The 2008 financial crisis revealed systemic weaknesses in the global financial architecture, gave rise to the most severe economic collapse since the Great Depression and engendered a fundamental shift in the prevailing consensus on financial governance. It reminded us of the fragility of the international financial system and the politically unacceptable costs to society when it fails. This dissertation adds to the literature on the governance of private and public sector financial institutions. It presents a conceptual framework of linkage between the governance of financial institutions, systemic risk and financial crises. It is based on a review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the influence of financial regulation and governance on the stability of the international financial system. The dissertation examines the application of financial governance in three different contexts: (i) the introduction of a common regulatory framework for the European securities industry, known as MIFID; (ii) the introduction of a risk governance framework at a US federal agency, the US Export-Import Bank, and (iii) the introduction of performance metrics among Export Credit Agencies that operate within a common governance framework known as the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. In addition, the dissertation provides specific policy recommendations designed to enhance the portfolio risk management practices of the US Export Import Bank. By extension, these recommendations are relevant to a wider audience of federal agencies with similar portfolio credit risks and may help inform the design of a robust risk management framework that is critical to the government's ability to manage its burgeoning credit portfolio. / Ph. D.

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This dissertation focuses on the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and consists of a historical overview of TARP and three empirical studies of the CPP. In the first empirical analysis, presented in chapter 2, I use an event study approach to examine the impact of firm announcements of CPP approval on their stock price. I find that the average firm in my sample enjoyed a 1.31% abnormal return on their stock price in the trading days surrounding this news event. In a multivariate regression that examines cross-firm variation in abnormal returns, I find evidence that legislative action in February 2009 to increase the restrictions on executive compensation at CPP-funded firms may have played an important role in dulling market enthusiasm for a firm qualifying for CPP capital. In chapter 3, I propose a model of TARP funding with numerous financial, structure, economic and regulatory explanatory variables to determine which factors were most influential in directing CPP capital to specific firms in the banking system. I find a clear pattern that CPP capital flowed most prominently to both larger, systematically important firms and firms that, while not on the verge of failure, were experiencing greater financial stress. In chapter 4, I study whether CPP funding altered bank behavior. Modifying established models from the economic literature on bank lending, loss recognition and CEO pay, I investigate whether CPP recipients behaved differently than non-recipient firms in lending activities, acknowledging portfolio losses or altering CEO compensation. Controlling for firm condition, I find that CPP recipients were significantly less likely to lend, but significantly more likely to acknowledge losses and curb CEO pay. Collectively, these results suggest that the government's decision to inject capital into the banking system primarily led to greater transparency about the health of recipient financial institutions. / Economics

No / This paper investigates the dynamics of R&D and capital investment using a large sample of US firms during the period 2002–2016. A partial adjustment approach is employed with a specific focus on the impact of the financial crisis on target adjustment speed. Evidence suggests that firms have a target in both types of investment and adjust to it at varying speeds. Specifically, firms adjusted to the capital investment target faster than to R&D investment. However, firms increased the adjustment speed in R&D investment significantly during the crisis, and it has remained at similar levels during the post-crisis period. The changes in adjustment speeds can be explained by several firm-specific characteristics that are related to the ability of firms to raise internal finance.

Yes / This paper investigates whether shareholder value is affected by non-compliance with the prescriptions of a principle-based ‘comply or explain’ sys-tem of corporate governance in the context of the global financial crisis of2007–2009. Using System Generalized Method of Moments estimates to controlfor different types of endogeneity, the main findings of this paper suggest thatnon-compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code adversely affectsshareholder value. Furthermore, ex-post estimates reveal that compliance withcertain corporate governance mechanisms is more beneficial than others. Withregard to this, compliance with provisions related to board independence ismore important than complying with performance-related pay requirements ofthe code. These findings have implications for policy makers and financialinstitutions regarding the usefulness of compliance with a prescribed code ofcorporate governance, specifically during periods of financial distress.

The recent financial crisis has raised serious questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance (CG) in monitoring management and protecting investors’ interests. There is concern that ‘poor’ CG was, to a certain extent, a major cause of the current financial crisis. This thesis, therefore, investigates the crucial policy question of whether the quality of CG has any effect on financial performance, information asymmetry and on block shareholders’ investment decisions. This is achieved and presented in the form of three essays on CG practices in UK with a particular focus on the periods before and during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The first essay aims to investigate the impact of firm-level CG on block shareholders’ investment decisions for a large sample of UK non-financial firms over the period 2005 to 2009. Using a panel data analysis, the results revealed the importance of CG for block shareholders’ investment decisions. Furthermore, the study results indicated that only institutional block shareholders consider CG to be important criteria for their investment decisions. Moreover, when the effect of CG on block shareholdings in both periods before and during crisis was examined, a significant difference in results appeared: an insignificant positive relationship in the pre-crisis period turned out to be significant during crisis. The result thus indicates that block shareholders viewed CG as particularly important during the crisis period. The second essay aims to examine the effect of CG on firm performance before and during the financial crisis. It also investigates the mediating effect of agency costs on the association between CG and firm performance. The results revealed that CG affects firm performance only in the period before the crisis, but no significant effect was found during the crisis period. Moreover, agency cost was proved to fully mediate the relationship between CG and performance in the pre-crisis period. The results point to an important issue, which is the need to re-evaluate CG not only in stable periods but also during turbulent times, and to evaluate its ability to perform effectively in such different conditions. The third essay investigates the effect of both CG and block ownership on information asymmetry. Further, the effects of CG in lessening the positive association between block ownership and information asymmetry is considered. The results revealed that CG affects information asymmetry only in the pre-crisis. In addition, block ownership was shown to have a significant and positive effect on information asymmetry during crisis periods suggesting that block shareholders benefit from their information advantage during crisis period which in turn worsens the information asymmetry problem. This suggests that block shareholders engage more in their private benefits rather than in efficient monitoring. The results also proved that CG is insignificant during turbulent period in lessening the negative effect of block ownership.

