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Detta arbete handlar om digital aktivism och uppfattningen om detta ur unga användares perspektiv. Studien diskuterar utvecklingen av aktivism i en digitaliserad värld och hur ungdomar, som anses var en stor grupp inom digitala medier, reagerar på detta fenomen. Syftet med denna undersökning är att skapa förståelse kring begreppet samt vad som påverkar ungas deltagande. Politisk kommunikation, sociala medier och digital teknologi är några nyckelbegrepp som har en viktig roll för syftet med denna studie. För att få bättre förståelse för ämnet och dess bakgrund har jag utgått från relevanta tidigare studier och teorier.I denna undersökning har jag använt mig av en kvalitativ forskningsmetod där jag har genomfört fyra olika kvalitativa intervjuer med fyra ungdomar i åldern 17–20 år, vilka representerar studiens målgrupp. I analysen har jag utgått från insamlad data och mina teoretiska ramverk för att tolka materialet. Sammanfattningsvis konstateras att digital aktivism är ett verktyg som används för att sprida kunskap och nå ut till en större publik. Samtidigt har undersökningen sammanställt tre olika faktorer som påverkar deltagandet. Resultaten av de genomföra intervjuar visar att sociala medier som politisk arena, den digitala gemenskapen och kommunikation anses vara orsaker som kan påverkar deltagandet i aktivistiska rörelser. / This study aims to construct and gain a better understanding of digital activism and how young social media users react to this phenomenon. The purpose of this study is to create a realization of what influences young people's participation indigital movements. Political communication, social media and digital technology are some keywords that have an essential role in the purpose of this study.

The aim of this project is to introduce and criticize the phenomenological theories of health and ill-health as they are described in Fredrik Svenaeus´PhD thesis The hermeneutics of medicine and the phenomenology of health: steps towards a philosophy of medical practices. Svenaeus was born in 1966 and is an associate professor in the Department for health and society at Linköping University. This criticism is twofold:Firstly Svenaeus tries to give a detailed phenomenological description of what it is like to suffer from illness. I will attempt to argue that the actual relationship between the patient and the world is also crucial in a phenomenological description of illness. Secondly I will attempt to criticize Svenaeus´generalization that illness can only be seen as an obstruction, not for the viewpoint that health is imperceptible and illness is perceptible. I will try to argue that illness is a way of life, a way which reveals to us that we are living towards death.

The purpose of the text is to get closer to what death means to the one who dies, concerning non-human animals that we kill for food. The leading theory of the meaning of death is the so-called deprivation account, which says that an individual's death is bad (or good) for the individual insofar as it deprives him/her of the good life (or bad life) they would otherwise have had. However, the deprivation account implies that it is worse to die as a fetus than as a 20-year-old, which the author thinks is unintuitive and not in line with most people’s view. Christopher Belshaw's theory "Desire to live" and Jeff McMahan's theory "Time-relative interest account" (TRIA) states that the death of the 20-year old is worse, and presentation and discussion of these theories is the main focus of the essay. "Desire to live," states that in addition to deprivation of well-being, an individual needs to have categorical desires, desires that give reasons for continuing to live, for death to be bad for the dying person. TRIA says that in addition to deprivation of well-being, an individual needs to be psychologically connected to oneself at those times when the good he/she is deprived would have happened if he/she had not died. The author argues that both theories provide good evidence as to why the respective requirements for the badness of death are reasonable, but that TRIA is the better one since it is easier to apply to empirical research. Furthermore, TRIA is reasonable in itself, and gives the answer that the death of non-human animals can be bad in a way that matter to themselves. However, this is often not the case in practice because of their situation where they are deprived of more poor life than good life.

Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att svara på frågeställningen om djur som kor och grisar kan skadas av en förtida död. Som utgångspunkt används the Deprivation View, en teori som säger att en förtida död skadar individen eftersom den blir berövad på framtida positiva upplevelser och njutningar. The Deprivation View har kritiserats på flera olika sätt, och i den här uppsatsen kommer fyra olika argument tas upp: argument som säger att teorin inte är en tillräcklig förklaring för att säga att någon skadas, eller argument som säger att djur inte uppfyller villkor som behövs för att de ska kunna skadas enligt teorin. Dessa argument är: djur har inget intresse för eller önskan om ett fortsatt liv; djur har inget koncept om döden; the Time-Relative Interest Account och att djur inte skadas eftersom de endast upplever lägre njutningar. Dessa argument presenteras och utvärderas. Min slutsats är att djur kan skadas av en förtida död, och att dessa argument inte på ett tillfredsställande sätt lyckas med att motbevisa det. The Deprivation View är en rimlig teori som förklarar varför såväl människor som djur kan skadas av en förtida död. / The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question whether animals like cows and pigs can be hurt by a premature death. The Deprivation View is used as a starting point, a theory which states that a premature death harms the individual because he is deprived of future positive experiences and pleasures. The Deprivation View has been criticized in different ways, and in this thesis four arguments will be analyzed: argument which suggests that the theory isn’t a sufficient explanation, or argument which suggests that animals don’t meet the conditions needed to be able to get harmed according to the theory. These arguments are: animals have no interest in future life and no desire to live; animals lack a concept of death; the Time-Relative Interest Account and that animals don’t get harmed because they only have the capacity for lower pleasures. These arguments are presented and evaluated. My conclusion is that animals can get harmed by a premature death, and that these argument are not able to rebut it. The Deprivation View is a reasonable theory that can explain why humans as well as animals can be harmed by a premature death.

<p>Höst termin 2021</p>

Some fictions deliberately omit all fictional statements about the mental functioning of fictional agents. This presents an interpretive dilemma, as when we read fiction we ought to reconstruct the fictional minds of characters significant to the plot. Fictions that present the reader with an opaque fictional mind resist the general imaginative project prescribed by fiction-making and seem to demand a novel approach to imagining their fictional entities. Such fictional entities demand the reader commit to one of at least two different ways of imagining nothing about a fictional mind, without explicitly authorizing either. One approach has already been described by H. Porter Abbott. Another can be extracted from Simone De Beauvoir, whose ethics of ambiguity is well suited to dealing with fictional entities about which nothing is fixed nor determined.

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In Sweden today, the forestry industry is criticized by environmental activist networks and organizations for using clear-cutting to harvest forests, which causes great harm to biodiverse-rich forests. Although youth voices are less represented in environmental politics, they find ways to affect these through their engagement in social movements. While current research focuses on global environmental movements, there is a lack of in-depth studies about environmental youth movements on a local scale. This study aims to understand youths’ motivations and experiences in protecting forests from deforestation within a Swedish environmental organization. Moreover, this study looks closely at youths’ strategies, what opportunities and obstacles they face, and how their engagement affects them. For this qualitative study, eight individual semi-structured interviews, combined with a participant observation, were conducted. The data was analyzed by using thematic analysis, where six themes were constructed. My results show that the organization is not solely focused on activism or opposition. Rather it provides them with companionship, fun, and learning – combined with activism, which helps them cope with eco-anxieties. Instead of taking the fight for climate justice to the streets, they inventory forests, use civil disobedience, educate, and inspire others to become engaged. In conclusion, the fact that this is a youth organization provides a community that empowers and encourages youth to feel included and express their environmental agency.

Abstract. Consistent valuation and societal prioritization of risks presupposes comparability among risks, that is, in order to rank risks in order of severity, and allocate risk preventative resources accordingly, we must be able to determine whether one risk is better or worse than another, and by how much. It is often claimed, however, that some risks are not amenable to this kind of comparison because they are incommensurable, which roughly means that they are not comparable with respect to a common cardinal measure (e.g. money). The aim of this thesis is to i) consider what it means to say that two risks are incommensurable, ii) explore if incomparability - comparison failure with respect to a common ordinal scale - ever occurs, and how to model it if it does. Essay I is a critical examination of the most prominent argument for incomparability, the so-called small improvement argument (SIA). It is argued that the argument fails because it conflates incomparability and a kind of evaluative indeterminacy. Essay II outlines so-called margin of error principles for comparative value judgements. They are based on the idea that if a proposition concerning the value relation between two value-bearing options is true, but there are sufficiently similar cases in which it is false, it is not available to be known. The usefulness of these principles is demonstrated by utilizing them in an epistemological case against SIA. Essay III presents a novel account of incomplete preference orderings which acknowledges that incomparability can vary in degrees. This is achieved by means of a probabilistic analysis of preferences. / QC 20101112