties of access to the Gaza Strip, the participants were interviewed via Skype from Cambridge. Informed by the literature review, and triangulated with other research activities, such as reviewing participants’ CVs, browsing universities websites, and keeping a reflective journal, a thematic analysis was conducted on the interview data. Theoretically, although this study has benefited from conceptual insights, such as those found in Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed and in Pierre Bourdieu’s work on symbolic violence, it is a micro-level study, which is mainly data driven. The findings of this research show that in the past, educationalists were relatively more passive in terms of shaping their HE experiences, despite efforts to become resilient. In the present, students and their lecturers continue to face challenges that impact negatively on their participation and everyday life at Gaza’s universities. However, how the HE experience will evolve out of this context in the future is uncertain. The Arab Spring revolutions have had an influence on Gaza HE institutions’ campuses as they have triggered more awareness of students’ grievances and discontent. Because of some political and educational barriers, however, students’ voices are a cacophony; they remain split between “compliance” and resistance (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471; Swartz, 2013, p. 39). Previously, Sara Roy (1995) rightly indicated a structure of “de-development” in the Gaza Strip (p.110). The findings from this research show that the impact of occupation and of the changes in the Arab World on the educational context in Gaza are more complex than previously thought. There is a simultaneous process of construction and destruction that is both external and internal to educationalists and which undermines academic work at Gaza’s universities. Based on this, the study concludes by explaining six implications of this complex structure for academic practice at Gaza’s universities, offering nine policy recommendations for HE reform, and highlighting six areas for future research.