This study follows a three–pronged approach to investigate the effects of the global financial crisis on the South African retail credit market (using Woolworths as subject). These three prongs, or areas, include a literature study, step–by–step credit scoring guide and an application of this guide in an empirical study. To achieve this goal, credit scoring was selected as the quantitative tool to illustrate these effects. Two different periods were chosen to supply a snapshot of the retail credit industry, namely the retail credit situation before and during the global financial crisis. To correctly define and understand the mechanics affecting South Africa's retail credit industry, a literature review was conducted to investigate the global financial crisis, the South African retail credit market and credit scoring itself. The literature investigation explains the global financial crisis and identifies some of the primary drivers behind it. These drivers included the US housing bubble, the introduction of subprime loans and the securitisation of these loans (mortgage backed securities). The study found that these drivers, especially the securitisation of subprime loans, were the vehicle used to enable the crisis to spread globally. The ultimate goal of the study was to provide the individual, and companies, with an understanding of the global financial crisis' effects on the consumer specifically through their credit worthiness and retail credit behaviour. Through the use of credit scoring, the study found that at least one retailer (Woolworths) in the retail industry was affected. Woolworths placed a stronger emphasis on reducing their credit exposure whilst consumers were steadily increasing their facility utilisation. / Thesis (M.Com. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

This study follows a three–pronged approach to investigate the effects of the global financial crisis on the South African retail credit market (using Woolworths as subject). These three prongs, or areas, include a literature study, step–by–step credit scoring guide and an application of this guide in an empirical study. To achieve this goal, credit scoring was selected as the quantitative tool to illustrate these effects. Two different periods were chosen to supply a snapshot of the retail credit industry, namely the retail credit situation before and during the global financial crisis. To correctly define and understand the mechanics affecting South Africa's retail credit industry, a literature review was conducted to investigate the global financial crisis, the South African retail credit market and credit scoring itself. The literature investigation explains the global financial crisis and identifies some of the primary drivers behind it. These drivers included the US housing bubble, the introduction of subprime loans and the securitisation of these loans (mortgage backed securities). The study found that these drivers, especially the securitisation of subprime loans, were the vehicle used to enable the crisis to spread globally. The ultimate goal of the study was to provide the individual, and companies, with an understanding of the global financial crisis' effects on the consumer specifically through their credit worthiness and retail credit behaviour. Through the use of credit scoring, the study found that at least one retailer (Woolworths) in the retail industry was affected. Woolworths placed a stronger emphasis on reducing their credit exposure whilst consumers were steadily increasing their facility utilisation. / Thesis (M.Com. (Risk management))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012.

Recent increases in stock repurchases among U.S. corporations coupled with a historically low cost of debt since the Global Financial Crisis has created media speculation that firms in recent years are paying for their expanding share buyback programs with debt. Repurchasing stock by increasing leverage, instead of using internal funds, implies that managers may speculate on current low interest rate environments at the expense of shareholders. Recent studies find that stock repurchases are associated with reductions in future firm employment and investments such as capital expenditures and research and development expenses. This study expands on prior studies by evaluating how debt-financed stock repurchases affect firm investment, investigating the likelihood of these repurchases in low interest rate environments and assessing the effects on firm value. Results confirm that, in recent years, debt-financed repurchases have increased substantially and the probability of debt-financed repurchases increases in the presence of low interest rates. This relationship is especially pronounced in the years following the Global Financial Crisis. Debt-financed repurchases are associated with small reductions in firm investment; however, these reductions are significantly less after adjusting for industry conditions. Finally, there is little evidence that the method of financing repurchases affects firm value nor does it increase a firm's operating performance.

Many recent books and articles have aimed to account for the recent financial crisis. They have exposed the facts, identified the causes, and assigned responsibility. They have proposed solutions to prevent a similar crisis to happen in the future. The debate is still ongoing, revealing a process of History in the making. My dissertation builds on this debate, but it does not contribute to it. I do not try to understand who is responsible for this crisis. I instead try to grasp how responsibility for this crisis was constructed. I explore the production of - and response to - a discourse of accusation. To study accusation discourses, I conducted a media analysis of three main national newspapers: The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and USA Today. I show how a blame game dominated by Democrats participated in the crystallization on Wall Street’s responsibility. To study responses to accusation discourses, I conducted thirty-three interviews in three Wall Street banks from Fall 2008 to Summer 2010. I show that bankers became increasingly defensive over time, while never accepting any personal responsibility for the crisis. Similarly, they reject the label of the “greedy banker.” Overall I argue that the complexity of modern social arrangement loosens the intrinsic connection between responsibility and accountability.