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This is a study concerning Hegel’s critic of Rousseau’s common will and shows how Hegel’s concept of freedom should be understood from this criticism. This is done first of all through a study of Rousseau’s social contract and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The different state theories which Rousseau and Hegel represent, are evaluated separately, first Rousseau’s then Hegel’s to see how Hegel’s philosophy is a continuation of Rousseau’s philosophy. The most important concepts of this essay are Rousseau’s ”moral freedom” and Hegel’s concept of the ethical system. / Detta är en studie om Hegels kritik av Rousseaus allmänvilja och visar hur Hegels frihetsbegrepp ska förstås utifrån denna kritik. Detta görs först och främst genom en studie av Rousseaus verk samhällsfördraget och Hegels verk Rättsfilosofin. De olika statsteorierna som Rousseau och Hegel representerar behandlas var och en för sig, först Rousseaus sedan Hegels för att se hur Hegel bygger vidare sin filosofi utifrån Rousseau. Huvudbegrepp i uppsatsen är moralisk frihet eller moralitet och sedlighet.

This dissertation explores the notion of objective chance as reasonable degree of belief given what might loosely be called our ultimate evidence. The goal is to develop a notion of objective chance that is broadly Humean: where chance ascriptions are construed as projected, De Dicto, physical modalities. It builds, in large part, on the work of David Lewis on objective chance and the metaphysics of indeterminism. It is argued that Lewis and the sciences take objective chance to measure the degree to which a proposition/sentence is physically determined true. These measures of determinacy are analysed in the Lewisian manner as a special kind of credence, an analysis justified by Lewis’ Principal Principle. This analysis faces several problems: the Principal Principle may not be generally applicable due to vicious circularities, chances so conceived may be incompatible with Humean supervenience, and the analysis itself may be uninformative. This dissertation addresses each of these concerns in turn. It proposes a novel trivial chance solution to the first problem and then extends this to solve the second problem, often referred to as the Bug. The aim of this text with respect to the Bug is not to provide a novel cure, but to increase our understanding of the Bug and why the standard medicine is the best on offer. Toward the end of the dissertation the informativity of the analysis is increased by an in depth study of the analysans. This study culminates in moving from Lewis’ objectified credences to credence conditional on an indexical as the analysans for objective chance.

Diss. Lund : University, 2004.

Diss. Åbo : Åbo Akademi, 2004.

Diss. Göteborg : University, 2003.

Diss. Stockholm : Kungliga tekniska högskolan, 2006.

In ethics, a highly relevant and divisive topic is that of consent. Many moral dilemmas and ethical forks in the road turn on the question of consent. But how do we differentiate between the consensual and the non-consensual? There is no simple answer to this question and philosophers are quite divided, as they tend to be. Some believe that consent is a mental state whereas others maintain that it is a behavioral expression of some kind. There are others still who argue that consent is some combination of mental states and communication. In this paper, I shall defend the view that consent is a mental state and that it does not depend on any type of behavior. My central thesis is that only this view accounts for the ethical importance of consent in a liberal moral framework where consent matters due to its connection to our intrinsic right to personal autonomy. Additionally, views that make consent dependent on behavior have counterintuitive, and sometimes morally unacceptable, consequences for what is and isn’t consensual. I argue that only the view that I defend can account for the moral significance that consent should have. / I etik är samtycke ett väldigt relevant och delande samtalsämne. Många moraliska dilemman och etiska vägkorsningar hänger på frågan om samtycke. Men hur skiljer vi mellan vad som är samtycke och vad som inte är det? Det finns inget enkelt svar på den frågan och filosofer är ganska oense, som de brukar vara. Vissa tror att samtycke är ett mentalt tillstånd medans andra hävdar att det är någonting vi uttrycker via vårt beteende på något sätt. Det finns andra som påstår att samtycke är någon slags kombination av mentala tillstånd och kommunikation. I den här uppsatsen ska jag försvara synsättet att samtycke är ett mentalt tillstånd och att det inte är beroende av något slags beteende. Min centrala tes är att enbart detta synsätt tar hänsyn till den etiska vikten som samtycke har i ett liberalt moraliskt ramverk där samtycke är viktigt på grund av dess koppling till vår intrinsikala rätt till personlig autonomi. Vidare har synsätt som gör samtycke beroende av beteende kontraintuitiva, och ibland moraliskt oacceptabla, konsekvenser för vad som samtycke är och inte är. Jag argumenterar att enbart synsättet som jag försvarar betraktar den moraliska betydelsen som samtycke bör ha.

The concept of moral standing applies to those who are of a direct moral concern, i.e. we have a reason to directly include those with a moral standing in our moral deliberation- they matter for themselves. How one accounts for the concept in question is controversial and thus there are several different accounts that one can consult when pondering what content the concept ought to have. This paper investigates the plausibility of some of the most influential accounts of moral standing, concluding that they, as they stand alone, are insufficient. Instead an alternative account of moral standing with a kantian foundation is offered, an account which is heavily based on Christine Korsgaard’s notion of final goods, with moral standing understood as a comparative concept as its distinguishing component.

Panpsychist and panprotopsychist views have become more prominent during the past years, greatlydue to Philip Goff, Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, William Seager and others. Panpsychism isthe view that fundamental entitites have phenomenal properties while panprotopsychism is the viewthat fundamental entities have the potential to realise consciousness under certain conditions, invirtue of their protophenomenal properties. My focus will be, particularly, on constitutive versionsof panpsychism, which entail the commitment to the constitutive grounding of ordinary subjects ofexperience in more fundamental phenomenal entities. More specifically, I will evaluate whethersolutions to its ”combination problems”, which theorise the combination or decombination offundamental entities, can be solutions of the problem of experience. Constitutive panpsychismattempts to avoid the emergence of consciousness altogether by postulating fundamental subjects,so that ordinary subjects should be explained exhaustively in terms of them. Emergentistpanpsychism, by contrast, is a form of intelligible, or non-brute, emergentism which considersordinary subjects to be something more than mere structure. However, I will argue that evenconstitutivism involves a type of emergence, compositional or individualizing emergence, whichmakes it collapse into emergentism. That also takes away its ability to solve the problem ofexperience through a combination problem. Furthermore, the problem of other minds puts epistemiclimitations on our abilities to solve combination problems, which makes it improbable, even ifconstitutivism could avoid subject emergence, that it would be possible to reach an objectivesolution to the problem of ordinary subjects of experience through combination. Also physicalism isa form of emergentism but involves the commitment of the brute emergence of phenomenalproperties from non-mental fundamental entitites. I will show that it too gains an emergenceproblem as a consequence of a small conceptual shift that causes its collapse intopanprotopsychism. By recognising that there are common emergence problems, if not aboutphenomenal properties in general then about ordinary subjects, physicalists and pan(proto)psychistscan continue consciousness research as a collected force. I will also be presenting versions ofemergentist panpsychism to exemplify views that already expect emergence problems andformulate questions for future research.